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MODERN

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## THE ROLL OF HONOUR.

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# THE MYSORE GAZETTEER

## VOLUME II

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### HISTORICAL

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#### PART IV

#### CHAPTER XI.

#### MODERN PERIOD.

*From 1565 A. D. to the present time.*

IN Part III of this volume, we brought the history down to the end of the Empire of Vijayanagar. We have seen how before that Empire finally ceased to exist, the South of India had been invaded by the Moghul and the Mahratta and how Mysore had gone so far south as Trichinopoly to assist in the resuscitation of the decaying Hindu Kingdom there. We have also seen how the nations of the West began to settle in the land and how slowly from the position of mere traders they were emerging out into the position of territorial sovereigns. In this Part, the story of the rise and expansion of the kingdom of the Mysore Rajas will be sketched and the circumstances under which Haidar Ali, the famous soldier of fortune, became prominent in the State about the middle of the 18th century brought out in some detail. The attempt of Tipū Sultān, his son and successor, to drive the British out of Southern India will be set down at some length. The restoration of the Hindu dynasty, in 1799, the story of the Regency and Dewanship of Pūrnaiya, the reign of Krishnarāja Wodeyar III, the vicissitudes he underwent in winning back the kingdom

once again to his family and the subsequent history of the State up-to-date, will form the theme of the rest of this Part.

Changes after  
Talikota.  
The Pālegars.

During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the Vijayanagar kings had bestowed on or confirmed to vassal chiefs, bearing various titles, sundry tracts in Mysore, on the condition of payment of tribute and rendering of military service. Those in the northern parts were directly controlled from the Capital. The southern chiefs were placed under a Viceroy whose seat of Government was at Seringapatam. Though the difficulties which followed on the battle of Talikota gave opportunities to ambitious vassals, the Empire held together and allegiance continued to be paid to the representative of the State at Penugonda and to the Viceroy at Seringapatam. After the fall of the IV dynasty of kings, such of the chiefs as had the power gradually broke loose of control and declared their independence. An account of each of these Pālegar families will be found in another volume of this work in connection with the localities which formed their respective estates. (See Volume V). It will be sufficient, therefore, here, to simply mention the more important. Among these were:—in the north, the Nāyaks of Bednur, Basavapatna and Chitaldrug; on the west, the Nāyaks of Balam; in the centre, the Nāyaks of Hagalvādi, and the Gaudas of Yelahanka and Ballapur; on the east, the Gauda of Sugatur; on the south, the Wodeyars of Mysore, Kalale, Ummatur, Yelandur, and others.

Mubammadan  
Inursions.

In 1573, the Bijāpur and Ahmednagar rulers came to a mutual agreement to extend their conquests in such different directions as not to interfere with one another. The Bijāpur line of conquest was to the south. Adōni having been captured, and the western coast regions from Goa down to Barkalur overrun, an attempt was

made in 1577 A.D. on Penugonda. But it found a most gallant defender, as before stated, in Jagadēva Rāya. Every attack was repelled, and the Bijāpur army forced to raise the siege and retire. For this brilliant service Jagadēva was rewarded by a grant of a territory which extended across Mysore, from Bāramahal—the previous possession of his family—on the east, to the Western Ghāts on the west. He fixed his capital at Channapatna, not far away from Bangalore city. Kankanhalli and Nagamangala were two of the most important towns in his territory, which also included Periyapatna on the west and Harnhalli and Bānawar on the north, while a long arm reached even to Hole Honnur. About the same period, Timme Gauda of Sugatur rendered some important military service, for which he received the title of *Chikka Rāya*, with a grant of territory in the southern half of the Kolar district, including Hoskote westwards and Punganur eastwards.

Meanwhile, in the south, the Rājas of Mysore, whose history will be given in detail further on, had been gradually subduing all the lesser chiefs, until in 1610 they gained Seringapatam, ousting the effete viceroy of Vijayanagar, and became the dominant power in that part of the country. In 1630 A.D. they took Channapatna, and Jagadēva Rāya's dominions were thus absorbed into the Mysore State.

Rise of the  
Mysore Rājas.

This brief sketch of the principal changes which took place in the seventy years following the battle of Talikota will serve to show how matters stood, and the several divisions of the country, in 1636 A.D., when the Bijāpur armies successfully invaded Mysore and established the government of that State over the Karnātic Bālaghāt.

Bijāpur is more properly called Vijayapūr, but as a Muhammadan Kingdom, and to distinguish it from

Ādil Shāhi  
Kings of  
Bijāpur.

Vijayanagar, the Muhammadan form of the name has been retained. The founder of the kingdom was Yūsuf Ādil Shāh, after whom his descendants were called the Ādil Shāhi kings. He is stated to have been a son of the Ottoman Sultān Amurath or Murād, and brother of Muhammad the Great, the conqueror of Constantinople. On the accession of the latter to the Turkish throne in 1450 A.D., Yūsuf, by the contrivance of his mother, escaped being put to death with the rest of his brothers, and was by her means conveyed to Persia. Being obliged to fly from Persia at the age of sixteen on account of some suspicion of his birth, he was inveigled to the Bāhmani court and there sold as a slave. He gradually rose into favour, was entrusted with the command of a body of horse and a provincial government. He became the head of the foreign or Shiah party, between which and the Dakhani or Sunni party there was a continual contest for power. When the latter in the reign of Mahmud gained an ascendancy, Yūsuf Ādil retired to his government of Bijāpur, and in 1489 A.D. took the royal title. He opposed the usurper of the Bāhmani kingdom, put down the neighbouring chiefs, who like him were endeavouring to assert their independence, and was successful in meeting the attacks of the Vijayanagar Rāja. The Bāhmani kingdom was eventually partitioned between him and the other new kings that arose about the same time in the Deccan.

Their order of  
succession.

The following is the succession of the Ādil Shāhi  
kings:—

Yūsuf Ādil Shāh	...	1489	Ibrāhīm Ādil Shāh	...	1579
Ismail Ādil Shāh	...	1510	Muhammad Ādil Shāh	...	1626
Mallu Ādil Shāh	...	1534	Ali Ādil Shāh	...	1660
Ibrāhīm Ādil Shāh	...	1555	Sikandar Ādil Shāh	...	1672
Ali Ādil Shāh	...	1557			

Their raids  
into Mysore.

The territory of Bijāpur extended from the Nira to the Tungabhadra, and from the Bhīma to the sea. South



of the Tungabhadra, it owned Adōni and perhaps Nandyāl. The limits of its western boundary were Bankot and cape Ramas. Between this power and Vijayanagar there were constant collisions, until in 1565 A.D. the battle of Talikota abated the power of the latter. In 1577 A.D., as we have already seen, a raid was made into the conquered territory, but repelled by the defence of Jagadēva Rāya at Penugonda. In 1637, a more formidable invasion took place. The Mughals had taken Daulatābād in 1634 A.D., and Aurangazīb was appointed viceroy of the Deccan; but the contests with the Mughal power were shortly brought to a close for the time by the treaty which extinguished the State of Ahmednagar and made Bijāpur tributary to Delhi. The Bijāpur arms were now directed to the South, under Ran-dulha Khān, with whom Shāhji, father of the famous Sivāji, was sent as second in command, with the promise of a *jāgīr* in the territories to be conquered. The course of this invasion was by the open country of Bānkāpūr, Harihar, Basvapatna and Tarikere, up to the woods of Bednur, the whole of which was overrun. The pālegar of Basvapatna or Tarikere is charged with having invited the Bijāpur Sultān to invade the country, in order to revenge himself for an insult received from the pālegar of Ratnagiri or Sira, arising out of an obscene jest and a coarse and filthy practical joke which will not admit of mention. The Bednur chief was besieged in Kavale-durga but bought off the enemy. An attempt was next made on Seringapatam. A breach was effected, but the Mysoreans repulsed the general assault with great slaughter, and the enemy was not only compelled to raise the siege but harassed in his retreat by successive attacks, in which, adds Wilks, the Rāja obtained considerable booty. The invading army retired to the north of Melkote and then turned east. Kempe Gauda, representative of the Yelahanka family, who had by this time grown into a



considerable chieftain, holding possession of Bangalore and Māgadi, with the impregnable hill fortress of Sāvandurga, was next attacked, and Bangalore captured from him in 1638 A.D. The possessions of the Chikka Rāya, namely, Hoskote and all the present Kolar District east of it, were then seized, in 1639 A.D., and the victorious army, passing below the Ghāts, took Vellore and Senji (Gingee). Returning to the tableland, Dodballapur, Sira and all the territory to the south of the Chitaldrug district fell to Bijāpur in 1644 A.D.

A Bijāpur  
Province  
formed—  
Shāhji as  
Governor.

By this time the conquests were complete, and a Province under the designation of Karnātic Bijāpur Bālāghāt was formed out of the districts of Bangalore, Hoskote, Kolar, Dodballapur and Sira; and bestowed as a *jāgīr* on Shāhji, who was also governor of the conquests below the Ghāts, called Karnātic Bijāpur Pāyan-ghāt. He resided at first at Bangalore, but subsequently, when not engaged in military expeditions, lived sometimes at Kolar and sometimes at Dodballapur.

Policy of  
Bijāpur  
kings.

The policy of the invaders, was, while taking possession of the capital town, and administering the revenue of each principality, to grant the ousted chief an estate in some less productive part of his territory. This resulted in bringing under cultivation and attracting population to the more neglected tracts of the country. Thus Basavapatna and its possessions being retained, Tarikere was given to the pālegar; Bangalore was taken but Māgadi left to Kempe Gauda; similarly Hoskōte was taken and Anekal granted; Kolar was taken and Punganūr granted; Sira was taken and Ratnagiri granted.

Some  
vestiges of  
their rule.

Some memorials of their occupation of parts of the State may be noted here. A fine Arabic and Persian

inscription of 1632 A.D., of the reign of Muhammad-Ādil Shāh records the erection of a fort on the hill at the Māsūr-madug tank on the northern frontier of the State in the Shikarpur taluk. (*E.C.* VII, Shikarpur 324.). Other records of the same reign are two dated in 1653, relating to the formation of a tank by the local governor. (*Ibid* Channagiri 43 and 44). In 1648, the local chief of Channarāyapatna built a fort at that place, in the Hassan District, apparently in pursuance of a treaty with Bijāpur. (*E.C.* V, Channarayapatna 158, 160 and 165). At Sira, there is an inscription on the tomb of Malik Riḥan, Subadhar of Sira, who died in 1651. (*E.C.* XII. Sira 66*b*). There are also a couple of records, dated in 1703 and 1712, in the governship of Gulām Alī Khan, in the earlier of which his decision in a dispute between two Hindu gurus as to their respective disciples is referred to. (*E.C.* X, Mulbagal 98 and Kolar 74.)

Shāhji was one of the most prominent characters of his day in India. A sketch of his remarkable career is given in the history of the Bangalore District. Under him, the Mahratta element was largely introduced into the north of Mysore, as well as into the Tanjore and other districts which he conquered below the Ghāts. The Mahrattas, or Mahārattas, in whom we may recognize the descendants of a people that have already appeared more than once in our historical review, after the overthrow of the Yādava kingdom of Dēvagiri, had been subjects first of the Bāhmani and subsequently of the Ahmednagar and Bijāpur kingdoms. Their influence was much increased by a remarkable change introduced, chiefly for sectarian reasons, by Ibrahim Ādil Shāh, the fourth king of Bijāpur, who came to the throne in 1535, A.D. Previous to his reign, all the revenue and official accounts had been kept in Persian. But he recognized Marāṭhi as the official language of the revenue accountants,

Mahrattas  
introduced  
into the State

(See Volume V). It continued a Mughal possession till 1757 A.D.

Some Mughal records.

A few records of the Mughal period may be noted here. Of these, the most interesting is one dated in the 34th year of Aurangazib's reign recording the grant of Dodballapur, which had been taken from Sambhāji by Khāsim Khān, to Sheikh Abdulla Fārukh, a native of Badāyūr near Delhi. (*E.C.* IX Dodballapur 31). In 1696, the big Mosque at Sira was erected. (*E.C.* XII Sira 66*a*). There are, besides, the records of Nawab Durga-Kūli-Khān dated in 1720, (Sira 112) and of Nawab Dilāvar-Khan in 1742 and 1745. (*E.C.* XII Sira 13 and *E.C.* IX Hoskote 19).

The Mysore Rajas.

Our attention will now be directed to the south, to the history of the royal family of Mysore. Their origin is traced to the heroes of a chivalrous exploit, Vijaya and Krishna, two young Kshatriyas of Yādava descent, who, according to tradition, had left Dvāraka, in Gujarāt, with the view of establishing themselves in the south. On arriving at Hadinād, or Hada-nād (called Hadana by Wilks, but now known as Hadinaru), a few miles south east of the present city of Mysore, they learned that the chief of the place had wandered away in a state of mental derangement; and that the neighbouring chief of Kārugahalli, who was of inferior caste, taking advantage of the defenceless condition of the family, had demanded the only daughter of the House in marriage. To this a consent had been given under compulsion, and arrangements unwillingly made for the ceremony. The two brothers espoused the cause of the distressed maiden, and having secreted themselves with some followers, fell upon the chief and his retinue while seated at the banquet, and slew them. Marching at once on Kārugahalli, they surprised it, and returned in triumph to

Hadanād. The girl became the willing bride of Vijaya, who took the title of *Odeyar*, or *Wodeyar*, and assumed the government of Hadanād and Karugahalli, adopting at the same time the religion of the Jangamas, or Lingavantas. The term *Odeyar*, *Wodeyar*, or *Wadeyar*, is the plural and honorific form of *Odeya*, a Kannada word meaning *lord*, *master*. Wilks states that it indicated, at the period of which we are writing, the governor of a small district, generally of thirty-three villages. But we find it applied in the Tamil form *Udaiyar*, to the Chōla kings as far back as the eleventh century, and in the Kannada form *Wodeyar* or *Wadiyar*, to the Vijayanagar kings from the beginning of their rule. *Vader*, a modification of the word, is the title of respect by which Jangama priests are addressed.

Inscriptions, however, tell a different tale. (*E.C.* IV Chamarajnaragar 92 etc.,) These describe the Mysore Rājas as of the Lunar race and add that certain Yādava Princes from Dwaraka, the capital of the epic hero Sri Krishna in Kathiawar, came to the Karnāta country, either led by fancy, according to some accounts, or, according to others, in order to visit their family God Nārāyana on the peak Yadugiri (Melkote) and seeing the beauty of the land and being pleased with it, took up their abode, it is said, in Mahishapura (Mysore) and became the progenitors of the present Royal family. The story connecting the founders of the Royal House with Hadanaru and making it their halting place seems thus a later invention. It has, therefore, to be dismissed as baseless.

The following is the succession of the Mysore Rājas, according to annals compiled in the Palace, Vijaya being here called Yadurāya :—

Succession  
list of kings.

Yadu Rāya, Vijaya	...	...	1399-1423
Hire Bettada Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (1)	...	...	1423-1458
Timma-Rāja Wodeyar (1)	...	...	1458-1478
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Hire Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (II) Ārberal (six-fingered).	1478-1518
Bettada Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (III)	1513-1552
Timma-Rāja Wodeyar (II), Appanna	1552-1571
Bōla Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (IV)	1571-1576
Bettada Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (V)	1576-1578
Rāja-Wodeyar (I)	1578-1617
Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (VI)	1617-1637
Immadi Rāja-Wodeyar (II)	1637-1638
Ranadhīra Kanthirava Narasa-Rāja Wodeyar	1638-1659
Dodda Dēva-Rāja Wodeyar	1659-1672
Chikka-Dēva-Rāja Wodeyar	1672-1704
Kanthirava-Wodeyar, Mūkarasu (The Dumb king, being born deaf and dumb).	1704-1713
Dodda Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar (I)	1713-1731
Chama-Rāja Wodeyar (VII)	1731-1734
Krishnarāja Wodeyar (II)	1734-1766
Nanja-Rāja Wodeyar	1766-1770
Bettada Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (VIII)	1770-1776
Khasa Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar (IX)	1776-1796
Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar (III)	1792-1868
Chāma-Rajendra Wodeyar (X)	1868-1894
Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar (IV)	1895

Yadu Rāja, or Vijaya, is said to have been eleventh in descent from Yaduvīra, of the Ātreya-gōtra and Āsvalāyana-sūtra. But of the early period no annals have been preserved until the time of Chāma-Rāja III. He, during his lifetime, made a partition of his dominions between his three sons. To Timma-Rāja, or Appanna, he gave Hemmanhalli, to Krishna-Rāja he gave Kembala, and to Chāma-Rāja IV, surnamed Bōla or Bald, (owing, it is said, to a stroke of lightning) he gave Mysore. No male heir surviving to either of the elder brothers, the succession was continued in the junior or Mysore branch. With Krishna-Rāja I, the direct descent ended. Chāma-Rāja VII, a member of the Hemmanhalli family, was next elected, but eventually deposed by the *dalavāyi* Deva-Rāj, and the minister Nanja-Rāj. He died a prisoner at Kabbaldurga in 1734 A.D. Chikka or Immadi Krishna-Rāja II, of Kenchengod, a younger and distant branch, was put on the throne in 1734 A.D., and died in 1766. His eldest son, Nanja-Rāja, was directed by Haidar to be installed, but finding him not sufficiently subservient,

Haidar turned him out of the Palace in 1767 A.D., and took all control into his own hands. Nanja-Rāja was strangled in 1770, being nominally succeeded by his brother Chāma-Rāja VIII, who died childless in 1775 A.D. Chāma-Rāja IX, son of Dēvarāj Arasu of Arkotār, a member of the Karugahalli family, was then selected at random by Haidar. He died in 1796, and Tipu appointed no successor. But the real rulers during this period were :—

Haidar Ali Khān	...	...	1761-1782
Tipu Sultān	...	...	1782-1799

On the fall of Seringapatam and death of Tipu, the British Government restored the Hindu Rāj and installed on the throne Krishna-Rāja III, the son of the last-named Chāma-Rāja. The British took over the country from him in 1831, but in 1867, a year before his death, his adoption was recognized of Chāma-Rājendra X (third son of Krishna Arasu, of the Bettadakōte family), who succeeded him, being installed on the throne on attaining his majority in 1881. He died at the close of 1894, and his eldest son, Krishna-Rāja IV, then a minor, was installed as his successor.

At what period Mysore (properly *Mahish-ūru*, buffalo town) acquired that name is uncertain. It is so called with reference to *Mahishāsūra*, the minotaur or buffalo-headed monster whose destruction is the most noted exploit of Chāmundi, under which name the consort of Siva, the tutelary goddess of the Mysore Rājas, is worshipped on the hill near the capital. Reasons have been given for supposing that it may have been known by that designation before the Christian era. The vulgar name of the place when Chāma-Rāja the Bald received it as his portion was Puragadi, but for the last four centuries, Mysore (*Mahishūr*) has been the common name

The name  
"Mysore"

of the fort and town originally erected or repaired by Hire Chāma-Rāja the Bald. (See Vol. of the work, Appendix):

The Early  
Kings.

Of the early Kings, stray inscriptions give a few particulars. Thus, Timma-Rāja is said to have gained the title of *Antembara Ganda* (probably a contraction for *Birud-ant-ambara-ganda* or *champion over those who say they have such and such titles*). Chāmarāja IV defeated in battle Remati-Vēnkata, the general of Rāma-Rāja. He left four sons. Mr. Rice has stated he was succeeded by his eldest son, Bettada Chāma-Rāja. (See *Mysore and Coorg from Inscriptions*, 126). This statement seems hardly correct. Several inscriptions show that Rāja-Wodeyar was the elder of the two. (*M.A.R.* 1902). Literary work also uniformly support this view. (*Ibid*).

Chāmarāja  
the Bald.

The fatal disaster which befell the Vijayanagar empire on the field of Talikota in 1565 diminished to some extent the influence of its viceroy at Seringapatam. We accordingly find Chāma-Rāja the Bald evading the payment of the revenue or tribute due by him, and obtaining permission to erect some works, probably barriers, on the pretext that the wild hogs destroyed the crops and disabled him from paying the tribute. The works were, however, no sooner erected than the collectors of the royal dues were expelled. The Viceroy attempted shortly after to seize Chāma-Rāja while paying his devotions at the temple of Ranganātha, at Seringapatam. But he received warning of the plot and escaped, and continued to evade all the demands of the viceroy with impunity.

Bettada  
Chāma-Rāja  
Wodeyar.

Bettada Chāma-Rāja Wodeyar, who succeeded, was not long on the throne. Though brave, he had no capacity for government, and his brother Rāja-Wodeyar, was shortly raised to the throne by the elders. Many



noble and interesting traits of the characters of the two brothers, and their mutual consideration, are recorded in Wilks. During Rāja-Wodeyar's reign occurred one of the most important events in the annals of the Mysore House, the acquisition of Seringapatam. For what reasons this was effected has been made known already; in 1610 the viceroy, Tirumala-Rāja (Tirumala II) retired to Talkid, where he shortly after died, and on his retirement, Rāja-Wodeyar took possession of Seringapatam and transferred thither the seat of Government. (See *ante*). At the same time, the religion of Vishnu was adopted by the court.

Rāja-Wodeyar extended the possessions of his family over all the south of the present Mysore district, and captured several places towards the north from Jagadēva Rāya. "His rule was remarkable for the rigour and severity which he exercised towards the subordinate Wodeyars, and his indulgence towards the *raiyats*. The Wodeyars were generally dispossessed and kept in confinement, on a scanty allowance, at the seat of Government; and it was the policy of Rāja-Wodeyar to reconcile the *raiyats* to the change by exacting from them no larger sums than they had formerly paid." He is said to have thrashed, according to his vow, one of his brother-Wodeyars on the field of battle with his riding-whip. (*E.C.* III Seringapatam 14 and 64 and T.-Narasipur 63). More important than this, he overcame Tirumala-Rāja, the Vijayanagar Viceroy, and seated himself on the jewelled throne in Seringapatam. (*E.C.* IV Yedatore 17 and 18). Both these statements are confirmed by Chidānanda in his *Munivamsābhyudaya*. Whatever were the means by which this was accomplished, it is undoubted that the Viceroy retired to Talkad in 1610, where he shortly after died and that Rāja-Wodeyar took possession of Seringapatam and made it his capital in place of Mysore. This seems to have been countenanced

Rāja-  
Wodeyar.



by the Vijayanagar sovereign Vēṅkatapati-Rāya, who is said to have confirmed Rāja-Wodeyar in 1612 in the possession of Ummattur and Seringapatam. (*Ibid* T.-Narasipur 62). Another record implies that he considered the Mysore Kings to have a right to the throne of Karnāta. (*Ibid* Nanjangud 198). From 1610 A.D., accordingly, dates the independence of the Mysore Rajas, though it is curious that some of their inscriptions still acknowledge the Vijayanagar supremacy down to as late a period as 1668 (*E.C.* IV, Gundlupet 65) and Narasa-Rāja of Mysore is said to be the right hand of the Vijayanagar sovereign in 1642 A.D. (*E.C.* IV, Yedatore 5). But at the same time, they make numerous grants in their own independent authority, one of the earliest that can be cited being of the date 1612 A.D. (*E.C.* IV Chamarajnagar 200; *E.C.* III Seringapatām 150 dated in 1616 A.D. and 117 dated in 1625 A.D. and T.-Narsipur 13, dated in 1633 A.D.) A likeness of Rāja-Wodeyar is to be seen on a pillar in the Nārāyanaswāmi temple at Melkote. (*M.A.R.* 1917, Para 142).

Chāmarāja-  
Wodeyar VI.

All the sons being dead, Chāma-Rāja, a grandson, succeeded. By the capture of Channapatna, in 1630, he absorbed the territories of Jagadēva Rāya into the Mysore State, and completed what remained of conquest in the south. He pursued the same policy as his predecessor. A copper-plate grant of his dated in 1623 A.D., has been discovered (*M.A.R.* 1908, para 75). He was the author of a Kannada prose version of Vālmiki *Rāmāyana* which is called *Chamarajōkti-vilāsa*. (*Ibid*). He visited Sravana-Belgola and re-established worship there, making grants to the famous temple at the place. (See Chidanandā's *Munivamsa-bhyudya*.)

Immadi Rāja-  
Wodeyar.  
Kantirava-  
Narasa Rāja-  
Wodeyar.

Immadi Rāja-Wodeyar, who came next, was a posthumous son of Rāja-Wodeyar. (*E.C.* IV, Yedatore 17). He

was shortly after his accession poisoned by the *dalavāyi*, and Kantirava Narasa-Rāja succeeded him. He was the son of the gallant and generous Bettada Chāma-Rāja, who had been superseded by his younger brother. The *dalavāyi* thought to find him as forbearing and unambitious as his father. But he had already, when living in obscurity, given evidence of his emulous and chivalric spirit. Hearing of a celebrated champion athlete at Trichinopoly who had overcome all opponents, he went there in disguise, and defeated and slew him in the presence of the whole court. Declining all honours for the feat, he quietly slipped away at night and returned home. Soon after his installation at Mysore, where that ceremony continued to be performed, he learned of the means by which his predecessor had been removed, and had the minister assassinated. The two peons, or foot-soldiers, who did the deed scaled the wall of the minister's court-yard after dark, and lay in wait until he passed across, preceded by a torchbearer. The latter was first killed, and the torch went out. "Who are you?" said the minister. "Your enemy," replied one of the peons, and made a blow. The minister closed with him and threw him down, holding him by the throat. The other peon, in the dark, knew not which was which. "Are you top or bottom?" he asked. "Bottom," gasped the half-strangled peon, on which his companion dealt the fatal blow.

The year after his accession, Kanthirava had to defend Seringapatam against the attack of the Bijāpur forces under Ran-dhullā Khān; and, as already related, succeeded in effectually repelling the invader. He subsequently carried his conquests over many districts to the south, taking Dannāyakankōte, Satyamangala and other places from the Nāyak of Madura. (See *ante* under *Vijayanagar*, Sri-Ranga VI). He was the "right hand" of

Attack of  
Ran-dhullā  
Khān  
repelled.

Sri-Ranga VI, the Vijayanagar king to whom he afforded asylum at Belur. (See *ante* under Sri-Ranga VI; also *E.C.* VI, Yedatore 5). Westwards, Arkalgud and Bettadpur were captured. Northwards, he took Hosur (now in Salem), and at Yelahanka inflicted a severe defeat on Kempe Gauda of Māgadi, levying a large contribution on him. With the booty obtained in his various expeditions, and the heavy tribute which from motives of policy he imposed on the *gaudas* or heads of villages in order to reduce their power, he improved and enlarged the fortifications of Seringapatam, and endowed the principal temples. On his behalf, Dodaiya of Kankanhalli was in charge of Chennarayapatna. He hoped for this place in 1648 A.D. and, apparently by an arrangement with the Bijāpur Sultan, the fort was included in the dominions of Kanthirava. (*E.C.* V, Channarayapatna, 158, 160 and 165). Kanthirava built the Narasimha temple at Seringapatam, where stands a magnificent figure of his. It is beautifully carved and has a life-like majestic appearance. A grant to this temple was made by him in 1650 A.D. (*M.A.R.* 1914-15, para 107). He assumed more of royal state in his court, and was the first to establish a mint, at which were coined the Kanthirāyahuns and fanams called after him, which continued to be the current national money until the Muhammadan usurpation. (See *E.C.* V, Arkalgud 64). He was, according to one inscriptional record, Krishna himself born to give peace to the world when it was troubled by the Turushkas, viz., Muhammadans. (*E.C.* III, Seringapatam 108). He established many *agrarhās*, bestowed numerous gifts, revived the observance of the Ekādasi-Vrata or the eleventh day vow in honor of Lakshmi-Nrisimha like Ambarisha and other Kings of old. (See *E.C.* V, Arkalgud 64; also *E.C.* IV Yedatore 53 and 54; and Heggaddevankote 119 and 120). In his honour, his queen built a *matha* in 1662 at Kalale and made a grant

to it. (*E.C.* III Nanjangud 81). He should have died in or about 1662 A.D.

The Jesuit Missionary Proenaza charges Kanthirava with "barbarity" when he ordered the cutting off of the noses of the opposing forces in his Madura campaign. His description of this war ending as "a war for noses" seems, as already remarked, an exaggerated one. Cutting the nose was a kind of punishment that was reserved in olden days for those who proved treacherous to their sovereign. Tirumala had rebelled against his suzerain and Kanthirava, who was fighting on the latter's behalf, probably inflicted it on the general of the opposing forces, which had hotly pursued the Mysore army on its retreat homewards. (See *ante* under *Vijayanagar*, Sri-Ranga VI. In regard to "cutting of noses" as a punishment, see note at the end of this Volume.)

Kanthirava died without issue, and of the possible claimants to the throne, the most suitable were a grandson and a great-grandson of Bōla Chāmarāja, both about thirty-two years of age. The former, though of a junior branch, was selected, and is known as Dodda-Dēva-Rāja; the latter, afterwards Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, was, with his father, placed in confinement at Hangala. A number of inscriptions dated in 1663 (*E.C.* III Mandya 114, Serinpapatam 13 and T.-Narsipur 23) show that he was in full favour in that year. A grant of his dated in that year to Raghavendra-tīrtha of the Raghavendra-swāmi *matha* of Nanjangud is also known. (See *M.A.R.* 1917, Para 143). It was during Dodda-Dēva-Rāja's reign that Sri-Ranga-Rāya, (III,) the then ruler of Vijayanagar, fled for refuge to Bednur. Sivappa Nāyak, who was the *de facto* ruler of that State, entered upon a considerable range of conquests southwards under pretence of establishing the royal line, and appeared before Seringapatam

Dodda-Dēva-  
Rāja  
Wodeyar.

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Dodda-Dēva  
Rāja  
Wodeyar.

with a large force. He was, however, compelled to retreat, and the Mysore armies before long overran Sakkarepatna, Hassan, and other places, with the Government of which Sri-Ranga-Rāja had been invested by Sivappa Nāyak. The Nāyak of Madura now invaded Mysore, meditating the conquest of the country; but not only was he forced to retire, but Erode and Dhārāpuram yielded to the Mysoreans, who levied heavy contributions on Trichinopoly and other important places. Dodda-Dēva-Rāja was a great friend of the Brāhmins, and was profuse in his grants and donations to them. He is said to have made all the gifts mentioned in the *Hemādri* and other sacred books and established in every important village inns (*chatras*) for the distribution of food. All those who were persecuted by the Mlēchchas (*i.e.*, Muham-madans), who had seized upon the land, flocked to him for protection. (*E.C.* IV, Yedatore 54). Details of his conquests are given in one record. (*E.C.* III, Seringapatam 14). He defeated at Erode, it is said, the army of the lord of Madura, slew Damaralaiyappendra and put to flight Anantōji, etc. (See *ante* under *Vijayanagar*). He died at Chikanāyakanhalli, which, together with Hulyur-durga and Kunigal, had been conquered not long before. The Mysore kingdom at this period extended from Sakkrepatna in the west to Salem in the east, and from Chikanāyakanhalli in the north to Dhārāpuram (Coimbatore District) in the south. The poet Chāmayya (about 1700 A.D.) has, in his work *Dēvarājendra-Sāngatya*, given a description of his reign. (See Narasimhachar's *Karnataka-Kavi-Charite*, II, 535).

Among his titles were *mūru-manneja-ganda*, *para-rāya-bhayankara* and *Hindu-rāya-suratrāna*. We know the last of these is a title claimed by the kings of the first Vijayanagar Dynasty from the very beginning of their rule. Dodda-Dēva-Rāja claims to have obtained the Kingdom by his valour. (Mysore Palace

Plates, dated in 1663 A. D. *M. A. R.* 1908-1909, Para 99).

A grant of his of some interest is the one mentioned in *T.-Narsipur* 23, dated in 1663 A.D., in favour of one Venkatavaradāchārya, a descendant of the Tātāchārya, who was the *guru* of Srī-Rāmārāja. The recipient is described as Brihaspati in the assembly (of the learned), conversant with Logic, acquainted with the *Pada stōma* of Patanjali and the essence of the Vēdānta. He is said to have been celebrated for his generosity, in having given away in marriage a crore of virgins. He evidently was descended in the family of Tātāchārya, to which the two brothers referred to in the reign of Virūpāksha-Rāya (Vijāyanagar Dynasty I) belonged. It is noted in this inscription that the King wrote out the grant himself in the Ārya (*i.e.*, Marāthi or Nāgari) characters in consideration of the donee being his *guru*. To the same Venkatavaradāchārya, another grant (of Tubinkere in Tumkur) was made in 1662 A.D. The Halagere plates, dated in the same year, record a still another grant of this King—of a village named after himself in the Tumkur District. (*E.C.* XII Kunigal 37.) Another grant was made by him in 1664 A.D. as a thank-offering for the victory obtained by him against the Ikkēri Chief (*E.C.* XII Kunigal 46). Two spurious grants pretending to have been issued by him are also known. (See *M.A.R.* 1910-11, Para 129). There is, besides, a grant of his dated in 1665 A.D. (*M.A.R.* 1912, Para 26).

Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, who was passed over at the commencement of the preceding reign, now succeeded, and became one of the most distinguished of the Mysore Rājas. His early youth had been passed at Yelandur where he had formed an intimacy with a Jain named Vishalaksha Pandit. When Chikka-Dēva-Rāja and his father were confined at Hangala, this man continued his

Chikka-Dēva-  
Rāja  
Wodeyar.



attachment and followed them into captivity; not, however, from disinterested affection, but because he had ascertained by his knowledge of the stars that Chikka-Dēva-Rāja would certainly succeed to the throne. Having obtained a promise that if such an event should come to pass he should be made prime minister, he repaired to the capital and industriously circulated in secret among influential persons the prediction of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja's destiny. When, therefore, Dodda-Dēva-Rāja died, every one was prepared to receive the successor decreed by fate. They did not acquiesce quite so readily when the pandit was made minister, but the ability of the Rāja and his adviser soon silenced all murmurs.

Establishment of post.

One of the earliest measures of the new reign was the establishment, for the first time, of a regular post throughout the country. Its functions were, however, conjoined with those usually discharged by a detective police, and information of the private transactions of each district was thus regularly collected and sent to court by the postal officials.

Extension of the Kingdom.

Several conquests were made between 1675 and 1678, the most important of which were those of Madgiri and Midagesi, with some of the intermediate districts; which brought the Mysore frontier, projecting in a long arm northwards, up to that of Karnātic Bijāpur, now disorganized by the raids of Sivāji, consequent on the dispute previously mentioned between him and his half brother Venkōji.

Financial changes.

During the next ten years were introduced a number of financial changes, having for their object, the increase of the revenue. The Rāja was, it is said, unwilling to incur the risk of increasing in a direct manner the estab-

lished proportion of one-sixth share of the crop payable to the crown as land revenue. A number of petty taxes were therefore imposed, of a vexatious character, in order that the *raiyats* might be driven to seek relief and compound for their abolition in voluntarily submitting to an increase of the land assessment. Lands held by the soldiery as part payment for their services were, on grounds of policy, exempted. These measures gave rise to great discontent, which was fanned by the Jangama priests. The opposition was manifested by a determination not to till the land. The *raiyats* deserted their villages and assembled as if to emigrate. The Rāja's resolution was prompt, but sanguinary. He invited all the Jangama priests to meet him at Nanjangud for the purpose of discussing matters. Only four hundred attended. What followed is thus described by Wilks:—

A large pit had been previously prepared in a walled enclosure, connected by a series of squares composed of tent walls with the canopy of audience, at which they were successively received one at a time, and after making their obeisance were desired to retire to a place where, according to custom, they expected to find refreshments prepared at the expense of the Rāja. Expert executioners were in waiting in the square, and every individual in succession was so skilfully beheaded and tumbled into the pit as to give no alarm to those who followed, and the business of the public audience went on without interruption or suspicion. Circular orders had been sent for the destruction, on the same day, of all the Jangam *mutts* (places of residence and worship) in his dominions; and the number reported to have been in consequence destroyed was upwards of seven hundred. This notable achievement was followed by the operations of the troops, which had also been previously combined. Wherever a mob had assembled, a detachment of troops, chiefly cavalry, was collected in the neighbourhood, and prepared to act on one and the same day. The orders were distinct and simple; to charge without parley into the midst of the mob; to cut down in the first selection every man wearing an orange-coloured robe (the peculiar garb of the

Jangama priests); and not to cease acting until the crowds had everywhere dispersed. It may be concluded that the effects of this system of terror left no material difficulties to the final establishment of the new system of revenue.

The chief odium of these massacres, as well as the innovations which had led to them, naturally fell upon the Yelandur Pandit who was at the head of the administration. An impression also got abroad that the Rāja was about to abandon the doctrines of the Jangama cult in which he was brought up, and to revive the ascendancy of the Jain faith. The result was that the minister fell a victim to a plot against his life, and he was assassinated one night while returning from court. The Rāja was much affected at the news and hastened to the death-bed of his faithful counsellor; who, with his dying breath, recommended a Brāhman named Tirumalaiyāṅgar as the most able and honourable man to succeed him as minister.

In the many inscriptions that have been discovered of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja's reign, there is not even a whisper of this opposition or suppression.

Acquisition of  
Bangalore.

These transactions bring us to 1687—the period when the Mughals, having captured Bijāpur, were taking possession of the Karnātic provinces dependent on it and forming the Province of Sira. The agreement as to the sale at this time of Bangalore by Venkōji, to the Mysore Rāja for three lakhs of rupees, its seizure by Khāsīm Khān, the Mughal general, before the entry of the Mysore troops, and the conclusion of the bargain notwithstanding, are related in the account of that district. Bangalore had now become a possession of the Mysore Rāja who assiduously cultivated an alliance with Aurangazīb through general Khāsīm Khān, while at the same time extending his territories in directions that would not interfere with the Mughal operations. Tumkur was taken the same year; then, turning east by way of Hoskōte, the Mysore army descended the Ghāts and subdued a great part of Baramahal and Salem. Between

1690 and 1694, the territories were extended westwards, and all the districts up to the Baba Budan mountains, including Hassan, Banavar, Chikmagalur and Vastara were taken from Bednūr. And by a treaty concluded in 1694 with the chief of that State, all these conquests, except Aigur and Vastara, were retained by Mysore.

The project was next formed of invading the possessions of the Nāyak of Madura, and Trichinopoly was besieged in 1696. But while the strength of the army was engaged before that fortress, a Mahratta force,—marching to the relief of Gingee where Rāma Rāj, the second son of Sivāji, had been long besieged by the Mughals under Zulfikar Khān,—attracted by the hope of plunder, suddenly appeared before Seringapatam. An express was at once sent to the Dalavāyi Kumārāiya directing him to return for the protection of the capital. But as he had made a vow not to appear before his Rāja before he had taken Trichinopoly, he despatched his son Doddaiya in command of a force, which came up by rapid marches, and, by means of a stratagem which seems often to have been resorted to by the Mysore troops, inflicted a total defeat upon the enemy, in which the leaders were slain and the whole of the ordinance, baggage and military stores of every description captured. It was the practice of the Mysore army to perform their night marches by the light of numerous torches, and this was made the foundation of a stratagem effected in the following manner:—

Mahratta  
raid on  
Seringapatam  
repulsed.

In the evening, the dalavāyi sent a small detachment in the direction opposite to that on which he had planned his attack; and in the probable line by which he would move to throw his force into the capital. This detachment was supplied with the requisite number of torches and an equal number of oxen, which were arranged at proper distances, with a flambeau tied to the horns of each in a situation where

they could not be observed by the enemy. At an appointed signal, the torches were lighted and the oxen driven in the concerted direction, so as to indicate the march of the army attempting to force its way through the besiegers by an attack on the flank of their position. So soon as it was perceived that the enemy were making a disposition to receive the army of torches, Doddaiya silently approached their rear, and obtained an easy but most sanguinary victory.

Embassy to  
Mughal  
Emperor's  
Court.

Next year, Khāsīm Khān, the friend of the Rāja at the court of Aurangazīb, died; and Chikka-Dēva-Rāja resolved to send an embassy to the emperor for the purpose of establishing a fresh interest at court, and gaining if possible a recognition of his authority over the newly conquered territories. The embassy, which set out in 1699, found the imperial court at Ahmednagar, and returned in 1700, bringing with it, as is alleged, a new signet from the emperor, bearing the title Jug Deo Rāj, (Jagat-Dēva-Rāja, the sovereign of the world) and permission to sit on an ivory throne. (For the history of this throne, see Volume V).

Administra-  
tive Reforms.

The Rāja now formed various administrative departments, eighteen in number, in imitation of what his ambassadors had observed as the system pursued at the Mughal court. The revenues were realized with great regularity. It was the fixed practice of the Rāja not to break his fast every day until he had deposited two bags (thousands) of *pagodas* in the treasury of reserve funds from cash received from the districts. He had thus, by economy and victories, accumulated a treasure which obtained for him the designation of Navakōti Nārāyana, the lord of nine crores (of *pagodas*).

His political  
ambitions.

Several inscriptions dated in the reign of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja give a few more particulars of his wars. One of the earliest of these, dated in 1675 A.D. *E.C.* IV

*Chamarajnagar* 92) describes him as seated on the throne of the Karnāta dominion like the great Indra and thus enumerates his conquests:—In the east, defeating the Pāndya King Chokka (*i.e.* Chokkanatha Nāyaka of the Madura Nāyak Dynasty) he seized Tripura (*i.e.* Trichinopoly) and Anantapuri; in the west, smiting the Keladi Kings, with the Yavanas (*i.e.* the Muhammadans of Bijāpur), he took Sakalesapura (Saklespur in the present Hassan District) and Arkalgudu (also in the Hassan District); in the north, defeating Ranadullā-Khān (the Bijāpur General) he captured Kētasamudra, with Kandikere, Handalakere, Guler, Tumkur and Honnavalli (all in the Tumkur District). Defeating in battle Mushtika, who was aided by the Morasas (a section of Vokkaligas found in the Kolar District) and Kirātas (*i.e.* Bedars), he captured Jadaganadurga, and changed its name to Chikka-Dēvarāyadurga (now Dēvarāyadurga in the Tumkur District). The (image of the) Varāha or Boar which was lost in the Yavana (*i.e.* Muhammadan) invasion, he brought from Srīmushna (in the South Arcot District) and set it up with devotion in Seringapatam. (This image is now in Mysore City, where it was removed in the time of Pūrnaiya). Another record, dated in 1679 A.D. (*E.C.* III *Seringapatam* 151) gives the same particulars but adds that he also conquered Timmappa Gauda and Rāmappa Gauda and took Madhugiri, Midagesi, Bijjavara and Channarāyadurga (all in the Tumkur District). As the capture of these places is not mentioned in the inscription dated in 1675 A.D., and appears in the one dated in 1679 A.D., it might be inferred that they were taken between 1675 and 1679 A.D. The campaign against Chokkanātha, the Madura Nāyaka, was, according to Wilks, a retaliatory measure. Chokkanātha, it would appear, “had meditated the entire conquest of Mysoor.” As the consequence of the War, Chokkanātha lost Erode and Dhārāpuram and his

country suffered the levy of contributions at the hands of Chikka-Dēva as far as Trichinopoly. This occurred, according to Wilks, in 1667 A.D. Inscriptions of a Dēvarāja-Udaiyar have been found at Satyamangalam and Vinnappalli in Gopichettipalaiyam in the Coimbatore District. These are dated in 1669 and 1671 A.D. (*M.E.R.* 1910, No. 181; V. Rangachari, *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency*, I. 551 and 552) and might be referred to Dodda-Dēva-Rāja Wodeyar, whose reign ended in 1672 A.D. Conceding that these records indicate an earlier occupation of parts of the Coimbatore country by the Wodeyars of Mysore—probably in the reign of Dodda-Dēva-Rāja—the fact that the war against Chokkanatha is referred to in Chikka-Dēva's record dated in 1675 A.D. and repeated in another dated in 1679, as quoted above, shows that the campaign should have been undertaken prior to 1675 A.D. As Chikka-Dēva ascended the throne in 1672, the event should have occurred between 1672 and 1675 A.D. Wilks' date of 1667 A.D., seems therefore rather too early and has to be given up. (See in this connection R. Satyanātha Aiyar, *History of the Nāyaks of Madura*, 161-163, 172-174). In conformity with this view is the fact that Chikka-Deva's inscriptions dated in 1673 and 1676 A.D., have been found in the Coimbatore country. This indicates that he was extending his conquests to the South at the expense of the Nāyak ruler of Madura. (Sewell, *List of Antiquities* I, 194; Rangachari, *Inscriptions of the Madras Presidency* I, 527; *M.E.R.* 1910, 209 of 1909). What led to this extension it is not by any means clear. It has been suggested by Mr. Sathyanatha Aiyar that about the time that Chikka-Dēva-Rāja ascended the throne, the Chiefs of Madura and Tanjore combined with the Sultān of Bijāpur and a few of the local chiefs and put up a fight against him on behalf of Srī-Ranga Rāya III, the Vijayanagar Emperor. A battle was fought at Erode, but the



combined allies were defeated and Srī-Ranga-Rāya III sought refuge with the chief of Ikkēri. This chief, after an unsuccessful attempt at forming an alliance with Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, took up the cause of Srī-Ranga-Rāya III and invaded Mysore. He was defeated at Hassan and Sakkarepatna, which Chikka-Dēva annexed to his own dominions. The defeats which he, Chikka-Dēva, inflicted on his enemies at Erode, Hassan and Sakkarepatna are referred to in some of his inscriptions already quoted. (*E.C.* III Seringapatam 151; Chamarajnagar 92 and Seringapatam 14). As we have seen, *Seringapatam* 151 refers to the defeat of the Pāndya King Chokka and the capture of Tripura (*i.e.* Trichinopoly) and Anantapuri and to his fighting the Keladi chief and the Muhanmadans and his conquest of Saklespur and Arkalgud. *Seringapatam* 14 which is dated in 1780 A.D., five years later than *Seringapatam* 115, gives fuller particulars of the victories over Chokkanātha of Madura and the Keladi chief. It says that Chikka-Dēva “defeated the army of the Lord of Madura in the Erodu (Erode) country, slew Damaralaiyyapendra, and put to flight Anantoji. He captured the elephant named *Kulasēkhara*, and closely besieging them, took by assault Chamballi-pura (Samhalli in the Bhavāni Taluk), Omaluru (Omalur in the Salem District) and Dhārāpuram (in the Coimbatore District). Conquering the army of the Keladi Kings, he captured the elephant called *Gangādhara* and took the impregnable fortresses of Hasana (Hassan) and Sakkarepatna.” These two wars of Chikka-Dēva enabled him not only to consolidate his position but also to ward off all blows both from the north and the south.

*Seringapatam* 14 (dated in 1686 A.D.) also states that Chikka-Dēva defeated the Mahrāttas from Panchavati (Nāsik) and killed (in battle) Dadaji, their leader and cut off the limbs and noses of Jaitaji and Jasavanta. (See Appendix at the end of this Volume). He also



reduced to abject terror Sambhu (*i.e.* Sāmbhāji, son of Sivāji), Ikkēri Basava (Basavappa Nāyak, adopted son of Channammaji, widow and successor of Sōmasēkhara-Nāyak) and Ekōji (*i.e.*, Venkōji, brother of Sivāji, who had seized Tanjore). A later inscription—*Seringupatam* 64 dated in 1722—states that Chikka-Dēva conquered the Lord of Madura (*i.e.* the Nāyak King Chokkanātha) and withstood Sivāji at the time when the rulers of the countries around Agra, Delbi and Bhāgya-nagara (Haidarabad) were falling down before him and presenting tribute. He thus acquired the title of *Apratima-vīra* (or unrivalled hero) which is one of the distinctive epithets of the Mysore *Mahārājas*. The same record sums up his achievements by adding that he defeated attacks from every point of the compass made by *Turukas* (Muhammadans), *Morasas* (Telugu Vokkaligas) of the Kolar and surrounding country to the north-east, *Areyas* (Mahrāttas), *Tigulas* (Tamils), *Kodagas* (Coorgs) and *Malegas* (hill tribes in the West), besides *Kutupu-shāh* (of Golkonda) and *Ādil Shāh* (of Bijāpur). What led to such an unprecedented combination against him as is mentioned in certain of his records is not quite clear. It is possible that he was a competitor for the vacant throne of the Vijayanagar King (Sri-Ranga-Rāya III). Sivāji appears to have been fired with that ambition (see Sathyanātha Iyer, *Nāyaks of Madura*, 176-7, *f. n.* 71) and the claim put forward for Chikka-Dēva that he refused to yield to him while all other rulers (around Agra, Delhi and Haidarabad) had done so, shows that he hotly disputed Sivāji's attempt at cherishing any such idea. As a matter of fact, the description of Chikka-Dēva (in Chamarajnagar 92 dated in 1675 A.D.) as seated on the throne of the Karnāta dominion like the great Indra and his subsequent despatch of an embassy to the Mughal emperor in 1700 A.D. and his obtaining from him a new signet bearing the title of

*Jaga-Dēva-Rāya*, the sovereign of the world, and permission to sit on his ivory throne indicate the success—partial, it may be—that attended his efforts in the same direction. Entirely in accordance with this political ambition of Chikka-Dēva is the ascription to him of the titles of the Vijayanagar king in Tirumalārya's *Chikkadēvarājaviṣaya* and *Apratima-vīra-Chārīta*:—*Srīmān Mahārājādhirāja-Rājaparamēśvara Praudha-Pratāpa-Apratima-ṣīranarapati Srī-Chikkadēvarāja-Mahārāja* of which the first part is one connected with the Vijayanagar kings from the time of Dēva-Rāya I. Such an ascription would be meaningless except on the basis that the sovereign to whom they are given was held to be the successor of the last representative of the Vijayanagar dynasty to which they belonged. That this ascription is not peculiar to Tirumalārya is clear from the fact that it occurs in a slightly varied form in the works of Chikupādhyāya, another poet of Chikka-Dēva's reign. His wording is as follows:—*Rājādhirāja-Rājaparamēśvara-pratima-Praudha-Pratāpa*, etc., etc. (See Chikupādhyāya's *Kamalāchala mahātmya*). The same terminology is adopted by Mallikārjuna in his *Srī-Ranga-mahātmya*.

Chikka-Dēva-Rāja encouraged learning and literary pursuits. (See Tirumalārya's *Apratima-vīra-charīta*). There flourished at his Court the following among other poets and poetesses:—Tirumalārya (also known as Tirumalaiyengar); Singārya, his brother; Chikkupādhyāya; Timmakavi; Mallikārjuna; Vēnugōpāla-Varaprasāda; Mallarasa; Srungāramma and Honnamma. The works of these writers have added lustre to Kannada literature as a whole. Of these Tirumalārya stands pre-eminently high, his brother Singārya coming next after him. Tirumalārya was, as we have seen, Chikka-Dēva's minister as well. It is said that Tirumalārya's father,

Chikka-Dēva-Rāja as a literary patron.

Alaga-Singārya was the Paurānika of Chikka-Dēva's father Dodda-Dēva-Rāja and that Tirumalārya and Chikka-Dēva studied together and in after life became Chikka-Dēva's minister. Born in 1645, he is said to have died in 1706, surviving his sovereign but two years. He was a pious Śrī-Vaishnava and was wholly devoted to his master. All his known works bear his sovereign's name or title:—*Apratima-vīra-charita*, an original work on Kannada prosody based on Sānskrit models, wherein every descriptive example is a stanza in praise of *Chikka-Dēva*; *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Vijaya*, a *champu* work devoted to the history of the kings of Mysore, of great value to the historical student; *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Vamsāvali*, a prose work of great literary merit, also devoted to the history of Mysore kings; and *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Sataka*, a centum in praise of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, even a single copy of which has not yet been discovered. Chikkupādhyāya, whose real name was Lakshmipathi, is perhaps the most voluminous writer known in Kannada. A Śrī-Vaishnava by faith, belonging to Terakanāmbi, several of his known works, which number some twenty-eight, deal with topics connected with that religion. In some of these, he gives considerable space to Chikka-Dēva's pedigree and conquests. Among the latter, he mentions how, in the east, Chikka-Dēva inflicted a defeat on Chokkalinga (*i.e.*, Chokkanātha) and how he captured his several horses and added to his territories Paramati, Malali, Muttamjatti, Sendamangala, Ariyalur, Toreyur, Anantagiri, Kunturu, Anduru and other places. He also refers to the campaign against the Ikkēri chief and to his conquest of Arkalgud, Angadi, Nuggihalli, Saklesapura and Belur. In the north, he is said to have taken Honnali, Kandikere, Bhutipura, Handanakere, Jadakanagiri, Tumkur, Maddagiri-durga, Channarāya-durga, Midigēsi, Holavanahalli. In the south, he is said to have conquered the Todavanād, or Toda country, which may be taken to

be the Nilgiris. He states that he wrote several of his works at the special request of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja. One of these is named *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Srīngara-padagalu*. Another protege of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja was Timmakavi, the author among other works, of *Yādavagiri Mahātmya*. In this work, the campaigns of Chikka-Dēva are referred to at some length. The fights against Chokkalinga-Nāyaka of Madura; Rāmachandra Nāyaka of Sendamangala, Venkatanāyaka of Velapuri (Belur); and Narasanāyaka of Jadakanadurga are also mentioned. Chikkupādhyāya not only himself composed many works but also induced a number of his contemporaries to write. Among the latter are especially Mallarasa and Mallikārjuna. Timmakavi was probably the author of *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Vamsavali*, which Mr. Narasimhachār sets down to a poet of the name of Vēnugōpālavaraprasāda, which evidently, as he himself suspects, is merely descriptive of the source from which the poet obtained his poetic inspiration. In this work, we have a brief outline of the pedigree of the Mysore kings who were the forbears of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja. (R. Narasimhachār, *Karnataka-Kavi-Charite*, II. 506-7). Chidānanda Kavi, the author of *Munivamsā-bhyudaya*, was another poet who lived and wrote in Chikka-Dēva's reign. He gives the king's pedigree at some length and addresses him in his work. In his account of Mysore Kings, he gives some interesting details which are confirmed by what is contained in the inscriptions of the period. According to him, Chikka-Dēva-Rāja bore the title of *Srīngāra Karnāṭaka Chakri* (i.e., Emperor of the beautiful Karnāṭaka country). Singārya, brother of Tirumālārya, wrote *Mitravindā-Gōvinda*, the only drama known to Kannada literature. It is in four acts and is based on Srī Harsha Dēva's *Ratnāvali*, though it departs from the original in certain respects. Singārya appears to have been a poet at Chikka-Dēva's court. Among the poetesses of the reign are Honnamma and Srungāramma.

Of these, the former was apparently in the service of queen Dēvajāmmanni of Yelandur. She was held in high esteem for her poetic talents by Singārya, under whose inspiration she wrote a poem called *Hadi-badeya-Dharma*. This treats of the duties of a virtuous wife, with examples taken from epic sources. Unlike this poetess, Srungāramma, the other poetess, was a Brāhman, though both were ardent Srī-Vaishnavas. Srungāramma calls herself "the little daughter" of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, which shows that she had had his patronage. She wrote a poem *Padmini Kalyāna*, which is devoted to a description of the marriage of Srīnivāsa, the deity at Tirupati, with Padmini. But, perhaps, the greatest poet of Chikka-Dēva's reign was Lakshmīsa, the author *Jaimini-Bhārata*. He belonged to Devanur, in Kadur District, just beyond the territorial limits of Chikka-Dēva's kingdom. Despite this fact, it has been admitted that he belonged to the Karnāṭaka country and that his work has been accorded the highest place in Kannada literature, ancient or modern. Its popularity is unique among all classes of Kannada readers and its fame has spread far and wide throughout the Kannada speaking land. As has been remarked, there is hardly a Kannada knowing man who has not read it or heard it read. Not only did Chikka-Dēva-Rāja prove himself a great patron of literary talent, but was also himself an author of merit in Sānskrit and Kannada. Among his works are:—*Chikka-Dēva-Rāja-Binnappa*; *Gīta-Gōpāla*; *Bhāgavata*; *Sēshadharmā*; and *Bhārata*. Of these, the first mentioned is a prose work conceived in the classical (Hala-Kannada) style. As its name indicates, it consists of thirty 'petitions' addressed by the royal author to God Nārāyaṇaswāmi of the Melkōte temple whom he styles his 'family deity' (*Kula-Daiva*). Chikka-Dēva was an ardent Srī-Vaishnava and in these thirty appeals he sets out the essence of that religious faith. Parts of this work are of a self-revelatory

character and as such are of great interest. The eternal problems of life and death are discussed in it in a moving manner. (See for example the Ninth Binnappa). It is an intensely human document, with an appeal which will never fail. In its preliminary portion, the royal poet gives an interesting account of his conquests, which, in the main, is in accord with what the inscrip-tional records, above quoted, furnish us with. The work entitled *Bhāgavata* is also known as *Chikka-Dēva-Rājā-Sakti-Vilāsa*. It is a Kannada prose commentary on the well-known Sānskrit work. Similarly, the *Bhārata* is a Kannada prose commentary on the great epic, though it only treats of that work from the *Sāntiparva* onwards. *Sēshadharmā* is also a Kannada prose commentary on the Sānskrit work of the same name. The *Gīta-Gōpāla* is modelled on Jaya-Dēva's famous work *Gīta-Gōvinda* and is replete with devotional hymns. The author claims to suggest an easy way to win salvation. He says that through songs he points the way to salvation much like the physician who gives medicine in milk to the sickman who dislikes milk. In this work we have a more elaborate description of Chikka-Dēva's conquests. As a great many of the verses appearing in this part of the work also figure in two of Tirumalārya's works (*Apratima-vīra-Charita* and *Chikka-Dēva-Rāya-Charita*), it has created the doubt that this might have been written by Tirumalārya and published in the name of his sovereign. There is, however, this to be said against this view, that royal authors have sometimes borrowed verses from the works of contemporary poets to describe their own conquests. Krishna-Dēva-Rāya of the III Vijayanagar dynasty in writing his *Āmuktamālyada* has, for example, borrowed freely from the introductory part of Allasani Peddana's work. Though the same doubt as to the authorship of the *Āmuktamālyada* has been expressed, the balance of opinion has been in favour of the view that

the work is that of *Krishna-Dēva-Rāya* and not Peddanārya. There is also the further fact that the *Gīta-Gōpāla* contains matter which is far too personal to the king to have been written by another hand, unless we can concede that the minister was too well acquainted with his sovereign's inner religious feelings to pour himself forth as he would himself have done. *Sachchhūdrāchārānirṇaya* is another work of Chikka-Dēva which has come down to us. (*M.A.R.* 1908-1909, Para 101; also R. Narasimhachār, *Karnāṭaka-Kavi-Charite* II. 455 *et seq.*)

His religious  
faith.

As might be inferred, Chikka-Dēva-Rāja was an ardent *Srī-Vaishnava*. His works breathe the spirit of a true devotee, who put his faith in the feet of *Srī-Nārāyaṇa-svāmi* of Melkōte. He gave prominence to the *Vajra-makuta* (or *Vaira-mudi*) festival at this place and inaugurated the *Gajēndra* festival there. (*M.A.R.* 1912, Para 127). Though he was a *Vaishnava*, he followed the *Vīrasaiva* (sometimes called *Jangama*) tenets as well, as his forefathers did and as his successors have always done. He was a tolerant prince though a pious *Vaishnava*; he built a pond at *Sravaṇa-Belgōla*, apparently for the use of Jain pilgrims frequenting the place. According to an inscription in the *mantapa* of the pond, it appears to have been built by him in 1680 A.D. *Chidānanda* says in his *Munivamsābhyudaya* that Chikka-Dēva-Rāja induced his brother *Dēva-Rāja*, to grant a village to the Belgola temple.

His grants.

Among Chikka-Deva's grants are the following :—

(1) The *Chamarajnagar* grant, dated in 1675 A.D., composed by *Tirumalārya*, recording a gift of two villages in the *Terakanāmbi* country, in favour of *Krishna-Yajvā*, who performed on the king's behalf the *srāddha* ceremony at *Gaya* (on or the villages were granted on the anniversary of) the death of the king's father, they being renamed Chikka-Dēva-



Rāyapura and Krishnāpura (*E.C. IV Chamarajnagar* 92; *M.A.R.* 1908-1909, para 100).

(2) The Melkote Rāmānujāchārya shrine grant, dated in 1678-9 A.D., in favour of Alahasingar Iyengar for reciting the *Mahābhārata*. (*E.C. III Seringapatam* 94).

(3) The Seringapatam copper-plate grant, dated in 1686 A.D. (*E.C. III Seringapatam* 14) in favour of the Kōdanda-rāma temple he built at Seringapatam.

(4) The Dēvanagara copper-plates, dated in 1674 A.D., recording the grant of two *agrahāras*, both situated in Dēvanagara; named after his father and bestowed in his name to learned men of the three sects of Brāhmins—Smārta, Sri-Vaishnava and Mādhva (*M.A.R.* 1912, Para 127.) The grant was composed by Rāmāyanam Tirumalārya.

(5) The Ullamballi copper-plate grant, dated in 1673, recording a grant in favour of Rudramunidēvārādhya of Revanārādhya *matha* at Hullamballi. (*M.A.R.* 1920, Para 96).

(6) The Garani copper-plate grant, dated in 1680, of which only a copy is forthcoming, recording the grant of Garani, renamed Chikkadēvarāyapura, as an *agrahāra*. (*M.A.R.* 1918 Para 130.)

Seringapatam became a flourishing City during Chikka-Dēva-Rāja's reign. There is a high flown description of it in an inscription dated in 1685 A.D. (*E.C. III Malvalli* 61). "With plum, jack, cocoanut, plantain, lime, orange, fig and other fruit trees, with house as high as hills, was the city filled; and with cows and Brāhmins, with trees and plants, with temples, with fine elephants like Airāvata, with horses neighing like the thunder of the clouds, with splendid chariots and foot-soldiers." Such was "the beautiful city Srīranga, having splendid gateways, an ornament to the lady-earth, surrounded by the Cauvery, filled with priests, poets, wise men and ministers." Another town of some importance was Malvalli, which had, we are told, a "fort with a deep moat." It was, it is recorded, filled with men learned in the Vēdānta, Sruti, Smṛiti and Dharma-Sāstra.

His capital,  
Seringa-  
patam, in the  
17th century.

Apparently it was a great intellectual centre, if not actually a seat of learning. At this place, Chikka-Dēva made in 1685 A.D. a magnificent pond for the use of the people. The political centre of gravity so far as Mysore was concerned had distinctly shifted from the West—from Banavāsi, Dorasamudra, Araga, etc, to Seringapatam, which during the next hundred years became the object of attraction to every aspiring power in India.

Domestic life,  
etc.

Chikka-Dēva-Rāja left an younger brother of the name of Kanthīrava and a son by his queen Dēvamāmba named Kanthīrava Narasa-Rāja II. The latter succeeded him. (See below). The former is mentioned in inscriptions, (*E.C. III Seringapatam* 64 etc). He does not appear to have ruled. Two of his grants are, however, known. One of these is dated in 1672 A.D. (*E.C. III Malvalli* 69) which has been wrongly assigned by Mr. Rice to king Kanthīrava-Narasa II, and the other is dated in 1676 A.D. (*E.C. III T.-Narsipur* 96). Personally Chikka-Dēva-Rāja is portrayed to us, both in inscriptions and in literary poems, as an intensely human personage. *Seringapatam* 14 calls him "the generous Chikka-Dēvēndra" who gave "pleasure like Upēndra." He was apparently profuse in his gifts. (His many gifts to Brāhmans seem to confirm this statement). His giving away the "sixteen great gifts" is referred to in the same inscription with evident approbation. He appears to have led his armies in person and to have won great fame both as a leader and as a soldier. His enemies are said to have sunk down in terror and rolled on the ground at sight of him, "as if he were himself the terrible Narasimha." This, of course, is hyperbolic language, but there is no doubt that he left on his contemporaries the impress of a born general. His gallantry towards Akkāreddy, whom he

caught alive on the field of battle at Erode and let off with mercy, is specially praised in one poem in his honour. He is described as fond of his capital city and as taking a delight in rambling through it. As regards his encouragement of the learned, the large array of poets and authors who flourished in his reign is proof positive of a highly developed literary taste in him. A poet in eulogizing his patronage of learned men states that he treated them like the lover of a parrot, who not only found a cage for it, but also the milk and fruits to feed and protect it from starvation. He is said to have given away houses and riches to learned men and to have protected them by encouraging learning among them. If the poet who supplies us all this information may be believed—his references to historical incidents have been fully confirmed by inscriptions and known facts of history—then, we should have to allow that Chikka-Dēva-Rāja was a brilliant conversationalist as well. To talk with him once, was, in this poet's opinion, to wish for more talks with him; and to him who had not conversed with him even once, the desire was to find an opportunity to do so. "If the nectar is only known by the name," he asks, "is it possible not to yearn for a drop of it? When you have had a taste of it, is it possible not to hunger for it the more?" Such was apparently Chikka-Dēva's power of attraction, at least to the wise and the learned in his dominions. (See V. Prabhākara Sāstri, *Chikka-Dēva-Rāja* in *Chātupadyamananjari*, 46-54).

A wholly distorted picture of Chikka-Dēva is given by Wilks on the basis of the Mss. records at his disposal. The inscriptional records give an account of him, which is fully borne out by the literary works of his own times. A just portrayal of his greatness as a conqueror, ruler, *literateur* and humble seeker after the truth is not now impossible with the materials before us. Without doubt

An estimate  
of Chikka-  
Dēva-Rāja's  
rule.

he was the first ruler of Mysore to look beyond the immediate pre-occupations of the hour. His wide conquests and high political ambitions show this unmistakably. His internal administration was rendered efficient and remodelled by him to suit the growing needs of his kingdom. He was not an innovator of the kind Tipu was; he was severely practical, sensible and far seeing in his reforms. His financial changes have been adversely commented upon by Wilks but it would be wholly uncritical to say that he invented petty imposts of a vexatious character to get more than the usual "one-sixth" prescribed by Manu. As we know, imposts of this nature had long been in force in the country, since the ancient days (Ganga, Chōla and Vijayanagar times *cf.* tax on Jangamas and tax on Jiyars in the time of Vijayanagar King Narasimha, see *E.C.* IV Gundlupet 67, dated in 1505) and all that Chikka-Dēva appears to have done is to enforce their payment with regularity and precision. His exemption of the soldiery from such taxation was one not only based on grounds of policy but also in keeping with established custom. The story of the "sanguinary and treacherous" disposal of his Jangama opponents seems to rest on the statement of authorities which have not so far been, in the least, confirmed either by inscriptional or literary evidence. The whole personal history of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja seems to be against his participation in this crime, if it was at all perpetrated. He was a devout Saivite; according to one well-known contemporary poem, which describes his conquests and his character, (see V. Prabhākara Sāstri, *l.c.*, 47) he was ever engaged in the worship of the Jangamas (*Jangamār chanamu . . . . . nējāna Sēyu*) and always busied himself in the discussion of the excellent *Sivāchāra* doctrine. (*Sajjana suddhamagu Sivāchāra darsana munē Sarasu derugu.*) The "system of terror" referred to by Wilks may have been part of

the working policy of the minister, the Yelandūr Pandit, to which he fell a victim. The baseless character of the rumour that the king was about to give up the Jangama faith and revive the Jain religion indicates to some extent the untrustworthy nature of the accusations preferred against the unhappy minister and his sovereign. Whatever may be said against the minister—his religion was evidently anathema to some—there is nothing in the shape of credible evidence against the king himself in this nefarious affair. It is remarkable that there is to-day no trace of a tradition even of the existence at Yelandūr of this minister of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja. It certainly stands to the credit of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja that at a time when South India was breaking-up he had the presence of mind not only to strengthen his position in his own kingdom but also to look round and see what he could to expand its limits. Haidar, who had been brought up in the traditions of Nanjarāja, the Dalavāyi, failed to keep his ambition under control. If he had followed the policy of Chikka-Dēva and had stuck to the practical issue before him, he would have gained rather than lost in realizing his dream of a Greater Mysore. Chikka-Dēva was also unfortunate in his successors, who, weak and incapable, prepared the way first for the Dalavāyi brothers and then for Haidar and his even more ambitious son Tipu.

Chikka-Dēva-Rāja died in 1704, at the advanced age of 76, after a youth spent in exile, followed by an eventful reign of more than thirty-one years; during which, amid the convulsions and revolutions which prevailed throughout the Deccan and the Karnātic, a secure and prosperous State had been established, extending from Palni and Ānamalai in the south to Midagēsi in the north, and from near Karnātic-ghur in the Bara-mahal in the east to the borders of Coorg and Balam in the west.

Death of  
Chikka-Dēva-  
Rāja, 1704  
A.D.

Kanthirava-  
Narasa-Rāja,  
II 1704-1713  
A.D.

Kanthirava-Narasa-Rāja, the son of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, was born deaf and dumb, and thence called Mūkarasu. But, through the influence of Tirumalaiyangār, he succeeded to the throne. During his reign, the Dalavāyi Kanthirava attempted to reduce Chikballapur, but lost his life in the enterprise. His son, Basava-Rāja, appears to have continued the siege and succeeded in levying tribute. An inscription of Kanthirava's, dated in 1705 A.D., states that the temple of Venkatēsvara in the Bangalore Fort was built by Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, his father, and that he made a grant to it. (*M.A.R. E.C. IX* Bangalore 118). There are hardly any other inscriptions of his time, though there are a few *nirūps* (orders) dated between 1707-1711. (*M.A.R.* 1910-11, Para 131).

Dodda-  
Krishna-Rāja  
Wodeyar I,  
1718-1781  
A.D.

Dodda-Krishna-Rāja, son of the dumb king, next came to the throne. At this time, a change was made in the Government of Sira, whereby the jurisdiction of Sadat-ullā Khān, who had hitherto governed the whole of Karnātic Bijāpur, was confined to the Payanghāt, and he was called Nawāb of Arcot; while a separate officer, Amīn Khān, styled Nawāb of Sira, was appointed to the charge of the Balaghāt, situated on the tableland of Mysore. Sadat-ullā Khān aware of the riches accumulated at Mysore resented the removal of that State from his control, and formed a combination with the Pathan Nawābs of Cuddapah, Kurnool and Savanūr, and the Mahratta chief of Gooty, to seize upon it. Amīn Khān resolved to be beforehand, and marched against the Mysore Army. But the allies came up with him, and they ultimately agreed to joint action, of which Sadat-ullā was to be the leader. The Mysore Rāja was glad to buy off this formidable confederacy, and Sadat-ullā received a crore of rupees. He accounted, however, for only 72 lakhs, which he divided in the proportion of 12 lakhs to each of the allies, pocketing the rest. This

affair led to further exactions. Two years after, the Mahrattas appeared before Seringapatam and levied a contribution. In order to replenish these drains upon the treasury, an attack was made upon Kempe Gauda, the chief of Māgadi, who was taken prisoner; and Sāvan-durga, with the accumulated plunder of two hundred years, fell to Mysore.

Inscriptions of his reign dated from 1719-1727 A.D. have been found. (*E.C.* III T.-Narsipur 18, 59, 68; Seringapatam 79, 64, 100 and Mysore 10). The Mēlkote Kanchi-matha copper-plates record a grant of this king in favour of god Varadarāja at Conjeeveram. (*E.C.* III Seringapatam 100 dated in 1724). He established an *agrahāra* at Kālale, called Apratima-Krishnarāja-Samudra and granted it to Brāhmins. The grant registering this gift is as voluminous as Seringapatam 64 and its date may be 1722 A.D., its composer being Ramāyanam Tirumalārya, who was the author of *Seringapatam* 64 and 100. (*M.A.R.* 1910-11, Para 132).

Dodda-Krishna-Rāja, however, proved himself a weak ruler and his ministers secured their own authority by affected humility. Under these circumstances, all power fell into the hands of the ministers, and they sought only to perpetuate their authority by placing pageant Rājas on the throne.

Chāma-Rāja, of the Hemanhalli family, was selected as a fit person to succeed the last Rāja; while the three chief offices in the State, those of *Dalavāyi* or head of the Army, *Sarvādhikāri* or head of finance and revenue, and *Pradhāna* or Privy Councillor, were held by Dēva-Rāja, who was Dalavāyi, and Nanja-Rāja, his cousin, who combined in himself the other two offices. Chāma-Rāja managed to effect a revolution and displace these two; but they were imprudently left at large, while the new administration, by ill-advised measures of economy,

Chama-Rāja  
Wodeyar VII,  
1731-1734  
A.D.



became so unpopular that Dēva-Rāja and Nanja-Rāja found means to recover their power. The Rāja and his wife were seized and sent prisoners to Kabbāldurga, the deadly climate of which they did not long survive.

Chikka-  
Krishna-Rāja  
Wodeyar II,  
1734-1766  
A.D.

Chamarāja VII died in 1734. A younger brother of his named Venkate-Arasu, was passed over as having too much talent to be subservient; and a child of five years of a distant branch, (Kenchangōd), was placed on the throne. He is known to history as Chikka-Krishna-Rāja. He ruled from 1734-1766. The administration continued as before, except that Venkatapati was appointed to the office of Pradhāna, while Nanja-Rāja, as Sarvādhikāri, was the head of the Government. Nanja-Rāja founded in 1741 the *agrahāra* of Nanjaraja-Samudra at Kannambadi. (*E.C.* IV, Yedatore 58). Judging from this grant and from the gifts he made to the temples, he should have been a pious man, with a conscience. (See *M.A.R.* 1912, para 114). He died after six years, refunding at the approach of death eight lakhs of rupees, which he estimated as the amount he had improperly acquired. He also left a warning against employing the person who was his actual successor, Nanja-Rāja, the younger brother of Dēva-Rāja, and surnamed Karachūri. (*Kara*, hand, *Chūri*, dagger; equivalent to the English expression "a word and a blow.") Nor was the warning a needless one. For, during the thirty-two years that Chikka-Krishna-Rāja ruled, momentous events occurred. It saw the fall of the Dalavais, the rise of Haidar and the coming into power of the English in India, whose first victory at Arcot was gained during the time that Chikka-Krishna-Rāja was sovereign at Mysore. Some idea of the position occupied, about 1760, by Haidar may be had from the fact that Chikka-Krishna-Rāja granted to him in that year, a village, in return for cash paid, in order that Haidar might make a gift of it to the tomb of Satar

Masūd Khādri at Tonnūr, to provide for feeding the poor. (*E.C.* IV Krishnarajpete 18—20). A grant of Chikka-Krishna-Rāja, dated in 1761, is the last so far known of him from inscriptions. (*E.C.* III Nanjangud 15).

The Nawābs of Arcot continued to eye with jealousy the rights of the Nawābs of Sira to receive tribute from the rich State of Mysore. The weakness of Tahir Khān, now in power at Sira, led Dōst Alī Khān, the Governor at Arcot, to despatch a powerful and well-appointed army to exact from Seringapatam the largest contribution that had ever been obtained from it. Deva-Rāja, though no longer young, advanced to meet this invasion. The chiefs on both sides were reconnoitring at Kailancha on the Arkāvati, a few miles east off Channapatna, when the two Musalman chiefs, not heeding, came too far. Dēva-Rāja skilfully cut off their retreat, and falling upon them with his party, they were both slain after a brave resistance. Dēva-Rāja followed up the blow, and attacked the Musalman camp with his whole army. They were completely surprised and overthrown, fleeing in confusion below the Ghāts, while the victor returned in triumph to Seringapatam.

Attack of  
Nawab of  
Arcōt  
repulsed.

In 1746, Nanja-Rāja commanded an expedition into the Coimbatore country against the Pālegār of Dhārāpuram; Dēva-Rāja, the Dalavāyi, taking charge of the revenue and finances. During the absence of the army, Nasir Jang, son of Nizām-ul-Mulk, now Subadār of the Deccan, marched towards the capital by order of his father to levy a contribution. A deputation was sent forth to meet him, tendering allegiance; and while the negotiations were going on, Nasir Jang, encamped at Tonnur, amused himself on the large tank, to which he gave the name of Mōti Talab, which it still retains.

Expedition to  
Coimbatore.

Siege of  
Dēvanhalli :  
rise of  
Haider Ali.

Nanja-Rāja having returned successful from the south, his daughter was married to the nominal Rāja, as the first step to other ambitious projects. But in 1749 was undertaken the siege of Dēvanhalli, in which obscure service an unknown volunteer horseman joined, who was destined before long to gain the supreme power of the State and to play no mean part in the history of India. This was Haider, who, in a private capacity, had accompanied his elder brother Shabāz, the commander of a small body of horse and foot in the Mysore army. The siege of Dēvanhalli was prolonged for nine months, after which the pālegār was allowed to retire to his relation at Chikballapur. Haider's coolness and courage during the hostilities attracted the notice of Nanja-Rāja, who gave him the command of fifty horse and 200 foot, with orders to recruit and augment his corps; and also appointed him to the charge of one of the gates of Dēvanhalli, then a frontier fortress of Mysore.

Haider's  
Ancestry.

Haider was the great-grandson of Muhammad Bhelol, an emigrant from the Panjab, who had settled in a religious capacity at Aland, in Kulburga district. His sons Muhammad Alī and Muhammad Wali married at Kulburga, and then coming to Sira, obtained employment as customs peons. Before long, they removed to Kolar, where the elder died; upon which the other seized all the domestic property and turned his brother's wife and son out of doors. A Nāyak of peons at Kolar took them in, and when Fatte Muhammad, the son, was old enough, made him a peon. At the siege of Ganjikōta, on the troops being repulsed in a general assault, the young man distinguished himself by seizing a standard and planting it once more on the breach, which rallied the assailants and thus carried the day. For this exploit, the Subadār of Sira made him a Nāyak, and he continued to rise. But on a change of Subadārs, finding himself not in

favour, he repaired to Arcot with fifty horse and 1,400 peons; and, on failing to obtain service from the Nawāb on the conditions he demanded, entered the service of the Faujdār of Chittūr. The latter was soon recalled to court, on which Fatte Nāyak returned to Mysore and was appointed Faujdār of Kolar, with Budikōte as a *Jāgir*, and the title of *Fatte Muhammad Khān*. At Budikōte were born Shabāz and his brother Haidar, the latter in 1722. They were the sons by a third wife. For, Fatte Muhammad, after three sons were born to them, had lost his first wife at Kolar, to which place she belonged, and on whose death he began the erection of the mausoleum there. His second wife was the daughter of a Nevayet who, in travelling from the Konkan to Arcot, had been robbed and murdered at Tarikere. The wife, with a son Ibrahim, and two daughters, escaping, had begged their way as far as Kolar, where Fatte Nāyak proposed to marry the elder and was accepted. She, however, died without issue, and he then took to himself her younger sister, who became the mother of Haidar.

Fatte Muhammad and the eldest son by the first wife were killed in 1729, in a battle between his patron, Abdul Rasūl Khān of Dodballapur, Subadār of Sira, and Tahir Khān, the Faujdār of Chittoor, under whom he had formerly served, who now sought to gain possession of Sira as Subadār. The bodies of the slain father and son were conveyed to Kolar, and buried in the mausoleum. Meanwhile, the family of Fatte Muhammad had been confined to Dodballapur as hostages for his fidelity, in accordance with the usual practice of those times. Abdul Rasūl had also fallen in battle, and Abbās Khuli Khān, his son, being left in possession of the Dodballapur *jāgir* on resigning all claim to Sira, now proceeded to plunder the families thus placed in his power. Shabāz and Haidar, the former about nine and the latter seven years

of age, were tortured for payment of a pretended balance due from their father. When suffered to depart, the mother with her children went to Bangalore, and found shelter with her brother, Ibrahim Sahib, who commanded some peons under the Killedār. Shabāz, when old enough, obtained a subordinate command, and rose to the position in which he appeared before Dēvanhalli.

**Expedition to Arcot: the Karnātic War of succession, 1751 A.D.**

An order soon arrived from Nasir Jang, as Subadār of the Deccan, for the Mysore troops to attend him in an expedition against Arcot. A force, which included Haidar and his brother, was accordingly sent under Berki Venkata Rao, and joined the main army at Maddagiri. It is unnecessary to follow the fortunes of the several claimants to the Nawābship of the Karnātic, with the rival struggles of the English and the French in support of one or the other. Suffice it to say that when Nasir Jang was treacherously killed and his camp broken up, Haidar took advantage of the confusion and managed to secure two camel loads of gold coins, which were safely despatched to Dēvanhalli, as well as about 300 horses and 500 muskets, picked up at various times. The Mysore troops shortly after returned to their own country.

**Muhammad Ali's secret Treaty with Mysore.**

In 1751, Muhammad Ali, the English candidate at Trichinopoly, opposed to Chanda Sahib, the French candidate at Arcot, sent an ambassador named Seshagiri Pandit to Mysore for assistance. The Dalavāyi Dēva-Rāja was adverse to engaging in the enterprise; but his younger brother Nanja-Rāja was tempted by an extravagant promise of the cession of Trichinopoly and all its possessions down to Cape Comorin to lend the required assistance, and agreed to make provision for Muhammad Ali in giving him Hardanhalli, at the head of the pass to Trichinopoly, as a *jāgir*.

About the time of Clive's celebrated siege and subsequent defence of Arcot, a Mysore army, consisting of 5,000 horse and 10,000 infantry marched from Seringapatam under the command of Nanja-Rāja. The only regular troops in the force were a small body in the corps of Haidar Nāyak, armed with the muskets before mentioned. The army had borne no part in warfare, when the desertion and murder of Chanda Sāhib occurred. His head, however, was sent as a trophy to Seringapatam, and hung up over the Mysore gate. The war seemed now to be at an end, and Nanja-Rāja claimed Trichinopoly. Muhammad Ali, unable any longer to conceal from the English the illegally formed agreement, declared that he had never intended to observe the compact. At the same time, he endeavoured to deceive Nanja-Rāja with fresh promises that he would deliver up the place in two months, and gave up to him the revenues of the island of Srirangam and the adjacent districts. Nanja-Rāja occupied the island, intercepted the supplies from Trichinopoly, opened negotiations with the French, and tried to gain the fort by treachery. Though powerfully assisted by the French, all attempts on the place were frustrated by the skilful measures of Major Stringer Lawrence. Nanja-Rāja then endeavoured to enter into a treaty with the English, but this came to nothing. Meanwhile news arrived of a serious danger threatening at home, and Nanja-Rāja returned to Mysore in 1755 at the summons of his brother, having nearly exhausted the treasury in the expenses of this unprofitable war, added to a subsidy paid during most of the time to his Mahratta ally Morāri Rao of Gooty and a loan of ten lakhs of *pagōdas* to Muhammad Ali, which was never repaid.

Mahammad Ali's treachery and Mysore's losses.

The danger which called for the return of the troops under Nanja-Rāja was the approach of Salābat Jang, Subadār of Deccan, with a powerful French force under

Salābat Jang's march on Seringapatam.

M. Bussy, to demand arrears of tribute. Dēva-Rāja had no money to meet this demand and the enemy therefore invested Seringapatam. Matters were brought to a crisis before Nanja-Rāja, though hastening with forced marches, could arrive. Dēva-Rāja was therefore driven to compromise for a payment of fifty-six lakhs of rupees. To raise this sum, "the whole of the plate and jewels belonging to the Hindu temples in the town were put into requisition, together with the jewels and precious metals constituting the immediate property or personal ornaments of the Rāja and his family: but the total sum which could thus be realised amounted to no more than one-third of what was stipulated. For the remainder, Dēva-Rāja prevailed on the *sowcārs* of the capital to give security, and to deliver as hostages their principal *gumastās* or confidential agents: but as he was never afterwards enabled to satisfy the *sowcars*, they left the *gumastās* to their fate, and of the two-thirds for which security was given not one rupee was ever realized. Of the unhappy hostages, some died in prison, others escaped, and after a period the remainder were released." On hearing of this transaction, Nanja-Rāja halted, and discharged one-third of his army; not without great difficulty in paying their arrears.

Haidar,  
Faujdar of  
Dindigul.

Haidar, who had continued to advance in favour during the operations before Trichinopoly, was now appointed Faujdar of Dindigul. He had enlisted a considerable body of Bedar peons and of Pindāri horsemen, and with the aid of his adherents organized a perfect system of plunder, the profits of which were divided between Haidar and the plunderers. Wilks writes:—

"Moveable property of every description was their object; and they did not hesitate to acquire it by simple theft from friends, when that could be done without suspicion and with more convenience than from enemies. Nothing was unseason-



able or unacceptable; from convoys of grain, down to the clothes, turbans, and ear-rings of travellers or villagers, whether men, women, or children. Cattle and sheep were among the most profitable heads of plunder: muskets and horses were sometimes obtained in booty, sometimes by purchase. The numbers under his command increased with his resources; and before he left Trinchinopoly, besides the usual appendages of a chief of rank, in elephants, camels, tents and magnificent appointments, he was rated on the returns and received pay for one thousand five hundred horses, three thousand regular infantry, two thousand peons, and four guns, with their equipments."

Haidar proceeded with a considerable force to the south to take charge of his district, while Khande Rao, one of his adherents, was left at the capital to protect his interests. By a great variety of fictitious charges, Haidar managed to accumulate a large treasure, and with the aid of skilled artificers under French masters, began to organise a regular artillery, arsenal and laboratory.

In 1756, the young Rāja, now twenty-seven years of age, becoming impatient of his position, hit upon the plan of confining the ministers and taking the power into his own hands. The secret was discovered, and Dēva-Rāja counselled mild measures. But Nanja-Rāja stormed the palace, forced the Rāja to take his seat on the throne, and then cut off the noses and ears of his partisans before his face. This disgusting affair, and the contempt of his counsel, led Deva-Rāja to retire from the capital. Accompanied by his family and a large body of adherents, he descended the Gajalhatti pass in February 1757, and fixed his residence at Satyamangala. To meet his expenses, he revoked the assignments made to Haidar, whom, therefore, Khande Rao advised to come to Seringapatam at once.

Rāja's  
attempt to  
throw off his  
Ministers.

Mahratta  
raid on  
Seringa-  
patam, 1757  
A.D.

Before Haidar arrived, however, the Mahrattas under Bālaḥi Rao appeared, demanding a contribution. Nanja-Rāja in vain represented his absolute inability. Seringapatam was besieged, and the operations being directed by Europeans, was soon reduced to extremity. Nanja-Rāja was forced to compromise for thirty-two lakhs of rupees, but as all the cash and jewels he could muster amounted to no more than five lakhs, a large tract of country was surrendered in pledge, and the Mahrattas departed, leaving agents for the collection of revenue, and six thousand horse, in the pledged districts. These were Nāgamangala, Bellur, Kikkeri, Channarāyapatna, Kadūr, Bānavar, Harnhalli, Honvalli, Turivekere, Kandikere, Chiknāyakanhalli, Kadaba, Kallūr, and Huli-yūrdurga. On Haidar's arrival, he expressed his regret that his troops had not been ordered up from Dindigul, advised that the revenue should be withheld from the Mahrattas, and their troops expelled at the beginning of the rains, which would prevent an invasion for that season. This was accordingly done. Haidar then waited on Dēva-Rāja and it was arranged between them that the resumed revenues should be restored to Haidar, with *scwār* security for three lakhs, in exchange for a military contribution of twelve lakhs to Haidar for assistance rendered to the Nāir Rāja of Palghāt, which Hari Singh, a brave Rājput adherent of Dēva-Rāja and Haidar's rival in the Mysore army, was deputed to collect. Haidar now returned to Dindigul and planned the conquest of Madura, which did not succeed; and he shortly returned to Seringapatam, where his presence was urgently required.

Mutiny of the  
troops.

The troops, whose pay had long fallen into arrears, had mutinied and sat in *dharna* at the gate of the minister. Nanja-Rāja sold the provisions in store, but the proceeds fell far short of the demand. Haidar, hearing of the state of affairs, hastened to Satyamangala

and prevailed on the old chief Dēva-Rāja, then very ill, to return to the capital and unite with his brother in restoring order at this critical juncture. But Nanja-Rāja was required first to make atonement to the Rāja for his former outrage. This done, he went forth with a great procession to meet Dēva-Rāja and conduct him from Mysore to the capital. Here Dēva-Rāja died, six days after his arrival, probably from dropsy, though suspicion naturally fell on Nanja-Rāja. Dēva-Rāja was apparently an active general. As Commander-in-Chief of the Chikka-Krishna-Raja's forces, he is credited in certain inscriptions (*E.C. III Tirumakudlu-Narsipur 63*, dated in 1759 A.D., *E. C. IV Yedatore 58*, dated 1741) with the conquest of the Midagēsi, Magadi, Sivandi (Sivamadhya) and many other places difficult to overcome. He founded the Ramachandrāpura *agrahāra* in the name of God Sri-Rāma of whom he was a great devotee. A voluminous grant on sixteen copper-plates, dated in 1759 A.D., records the grant of this *agrahāra*.

Nanja-Rāja disgusted with the task of liquidating the arrears due to the troops, now requested Haidar and Khande Rao to undertake it. This they did after a strict scrutiny of the demands, which their consummate skill in such matters enabled them to rid of all excessive and false charges; and the claims were finally settled by distribution of all the available State property, down to the Rāja's elephants and horses. At the same time, Haidar's own troops were placed as guards of the fort; and as soon as the mutineers, having been paid and discharged, had left the capital, the most wealthy chiefs in the army were seized and all their property confiscated as ring-leaders in the mutiny.

The mutiny  
quelled.

Hari Singh, who had been sent to receive the tribute due from Malabār, found himself unable to realize any

Murder of  
Hari Singh,  
Haidar's  
rival.

of it, and on hearing of the death of his patron Dēva-Rāja, was marching back, when Haidar, to get rid of his rival, under pretence of sending back troops to Dindigul, despatched a force which fell upon Hari Singh at night while encamped at Avanāshi, and massacred him as a mutineer with the greater part of his followers. Haidar presented three guns and fifteen horses to the Rāja, and kept the rest of the plunder. At the same time, in lieu of the *sowcār* security which Dēva-Rāja had given him, an assignment was granted on the revenues of Coimbatore, and the fort and district of Bangalore were conferred on him as a personal *jāgir*.

Mahratta  
raid on  
Bangalore  
and Channapatna.

The Mahrattas, whose troops had been expelled as before stated, now returned, early in 1759, in great force, under Gōpāl Hari; and reoccupying all the pledged districts, suddenly appeared before Bangalore, which they invested, and at the same time sent a detachment which surprised Channapatna. Haidar was appointed to the chief command of the army to oppose this invasion. He stationed one detachment at Malvalli, under his maternal uncle Mir Ibrāhīm, and another at Maddur under Latīf Alī Beg. The latter, by feigning fear of attack, drew out the Mahrattas from Channapatna, and then surprised and took it by escalade. Haidar now concentrated his forces near Channapatna, and Gōpāl Hari, raising the blockade of Bangalore, marched to meet him with a superior force. After three months of various warfare, Gopāl Hari, finding himself straitened by the activity of his opponent, proposed a negotiation. It was arranged that the Mahrattas should relinquish all claims to the districts formerly pledged, and that Mysore should pay thirty-two lakhs pagōdas in discharge of all demands, past and present. To raise the money, a *nazarāna* or gift was levied from all the principal public servants and wealthy inhabitants, but Khande Rao could

obtain only sixteen lakhs from this source. The Mahratta *sowcārs*, however, made themselves responsible for the rest on the personal security of Haidar, on the understanding that he should have the management of the restored districts in order to realize the amount.

The Mahrattas now withdrew to their own country, and Haidar returned in triumph to Seringapatam, where he was received by the Rāja in the most splendid *durbār* since the time of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja. He was saluted with the title of *Fatte Haidar Bahādūr*, and Nanja-Rāja on his approach rose up to receive him and embraced him. Haidar  
honoured.

Before long, the pay of the troops again fell into arrears, and Haidar was again the medium of satisfying their demands. This he was commissioned to do by the Rāja on condition that he renounced Nanja-Rāja; and the fresh assignments made to enable him to meet the demand placed in his hands more than half the possessions of the kingdom. Khande Rao was made *Pradhāna* and on Nanja-Rāja was settled a *jāgir* of three lakhs of *pagodas*, with a stipulation that he should maintain 1,000 horse and 3,000 foot without personal service. Nanja-Rāja, who had been the virtual ruler of Mysore for nearly twenty years, yielded to necessity, and departed from the capital in June 1759, with all his family and adherents. He lingered, however, at Mysore, under pretence of visiting the temple at Nanjangud, until it became necessary for Haidar to regularly besiege the place and force him to retire. His *jāgir* was in consequence reduced to one lakh, and he was required to fix his residence at Konanur in the west. His daughter, married to the Rāja, died soon after, and he, the Rāja, espoused two wives at once, one of them being the famous Maharāni Lakshmi Ammanni, who survived the Haidar in  
high favour.

fall of Seringapatam in 1799 and signed the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam in that year. Haidar now pressed for and obtained a further assignment of four districts for the expenses of this siege, though the grant was strenuously opposed by Khande Rao, on whom the incident left an impression of permanent disgust.

His machinations with the French.

A French emissary, styling himself the Bishop of Halicarnassus, shortly arrived with proposals to Haidar to join them in expelling the English from Arcot. The terms of a treaty for the purpose were concluded with Lally at Pondicherry on the 4th of June 1760. Haidar was to furnish 3,000 select horse and 5,000 sepoys, with artillery, to be paid to the French; and on a favourable conclusion of the war, Trichinopoly, Madura and Tinnevely were to be ceded to Mysore. In order to clear the way from Seringapatam to Arcot, the district of Baramahal, though in the possession of the Nawāb of Cuddapah, was taken possession of by Haidar, as well as Anekal, from the pālegār of that place, while the French yielded up the fort of Tyagar as a point of communication. The Mysorean troops, commanded by Makhдум Ali, on descending the *ghāts*, gained an easy and unexpected victory at Trivadi on the 17th of July. But the ambitious prospects which this opened up were swiftly blighted by the imminent jeopardy in which Haidar in a moment was placed.

Khande Rao's attempt to displace Haidar Ali.

The royal party at Seringapatam found that an exchange of Haidar for Nanja-Rāja had left them in the same dependent condition as before, and a plan was formed by the old dowager and Khande Rao for getting rid of one whose recent encroachments tended to a complete usurpation of the government. A favourable opportunity seemed now to offer. A large portion of Haidar's troops were absent at Arcot; the remainder were

encamped on the north of the river, which was too full to ford; while Haidar himself with a small guard occupied an exposed position under the guns of the fort. Negotiations were opened with a Mahratta force under Visaji Pandit, which was ravaging the country between Ballapur and Devanhalli, and the services obtained of 6,000 horse to reach Seringapatam by the 12th of August. On the morning of that day, the fort gates were not opened as usual, and Haidar was roused up by a tremendous cannonade upon his position at the *Mahānavami Mantapa*—the site of the present Darya Daulat. In amazement he sent for Khande Rao, and was informed that it was he who was directing the fire. He at once grasped the position and sheltering his family and followers as well as possible, promptly secured all the boats (*harigolu*) on the river. The Mahrattas, as usual, not having arrived, Khande Rao could not attack, and the day passed in negotiations. The result was that the landing-place on the northern bank was left unguarded, and Haidar escaped that night across the river with a few tried followers, bearing what money and jewels they could carry, but forced to leave behind his wife with his eldest son Tipu, nine years of age, and all his foot-guards. The family were removed to the fort and kindly treated by Khande Rao.

Haidar fled north-east and arrived before daylight at Anekal, commanded by his brother-in-law Ismail Ali, having ridden seventy-five miles on one horse. Ismail Ali was at once despatched to see how matters stood at Bangalore. He had scarcely arrived there before Khande Rao's orders to seize the Killedār were received. But it was too late. Kabir Beg, an old friend of Haidar's, was faithful to him. The Hindu soldiers were excluded and the fort gates shut. Haidar, on receiving the news, at once set out and reached Bangalore the same evening.

Haidar's  
flight from  
Seringa-  
patam.



His desperate  
position.

Haidar's position was indeed desperate. "He was now left, as it were, to begin the world again on the resources of his own mind. The bulk of his treasures and his train of artillery and military stores all lost: the territorial revenue at the command of Khande Rao: and the only possessions on which he could rest any hope for the restoration of his affairs were—Bangalore at the northern, and Dindigul at the southern extremity of the territories of Mysore, with Anekal and the fortresses of Baramahal. The sole foundation of a new army was the corps of Makhdum Ali; and its junction was nearly a desperate hope. He had, however, despatched from Anekal positive orders for them to commence their march without an hour's delay, withdrawing altogether the garrison of Tyagar, and every man that could be spared from the posts of Baramahal." He obtained a loan of four lakhs on his personal security from the *sawcārs* of Bangalore and was joined by a few adherents. Among others, a Muhammadan of rank, Fazal-ulla Khān, son of the late Nawāb of Sira, offered him his services. All hope now rested on the corps of Makhdum Ali; against whom Khande Rao had sent the Mahrattas and the best of his troops, and reduced him to great extremities.

Haidar's  
return and  
defeat by  
Khande Rao.

A most unexpected turn in events saved Haidar from apparent destruction. Visaji Pandit was found ready to negotiate, and agreed to retreat on the cession of Baramahal and a payment of three lakhs of rupees. The money was at once paid, and the Mahrattas marched off. Makhdum Ali, relieved from his critical blockade, proceeded to Bangalore. The explanation of the haste of the Mahratta retreat which had excited Haidar's suspicion, now appeared. News had secretly been received of the crushing defeat of the Mahrattas by the Abdālis on the memorable field of Panipat, and all their forces were

ordered to concentrate. Haidar, who had delayed giving up Baramahal, therefore retained it. He detached Makhdum Ali to secure the revenues of Coimbatore and Salem; and proceeded in person, accompanied by a French contingent, against Khande Rao, to whom place after place was yielding. He crossed the Cauvery below Sosile, and the two armies met near Nanjangud. Haidar's force being inferior in point of numbers, he endeavoured to avoid an action while waiting for reinforcements. But Khande Rao forced on a battle, and compelling Haidar's infantry to change its front, charged it while performing that evolution. Haidar was severely defeated and retired to Hardanhalli.

"Nothing but a confidence in powers of simulation altogether unrivalled could have suggested to Haidar the step which he next pursued. With a select body of two hundred horse, including about seventy French hussars under M. Hugel, he made a circuitous march by night; and early on the next morning, unarmed, and alone, presented himself as a suppliant at the door of Nanja-Rāja at Konanūr, and being admitted, threw himself at his feet. With the semblance of real penitence and grief, he attributed all his misfortunes to the gross ingratitude with which he had requited the patronage of Nanja-Rāja, entreated him to resume the direction of public affairs and take his old servant once more under his protection. Nanja-Rāja was completely deceived: and with his remaining household troops, which during the present trouble he had augmented to two thousand horse and about an equal number of indifferent infantry, he gave to the ruined fortunes of Haidar the advantages of his name and influence, announcing in letters despatched in every direction his determination to exercise the office of *Sarvādhikari*, which he still nominally retained, with Haidar as his *Dalavāyi*."

Haidar wins over Nanja-Rāja.

Khande Rao now manœuvred to prevent the junction of Haidar with his army, and had arrived at Katte Malavādi. The destruction of Haidar and his new friends appeared to be inevitable, when his talent for

Khande Rao out-manœuvred and deceived.

deception again released him from the danger. He fabricated letters, in the name and with the seal of Nanja-Rāja, to the principal officers of Khande Rao's army, to deliver him up in accordance with an imaginary previous compact. It was arranged that these letters should fall into the hands of Khande Rao, who, thinking himself betrayed, mounted his horse and fled in haste to Seringapatam. His forces became in consequence disorganized, when Haidar fell upon and routed them capturing all the infantry, guns, stores and baggage. He next descended the Ghâts, took all the forts that had declared for Khande Rao, and by the month of May returned to the south of Seringapatam with a large force. Here for several days he pretended to be engaged in negotiating; and every evening made a show of exercising his troops till after sunset. On the eighth day, instead of dismissing them as usual, he made a sudden dash across the river, and surprising Khande Rao's forces, completely routed them and encamped on the island.

Khande Rao  
surrendered  
and put to  
death.

Haidar now sent a message to the trembling Rāja, demanding the surrender of Khande Rao as being his servant, and the liquidation of arrears due which were designedly enhanced; offering at the same time to relinquish the service when the conditions were complied with. He, however, expounded his real views to the officers of State, and they working upon the fears of the helpless Rāja, prevailed upon him to resign the entire management of the country into the hands of the conqueror, reserving only districts yielding three lakhs of *pagodas* for himself and one lakh for Nanja-Rāja. Khande Rao was delivered up, Haidar having promised to spare his life and take care of him as a parrot, an expression used to denote kind treatment. It was, however, fulfilled to the letter, by confining him in an iron cage and giving him rice and milk for his food, in which condition he ended his days.

In the last edition of this work, following Wilks, the historian of Mysore, it was assumed that Khande Rao was originally a "servant" of Haidar and that his "treachery" towards Haidar in espousing the cause of the ruling Rāja was accordingly great. Since the publication of that edition, a study of the records preserved at Fort St. George, Madras, has thrown new light on the character of Khande Rao and his part in the revolt he led against Haidar. Khande Rao was, from all accounts, already in the service of the Rāja when Haidar entered it; he was, therefore, neither his "servant," as he is reported to have claimed him, nor indeed could he be pronounced guilty of "treachery" for endeavouring to rid the Rāja, his master, of the new usurper of his Sovereignty, when he acted against Haidar. Wilks admits that Khande Rao was party to the removal of the "more dangerous usurper" as Haidar had proved himself to be, with the Dowager Rāni. He agreed in the view put forth to him that "if this opportunity were lost, the Hindoo House of Mysore might be considered as extinct." As preparatory to the step eventually taken by the dowager Rani and Khande Rao, who had been *Pradhan* by then for some time, an attempt was made to secure the help of the English at Madras against Haidar. Haidar and the Rāni held different views in regard to their respective attitudes towards the English. Haidar had helped the French at Pondicherry, while the Rāni was positively against such action. Khande Rao, acting on her behalf, made it known to the English that Haidar's action was unauthorized and engaged a body of Mahratta troops to proceed in aid of the English. (Letter No. 1010 *Military Country Correspondence VIII* 321-3, Letter received 3rd October 1760). In one of his letters to Madras, Khande Rao, writing in the name of the Rāja, expressed his feelings of friendship towards the English and informed the Governor that the assistance

Character of  
Khande Rao  
and his  
position.

given by the Mysoreans to the French was against the Rāja's orders, that Haidar Nāik was a rebel, that a severe defeat had been inflicted on him, that he was besieging him at Bangalore, and that it was his intention to send a troop of Mahrattas and a large body of the Rāja's army to their help at Pondicherry. He also requested the English not only to expel Haidar's troops in those parts but also to order the cessation of all plundering of the Rāja's subjects there. This letter was considered in Council and orders were issued to the troops of the Nawāb of Arcot to cease committing hostilities against the Mysore districts. (*Military Correspondence XIII*, 906-11). Replying to the letter of the Rāja, Lord Pigot, the then Governor of Madras, requested the Rāja to send a *Vakīl* (envoy) to Madras with full powers to settle affairs on his behalf. He at the same time ordered Major Preston to prevent the French party at Tiagadrug from proceeding to the assistance of Haidar. (*Military Correspondence VIII*, 324-5). In a further letter which was received at Madras on 7th October 1760, Khande Rao, who is described as Prime Minister, sent particulars to the Governor at Fort St. George of Haidar's rebellion and of the Rāja's calling in of the Mahrattas and of Haidar's defeat and flight and suggesting the advisability and advantage of an alliance between the King of Mysore and the English. (Letter No. 1032 *Military Country Correspondence VIII* 328-30). The Governor expressed his entire concurrence in the proposed accommodation of affairs with Mysore. (*Military Correspondence XIII* 968). The proposal, indeed, was considered so beneficial that a despatch was sent to the Court of Directors on the subject, in which it was stated that the proposed alliance was a cause of relief from further apprehensions. (*Military Des. to Court II*. 159-65). In another letter Khande Rao wrote to Governor Pigot expressing his desire to join the English to do things of

great consequence. (*Military Country Correspondence IX* 12-13 letter No. 1340, received 15th January 1761). The despatch of the *Vakīl* appointed by Khande Rao, one *Srīnivāsachāry* by name, was announced by the *Rāja* in a letter received at Madras in February 1761. Shortly afterwards, Krishnayya, the *Rāja's Bhakshi*, intimated Haidar's escape and of his harassing the country as far as *Nāmakal* and asking for the despatch of the *Nawāb's* troops as promised against him. (*Military Country Correspondence IX*, 53-6, Letter No. 1726, received 30th April 1761). On 15th July, the Council at Madras resolved on refusing any aid to the *Rāja*. (*Military Country Correspondence XI* 446-56). On the 29th July, the Council considered a further proposal from the *Mysore Rāja* sent through Mahomed Usuff, their agent at Madura, requesting the despatch of military aid for putting down Haidar *Nāik* who was then besieging *Seringapatam*. The aid never reached the *Rāja* and on 31st August 1761 the English at Madras heard that Haidar had succeeded, that Khande Rao was a close prisoner in his hands and that he (Haidar) was intending to join *Salabat Jung*. (*Military Country Correspondence IX*, 124 and *Military Country Correspondence XI*, 530-47). Not long after, the *Nawāb* of Arcot began to represent of Haidar's intentions on Arcot and urged an immediate opening of hostilities against him. (*Military Country Correspondence XVI* 2-5). The proposal was, however, rejected (*Military Country Correspondence* 21-25) with the consequence that the fears of the *Nawāb* of Arcot were not long after found to be well-grounded. Khande Rao was true to the *Rāja*, whose loyal subject he justly claimed to be. If he was found to be true to him, he could not be expected to be a "rebel" with Haidar against him. That he was a keen soldier and that he out-manceuvred Haidar is not disputed. He was, however, no match to Haidar in the art of dissimulation, in which

Haidar was a past master. He fell a prey to it. His end was sad but he will be remembered as among the first to lay down his life to save the country from the usurper's hands.

Haidar's  
usurpation  
complete,  
June 1761.

Haidar's usurpation was by this time complete; but he entered on the Government of the country, in June 1761, with a studied show of reluctance and in the form of a mock submission to the wishes of the Rāja. After two months, having placed Seringapatam under the command of his brother-in-law Makhdum Āli, he proceeded to Bangalore. Basālat Jang, a brother of the Subadār of the Deccan, and therefore one of the claimants to that dignity, was at this time in possession of Adōni and meditated establishing his own pretensions. The south was the direction in which he could with least opposition extend his territory. He accordingly, in June 1761, planned to reduce Sira, then in the hands of the Mahrattas, but found it would require too long a siege. He therefore marched to Hoskote, which also defied his efforts. Negotiations were soon opened between Haidar and Basālat Jang; and the latter, in return for a gift of three lakhs of rupees, invested Haidar with the office of Nawāb of Sira, styling him in the deeds of investiture Haidar Ali Khān Bahādūr. He also offered him the title of *Zang*, but Haidar, who could not pronounce it better than *Jang*, fancied it contained some covert sneer, and so declined it in favour of Fazal-ulla, who thus became Haibat Jang.

His extensive  
conquests —  
Sira, Chital-  
durg, Bednur  
etc.

Haidar now united his army to that of Basālat Jang and captured Hoskote. Doddballapur was next taken, and lastly Sira. Here Basālat Jang left Haidar, being called to the north by the hostile movements of his brother Nizām Ali, now Subadār of the Deccan. Haidar returned and attacked Chikballapur. Morāri Rao of



Gooty, advancing to its relief, was defeated, and the place fell after a most obstinate defence, the palegār taking refuge on Nandi-durga. Kodikonda, Penukonda and Madakasira, possessions of Morari Rao, were next taken ; and returning to Sira, Haidar received the submission of the palegārs of Raydurga and Harpanhalli, and forced that of the *palegār* of Chitaldurg. The latter introduced to him a pretender to the throne of Bednūr, as related in the history of the Chitaldurg District, and the invasion of Bednūr was planned. He entered the province at the end of January 1763, and at Kumsi found the late Rājā's prime minister, who had been long imprisoned at this place. From him every information was obtained as to the approaches and resources of the capital, in consequence of which Haidar, rejecting all the offers of money made to buy him off, pressed on. The Rāni and her paramour fled, followed by the inhabitants *en masse* who took shelter in the woods. Haidar, the instant of his arrival at the barrier, in March, ordered a noisy but feigned attack to be made on the posts in his front, while he himself, at the head of a select column, entered the city by a private path pointed out by the minister. The flames of the palace were extinguished and a seal placed on the doors of all but the poorest of the deserted dwellings. A booty was thus secured which has been valued at twelve millions sterling. Detachments were despatched to the coast and in pursuit of the Rāni. The former took possession of the fortified island of Basavarāj-durga, as well as of Honavar and Mangalore. The latter took the Rāni prisoner at Ballarāyan-durga. She, with her paramour, her adopted son, the nominal Rāja, and even the pretender whose cause Haidar had ostensibly espoused, were all alike sent to a common imprisonment at Madgiri. This important conquest was ever spoken of by Haidar Ali as the foundation of all his subsequent greatness. He designed to make Bednūr his capital, and

gave it the name of Haidar-nagar. His family was removed thither, and the building commenced of a splendid palace, which was never finished. He also established a mint and struck coins—known as *Haidari* and *Bahādūri Pagodas* in his own name. (See Chapter IV above). A dock-yard and naval arsenal were further formed on the western coast for the construction of ships of war.

Attempt at  
assassination  
at Bednur  
frustrated.

The former officials of Bednūr had been, to a great extent, retained in their offices, and when Haidar Alī, having contracted the usual Malnād fever, was unable to attend to business, they formed a conspiracy for assassinating him and recovering the capital. But it was discovered. The commissioners appointed to investigate it were found to be involved, and instantly hanged in his presence. Three hundred conspirators suffered the same fate before the day ended. All opposition was thus effectually crushed.

Reform of the  
Army and  
Court  
etiquette.

The hill country of Sunda was subdued in December. Meanwhile Reza Alī Khān, son of Chanda Sāhib, and the French candidate for the Nawābship of the Karnātic, who, escaping from Pondicherry on its capture by the English in 1761, had been living since in Ceylon, landed in Kanara and claimed protection from Haidar. He was received with distinction, and presented with a *jāgir* of a lakh of rupees. By his advice, many changes were introduced into the army. The infantry were for the first time dressed in a uniform manner, and classed into *avval*, first, and *duyam*, second: the former composed of tried and veteran troops with superior pay. The etiquette and ceremonials of the court were also regulated, and a greater show of splendour assumed in retinue and personal surroundings.

Haidar now bethought himself of appeasing the Mahrattas and the Nizām, the former for the seizure of Sira, the latter for accepting the title of Nawāb from his brother. Embassies with gifts were accordingly sent to either Court. At Haidarabād the object was attained, but the Mahrattas could not be reconciled, and Haidar resolved to anticipate an invasion. Savanur was conquered, and the Mysore frontier advanced nearly to the Krishna, when Gopāl Rao, the Mahratta chief of Miraj, was ordered to check further progress, but he was defeated. Mādhava Rao, the Pēshwa, now crossed the Krishna with an immense army, and Haidar sustained a damaging defeat at Rattihalli, with severe loss of the flower of his army. He fell back to Anavatti, where also the Mahrattas were victorious, and Haidar, with fifty cavalry, barely escaped by the fleetness of their horses. The Mahrattas retook all the recent conquests to the north; and Haidar, driven back into Bednūr with the most hopeless prospects, sent off his family and treasure with all speed to Seringapatam. At length negotiations were opened, and the Mahrattas retired in February 1765, on the restoration of all places taken from Morāri Rao of Gooty and Abdul Hakīm Khān of Savanūr, and the payment of thirty-two lakhs of rupees. Sira was left in Haidar's hands.

Embassies to the Nizām and the Pēshwa. Haidar suffers defeat at Rattihalli.

During this unfavourable aspect of his affairs to the west, all his recent acquisitions to the east were in a flame of rebellion. His brother-in-law, Mir Alī Reza, was sent thither, and restored his authority. The palegār of Chikballapur, being starved out on Nandi-durga, was forced to surrender, and sent a prisoner, with his family, first to Bangalore and then to Coimbatore.

Rebellion in the East.

The conquest of Malabar was next undertaken, on information derived from Alī Rāja, the Māpilla ruler of

Conquest of Malabar.

Cannanore, who sought help from Haidar to extend his own power. A force was left at Basvapatna for the security of the north, and with all disposable troops Haidar descended into Kanara early in 1766. The Nairs were subdued with difficulty, owing to the wooded nature of the country. The northern States being conquered, the Zamorin of Calicut came forward and made his submission. Haidar suspected treachery and, while concluding an agreement to reinstate him on payment of four lakhs of Venetian Sequins, secretly sent a force to seize Calicut. The Zamorin was perplexed and delayed payment, on which he was confined to his palace and his ministers tortured. Fearing the same fate, he set fire to the building and perished with all his family. Leaving a force at Calicut, Haidar moved on to Coimbatore, receiving the submission of the Rājas of Cochin and Palghāt on the way. In three months, the Nairs again rebelled. Haidar returned to put them down, and adopted the expedient of deporting vast numbers to the less populous parts of Mysore. But the usual consequence to which the natives of Malabar are subject followed from the change of climate, and of 15,000 who were removed not 200 survived. A general amnesty was proclaimed, and the erection commenced of a fort at Palghāt as a point of communication with the country.

Death of  
Chikka-  
Krishna-  
Rāja ;  
accession of  
Nanja-Rāja  
Wodeyar,  
1766-1770 A.D.  
Haidar  
plunders the  
Palace.

During these operations, the reigning Rāja, Chikka-Krishna-Rāja, had died in 1766 A.D. and Haidar had sent instructions to instal his eldest son, Nanja-Rāja, then eighteen years of age, in his place. On arriving at the capital in 1767, he discovered that this youth was not likely to acquiesce in his subservient position. Haidar immediately resumed the three lakhs of *pagodas* allowed for the Rāja, plundered the palace of every article of value except the ornaments the women actually had on

their persons at the time, and placed his own guards over the place.

Nanja-Rāja, taking advantage of Haidar's low fortune in Malabar, tried to throw off the usurper's yoke. He was 23 years of age and fretted at his confinement, which was worse than ever before. He opened negotiations with the Mahrattas, with whom the Mysore House was generally on friendly terms. Communications were opened through Tryambak Rao and soon the way was paved for the second attempt that was made to put down Haidar. But it was destined to prove a failure because those who were called in to aid in the endeavour were too much bent on their own self-aggrandizement to remember their duty to their King (see below). In view of their own interests, the Mahrattas joined with the Nizām in a joint invasion of Mysore. Intelligence of this soon reached Haidar. The Mahrattas first appeared, under Mādhava Rao, and Haidar in vain endeavoured to stop their progress by cutting the embankments of the tanks, poisoning the water in the wells, burning the forage, and driving off all the villagers and cattle on their route. The Mahrattas arrived at Rāyadurga and marched down the bed of the Haggari to Sira. Here Mīr Sāhib, Haidar's brother-in-law, betrayed his trust, and gave it up in return for Guramkonda, the possession of his ancestors. Haidar now made strenuous efforts to treaty with the Mahrattas, who had overrun all the east, before Nizām Ali should join them. At length, by the address of Appāji Rām, a witty and skilful negotiator, the Mahrattas agreed to retire on payment of 35 lakhs of rupees, half to be paid on the spot, and Kolar to be retained in pledge for the rest. On Nizām Ali's arrival soon after, Haidar persuaded him into an alliance with himself against the English. Meanwhile, discovering that Nanja-Rāja, the old minister,

Fresh  
attempt to  
put down  
Haidar :  
King Nanja-  
Rāja at its  
head.

was negotiating with the Mahrattas and Nizām Ali, he induced him by a false oath of security to come to Seringapatam, on the plea that his advice was needed in the critical state of the country, and then made him prisoner, reducing his allowances to the bare necessities of life.

Fall of Nanja-  
Rāja,  
Dakavāi.

Thus disappears from history Nanja-Rāja, who more than once so artlessly played into the hands of Haidar and wrought not only his own destruction but also that of his comrades and country. In his earlier days, Nanja-Rāja showed considerable promise. He was in the fight, as we have seen above, which ended with Clive's successful defence of Arcot. His avarice, however, was unbounded and his power of discrimination poor. His fall is pathetic to a degree, the more so when we remember what a distinguished part he could have played if he had worked more prudently and thought a little less of himself and a little more of the fortunes of his sovereign. His great defect was want of political foresight. History will adjudge him responsible for Haidar's usurpation, in so far as a single personage could be held responsible for it. Haidar used for his own ends what he had learnt from Nanja-Raja and the first man whom he sacrificed in his upward ascent was his former master and first employer. Nanja-Rāja was in private life a pious and studious man-of-letters. He was a prolific writer in Kannada, and found time, in the midst of his many-sided administrative activities to translate a number of Sanskrit works. Among these may be mentioned the *Kakudgiri-mahātmya*, *Mārkaṇḍeya-Purāna*, *Sivagite*, *Siva-dharmōttara-darpana*, *Bhadrāgiri-mahatmya*, *Kāśī-Kāṇḍa*, *Garalapuri-mahimāḍarsa*, *Bhakti-Vilāsa-darpana*, *Sētu-mahimāḍarsa*, *Harivamsa*, *Hālāsyamahatmya*, *Sivabhakti-mahatmya*, and *Hari-dattāchārya-charita*. He also composed the *Sangīta-gangā-*

*dhara* and other works in Sanskrit. There is a well-known tradition in Mysore that he kept a diary of the warfare he engaged in which, it is said, he gives an account of the siege of Arcot and other well-known incidents in the early stages of the Karnātic War. He was not only an author himself but he also appears to have liberally patronised literary merit. Thus, Nrisimha-Kavi, author of the Sanskrit drama *Chandra-kala-parinaya*, speaks of him as a modern Bhōja in encouraging poets. (*M.A.R.* 1908-9, Para 102). He was an ardent Saivite and his benefactions to the temples were many. He built, in 1752, the tower of the Trinayanēsvara temple at Mysore, (*Ibid*); and he presented metal images of the sixty-three Saiva saints—*Tiruttondur*—to the Nanjangud temple. (*E.C.* III Nanjangud 200-265; see also Yedatore 32, dated in 1767).

The circumstances under which Nizām Ali went out to Haidar and both attacked the English at Madras may now be detailed. In October 1765, the Madras Government had been advised by Lord Clive that the Mughal Emperor at Delhi had made a free gift of the Northern Circars to the East India Company. These districts being then held by the Nizām, a force under Brigadier-General Caillaud was sent to take possession of them early in 1766, and met with no serious opposition, except at the fort of Kondapalli, which was taken by storm on the 7th March. Upon this, the Nizām, who was not disposed to surrender his claims without resistance, threatened to invade the Karnātic, and the Government of Madras, becoming alarmed, deputed General Caillaud to Haidarabad with full powers. The result was a treaty concluded on the 12th November by which the Nizām consented to the cession of Rajamundry, Ellore, Chicacole and Guntur subject to an annual tribute of nine

First Mysore  
War, August  
1767 to April  
1769.



lakhs of rupees ; but with the proviso that Guntur, then in possession of Basālat Jang, a brother of the Nizām, was to be continued to him for life, during which continuance the annual payments were to be limited to seven lakhs. The Madras Government further engaged to furnish a detachment of troops to "settle in everything right and proper the affairs of His Highness' Government." The intention of this being that the Nizām should be assisted in a projected attack on Haidar, Colonel Joseph Smith was sent to Haidarabad early in 1767 to arrange the details, and on the 20th January he was granted an audience at which it was determined that the English detachment should assemble on the Krishna, and proceed with the Nizām's army against Bangalore. The detachment marched accordingly but shortly after the junction had been effected Colonel Smith retired towards the British frontier on discovering that the Nizām was secretly negotiating with Haidar. The Madras Government, however, did not share in the Colonel's suspicions and permitted three battalions of sepoys to remain in the Nizām's camp as a proof of their confidence. This force was reduced soon afterwards to five companies under Captain George Brown, for whose safety considerable apprehensions were entertained, but they were ultimately permitted to depart without molestation a few days before the commencement of hostilities.

About the end of May, the Nizām and Haidar prepared to enter the Karnātic while the English, on their part, endeavoured to strengthen their frontier by taking possession of certain places in the Baramahal belonging to Haidar, *viz.*, Vaniambādi, Tirupattūr, and Kāveripatnam. An attempt to take the rock fort of Krishna-giri, which was made on the 3rd June, was repulsed with loss, although the storming party behaved with much gallantry.

On the 25th of August, 1767, the forces of Mysore and Haidarabad descended the Ghâts by one of the passes near Krishnagiri and attacked Colonel Smith, who, though at first taken by surprise, completely defeated them at Tiruvannāmalai on the 26th September. Tipu, then seventeen, had, under guidance of Ghazi Khān, his military preceptor, penetrated with a body of horse to the very precincts of Madras, when, hearing the result of the battle of Tiruvannāmalai, he retired with precipitation to join his father. Mutual recriminations ensued between Haidar Alī and Nizām Alī, and nothing was done for a month. The former then resumed the offensive and retook Tirupattūr and Vaniambādi on 5th and 7th November respectively but signally failed in an attack on the hill fort of Ambur, which was gallantly defended by Captain Calvert, who won an honorary distinction for his battalion by his brave conduct on the occasion. In the hope of closing the campaign with a brilliant exploit, Haidar went in person against an English detachment escorting supplies, but was repulsed at Singārapettai, his horse being shot under him and his turban pierced by a bullet. Leaving some cavalry to watch the English, the confederates retired in disappointment above the Ghâts with all their forces at the end of the year.

Invasion of the Karnātic by Haidar Alī and the Nizām, August 1767.

On the side of the English, a detachment from Bengal operating from the Northern Circars soon penetrated to Warrangal, which was abandoned on his approach. This diversion having laid open the door to Haidarabad, the Nizām was glad to conclude on 23rd February 1768 a treaty with them, ceding the Northern Circars and resigning all claims to Mysore, and, separating from Haidar Alī, returned to his capital. Haidar also made overtures, but without success. Meanwhile a fleet was fitting out at Bombay for capturing the Mysorean ports on the western coast, and the chiefs of Malabar were

Operations in the Northern Circars.

prepared to rebel. Haidar, leaving Fazal Ulla Khān at Bangalore, marched with all his forces to the west and retook Mangalore, Honavar, and Basavarāj-durga, which had fallen to the English. He then visited Bednūr, and levied heavy fines on all the land-holders for furnishing supplies to his enemies. He also obtained large contributions from the chiefs of Malabar in consideration of recognizing their independence, which, however, they never attained.

Operations of  
Col. Smith's  
Division,  
1768.

Soon after Haidar's return above Ghāts, Colonel Smith made preparations to enter Mysore, while Colonel Wood was detached against the forts in the southern parts of Baramahal, and those in Salem, Coimbatore and Dindigal. The English forces in the east were thus in two detachments. That under Colonel Wood secured all the fortified places in Salem, Erode, Coimbatore and Dindigal; while the other under Colonel Smith after capturing Krishnagiri, had ascended the Ghāts, taken Mulbagal (by stratagem), Kolar, Hosur, Ānekal and Denkanikōta and was awaiting, burdened with the care of Muhammad Alī, the junction of the two at Hoskote. The junction was duly effected on 6th September 1768 but not before Colonel Wood had sustained some loss owing to his imprudent conduct and disregard of orders. Nothing further of importance occurred before October, when the fort at Mulbagal was retaken by Haidar. The action here (3rd October) was a very obstinate and severely contested one, which terminated in the English being left in possession of the field, although they narrowly escaped defeat. Shortly after, Colonel Smith was recalled to Madras to assist Government with his advice and Colonel Wood succeeded him in command of the army. On the 16th November, Colonel Wood marched to relieve Hosur then besieged by Haidar. He reached Bagalur on the 17th and left his baggage and two 18 pounders

at that place while he continued his march for Hosur, distant about 10 miles. But he was out-mancœuvred by Haidar, who on receiving notice of his approach, came upon Bāgalur by an unexpected route and succeeded in carrying off the 18 pounder and a great quantity of stores, baggage, and camp equipage, together with a number of draught cattle which had not been taken inside the fort. Haidar, after having secured the plunder, returned on the 22nd, surprised Wood near Arleri when on his march towards Kolar, and opening fire from 12 heavy guns which Wood passively sustained without making any attempt to charge, he inflicted a loss in killed and wounded of 1 Captain, 6 Subalterns, 20 Europeans and 200 sepoy. He renewed the attack during the night and again on the next day until noon, when he drew off on the approach of Major Fitzgerald from Venkatagiri. Fitzgerald proposed that the Colonel should proceed to Kolar and there to refresh a few days, while he proceeded to the relief of Bāgalur, which was then known to be threatened by Haidar. To this the Colonel refused his assent as he did not think that "our whole army was by any means of sufficient strength to cope with Haidar's." No wonder that Fitzgerald, animadverting on his conduct, wrote thus to Colonel Smith, the Commander-in chief :—

"As this is his opinion, for God's sake, Sir, consider what we have to expect—in my opinion, nothing but the entire ruin of the Company, and let me intreat you, as you are now on the spot, to concert the proper means, for the recovery (I must say) of our lost honour and the interest of those we serve, for certainly no time is to be lost in the present emergency."

The Madras Government on becoming acquainted with this communication immediately directed Colonel Wood to make over command of the army to the next senior officer and to proceed to Madras. He was tried

by Court-Martial at the end of 1769 among other charges for misconduct in the field at Arleri and elsewhere and was found guilty on the latter count but the Court refrained from passing any sentence in consideration of his former services. Government disapproved of the finding for certain reasons and directed the Court to revise their proceedings, but they refused either to allow the reasons to be read or to be noticed in any way. Government upon this ordered that he should be dismissed and that proceedings should be taken against him in Court for the recovery of grains, stores and plunder taken and misappropriated in the Baramahal and Coimbatore countries.

At Hoskote a corps under Morāri Rao joined the English forces on the same day that Haidar Ali arrived at Bangalore. Haidar made a desperate attempt to surprise the camp of Morāri Rao, but failed. Then, sending off his family and treasure to Savandurga, he set off on one of those extraordinary diversions which seemed always to occur to him when his affairs were most critical. He passed rapidly by a circuitous route east and then north to Guramkonda, with the view of inducing Mīr Sāhib to return to his allegiance. This unlikely object was actually attained, and Haidar, reinforced, returned towards Kolar, and opened negotiations. But his offer of Baramahal and ten lakhs of rupees fell far short of the demands of the English and of Muhammad Ali, and came to nothing.

Haidar's  
descent  
into the  
Baramahal,  
Nov. 1768.

Haidar had meanwhile despatched Fazal Ulla Khān to Seringapatam, whence he descended the Gajalhatti pass with a field force for the recovery of the districts in the south. He himself, after some indecisive engagements, suddenly descended into the Baramahal, and, giving out that he had defeated the English, passed on to Coimbatore, gaining possession of the fortified places

on the route. This proved an easy task for him owing to the faulty and unmilitary disposition of the troops left behind by Colonel Wood, when in August he marched to rejoin Colonel Smith. The isolation of so many weak detachments at such a distance from the army, which prevented their being supported in case of need was unjustifiable, especially when we remember that they had been left "without provisions, without money, and without instructions." The garrisons of Erode and Kāvēripuram held out, but, induced to surrender on a promise of safety, were marched off as prisoners to Seringapatam.

As soon as Haidar's incursion into the Baramahal became known, Colonel Ross Lang, who had succeeded to the command of the troops in Mysore on the recall of Colonel Wood, detached a select corps of about 5,000 men, under Major Fitzgerald, to follow him. Major Fitzgerald, however, was unable to overtake Haidar, before his recapture of the forts in Salem, and having received instructions to make the safety of Trichinopoly his first care, he inclined his course in that direction. Haidar, after the capture of Kāvēripuram, entered the Karnātic, burning and plundering, as he went, and eluding Fitzgerald's efforts to come up with him.

Major  
Fitzgerald  
follows  
Haidar.

Colonel Smith resumed command of the army at Chetput, about 70 miles South-West of Madras, on the 1st February 1769, and having been furnished with good and sufficient carriage, he began to press Haidar hard.

Colonel Smith  
resumes  
command,  
1769.

Fazal Ullā Khān invaded Madura and Tinnevely, while Haidar, levying four lakhs of rupees from the Rāja of Tanjore, moved by rapid marches towards Cuddalore. Negotiations were again opened, about this time, and a cessation of arms for twelve days took place on 22nd February 1769. Haidar's first condition, however, was



that he would treat only with the English and not with Muhammad Ali. These terms could not be agreed on, and hostilities continued. Haidar, who knew that the Mahrattas were preparing for another invasion of Mysore, had become really desirous of peace, and finding himself opposed by a really capable officer, and being apprehensive, further, of some disaster, he resolved to endeavour to put an end to the war by a bold stroke without running the risk of a general engagement. Acting on this determination, he secretly sent off the main body of his army together with all his guns and baggage to re-ascend the Ghāts, while he himself, with 6,000 chosen horse and 200 foot, marched 140 miles in three days and a half, and appeared at the gates of Madras with his cavalry on the 29th March. He had come to make peace in person with the English. Mr. Du Pre, one of the Members of Council, was, at his request, deputed to discuss the terms with him. A treaty was signed by the English on the 3rd April 1769 and by Haidar the next day. Colonel Smith had come up on the 31st March to Vandalur, about 12 miles from the Mount, while the negotiation was pending, but Haidar was so much disquieted by this proximity that he insisted on Smith's being required to keep at a distance of 25 miles until matters should be finally adjusted. The conditions of the treaty were moderate and consisted of mutual restitution of conquered districts with the single exception of Karūr, an ancient dependency of Mysore, which had been retained by Muhammad Ali, since the last war, by tacit acquiescence, and was now to be restored to Mysore, an exchange of prisoners, and reciprocal assistance in purely defensive war. Thus ended what is known in the annals of British India as the first Mysore war. Haidar returned leisurely to Kolar and then to Bangalore. Though there is (as Wilks puts it), "genuine moderation" observable in this treaty, nothing



"can relieve it from the character of dictation" on Haidar's part under the walls of Madras and nothing can take away from it "the unnecessary and insulting degradation" under which it was concluded by the authorities at Fort St. George. Another feature of the treaty which demands notice is the second article which stipulated that "in case either of the contracting parties shall be attacked, they shall, from their respective countries, mutually assist each other, to drive the enemy out," the pay of the auxiliaries being defrayed at fixed rates by the party demanding assistance. Haidar's first demand was for an alliance offensive and defensive, which, after much discussion, Mr. Du Pre, the Madras Envoy, peremptorily refused. Now it was notorious to all India and openly avowed by Haidar himself that this clause was intended by him to be operative against the Mahrattas, whom he considered his greatest foes. It will be evident from the sequel that by the article ultimately agreed to, the Company subjected themselves to all the embarrassments of an offensive alliance without any of its advantages; and that Mr. Du Pre had acquiesced in the spirit of an article to the letter of which he had objected as fundamentally inadmissible. Historical justice demands, as even Wilks admits it, this reluctant notice of an error committed by Mr. Du Pre, whose political wisdom and distinguished talents were undoubtedly great.

It must, however, be conceded that neither Mr. Du Pre nor the Madras Government of the time had any option in the matter. They found peace "necessary" to them at the time; they had "to save as much of the Jaghir as possible from plunder" and as they explained in their Consultation of the 10th April 1769, they had to carry out the positive orders of the Court of Directors themselves in the matter of effecting a peace conveyed in their letter

Defence of the  
Madras Gov-  
ernment.

dated 13th May 1768. They thus defended themselves to the Court of Directors regarding the peace :—

“ Much invective hath been circulated in this colony, and nearly in the terms in which you express your sentiments of the peace ‘dictated at the gates of Madras,’ and we find it hath been used as industriously at home to establish the same ideas. If an indifferent person were to read of an enemy dictating peace at the gates of a fortified town, the idea that would immediately occur would be that the enemy came with a superior force; that the garrison, seeing no hope of dislodging the enemy, and fearing for their town, their, lives and property, accepted the terms prescribed. This is the idea that men have endeavoured at home, and abroad to propagate; how justly will appear. Our army had been in pursuit of the enemy in the southern part of the Carnatic for nearly four months without being once able to come up with him; at the last march before the peace he gave our army the slip, and arrived at the Mount about 48 hours before our army halted at Vandaloor twelve miles short of the Mount. One of the first points he insisted on was, that an order should be sent to Colonel Smith to halt at 10 Coss (about 25 to 30 miles) from him, and declared that although he came to negotiate a peace he would not remain there, unless an order was sent, but would march immediately to the northward, of Madras, or to Tripasoor, where he could be more conveniently supplied with provisions and provender. As a peace was necessary to us, and every day increased our distress, it appeared better to us to negotiate with him near at hand than at a distance, and it was very material to save as much of the Jaghir as possible from plunder. It missed Colonel Smith, but the messenger returning overtook him at Vandaloor twelve miles from the Mount. What then, it might be asked, could induce us to make the peace, if the enemy was so much afraid of our army. The motives are clearly and fully assigned in our reasons entered in Consultation on the 10th April 1769. This being the case, we cannot see why it was more disgraceful to negotiate at the Mount than at 100 miles distant.”

The following is an abstract of these reasons which are set forth at considerable length in the Proceedings of Government quoted above—

(1) The repeated anxiety for peace which had been expressed in several letters from the Court of Directors, and their positive orders on the subject, dated 13th May 1768.

(2) The insufficiency of the means of maintaining a body of cavalry, the want of which army enabled the enemy to protract the war, and to deprive Government of their ordinary sources of revenue by laying waste the Carnatic, Hyder being able to detach a large body of horse to cut off communications, and to prevent Colonel Smith from obtaining any intelligence regarding his movements, while he on the other hand was kept fully informed as to those of the Colonel.

(3) The losses sustained by the army from death, sickness and desertion, as evinced by the state of Colonel Smith's force at the Mount on the 4th April 1769, at which time the effective Cavalry, European and Native, had been reduced to 68 men, the two regiments of European Infantry to 379 of all ranks, and the battalions of sepoys to less than half of their established strength of 1,000 men.

(4) The state of the Carnatic which had been reduced to a desert by Hydar's policy of avoiding an engagement, and ravaging the country.

(5) The safety of the districts of Madura and Tinnevely which had been entered by detachments of the enemy.

Colonel Wilson, the historian of the *Madras Army*, has gone into the question of the causes that led to the want of success during this campaign. He is inclined to set it down to the cupidity of the members forming the Madras Government of the time and the appointment of Field Deputies, who impeded the work of the Commander-in-Chief. It would appear that shortly before Colonel Smith entered Mysore, Government sent two Members of Council, *viz.*, Messrs. Call and Mackay, to his camp, under the designation of Field Deputies, to be associated with him in the conduct of operations. One of these gentlemen held the contract for victualling the European troops, and also that for the supply of carriage to the army, but the profits were shared by the other Members of Government, with the exception of the Governor.

Causes of the failure of the campaign.

The Nawāb of Arcot also joined the camp at the same time, for the purpose of assuming the management of any territory that might be conquered, and of aiding generally with his advice. The Deputies and the Nawāb established their head-quarters at Kolar where they detained from 150 to 200 European Infantry and several battalions of sepoys for their own protection, thus seriously diminishing the means at the disposal of Colonel Smith.

The unsatisfactory character of the campaign was owing, in a great measure, to this mischievous arrangement which led to constant interference with the Commander-in-Chief; one notable instance of which was the withdrawal of the regular garrison from the rock fort at Mulbagal, the result having been the loss of that important post. In addition to this source of embarrassment, the want of carriage, the scarcity and dearness of provisions, and the inadequate supply of ammunition and military stores, all combined to retard the movements, and impair the efficiency of the army.

The Madras Government, in a report to the Court of Directors written in March 1769, ascribed the failure of the campaign, principally to the want of hearty co-operation on the part of the Nawāb, to the want of cavalry, and to the want of money; but the feeling of indignation occasioned by the mismanagement in the field was so general throughout the service that it was found expedient to assemble a Committee for the purpose of ascertaining the causes of the failure in respect of carriage and provisions.

In November 1769, this Committee submitted their report. They admitted the great impropriety of the Members of Council having been principals in the contract, but ascribed the bad condition of the cattle generally to causes over which the contractors had no control, *viz.*, rainy weather, bad roads, want of forage, etc., etc., and they exonerated them from any default in

the matter of victualling the Europeans. It was allowed that the rice furnished to the Native troops had been bad in quality and deficient in quantity, but it was held that for this the Nawāb and his agents were to blame, as they had engaged to make the supply.

The Madras Government in their letters to England, defended themselves both in regard to the contract, as well as the general management of the war, but their conduct was condemned by the Court of Directors in almost every particular.

The following extract from their general letter, dated 15th September 1769, contains their opinion regarding the appointment of the Field Deputies:—

“Upon the return of the army from the Mysore country into the Carnatic, we find that the Field Deputies are come back to the Presidency of Madras. We cannot but disapprove of their original appointment which could have no other tendency but to impede the operations of the campaign, and give rise to very mischievous disputes betwixt the Commander-in-Chief and the Deputies, by which we fear the public service has suffered essentially.

\*            \*            \*

“Our opinion is that when the Company has made choice of a proper person to be a Commander-in-Chief, all trust and confidence should be reposed in him to direct the plans and operations of the campaign.”

In March 1770, the Court, when reviewing the conduct of the war, observed they were satisfied that the army had not been properly supplied either with provisions, stores, or carriage; and in reply to the explanation given by the Madras Government regarding the contract, they made the following remarks with reference to the acceptance of Mr. Call's tender in 1761, and the arrangement then made by the Members of Council to take shares in the contract:—

“The advantages of the Council (you say) were small; therefore, Mr. Call proposed that the members thereof should

become joint subscribers for carrying on the business of that contract, which it was their duty to put on the best and most beneficial footing for the Company.

\* \* \* \*

“We were yet much more astonished and concerned to find that of all the Members of our Council, not one had honour or virtue enough to reject a proposal which was as wholly incompatible with their duty, as it was unworthy of their character and station to accept.”

The Court then proceeded to dwell on the fact that after this arrangement had been made, no public tenders were again invited. With respect to the manner in which the contract had been fulfilled, the Court were of opinion that “the contractors had an eye to the profits, rather than any regard to promote the public interests”—they also pronounced the defence to be contradictory, loose, and unsatisfactory, and the omission to advertise for fresh tenders to have been “highly criminal.”

The result of all this was the organisation of a department for the supply of provisions and carriage.

The actual effect of the mismanagement of the campaign and the treaty which concluded it was that Haidar, when he next got embroiled with the Mahrattas, sought the aid of the English at Madras, who, remaining neutral, became his mortal enemies, upon whom he vowed vengeance.

Haidar levies contributions from Cuddapah and Kurnool.

Haidar was soon again in the field, in order to acquire the means to meet the meditated Mahratta invasion. When he had allied himself with Nizām Āli, it was secretly stipulated that Cuddapah, Kurnool and other places up to the Tungabhadra, should be transferred to the control of Mysore. He resolved now to enforce this agreement, and, moving north-east, levied contributions on the Pathan Nawābs of Cuddapah and Kurnool and the *pālegārs* of the neighbourhood. He, however,



feigned friendship for Morāri Rao, and was repulsed in an attempt on Bellary. But, unable to meet the superior forces of the Mahrattas, now (1770) in full march on his capital, he gradually retired before them, laying waste the whole country to prevent their advance, and placing a detachment at Bednur, under Tipū, to cut off their supplies and harass them in the rear. Negotiations being opened, Mādhava Rao demanded a crore of rupees; Haidar would offer only twelve lakhs. Both parties claimed help from the English, who therefore remained neutral.

The Mahrattas conquered the whole of the north and east of the country, their progress being, however, long arrested by a gallant defence of the little fort of Nijagal (Nelamangala Taluk), which was at last taken by the pālegār of Chitaldrug, who had joined the Mahrattas. Madhava Rao was now taken ill and returned to Poona, leaving Tryambak Māma in command. Haidar was emboldened by this change and took the field, but met with no success. At last an attempt to retreat unobserved by way of the Mēlkōte hills being discovered, Haidar's army was attacked, disorganized, and totally routed with great slaughter, at Chinkurali, on the 5th of March 1771. Haidar fled on horseback to Seringapatam. Tipū, who was thought to have fallen, escaped in disguise. For ten days the Mahrattas were engaged in dividing their spoils. They then sat down before Seringapatam with a large force, the remainder being employed in ravaging the whole country above and below the Ghats. Haidar could produce little effect on them, and in June, 1772, a treaty was concluded, by which he bound himself to pay thirty lakhs of rupees, one-half at once, besides five lakhs for "durbār expenses"! For the balance, Kolar, Hoskote, Dodballapur, Sira, Maddagiri, Chanrāyadurga and Guramkonda were left in their hands.

Mahratta  
incursion,  
1771.

Public  
exactions to  
meet  
Mahratta  
demands.

Haidar next turned his attention to the reigning King. Nanja Rāja had, as stated before, opened negotiations with the Mahrattas through Tryambak Rao. He was therefore strangled, and his brother, Chāma Rāja, put in his place. Haidar next proceeded to extort money from all who were supposed to have any, applying the torture wherever necessary. Even his brave general, Fazal Ulla Khān, was not spared, nor Nanja Rāja, his old benefactor. The latter survived only one year, the former gave up all he had and died in extreme poverty. Fazal Ulla Khān surrendered every pie and died in a *wretched pal*, or private tent, a patched remnant of his former splendour.

Conquest of  
Coorg, 1773.

Mādhava Rao died in November 1772, his successor Nārāyan Rao was killed in August 1773, and Raghunātha Rao or Raghōba became ostensible Pēshwa. Haidar considered the time favourable for action. He sent an embassy to Madras to form an alliance with the English. Tipu was detached to the north to recover the places ceded to the Mahrattas, while Haidar suddenly invaded Coorg, as the first step towards reconquering Malabār. The Coorgs, entirely unprepared, were surrounded by his troops, and a reward of five rupees was offered for every head. About 700 had been paid for, when, struck by the fine features, Haidar relented and ordered the massacre to cease. The landholders were confirmed in their possessions on a moderately increased rent, a fort was erected at Mercara, and Dēvaiya, the Rāja, who had become a fugitive, was captured and sent to Seringapatam.

Reconquest  
of Malabar,  
1778.

A force was at once despatched to Malabār, which seized Calicut and reduced the Nāir chiefs to dependence in a wonderfully short time. Tipu was equally successful in the north, and thus, between September 1773 and



February 1774, Haidar completely recovered all the territory he had lost. A treaty was shortly formed with Raghōba, by which Haidar engaged to support his pretensions to be the head of the Mahratta State, in consideration of the tribute payable from Mysore being reduced to six lakhs. An insurrection in Coorg was promptly put down, and Haidar returned with his army to Seringapatam early in 1775. The negotiations with the English unfortunately came to nothing, owing to the intrigues of Muhammad Alī, and Haidar therefore turned towards the French.

Chāma Rāja now (1775) died, and there being no heir to the throne, Haidar, who had so far professed to hold Mysore on behalf of the Hindu Royal House, resorted to the following method of selecting one:—Assembling all the male children of the different branches of the family, he introduced them into a hall strewn with fruits, sweetmeats, and toys, telling them to help themselves. They were soon scrambling for the things, when one little fellow took up a dagger in one hand and a lime in the other. “That is the Rāja!” exclaimed Haidar, “his first care is military protection, his second to realize the produce of his dominions; bring him hither and let me embrace him.” Thus did Chāma Rāja IX, a member of the Kārugahalli family, obtain the throne, and he was accordingly installed as Rāja. Haidar, however, continued to wield his usurped authority in unabated fashion. An inscription dated in 1774 (*E.C.* V, Belur 65) truthfully represents Chāma-Rāja VIII as the King and the Nawāb, the most excellent Bahādur Haidar Alī, as the Administrator.

Death of  
Chāmarāja-  
Wodeyar  
VIII. Acces-  
sion of  
Chāmarāja  
Wodeyar, IX  
1776-1796 A.D.

About this time, Haidar received a body of 1,000 men from Shiraz in Persia to serve in his army, and sent an embassy for more. But the latter was lost in the Gulf

Attack on  
Bellary,  
Gooty, etc.

of Cutch and the first instalment did not long survive the change of climate. Diplomatic agents were now employed to foment dissensions in such neighbouring States as Haidar had resolved to conquer. His assistance was thus applied for by the *pālegār* of Bellary, who, having been induced by such emissaries to declare his independence, was attacked by Basalat Jang. Haidar marched to the relief in the incredibly short space of five days, fell upon the besiegers before they knew he had left his capital, and completely routed them, the commander being killed, and Lally escaping with difficulty. But Haidar promptly took their place in the batteries, and forced the chief to surrender it to himself at discretion. Meanwhile the forces sent in pursuit of Basalat Jang were bought off with a lakh of *pagodas*. A demand was next made by Haidar on Morāri Rao of Gooty and refused. A siege ensued, and after some months, Gooty was taken, all its dependencies added to Mysore and Morāri Rao sent prisoner, first to Seringapatam and then to Kabbal-durga, where he shortly died.

Haidar and  
Raghōba.  
Invasion of  
Mahratta  
territories up  
to Krishna,  
1775.

Meanwhile Raghōba's power had met with a reverse which caused him to fly to Surat, where, on the 6th of March 1775, a treaty was concluded with the English to aid him in recovering his authority. He also proposed to Haidar to take possession of the Mahratta territories up to the Krishna, that he might be at hand to assist. No second invitation was needed. All the tributary *pālegārs* in the north were summoned to attend with their troops, and Savanur was overrun; but the monsoon bursting with such violence as to cause great mortality in the army, Haidar, disbanding the troops, returned to Seringapatam. All the Amildārs were, however, summoned to the capital, the rates of revenue were investigated and increased, the *peshkash* payable by tributaries

was also raised, and finally a general contribution under the name of *nazarana* was levied on the whole country for the expenses of the war.

Of the claimants to Mahratta sovereignty, Raghōba being supported by Haidar, while Nizām Ali declared for the ministerial party and the reputed son of Nārāyan Rao, a joint invasion of Mysore by the latter was the consequence. Four chiefs were sent in advance to clear Savanur of Haidar's troops; but they were skilfully and completely defeated by his general at Saunsi, two of them being taken prisoners. The main armies of the confederates now approached. The Mahrattas, under Parasu Rām Bhao, numbered 30,000, and were to march south-east through Savanur. The army of Nizām Ali, estimated at 40,000, under Ibrāhim Khān, were to move south by Raichur. Haidar took post at Gooty. Parasu Rām Bhao, on hearing of the defeat of the advance corps, fell back beyond the Krishna for reinforcements. Ibrāhim Khān, informed of this movement, and secretly bribed by Haidar, thereupon also retired beyond the Krishna, after he had marched as far as Adōni. The rains set in, and put a stop to further proceedings for the present. The Nawāb of Cuddapah and the *pālegār* of Chitaldrug, instead of assisting Haidar, had joined the enemy. He resolved now to punish them, and sat down before Chitaldrug. It was bravely defended for months, when Haidar, aware that 60,000 Mahrattas, under Hari Pant, were approaching, concluded an agreement to retire on payment of thirteen lakhs of *pagodas*.

Mahrattas  
and Nizām  
invade  
Mysore.

Haidar thence advanced to meet the enemy, in whose forces his agent had managed, by a bribe of six lakhs of rupees, to secure the treachery of a chief of 10,000, who was to come over in the first action. The Mahrattas, after waiting in vain for the forces of Nizām Ali, crossed

Nizām's  
defection:  
Mahrattas  
driven off,  
1777.

the Tungabhadra. The armies met at Raravi. Manaji Pankria, the chief who had been bribed, hesitated. Haidar, suspecting double treason, made dispositions which excited the suspicions of Hari Pant, who saw he was betrayed, but knew not to what extent. "In a few moments an impenetrable cloud of dust arose both in front and rear of the Mahratta line, which neither decidedly approached nor decidedly receded; it was evidently the mass of their cavalry in full charge; but not towards Haidar. Some time had elapsed before he perceived that the corps of Manaji Pankria had been enveloped and swept off the field, and that a powerful rear-guard presented itself to cover the retreat of the whole. The armies had not sufficiently closed to render pursuit decisive, and two guns only were lost by Hari Pant in effecting his retreat behind the Tungabhadra, where a strong position secured him from assault and afforded him leisure to investigate the extent of the disaffection which had produced his retreat. The troops of Manaji Pankria had made a tolerably gallant resistance, and attempted to move in mass towards Haidar; the greater part, however, were cut to pieces, and Manaji Pankria himself wounded, and, accompanied by no more than thirty select friends, had opened a way through the surrounding mass, and made good his escape to Haidar." But the project of invasion was thus defeated. Hari Pant retreated. Haidar rapidly followed, and drove the enemy over the Krishna in December 1777. He now reduced all the forts between the Krishna and the Tungabhadra, making the *Deshayis*, or chiefs, tributary to himself.

Capture of  
Chitaldrug  
and  
Cuddaspah.

Haidar then returned to Chitaldrug, which was taken at last in March 1779, by treachery, as related in the history of the place. The Bēdar population, to the number of 20,000, were deported to people the island of

Seringapatam, while all the boys were converted and trained up as soldiers, forming what were called *Chela* battalions. A young Nair, who had been taken from Malabār and forcibly converted to Islām, with the name of Sheikh Ayaz, was appointed Governor of Chitaldrug. He was a handsome youth, and Haidar had formed the most exalted opinion of his merits, frequently upbraiding his son Tipu for inferiority to him. "Modest as he was, faithful and brave, Ayaz wished to decline the distinction as one to which he felt himself incompetent; and particularly objected that he could neither read nor write, and was consequently incapable of a Civil charge." "Keep a *Korla* at your right hand," said Haidar, "and that will do you better service than pen and ink." Then assuming a graver countenance, "Place reliance," added he, "on your excellent understanding: act from yourself alone: fear nothing from the calumnies of the scribblers; but trust in me as I trust in you. Reading and writing! how have I risen to empire without the knowledge of either?" The *Korla* referred to was a long whip of cotton rope, about an inch and a half in diameter at the thick end where it is grasped, and tapering to a point at the other extremity; this severe instrument of personal punishment is about nine feet long; and Haidar was constantly attended by a considerable number of persons too constantly practised in its use. Cuddapah was the next object of attack. The Pathān guards were surprised and forced to surrender; the Nawāb retired to Sidhout, and Cuddapah was taken without opposition. But Haidar was near losing his life by a plot of the Afghans. Admiring their courage, he had taken into his service all who could find security for their behaviour, among his own followers. Eighty, who had not succeeded, were left that night with their arms near his tent. They suddenly arose at dead of night, slew the guards, and made for Haidar's tent. The noise awaking him, he

guessed the danger, pushed the bolster into the bed to resemble a sleeping figure, and, slitting a hole in the tent, escaped. The assassins rushed in and cut at the bed. Paralysed with astonishment to find their victim gone, they were instantly overpowered. Of those who survived till morning, some had their hands and feet chopped off, and the rest were dragged at the feet of elephants. Sidhout surrendered on the 27th of May, and Abdul Halim Khān, the Nawāb, was sent prisoner to Seringapatam. His sister, whose sense of honour was only equalled by her beauty, which surpassed that of any female captive yet secured, threatened to destroy herself, rather than enter the unlimited *harem* of the conqueror in the usual informal manner. The ceremony of *nika* was therefore performed, and this lady, under the title of Bakshi Bēgam, was soon after placed at the head of the seraglio.

Reorganiz-  
ation of  
Civil  
Departments.

On returning to the capital, a complete revision was made of the civil departments. Mir Sādak was made finance minister and Shāmaiya head of the police and post-office. Since the defection of Khande Rao, every one of Haidar's ministers, Hindu and Muhammadan alike, had died from tortures inflicted to recover real or pretended defalcations. The undoubted ability of Shāmaiya developed to the utmost perfection the system of espionage and fabrication of such charges, to atone for which the utmost farthing was exacted under the pressure of tortures which often terminated the lives of the unfortunate victims. A system was introduced of paying the troops on half-monthly *pattis* (lists) instead of monthly, which gradually resulted in their getting only nine or ten months' pay for the year. A double marriage was arranged in 1779 with the family of the Nawāb of Savanur, whose eldest son was united to Haidar's daughter, and Haidar's second son Karim, to



the Nawāb's daughter. The ceremonies were celebrated with great pomp at Seringapatam, and accompanied with the gift of the unrestored half of Savanur to the Nawāb.

During these festivities, an envoy arrived from the ministerial party at Poona, by whom Haidar was expecting an invasion. But, induced by the hopelessness of Raghōba's cause, once again a fugitive, and other considerations, Haidar entered into a treaty. On condition that Raghōba's grant of territories up to the Krishna was confirmed, the future tribute fixed at eleven lakhs of rupees, and all arrears cancelled, he agreed to co-operate with the dominant Mahratta party and Nizām Ali for the expulsion of the English from India. The failure of negotiations with the latter had made him ill-disposed towards them. Two events gave ground for open hostilities. The English being then at war with the French, Pondicherry was taken in October 1778, and Mahe in March 1779. The capture of the former did not directly affect Haidar, but the latter was the port through which he received military supplies from the Mauritius. He had, therefore, declared it to be under his protection, as being situated in his territory, and had threatened to lay waste the province of Arcot if it were attacked. The other event was that an English corps under Colonel Harper, marching to relieve Adōni, proceeded through the territory of Cuddapah without formal permission obtained from Haidar, to whom it now belonged, the Commanding Officer being merely furnished with a letter to the Manager of the district.

Treaty with  
the  
Mahrattas.

The news of this reached Haidar at the very time that the missionary Schwartz had arrived at Seringapatam, commissioned by the Governor of Madras to assure him of the amicable designs of the English Government,

Second  
Mysore War  
July 1780-  
March 1784.  
Mr. Gray,  
envoy from  
Madras.

"If the English offer the hand of peace and concord, I will not withdraw mine," said Haidar, but he sent letters to the Governor requiring reparation for the alleged grievances, and referring to his unfulfilled threat of revenge. Meanwhile, some English travellers who landed at Calicut were seized and conveyed to Seringapatam. Mr. Gray, Member of Council, was sent as an envoy to demand their release, and to bring about a good understanding. But Haidar, on finding that none of them were military, had let them go, and Mr. Gray met them on his way; but he proceeded on to the capital, where he was treated with studied disrespect, for war had been determined on.

Haidar's  
invasion of  
the Carnatic,  
July 1780.

After prayers for success, in both mosques and temples, Haidar Ali left his capital and descended the Ghâts by the Chengama Pass on the 20th July 1780, with a force of 90,000 men, unequalled in strength and efficiency, by any indigenous army that had ever been assembled in the south of India. French officers of ability (Mons. Pimorin and Lally the younger) guided the operations, and the commissariat was under the management of Pûrnaiya, one of the ministers of finance. A body of horse, under his second son, Karîm Sâhib, plundered Porto Novo on the 22nd; a larger body proceeded towards Madras, burning the villages and mutilating the people who lingered near them. From Pulicat to Pondicherry a line of desolation, extending from thirty to fifty miles inland, was drawn round Madras. The black columns of smoke were visible from St. Thomas' Mount, and the bleeding victims were pouring into Madras. On the evening of the 24th July, a body of horse appeared at St. Thomas' Mount and pillaged St. Thome and the adjoining villages. All the families in the neighbourhood of Madras retired into the fort that night, and every residence beyond the island was vacated, except Govern-



ment House, which was protected by a company of sepōys and a party of artillery with two guns.

The Madras Government under Mr. Whitehead, though frequently warned by some of its own members, had remained wholly supine until the 24th July, when the appearance of the enemy compelled them to issue orders for the concentration of all the troops at their disposal. Colonel Braithwaite, commanding at Pondicherry, was directed to evacuate that place and march to Madras. He reached St. Thomas Mount on the 24th August. On the 6th August, Colonel Cosby was sent from Madras to the south to organise a detachment for intercepting any convoys which might come through the passes for Haidar's army. A number of minor forts in the Karnatic were garrisoned, among them Wandiwash by Lieutenants Flint and Parr detached from Braithwaite's forces. About the end of July, the Government resolved to assemble the army at Conjeeveram, and they directed Colonel Long to send the battalion of European infantry from Vellore to that place. Lord Macleod, commanding H.M. 73rd Regiment at Poonamalli, was sent for to Madras and offered the command of the army. Lord Macleod earnestly protested against the proposal to assemble the troops at Conjeeveram at a time when the whole country was occupied by Haidar, and he recommended the concentration near Madras of all available troops previous to undertaking operations. He also objected to the removal of the European battalion from Vellore, and concluded by saying that a proper regard to his reputation would not permit him to adopt a responsibility in the execution of plans which did not coincide with his own judgment.

Inactivity of  
Madras Gov-  
ernment.

General Sir Hector Munro maintained his own view and it was decided he should assume command of the

Sir Hector  
Munro's  
Campaign—  
its Failure.

army in the field and marched to Conjeeveram, there to effect a junction with the troops expected from various quarters; which were ultimately restricted to the detachments of Baillie and Cosby. On the 21st August, Haidar invested Arcot and on the 26th, the British troops at St. Thomas' Mount marched for Conjeevaram, partly in order to cause Haidar to raise the siege of Arcot, and partly for the purpose of effecting a junction with Colonel Baillie's detachment then marching from the north. On the 15th June, Colonel Baillie had been ordered to march from Ellore to Inacondah in the Guntoor District, so as to be south of the river Krishna in the event of his being required in the Karnatic. He arrived on the 15th July and on the 25th, he was directed to proceed to Cuddapah for the purpose of effecting a division. This measure was protested against and was subsequently dropped. At the same time, the western route by Tirupati was recommended to intercept some of Haidar's convoys. Colonel Baillie reached Nellore on the 16th, and on the 24th was about 4 miles south of Gummadipundi, about 27 miles from Madras, which he could have reached by one forced march, the road being clear. But at Gummadipundi, he received a letter from General Munro directing him to march to Conjeeveram by Periapālaiyam and Tirupāssur. In compliance with this ill-advised order, to which the disasters of the campaign have been attributed, Baillie struck off to the south-west, and reached the bank of the Corteliar near Vungul on the 25th. Owing to heavy rains, he did not cross the river until the afternoon of the 3rd September (Wilks says the 4th, but both Baillie and Munro in their Reports give the 3rd as the date). Haidar, having received intelligence of this change of route, which brought Baillie's detachment straight towards him, detached Tipū with a division estimated at 40,000 horse and foot with 12 guns in order to intercept

Baillie, while he himself with the rest of his army, advanced to within a short distance of General Munro's camp at Conjeeveram.

On the afternoon of the 6th, Colonel Baillie reported that he had on that day been engaged with, near Perambākam, from 11 A.M. until 2 P.M., a large body of the enemy which he had beaten off, but that he could not venture to leave his position, and therefore requested the General to move to his assistance. The letter reached Sir Hector Munro on the 8th, but he being of opinion that it was necessary for him to remain at Conjeeveram with the main body for the protection of his stores and provisions, contented himself with sending a detachment composed of the flank companies of the army under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher. This detachment left camp on the night of the 8th, but Colonel Fletcher, having skilfully evaded the enemy, joined Baillie at Perambākum early in the morning of the 9th. About 8 o'clock that night, Baillie, in conformity with orders, set out for Conjeeveram. Shortly afterwards, fire was opened upon the column, but this was soon silenced, and the detachment was prepared to resume the march when Colonel Baillie suddenly resolved to halt until daylight contrary to the orders received, and also against the opinion of Colonel Fletcher who urged him to push on to Conjeeveram, then distant only 8 or 9 miles. To this Baillie would not assent, and the troops lay on their arms all night unmolested.

Engagement  
at Perambā-  
kum.

The march was recommenced about daylight and the detachment had proceeded about two miles when the enemy began to fire from four or five guns in the plain at a considerable distance from the left flank. This was followed by a charge of Tipū's select horse which was repulsed with heavy loss (one account puts it at 1,200).

Second en-  
gagement at  
Perambākum.

Captains Rumley and Gowdie, with the sepoy grenadiers, were then sent against the guns, and succeeded in taking three or four, but the sepoys had lost their order during the advance, and being charged in flank by a large body of cavalry, they fell back in some confusion, and with some loss. Haidar who had sent off his infantry and guns towards Perambakum on the previous night unobserved by Munro, followed with his cavalry before daybreak, and was now seen advancing in force. A cross fire from 50 or 60 pieces of artillery was then opened on the detachment, and shortly afterwards two, or according to some accounts, three tumbrils were blown up. Many were killed by the explosion, and the camp followers rushing in for protection, the troops, both European and Indian, were thrown into disorder. The Europeans were speedily rallied, and although exposed to a heavy fire from 7-30 to 9 or 10 A.M. without the means of returning it, they repulsed no less than thirteen separate attacks. The sepoys, who had become mixed up with the camp followers, no longer preserved any order. Baillie, worn out at last and hoping to save the lives of his men, ordered them to lay down their arms; which had no sooner been done than the enemy rushed in, and commenced an indiscriminate slaughter which lasted until stopped by the French Officers with Haidar's army. Of eighty-six European Officers, including those on the Staff and the Surgeons, thirty-six were killed or died of their wounds, and fifty, of whom thirty-four were wounded, were taken prisoners. Thus ended the second action at Perambakum, which assumed such an importance in Tipu's mind that he got the details of the action caricatured on the walls of his palace—Darya Doulat—at Seringapatam.

General  
Munro's  
movements.

General Munro arrived at Conjeeveram on the 29th August, and on the 6th September moved on to an

elevated spot about two miles on the road to Perambākum, where he encamped. Haidar's camp was then on the left at a distance of two miles. On the 8th, Baillie's application for assistance arrived, and the General, after some consideration, determined to send a detachment instead of proceeding in person with the whole army. The reasons which influenced him, as explained by himself in a letter to Government, were his own highly critical situation at Conjeeveram, his only hopes of provisions being from the paddy he had collected in the *pagoda*, his proximity to Haidar's camp, his fear that, if he moved with his whole force, Haidar would most certainly possess himself of his (the General's) ground and Conjeeveram and thereby cut him off from all provisions. In that case, he said, he must have starved. He, therefore, resolved, with the concurrence of his principal officers, to send a strong detachment and to remain with the rest of the troops to watch the enemy's movements. He flattered himself that so strong a detachment as he had sent would enable Colonel Baillie to join him, the more so as he had sent word to him to begin his march on the 9th September and march all night towards him—which was the one thing which, despite Fletcher's admonition—Baillie's failed to do. After sending off the detachment, General Munro ordered the tents to be struck, and the men lay on their arms all night. Firing was heard about mid-night, but it soon ceased, and no alarm was occasioned thereby. About daybreak, heavy firing was heard from the direction of Perambākum, and the army marched immediately. After proceeding about 4 miles, smoke was seen on the left. The line of march was altered accordingly, but after going a short distance, the direction was again altered towards the right (Sir Thomas Munro, who was present, records that it was obvious to everyone that the guides were leading the army away from the scene of action), and was so main-

tained for about 2 miles when a wounded sepoy brought intelligence of Baillie's defeat. Upon this, the army retreated to Conjeeveram, where it arrived at about 6 o'clock in the evening.

His retreat to  
Madras.

Sir Hector Munro, finding himself without provisions and having no hopes of assistance, determined to retreat to Madras. The heavy guns and all stores which could not be removed were thrown into the large tank at Conjeeveram, and the retreat commenced early on the morning of the 11th. The army was harassed all the way to Chingleput by a numerous body of cavalry and lost a large quantity of ammunition and military stores, besides camp equipage and private baggage. It arrived at Chingleput on the morning of the 12th and was there joined by a detachment from the south under Colonel Cosby, who had tried to carry Chittapet by escalade but had been repulsed with loss. The casualties, according to Innes Munro, were heavy, as many as 500 sepoys being killed or wounded between Conjeeveram and Chingleput. The rear guard of the retreating army was wholly made up of sepoys, who behaved splendidly, despite the fact that several of them had fought on two consecutive days in the advances of Baillie and Munro and had been physically worn out with fatigue and exhaustion. The army resumed the march from Chingleput on the 13th September, and encamped at Māmbalam (the Marmalong of History), between St. Thomas' Mount and Madras, on the succeeding day.

His conduct  
criticised.

As Wilson points out, different views have been taken regarding the course taken by General Munro in detaching Fletcher to Baillie's instead of proceeding himself. His subsequent action—after despatching Fletcher—shows what he thought of his own decision.



Although considered unwise by most, it was defended by some, amongst them by Innes Munro and Lieutenant Liridsay, H.M. 73rd Regiment. In other respects, however, the conduct of this short campaign has been universally condemned, more especially the selection of an unsafe point of junction for Baillie's detachment, and the failure to support it on the morning of the 10th September. The Court of Directors were so much dissatisfied, that in January 1782, they sent out orders for General Munro's removal, offering him at the same time, the option of submitting his general conduct while in command to the judgment of a Court of Enquiry or Court Martial. These instructions, however, were not received at Madras until Sir Hector Munro had sailed for England.

Baillie's mistake in not keeping up to Sir Hector Munro's injunction has been severely censured by Innes Munro, who writes in his *Narrative*:—

Baillie's  
mistake.

"While I profess my admiration of the enterprising spirit of Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie, and lament his unhappy fate, yet, as the melancholy period of his expedition will probably become the topic of general conversation in many circles of your acquaintance at home, it may be proper to point out to you, who are unacquainted with the nature of military operations, two circumstances which appear to have materially contributed to the accomplishment of this fatal disaster. His halting so long in the night, contrary to the instructions sent to him from the General by Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, was unquestionably an imprudent measure. The speedy union of the two armies was essential to the preservation of both; and had he continued his route, this must have been effected early in the morning, in despite of every obstacle, which would have put the general in a condition to execute his intended plan of giving battle to the enemy, and opening a passage to Arcot, the only place where provisions were to be found. It seemed also a great omission in Colonel Baillie not to take possession of the village of Pollilore, which was not then above eight



hundred yards from his right, in place of indulging Tippoo in his views of procrastination until his father should arrive, by drawing up his army on disadvantageous ground, and sending out detachments to seize guns that could render him, though successful, no material advantage. Even after Haidar's division appeared clearly to be in possession of the village, it may with reason be supposed that the detachment of grenadiers which marched from our army, led by an officer of such intrepidity and judgment as Lieutenant-Colonel Fletcher, (supported by the rest of Colonel Baillie's command under his own gallant direction, having their flanks properly secured by the British artillery as they advanced), would have put him in safe possession of the village, where he might have made a successful stand until joined by the main army then rapidly marching towards him, nor ought the water-course intervening to have been considered on such an occasion as any material obstacle. Human nature, however, is never infallible. Events are deduced by means which at the time are not equally perceptible to all: misconception therefore, particularly when it leads to unparallelled suffering and disaster, is not surely to be imputed as a fault. The gallantry of Colonel Baillie was undoubted; his virtues were acknowledged by all; and his calamitous end must excite the sigh of pity in every bosom not wholly unassailable by the accumulated misfortunes of another."

Madras  
Government's  
plan of  
operations.

The original mistake, however, lay in the plan of operations adopted by the Madras Government, which shifted the field of battle from near Madras to Congeeveram. What Innes Munro says is right when he observes :—

"In a review of this melancholy and fatal event, that no imputation may fall on any individual, it is necessary to recur to the origin of the ill-concerted expedition. It was first suggested, as has been already observed, by the Navob of Arcot (who was very naturally solicitous to save his capital), and eagerly embraced by the council. The only plausible reason which they could adduce in support of a measure of such singular hazard, was the impossibility of supporting the army, when reinforced, in the vicinity of Madras. No provisions had been laid in by them, nor the smallest preparation

made for the support even of a force so inconsiderable. They therefore, without any consideration of probable contingencies, resolved upon sending out the army to forage for themselves, who were to be joined by another still worse provided than they were. Had Lieutenant-Colonel Baillie's detachment been ordered to repair to St. Thomas' Mount, as proposed by Sir Hector Munro and Lord Macleod, it is probable it would have accomplished the junction without molestation, as Hyder's whole army was then before Arcot. When united, they might then have had the ability to execute any judiciously concerted plan which might have tended to the relief of the settlement."

Haidar broke up his camp near Conjeeveram on the 19th September and returned to Arcot to prosecute his siege. The *pettah* was carried by assault and the place surrendered on the 3rd November. Various minor forts, including Gingee, gave themselves up. Amboor, under Captain Keating, held out for over a month but capitulated owing to want of ammunition on 15th January 1781 to Tipū and General Lally, who invested it with a large force. On the west coast, Major Cotgrave twice beat back in September and October 1780 Haidar's forces; Lieutenant Close (afterwards well known as Major-General Sir Barry Close, Bart) distinguishing himself in one of the actions.

Surrender of  
Arcot and  
minor forts.

Haidar's successes and the failure of Sir Hector Munro's campaign led the Supreme Government at Calcutta to interfere in Madras affairs. Warren Hastings, then at the head of affairs, sent out Lieutenant-General Sir Eyre Coote with a detachment. He also suspended Mr. Whitehill, the Governor at Madras, whose place was taken by Mr. Charles Smith, Senior Member of Council. On June 23rd, 1781, Lord Marcartney took over charge from Mr. Smith. Sir Eyre Coote reached Madras early in January 1781 and immediately took the field. On

Sir Eyre  
Coote's  
campaign,  
1781.

the 17th, he marched for the relief of Chingleput, Wandiwash and Perumukkal (Permacoil). Chingleput was relieved on the 19th, on the 21st Karunguli was taken by storm, on the 23rd Haidar decamped from Wandiwash, and about the same time the siege of Perumukkal was also raised. The army moved on to Pondicherry, where it remained inactive for a time. In April, Tiruvidi, 16 miles west of Fort St. David, was taken by a detachment under the personal command of Coote. A French fleet now appeared off the coast, and the English force moved to cover Cuddalore, which was threatened by Haidar with the view of occupying it as a depôt for the troops expected from France. But Sir Edward Hughes, being off the western coast with a British squadron, destroying Haidar's infant navy in his own ports of Calicut and Mangalore, the French fleet made off for Mauritius; and Haidar, who had avoided every opportunity of coming to close quarters with Coote, withdrew rapidly to the interior, leaving a sufficient force to intercept all supplies. While a want of these, and a wretched equipment, prevented the English from following, he ravaged the district of Tanjore, sending off to the upper country all that was movable, including immense herds of cattle. "Weavers and their families," adds Wilks, "were collected and forcibly sent to people the island of Seringapatam. Captive boys, destined to the exterior honour of Islam, were driven to the same place with equal numbers of females, the associates of the (then) present and the mothers of a future race of military slaves."

Battle of  
Porto Novo,  
1st July 1761.

In June, Coote moved out against Chidambaram, which had been used as a depôt for provisions, but, being repulsed, retired to Porto Novo with a view to procure battering guns. Encouraged by this and overestimating the effect of the repulse, Haidar made a forced march of

a hundred miles in two days and a half, and placed himself between the English and Cuddalore. Sir Edward Hughes at this juncture arrived off the coast. While with a portion of the squadron he protected Cuddalore, the English force, with only four days' rice, carried on the soldiers' backs, marched against Haidar's position; and on the same day, the 1st of July, was fought the battle of Porto Novo, in which, with a force one-eighth that of the enemy, Sir Eyre Coote, after a severe engagement, completely beat Haidar's army from the field. Haidar Ali, who was watching the operations seated on a stool on a small hill, was near being taken prisoner. He was conveyed out of danger by a faithful groom, who made bold to force the slippers on his master's feet, saying, "We will beat them to-morrow; in the meantime, mount your horse." He reluctantly left the field, pouring forth a torrent of abuse.

The following is taken from Coote's account of the battle, dated Camp near Cuddalore, 6th July 1781:—

Coote's  
description  
of the battle.

"One extra day's rice was landed, and the march at length commenced on the 1st instant at 5 in the morning. From every information received, it was clear that the enemy had united their whole forces (Tippoo's detachment excepted) and from their position taken up between us and Cuddalore, meant to try the issue of a general engagement. The grounds they occupied, naturally strong and commanding, were rendered much more formidable by most of the spots that would admit of it being strengthened with front and flanking batteries erected with judgment and despatch by Hyder Ally's corps appropriated for such services. Large bodies of cavalry, who had from our arrival at Porto Novo hovered round our camp, rendered it impossible for even a single hircarrah to return with any intelligence to be depended on, of either the strength or position of the enemy's batteries. Our grand guard, and the other outposts were absolutely the boundary and limited extent of our knowledge respecting the enemy. The protection of our baggage and numerous followers required

a very considerable proportion of our small army to prevent or repel any insult during our march in that quarter, and forming the most necessary detachment considerably weakened our force in line, which could ill-afford a single man from the grand object of engaging and forcing the numerous army of Hyder Ally situated as described. However, two regiments of cavalry, a battalion of sepoys with three 6=<sup>and</sup> four 3=<sup>and</sup> pounders, the baggage guard consisting of about 150 sepoys, the few Polygars we have, and our small Mahratta corps, were ordered for their protection. Their road lay on the right between our army and the sea.

“By seven in the morning, the line had drawn out of our ground of encampment near Porto Novo marching from the right. The country soon opened into an extensive plain, and as the enemy's cavalry appeared there in force, I formed in two lines, and proceeded on my march in order of battle. We had not advanced above one mile when the enemy's batteries were clearly discovered. As to position, they lay exactly on our intended road of march. I halted the army for nearly an hour. It was necessary to explore, if possible, the ground on our right in hopes of its admitting an advance from that point by which we should avoid the enemy's direct fire from their batteries, and have a chance, by gaining the left of their posts, to turn, or otherwise command them.

“The principal force of their army was drawn up in rear of their works, extending further on the plain than either eye or horizon could command, with large bodies of cavalry in every direction, and their rockets were thrown in numbers to impede or harass our movements. During this interval of unavoidable inaction, thoroughly to examine their position, we were obliged to suffer a warm cannonade; their guns were well served and did execution.

“We could not afford to throw away many a shot to answer them, having occasion for every round we had for more decisive service.

“I determined upon the movement to the right, and proceeded about 9 o'clock, the two lines marching parallel to one another in that direction; consequently it only required their facing the front to reassume at any time their original order. Two battalions with eight field pieces were ordered to form a third face, the flanks of this corps joining both lines on the left

to keep some batteries in check from that quarter which opened while we were forming the above movement.

"A practicable road was found on the right, made by Hyder for other purposes than our approach. The road alluded to was made by Hyder for the purpose of drawing his guns to a large redoubt about half a mile from the sea. The work was far advanced and required but another day to complete it. Through it we proceeded towards the field. His guns which were under cover, and his artillery uncovered in line, galled us considerably as we advanced, and a quick and forward movement seemed absolutely necessary. On passing the road above mentioned, I was obliged to file off, and reduce my front, but as soon as the ground permitted, formed in order as before, a thick caldera (screw-pine) hedge covering my right. Some sand hills contiguous to this pass that lay luckily situated, were unoccupied, and contributed very materially to favour my plan of operations.

"The moment was critical. I had gained the flank of the enemy's batteries, waited with impatience under a very heavy fire of cannon till I had ascertained that the heights in my rear were passed by the second line, then instantly moved on with the first, as fast as order and an advancing fire of artillery on our side would permit.

"I have the pleasure of acquainting you that the disposition promptly resolved on succeeded, for there was no time for aught but decided despatch: hesitation in the situation of our affairs would have been little better than a defeat, having no resource but four days' provisions carried on the soldiers' backs. The guns in their batteries were soon drawn off, and retired to their line, when our attack was very warmly disputed till 4 o'clock.

"The bravery of our troops at length carried the point, and the first line forced the enemy's infantry, artillery, and their cavalry to give way, obliging them to seek for safety by a retreat. Just as they went off, their principal force of infantry, who were, from the situation of the ground, under tolerable cover, gave one general discharge of musketry, but too distant to do considerable execution.

"The second line obstinately disputed, and with success, an attack meditated on my rear by many battalions of infantry with their guns, and a very large body of cavalry.



"The different efforts made to force and charge the rear corps of the second line were all repulsed, the heights disputed were carried and kept possession of, by which the advancing corps were left at liberty to push on in front advantageously.

"The possessing the heights also prevented their proceeding towards the sea to attempt our baggage as it was from thence covered in perfect security and unmolested.

"I was joined by the corps in my rear at midnight. It took some time to bury our dead on the enemy's ground of encampment. Every possible attention was paid also on the field to our wounded men.

"That night the army pursued the road the enemy had retired by, crossed the strong pass or *nallah*, "Paravernar," without any molestation, and took up our ground on the north-west side of it near to the village of Mootypollam (Mötupālaiyam), thereby securing a material point towards completing my march to Cuddalore.

"From authentic information, the enemy's force was nearly as follows: Artillery 47 pieces very well served, 620 Europeans, 1,100 Topasses and others in European dress, Cavalry 40,000, 23 battalions of sepoys, strength 18,000. Irregular footmen armed with matchlocks, pikes, and rockets, 120,000. The above were in Hyder's own pay, besides lascars, pioneers, and artificers not included.

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"His guns were principally worked by Europeans, and Native Artillery who had formerly been in the Nabob's service, and it is reckoned that there were embodied in his infantry from 2,800 to 3,000 of our sepoys made prisoners in Colonel Baillie's action, and at other places since the commencement of the war.

"These accounts are taken from an intelligent Portuguese officer who has come over to us in the beginning of the action. They are also corroborated from other channels of intelligence.

"The behaviour of the whole army on this most interesting day was uniformly steady and worthy of the highest commendation.

"I was well seconded by Major-General Munro who commanded the first line. His spirited and active conduct contributed much to our success. Brigadier-General Stuart who commanded the second line, and had orders to defend the heights, performed that service much to my satisfaction.



"In short, every individual of our little army seemed to feel the critical situation of our national concerns.

"The only difficulty was to restrain the ardour of the troops within prudential bounds. Eager to advance, it became particularly necessary to guard against accidental disorder, situated as we were with multitudes of cavalry against us on the watch to take advantage of hurried, or confused movements.

"From the want of a corps of cavalry on our side equal in number to the service required, we were, with victory decidedly declared, obliged to halt just beyond the enemy's ground, not being able to take advantage of so distinguished a day; for with a corps of cavalry, the enemy's guns, stores, etc., etc., would to a certainty, have fallen into our hands. Their strong, fine cattle drew their guns off on a trot, nor was it possible for fatigued infantry to hinder this distressing sight to us.

"The spirited behaviour of our sepoy corps did them the greatest credit. No European could be steadier; they were emulous of being foremost on every service it was necessary to undertake."

Innes Munro, who was present at the battle, regrets that the enemy was not pursued and blames Coote for not giving the order for pursuit. He writes in his *Narrative*: Innes Munro's narrative.

"Upon the conclusion of this hard-contested business, how mortifying was it to find that no other advantage had been gained by us after such extreme fatigue than the simple possession of the field?—a compensation very inadequate to the loss of so many gallant soldiers. This might have been one of the most glorious and decisive victories ever obtained, had the General permitted the line to advance at an earlier period of the day. There cannot be a doubt but it would have finally terminated the war, as most of the enemy's guns must have inevitably fallen into our hands; for it was with the utmost difficulty they got them reconveyed across the *nullah* during the pursuit; a labour in which, by Meer Sahib's

gallantry, and our own tardiness, they were singularly favoured. It was also a matter of surprise to many in the army that the British cavalry were not ordered to pursue the fugitives, there being, with Marrattas and others, a thousand in the camp, a number that might have done considerable execution against a flying enemy if properly conducted, particularly as they had eight light three-pounders dragged by horses constantly attached to them."

Wandiwash, invested by Tipu, was again relieved, and he was recalled to join his father at Arcot.

Battle of  
Pollilore, 27th  
August 1781.

Haidar, resolved to risk another battle, chose, as being fortunate to himself, the very spot on which Colonel Baillie's detachment had been overcome, and the anniversary of that event was the day fixed on. Sir Eyre Coote, after forming a junction with the troops sent by land from Bengal, had taken Tirupāssur, and wished for nothing so much as to bring his enemy to action. The result was the battle of Pollilore, 17 miles south-west of Tirupāssur, fought on the 27th August, in which, after an engagement of eight hours, Haidar was forced to abandon the field. Coote in his description of this battle states that "had not Hyder Ally from a principle of superstition which we know regulates in a great measure the actions of the natives, chose to have met me at the ground on which he had formerly been successful, I could not have moved one mile further to the westward in quest of him, but must have been, for want of provisions, reduced to the necessity of returning without an action." Coote's information was that Haidar had on the day of action in the field 1,50,000 men with 80 pieces of cannon. He calculated Haidar's loss at near 2,000. Coote adds :—

"Hyder Ally's army was strongly posted. His troops covered in hollow ways and ranged just behind the summit of the rising ground in our front, would not stand when pushed.

Their loss consequently (was) not so considerable as it would have been had they waited the decision of the day from our musketry, but this they in general avoided, always drawing off their guns, and retiring before we can bring them to close action."

The English forces numbered about 11,000 Europeans and Indians included, the casualties being Europeans killed 28, wounded 28, and Indians killed 105, wounded 207, and missing 58. Wilks describes the action as a "dubious victory," while Mill takes much the same view and greatly exaggerates the English losses. Sir Thomas Munro, who was present as a subaltern at the battle, says that the enemy were forced from all their positions before sunset, and after standing a cannonade on open ground for a short time, fled in great hurry and confusion beyond Conjeeveram.

Haidar next took up a strong position in the pass of Sholinghur, to prevent the relief of Vellore, reduced almost to extremities. At the battle of Sholinghur, fought on the 27th of September, victory again declared for the English, and Vellore was saved. Haidar's forces precipitately fled from the field of action towards Kaveripak. The whole of Haidar's army was in the action and his losses exceeded, according to Coote, 2,000, while Wilks mentions it as being upwards of 5,000. The English losses were only 100 killed and wounded. The *pālegārs* of Chittoor now came over to the English, and Haidar, indignant at their desertion, detached a select corps to burn their villages and lay waste their country. But Sir Eyre Coote, placing himself at the head of a light corps, after an absence of thirty-eight hours, during thirty-two of which he had never dismounted from his horse, returned to camp, having completely surprised and defeated these troops, capturing all their equipments.

Battle of  
Sholinghur,  
27th September  
1781.

The diplomacy of Hastings: Haidar's position critical.

The energy of Warren Hastings, the Governor-General—never more conspicuous than at this critical time, when England, at war with America, France and Holland, was engaged in a life struggle in India with the Mahratta hosts in the west, and Haidar's armies in the south—having triumphed over the mischievous opposition of a Council which frustrated every public measure, had succeeded in withdrawing the active opposition of Nizām Āli and of one branch of the Mahrattas, under Madhoji Bhonsla. He now concluded a treaty with Sindhia, on the 13th October 1781, and the mediation of the latter was to be employed in bringing about a peace between the English and the Poona Mahrattas under Nāna Farnāvis, which was actually effected in May 1782. Meanwhile Haidar's *vakil* had ascertained that this was intended, and that the Mahrattas would unite with the English in compelling his master to make peace, unless the latter would at once give up all the territories acquired by him north of the Tungabhadra and all claims over the *pālegārs* to the south, in which case they undertook to continue the war and bring back Sindhia to the confederacy. Haidar now felt himself in a critical situation. He was beaten at all points by Sir Eyre Coote; he had received no adequate assistance from the French; the west coast was lost; Malabār, Coorg and Balam were in rebellion. The defeat of Colonel Braithwaite's corps at Annagudi, 6 miles N.-E. of Kumbakonam, by Tīpu, which occurred at this time (February 1782), had no permanent effect in improving his prospects. It was about this period that Haidar, being much indisposed, was, either by accident or design, left entirely alone with his minister Pūrnaiya; after being for some time apparently immersed in deep thought, he addressed himself to Pūrnaiya in the following words (related to Colonel Wilks by Pūrnaiya):—

“I have committed a great error, I have purchased a

draught of *sendi* (spirits) at the price of a lakh of *pagodas*: I shall pay dearly for my arrogance; between me and the English there were perhaps mutual grounds of dissatisfaction, but not sufficient cause for war, and I might have made them my friends in spite of Muhammad Ali, the most treacherous of men. The defeat of many Baillies and Braithwaites will not destroy them. I can ruin their resources by land, but I cannot dry up the sea; and I must be the first to weary of a war in which I can gain nothing by fighting."

He now resolved to abandon the east and to try his fortune in the west. In December, he sent all the heavy guns and stores to Mysore, compelled the people below the Ghāts to emigrate thither with their flocks and herds, destroyed the forts, and made arrangements for demolishing Arcot, when news suddenly arrived that a French force had actually arrived off Porto Novo (10th March 1782). But of the troops M. Bussy had originally embarked for the prosecution of his plans in India, the first division had been captured by Admiral Kempenfelt in December 1781, and a second in April 1782. Several naval engagements also took place at this time in Indian waters, in which the English uniformly gained the advantage. Cuddalore, however, was now taken by the French; and, forming a junction with Haidar, they carried Perumukkal in May, before Sir Eyre Coote could arrive for its relief. But on the 2nd of June was fought the battle of Ārni, in which the English were victorious, and nothing but the want of cavalry prevented a large capture of artillery. As it was, Haidar's loss included several tumbrils and a gun. On the 8th June, however, Coote's grand guard, consisting of a select body of cavalry and 100 sepoys, was nearly entirely destroyed at Nedd-  
ingal, between Ārni and Wandiwash, by a body of about 6,000 horse commanded by Haidar, Tipū and Lally. Apart from this unfortunate disaster, which was wholly due to the imprudent conduct of Lieutenant Cruityzer,

Campaign of  
1782.

the Officer in Command, who was taken prisoner, the campaign of 1782 proved a great success. Vellore was relieved by Ensign Byrne on 14th June 1782. Sir Eyre Coote requiring a change of air, embarked for Bengal on the 28th September (1782) and was succeeded by Major-General James Stuart, Sir Hector Munro having previously resigned.

Operations on  
the West  
Coast—  
Haider's  
death, 7th  
December  
1782.

On the other coast, the corps sent to Malabār under Makhdum Ali was completely defeated and destroyed at Tricalore by Colonel Humberstone, the commander being killed. Nothing could be done during the monsoon to retrieve this disaster, but as soon as the weather permitted in November, Tipu, assisted as usual by Lally's corps, under pretence of striking some blow near Trichinopoly, proceeded by forced marches across the peninsula, hoping to fall upon the English, who were preparing for the siege of Palghāthēri. But in this he was disappointed, and sustained a defeat at Paniani on the 25th. While waiting for reinforcements to renew the attack, an event occurred of the utmost importance. Haider's army in Coromandel had cantoned sixteen miles north of Arcot for the rains, the French being at Cuddalore, and the English at Madras. The health of Haider had been declining, and in November he developed an abscess, or cancer, in the back, known as the *rajpora*, or royal boil. The united efforts of Hindu, Muhammadan and French physicians did no good, and on the 7th of December 1782, this remarkable man breathed his last in his camp at Narasingarāyanpet, near Chittoor, at the age of sixty.

Character and  
personality of  
Haider Ali.

War first brought him to notice, and engaged in war he died. War was his element. The brief periods of repose between one warlike expedition and another were consumed in repairing the losses of the last, or providing



the means for the next. The arts and products of peace he valued only as they furnished the sinews of war. But it is impossible to withhold homage from the great natural talents which raised an unlettered adventurer to the supreme control of a powerful kingdom, or the indomitable energy and fertility of resource which found in the most desperate reverses but fresh opportunities of rising. He could neither read nor write any language, though he spoke fluently Hindustani, Kannada, Marathi, Telugu and Tamil. The sum of his literary attainments consisted in learning to write the initial of his own name, H, to serve as his signature on public occasions; but either from inaptitude to learn, or for the purpose of originality, he inverted its form, and signed thus, *hr* (copied from a grant in the Inam office). In person he is described as robust and of medium height, of dark complexion, with an aquiline nose and small eyes. Contrary to the usual custom of Musalmans, his face was clean shaven, even the eyebrows and eyelashes being removed. The most striking article of his dress was a scarlet turban, flat at the top, and of immense diameter. His uniform was flowered white satin, with yellow facings and yellow boots, and a white silk scarf round his waist. He was fond of show and parade on great occasions, and at such times was attended by a thousand spear-men, and preceded by bards who sang of his exploits in the Kannada language. He was an accomplished horse-man, a skilful swordsman, and a dead shot. He had a large *harem* of six hundred women, but his strong sensual instincts were never allowed to interfere with public business. From sunrise to past noon he was occupied in public durbār; he then made his first meal, and retired to rest for an hour or two. In the evening, he either rode out or returned to business. But frequently the night was enlivened with the performances of dancing girls or of actors of comedies. He took a



second meal about midnight and retired to rest, some times having drunk freely.

His characteristics and modes of business.

The following extracts from accounts by the Rev. W. Schwartz, who was sent by the English in 1769 to Haidar as a peace-maker, contain a graphic description of his characteristics and modes of business :—

“ Haidar's palace is a fine building in the Indian style. Opposite to it is an open place. On both sides are ranges of open buildings, where the military and civil servants have their offices, and constantly attend. Haidar can overlook them from his balcony. Here reigns no pomp, but the utmost regularity and despatch. Although Haidar sometimes rewards his servants, yet the principal motive is fear. Two hundred people with whips stand always ready to use them. Not a day passes on which numbers are not flogged. Haidar applies the same cat to all transgressors alike, gentlemen and horse-keepers, tax-gatherers and his own sons. And when he has inflicted such a public scourging upon the greatest gentlemen, he does not dismiss them. No, they remain in the same office, and bear the marks of the stripes on their backs as public warnings, for he seems to think that almost all people who seek to enrich themselves are void of all principles of honour.

“ When I came to Haidar, he desired me to sit down alongside of him. The floor was covered with exquisite tapestry. He received me very politely, listened friendly and with seeming pleasure to all I had to say. In reply, he spoke very openly and without reserve.....When I sat near Haidar, I particularly observed in what a regular succession, and with what rapid despatch, his affairs proceeded one after the other. Whenever he made a pause in speaking, an account was read to him of the district and letters received. He heard it, and ordered the answer immediately. The writers ran, wrote the letter, read it, and Haidar affixed his seal. Thus, in one evening, a great many letters were expedited. Haidar can neither read nor write, but his memory is excellent. He orders one man to write a letter and another to read it to him. If the writer has in the least deviated from his orders, his head pays for it. What religion people profess, or whether

they profess any at all, that is perfectly indifferent to him. He has none himself, and leaves every one to his choice."

English and French writers widely differ in their estimates of the character and greatness of Haidar. Captain Innes Munro of the 73rd (or Lord Macleod's) Regiment of Highlanders, who took an active part in the military operations on the Coromandel Coast against the combined forces of the French, Dutch and Haidar from the year 1780 to the peace concluded in 1784, has left on record a view of Haidar's talents which, besides being a contemporary one, is also fairly just to him. Writing in July 1780, he said :—

Varying  
European  
views :  
Innes  
Munro's  
opinion.

"Many have compared the military genius and character of Hyder Ally to those of the renowned Frederick the Second, king of Prussia; and indeed, when we consider the distinguished abilities of that prince amongst his contemporaries in this country, and the intrepid manner by which he had established himself upon the throne of Mysore, and extended his dominions, one cannot but allow the simile to be exceedingly just.

"Hyder Ally first placed himself at the head of the Mysore army entirely by his military prowess. A great part of that kingdom borders upon the Mahratta states, which occasions a constant enmity betwixt two powers. The Mahrattas, being in former times the most powerful warriors, were always making unlawful encroachments upon the Mysore territories; but when Hyder Ally came to head the troops of that nation against its enemies, he soon convinced the Mahrattas that his countrymen only wanted a proper leader to make ample retaliation; for, by his prudence and conduct in the art of war, he not only drove them back to their own country, but considerably extended the Mysore kingdom by acquisitions from the Mahratta frontiers, which all the efforts of the latter have been ineffectual to retrieve. By these exploits, he ingratiated himself much into the favour of his countrymen; and was particularly admired and respected by the soldiers under his command, for his singular address and intrepidity, although he was at the same time reckoned austere and arbitrary in his deportment. Hyder soon afterwards availed himself of this

attachment in the usual Asiatic manner; for, upon the demise of his sovereign, the old king of Mysore, he immediately usurped the throne under the title of regent and guardian to the young prince (who was then an infant); and has ever since assumed the supreme authority and titles of Navob of Mysore, keeping the real heir confined within the walls of Seringapatam, the capital of the Mysore country, who is occasionally exhibited to the public by way of show or form, as Mahomed Ally, the navob of Arcot, is at Madras by the Company, who, excepting empty titles, has in like manner been divested of every prerogative in the Carnatic.

"Hyder now became a terror to all his neighbours; for, having united the talents of a profound politician to those of an able warrior, he showed uncommon abilities in forming such judicious establishments, both civil and military, in his dominions, as in course of time rendered him the most formidable and potent prince in Hither Hindostan.

"As all great acquisitions in this country are made by force of arms, the first object with Hyder Ally was to establish a good army; and experience taught him, in the course of his frequent conflicts with the English, that European discipline was absolutely essential to that end. He therefore endeavoured, by every possible means, to allure to his standard military adventurers of all nations and tribes, but particularly the European artificers and sepoys that had been trained up in the Company's service, to whom he held out the most tempting rewards; nor did he ever want emissaries for this purpose in every battalion in the Company's service, as appears from the words of command, which are now given in English throughout his whole army.

"By this means he soon brought his established forces to a perfection in European discipline never before known amongst the black powers in India; and his progress in tactics has been matter of astonishment and terror to all those who have ventured to encounter him in the field. But what at once show the extended ideas and ambition of this prince, are his surprising endeavours to become formidable at sea. No art has been left untried to entice into his pay our ship-carpenters and dockyard-men from Bombay and other places; and in this attempt the French and other European powers have been induced to assist him; so that the progress which

he has already made in constructing docks and equipping a naval force is almost incredible.

"The surprising energy of this man's uncultivated mind (for he is totally ignorant of letters), when compared to the rest of his contemporaries in power, is truly worthy of admiration. Who, but an hero born to conquer, would at once relinquish all the prejudices and ill-founded habits of his country, so foreign to ours, and so readily adopt whatever European improvements appeared most essential to secure his government, to extend his empire, and to render his name immortal? He is not only sublime in his views, but capable of seeing them minutely executed. His ends are always great, his means prudent, and his generosity unbounded, whenever proper objects offer; nor can any prince be more watchful over the intrigues of his enemies both abroad and at home; by which means he knows well where to anticipate hostile designs, and where to take advantage.

"It is not then to be wondered at, if a prince possessed of so many great qualities, and so ambitious of fame and high honours as Hyder Ally Cawn, should behold his powerful neighbours the English, and their ally the navab of Arcot, with an eye of jealousy and hatred. It can only be from political motives if ever he is at any time induced to show them a fair face; for I have been told from good authority that he secretly entertains an implacable aversion to all Europeans, which he takes as much care to instil into the mind of his son Tippu, as Hamilcar, the famous Carthaginian general, did when he caused Hannibal to take the oaths of perpetual enmity against the Romans. Need we then have doubted that he would openly declare those sentiments whenever an opportunity offered? No; his reasons were too well founded ever to admit of a deviation from them; nor can he be blamed for breathing a spirit of patriotism, which is natural to every native of Hindostan."

The *Nishani Haidari* (*History of Hydur Naik*, by Kirmani, translated from the Persian by Colonel W. Miles) says:—

Some Indian views :  
Kirmani's  
characteriza-  
tion.

"In all the cities and towns of his territory, besides news-writers, he appointed separately secret writers and spies to

patrol the streets at night, and from them he received his intelligence. From morning to night he never remained a moment idle. He was a slave to the regulation of his working establishments. . . . . All the operations or measures undertaken by Haidar's government, small or great, were superintended by himself in person; insomuch that even leather, the lining of bullock-bags, tent walls, and strands of rope, all passed under his inspection, and were then deposited in his stores."

The *Ahvali Haidar Naik* (by Mirza Ikbāl, printed as a supplement to Kirmani's *Nishani Haidari*) thus describes the state of the country in Haidar's time:—

"By his power, mankind were held in fear and trembling; and from his severity God's creatures, day and night, were thrown into apprehension and terror. Cutting off the nose and ears of any person in his territories was the commonest thing imaginable, and the killing a man there was thought no more of than the treading on an ant. No person of respectability ever left his house with the expectation to return safe to it."

Wilks' view.

Wilks writes:—

"On the conquest of a new country, it was his invariable habit to inflict some memorable severities, not only for the purpose of extorting money, but with the avowed object of impressing his new subjects with a salutary terror of his name. On the same avowed principle, of inspiring terror into all descriptions of men, whether absent or present, he availed himself of a police too horribly perfect, to punish with boundless cruelty, the slightest levity of observation, made in the confidence and seclusion of domestic intercourse, that had any reference to his public or private conduct; and thus, where it was worse than death to blame, unqualified applause became the necessary habit of public and of private life.

"In spite of this reputation, and the notorious system of exaction and torture applied to every individual who had to render an account, men of almost every country were attracted to his court and standard, by brilliant prospects of advancement and wealth; but a person, once engaged in his

service, and deemed to be worth keeping, was a prisoner for life: he would hear of no home but his own, and suffered no return; but the summary severity, cruelty, and injustice of his character were directed rather to the instruments than the objects of his rule; official men had cause to tremble; but the mass of the population felt that the vigour of the Government compensated for many ills, and rendered their condition comparatively safe.

"In action, Hyder was cool and deliberate, but enterprising and brave when the occasion demanded. In his early career, and in his wars with the native powers, he was far from sparing of his person, but opposed to Europeans, it was observed that he never personally encountered the heat of action. His military pretensions are more favourably viewed in the conduct of a campaign than of a battle; and if the distinction can be allowed, in the political, than in the military conduct of a war. In the attack and defence of places, he and his son were equally unskilled; because in that branch of war, no experience can compensate for want of science.

"In Council he had no adviser, and no confidant; he encouraged, on all occasions, a free discussion of every measure suggested by himself or by others, but no person knew at its close, what measures he would adopt in consequence.

"Hyder was of all Mohammedan princes the most tolerant, if, indeed, he is himself to be considered as a Mussulman. He neither practised, nor had ever been instructed how to practice, the usual forms of prayer, the fasts, and other observances. He had a small rosary, on which he had been taught to enumerate a few of the attributes of God, and this was the whole of his exterior religion. It was his avowed and public opinion, that all religions proceed from God, and are all equal in the sight of God; and it is certain, that the mediatory power represented by *Ranga Swamey*, the great idol in the temple of Seringapatam, had as much, if not more, of his respect, than all the Imaums, with Mohammed at their head.

"In common with all Sovereigns who have risen from obscurity to a throne, Hyder waded through crimes to his object; but they never exceeded the removal of real impediments, and he never achieved through blood what fraud was capable of effecting. He fixed his steadfast view upon the end, and considered simply the efficiency, and never the moral



tendency of the means. If he was cruel and unfeeling, it was for the promotion of his objects, and never for the gratification of anger or revenge. If he was ever liberal, it was because liberality exalted his character and augmented his power; if he was ever merciful, it was in those cases where the reputation of mercy promoted future submission. His European prisoners were in irons, because they were otherwise deemed unmanageable; they were scantily fed, because that was economical; there was little distinction of rank, because that would have been expensive: but beyond these simply interested views, there was by his authority no wanton severity; there was no compassion, but there was no resentment: it was a political expenditure, for a political purpose, and there was no passion, good or bad, to disturb the balance of the account. He carried merciless devastation into an enemy's country, and even to his own, but never beyond the reputed utility of the case; he sent the inhabitants into captivity, because it injured the enemy's country, and benefited his own. The misery of the individuals was no part of the consideration, and the death of the greater portion still left a residue, to swell a scanty population. With an equal absence of feeling, he caused forcible emigrations from one province to another, because he deemed it the best cure for rebellion; and he converted the male children into military slaves, because he expected them to improve the quality of his army. He gave fair, and occasionally brilliant encouragement, to the active and aspiring among his servants, so long as liberality proved an incitement to exertion, and he robbed and tortured them, without gratitude or compunction, when no farther services were expected; it was an account of profit and loss, and a calculation whether it were most beneficial to employ or to plunder them.

"Those brilliant and equivocal virtues which gild the crimes of other conquerors, were utterly unknown to the breast of Hyder. No admiration of bravery in resistance, or of fortitude in the fallen, ever excited sympathy, or softened the cold calculating decision of their fate. No contempt for unmanly submission ever aggravated the treatment of the abject and the mean. Everything was weighed in the balance of utility, and no grain of human feeling, no breath of virtue or of vice was permitted to incline the beam.



"There was one solitary example of feelings incident to our nature, affection for an unworthy son whom he nominated to be his successor, while uniformly, earnestly, and broadly predicting, that this son would lose the empire which he himself had gained."

The minister Purnaiya sagaciously planned that the death of Haidar should be concealed from the army until the arrival of Tipu, and Krishna Rao, his official colleague, acceded to the same course. It is a high testimony to the order and discipline of the army, and the influence and ability of Purnaiya, that this was successfully carried out. The body of Haidar, deposited in a large chest filled with aromatics, was sent off to Kolar under escort, as if a case of valuable plunder. All business went on as usual. The chiefs of the army were separately and quietly taken into confidence, and all inquiries were answered to the effect that Haidar was better, but weak. Only one officer, commanding 4,000 horse, conceived the project of removing the ministers, seizing the treasury and proclaiming Abdul Karim, Haidar's second son. But the plot was discovered, and the accomplices were put into irons and sent off under guard.

News of  
Haidar's  
death kept in  
secret.

A courier on a dromedary, travelling 100 miles a day, conveyed the intelligence to Tipu at Paniani by the afternoon of the 11th. Next morning he was in full march eastward. Dispensing with all ceremony calculated to excite inquiry, he went forward as rapidly as possible, and after performing the funeral ceremonies at Kolar, joined the army in a private manner between Arni and Vellore on the 2nd of January 1783. The most ample acknowledgments were made to all the public officers, and especially to Purnaiya, for their prudent management of affairs during this critical period, and Tipu Sultan took peaceable possession of an army of

Tipu joins his  
army and  
succeeds  
Haidar.

88,000 men, and a treasury containing three crores of rupees in cash, besides an immense amount of jewels and valuables.

Lord Macartney's plans foiled.

It was part of the policy and plan of Lord Macartney, the Governor of Madras, to prevent the easy return of Tipū to the Karnātic and effectuate his defeat before he joined his main army. That the health of Haidar had been for some time on the decline was well known at Madras. That his increasing indisposition induced Tipū to deem his presence absolutely necessary in the Karnatic at a period so critical and big with his future fate was also equally well known. In view of his illness, Haidar had also made some overtures of peace to the English at Madras, with seeming sincerity as he then seriously anticipated his own dissolution, in consequence of which he was apprehensive of some fatal commotions. What transpired actually in Haidar's camp confirmed the truth of his apprehensions and the news that had filtered down to Madras. The anxiety, therefore, of Lord Macartney to prevent Tipū's return to the Karnātic was both natural and real. As soon as the death of Haidar became known, he urged Major-General Stuart, who had succeeded Sir Eyre Coote in the post of Commander-in-chief, to take the field before Tipū could return from the West Coast, but the General at first professed his disbelief in the report and afterwards threw other difficulties in the way, so that Tipū was enabled to join his army, as above stated, on the 2nd January 1783 before the English troops had moved from the Mount. No sooner had he found himself at the head of the army without opposition of any kind and without any the least symptom of the commotion usual upon such an occasion, and proclaimed Nawāb and Generalissimo of the Armies, than he dropped his father's negotiations with the English for peace and gave every assurance to the

French of his fidelity and attachment to them, and of his fixed determination to prosecute a vigorous war against the English. While the highest praise is due to the consummately clever manner in which Purnaiya and Krishna Rao made possible the succession of Tipū, blame cannot but affect to the English General who frustrated Lord Macartney's plan by his dilatory methods and made it impossible for the English to deal a severe blow to Tipū at a time when it would have been easy for them to do so.

Tipū and the French, awaiting with sanguine prospects the arrival of M. Bussy to decide on the plan of the campaign, were offered battle by the English near Wandiwash on the 13th of February. But this was declined, and within a week news from the west obliged Tipū and his allies to withdraw the main body of the army for the defence of his possessions in that quarter. General Matthews had landed at Coondapur, carried Haidarghar, and on the 16th February captured Bednur. Honavar and Mangalore had also fallen to the English, who were now in possession of all the intermediate country. Shekh Ayaz, the *Chela*, whom we have previously mentioned in connection with his appointment to the government of Chitaldrug, was at this time governor of the Bednur country. He had abundant reason for fear in the accession of Tipū, and having discovered, as he anticipated, that the latter had ordered his immediate assassination, abandoned his charge and fled to Bombay, at the same time that Tipū's army was marching for its recovery. General Matthews, having gained spoils to the value of eighty-one lakhs of *pagodas*, besides jewels, was waiting for reinforcements, when Tipū appeared on the 9th of April. The General had, however, committed the grave mistake of not only extending his conquests in the districts dependent on Bednur but also in place of destroying those forts

Campaign  
of 1783:  
operations on  
the West  
Coast.

immediately on their surrendering, he imprudently dispersed a great part of his army in a pitiful detail for their defence, without ever anticipating the least bad consequence from such a hazardous measure. Meanwhile Tipū, dividing his army into two columns, with one retook Kavale-durga and Haidarghar, and with the other Anantapur; and, cutting off all communication with the coast, invested Bednur. The place was defended with every spirit and bravery until it became a heap of ruins and further resistance unavailing. The garrison, being starved out, capitulated on the 30th on honourable terms. But instead of being sent to the coast as stipulated, both officers and men were on the ground of their having tampered with the treasury marched off in irons to Seringapatam. Tipū now advanced for the recovery of Mangalore, and invested it on the 4th of May. The garrison under the brave Colonel Campbell and his undaunted garrison held out in spite of great hardships. In July arrived intelligence that peace had been concluded in Europe between the English and the French; the leaders of the French forces, therefore, to the great indignation of Tipū, announced the necessity for their withdrawal. An armistice was agreed to on the 2nd of August, but the articles were not observed by Tipū. Mangalore held out till the 30th of January 1784, when the starved-out garrison, whose bravery had excited the highest admiration even from Tipū, were allowed to retire to Tellicherry. Thus ended a siege, in which Colonel Campbell and the troops under his command, acquired the highest share of military glory. Unfortunately, however, that brave officer, worn out with fatigue, did not live long to enjoy his justly merited applause, he soon afterwards dying at Bombay.

Karunguli, which he completed by the end of February. In March, he moved for the relief of Vellore, and it was not until the 21st April that he commenced his march towards Cuddalore for recovering it from the French. His movements were so dilatory that he did not arrive there until the 7th June, having taken 48 days to accomplish 126 miles, and thus given the enemy time to supply themselves with provisions and ammunition, of both of which they had been much in want, as shown by intercepted letters. The General was severely censured for his procrastination, though a good part of the censure was ill-deserved as there was hardly any use in arriving at the place before the ships which carried the entrenching tools and gun and stores arrived there, and also for the mismanagement by which the carriage of the army, equal to the transport of provisions for twenty-five days, had in a few weeks been so reduced as not to be able to carry more than sufficient for nine days' consumption. This result was contrasted with that effected by General Coote in January 1782 when he threw three months' provisions into Vellore in the face of the enemy, and returned to Madras in fifteen days without any particular diminution in the carriage. Just about this time (24th April), Sir Eyre Coote returned to Madras from Bengal, but died there on the 27th March to the grief of the army, especially to the Indian part of it, by whom he was regarded with a degree of attachment never manifested towards any other European officer. (See Wilks, *History* II. 355). At Cuddalore, General Stuart was not able to produce any impression, though the attack on the French lines proved successful so far as its objective was concerned. The casualties were heavy and the arrival of Suffrein's fleet proved timely. With the reinforcements it landed, the French made a sally, which was repulsed, among the prisoners taken being Bernadotte, afterwards king of Sweden, who was then a

Serjeant. Despite this success, the position of the English now became critical, their number having been diminished by casualties and disease, whereas the enemy had been considerably strengthened from the fleet. Fortunately, at this juncture, intelligence was received of the conclusion of peace in Europe in consequence of which hostilities ceased on the 2nd July. .

Operations in  
the South  
(1782-4).

In the south, in September 1782, Colonel Lang demolished the fortifications of Negapatām; then he took Karoor (1783); and Avarakurichi was taken by storm on the 10th April. Dindigul next surrendered (4th May). A few days later, Colonel Lang was superceded in his command by Colonel Fullarton, of H. M.'s 98th Regiment. Vigorous in action, Fullarton took Dhārāpuram on 2nd June and was about to proceed towards Coimbatore, when he was directed by General Stuart to join the main army at Cuddalore. In compliance with this order, he arrived within three forced marches at that place, when intelligence of the cessation of hostilities with the French enabled him to retire to the South, where he commenced a series of successful operations which continued until the close of the war and formed, as Colonel Wilson rightly characterises it, "a striking contrast to the unsatisfactory result obtained under the other leaders of the time, Coote only excepted." He began by marching to Melur, in the Madura District, where he left a strong garrison. Next he reduced Sivaganga, twenty miles further east. Here he exacted the tribute due from the Rāja and compensation for the ravages committed by him in the Company's territory. Next he took Panjālamkurichi, distributing the large sums of money found in it to the troops, who had been ten months in arrears of pay. Having arranged for garrisoning this fort, he marched on Sivagiri, which was evacuated. The Rāja, who had fled to a mountain stronghold, had been joined by several other

*pālegārs*. Their united resistance was, however, broken and the stronghold taken. With its reduction, all the Madura *pālegārs* submitted. At Dindigul, which he reached on the 23rd September, two detachments from the main army joined him. This accession raised his force to 13,600 men, of whom 2,050 were Europeans. He brigaded the troops and changed the usual march order to facilitate easy communication between distant parts of the line and then re-commenced his march. Early in October, he marched towards Palni and from thence to Palghautcheri, reducing different minor forts by the way. The march through the Anāmalai forests was attended with great difficulty but was successfully accomplished. Palghautcheri was captured on the 5th November and the treasure found in it was, once again, distributed among the troops in consideration of their necessities. Coimbatore was next taken and preparations were made to advance against Seringapatam *via* Satyamangalam, in the hope of either attacking that place at a disadvantage during the absence of Tipū, then before Mangalore with a considerable army, or to force him to raise that siege. These preparations had been completed, and Fullarton was about to march, when on the 28th November he received instructions desiring him to restore all the places he had taken, and to retire within the limits possessed by the British on the 20th July preceding. These instructions emanated from the English Commissioners (Messrs. Sadlier and Staunton, later joined by Mr. Hudleston) who, at the suggestion of Tipū, had been deputed by Lord Macartney to proceed to Mangalore, there to negotiate a treaty and who had been invested with plenary powers. Colonel Fullarton remonstrated strongly, pointed out the great advantage of his position and intended operations, and intimated his intention to remain at Coimbatore until further orders. His reasoning, however, was of no avail and about the middle of



December he was directed by the Madras Government to obey the instructions of the Commissioners. He accordingly left Coimbatore, and returning to the south, he broke up his army into three divisions, one of which was sent to Karoor, another to the neighbourhood of Dindigul, and the third to Kovanur on the borders of Madura. Scarcely had he finished these cantoning arrangements, when the Madras Government, beginning to doubt the sincerity of Tipū, sent orders desiring him to re-assemble his army, and to retain possession, until the conclusion of the negotiation, of all places taken by him which he had not already given up in conformity with their previous instructions.

Treaty of  
Mangalore,  
11th March  
1784.

In the meantime, the journey of the Commissioners towards Mangalore had been retarded on various pretexts and they did not reach that place until it had been evacuated by the British. On their arrival, they were treated with marked indignity, and Tipū continued to postpone the settlement of the conditions of peace until the intelligence of the re-assembly of Colonel Fullarton's army, and of other preparations being made by the Madras Government, induced him to sign the treaty on the 11th March 1784. This was primarily based on the condition of the mutual release of prisoners and restitution of conquests. In accordance with the latter, all the places taken by Fullarton were given up with the exception of Dindigul, which was held pending the release of prisoners. Cannanore was kept by the Bombay Government on the same ground, while Tipū on his side retained possession of Āmbur and Satghur.

Third attempt  
at uprooting  
the  
usurpation,  
1782-3.

About this time, the idea of uprooting the usurpation was determined upon by those interested in the reigning family. Two attempts had already been unsuccessfully made but the ardour of the loyalists had not been damped.

The time appeared propitious for a fresh attempt. Haidar had died; his son Tipū, generally unpopular and disliked even by his own father on occasions, was absent at Mangalore; and some of Tipū's own party were inimical to him. Added to these pre-disposing causes was the intensity of feeling among the dispossessed *palegārs* and others for the losses of territory sustained by them and the indignities they had suffered. Very similar was the feeling among the immediate adherents of the reigning family, both Hindu and Muhammadan, who made up their minds that the usurpation should cease and the royal house restored to its ancient position of dignity and independence. The attempt appears to have been carefully planned, steps having been taken to time it opportunely with the expected arrival of British troops at the capital. The scheme accordingly consisted of two parts: one was the obtaining of British aid by getting the English at Madras interested in the restoration idea, as much in their own interests as in the interests of the loyalists; and the other was to make the necessary arrangements at the capital (Seringapatam) by getting the loyalists act together and subvert on a day fixed the Killedār's authority in the city and thus obtain the key position as it were to the Government of the State. Once this was done, the idea seems to have been the British army would occupy the fortress and the return of Tipū effectually prevented. Wilks, who had access to all the documents pertaining to this loyalist attempt, writes thus of the first part of the scheme:—

"In the early part of 1782, Mr. John Sullivan, political resident at Tanjore, charged with a general superintendence over the southern provinces, and unlimited powers of political communication with both coasts, had in the course of the confidential authority committed to him by his government, opened to Colonel Humberstone, recently arrived on the coast of Malabar, his views regarding the employment of the forces

The first part of the story: Wilks' account of the same.

under his command which would best promote the general purposes of the war; and there is in the whole of his extensive correspondence at that period, a manly, energetic, and enlightened grasp of mind, which leads us incessantly to regret its limited sphere of operation, and the inadequacy of his means to the accomplishment of his conceptions. The recent defeat and capture of Colonel Braithwaite's corps in Tanjore had produced the greatest degree of despondency in the southern provinces, and even considerable alarm for the safety of the provincial capital: but the ample authorities committed to Mr. Sullivan, were exercised on this occasion with so much energy and address, as speedily to revive the public confidence; he had even found resources for raising and equipping troops, to replace, at least numerically, the losses of the late disaster, and had reason to hope for the early organization of that force, which afterwards took the field under Colonel Lang. The plan proposed in the first instance, involved little more than the general views of the Governments of Bengal and Madras, officially communicated to him, for an efficient diversion on the coast of Malabar, which among benefits of a more general nature, would relieve the pressure and liberate the resources of the provinces committed to his charge; but on further correspondence with Colonel Humberstone, these views extended to a combined operation by the route of Palghaut, to unite with Colonel Lang in Coimbatore, and eventually to prosecute farther offensive operations. These ideas were approved by his own Government and afterwards recommended to the adoption of that of Bombay, but the displeasure of Sir Eyre Coote, which has been already noticed, and his disappointment at Colonel Humberstone's landing in Malabar, gave to his opinions, if not an original bias unfavourable to the measure, at least the character of intemperate disapprobation; the landing therefore of Colonel Humberstone, approved by the Government of Madras, but disapproved as we have seen in the first instance, by that of Bombay, and by Sir Eyre Coote, instead of being, as it might have been, rendered an efficient branch of an important combination, was left to assume the character of an insulated and eminently dangerous diversion.

"Mr. Sullivan, who in consequence of the difficulty of communication, long remained ignorant of the opinions of Sir

Eyre Coote, and the dissensions at Madras, sought to strengthen a plan approved by his Government, by means of such political support as circumstances might admit. For about six years past, a bramin named Tremalrow had been residing in Tanjore, who gave himself out as "the son of the minister of that Raja of Mysore who had been deposed by Hyder," that he had been deputed on a secret mission from the imprisoned Ranee (the personage described in Volume I, page 233) to Lord Pigot in 1776, and on hearing of his revolutionary supersession, retired to Tanjore. (A genealogy, with which I am furnished, traces the family of Tremalrow up to Govind Acharee, the Gooroo, high priest, of the Kings of Vijayanuggur: from him is said to have descended Tremalayangar, the minister of Chick Deo Raj, *Vide* Volume I, page 56, the alleged ancestor of Tremalrow. I have the authority of the brother of Tremalrow, for stating, that he is entirely unconnected with either of these families, and that the second is not lineally descended from the first, and is of a distinct sub-division of caste; but it is right to add, that these brothers were at variance.) In this situation he had ingratiated himself with the Raja, by whom he had been announced to Mr. Sullivan, through the medium of Mr. Schartz, whose knowledge of the languages, joined to his personal character, gave weight to every representation which he consented to convey. Tremalrow was a person of considerable talents and acquirement, and showed himself to possess extensive information regarding the Government and resources of Mysore. It is known, that he had served in a subordinate capacity, in some of the departments of Hyder's Government, at first as a writer in the office of Assud Ali Khan, minister of finance, who died in 1772, and afterwards in the department of the post-office and police, under Timmapa (the predecessor of Shamia), by whom he was patronized and employed on several missions; and it is understood in Mysore, that while absent on one of these, he heard of the intended disgrace of his patron, and apprehensive of being involved in its consequences, fled from Mysore. This person stated himself to possess political powers from his imprisoned mistress, and means of communication which enabled him to receive from her letters addressed to Lord Macartney, and Sir Eyre Coote, and political instructions for his own guidance. Original letters, addressed by Colonel Wood,

Colonel Smith, and Mohammed Ali, during the war of 1767, to Madana, Hyder's Governor of Coimbatore and Malabar, produced to support the authenticity of his communications, were scarcely conclusive to that extent, although affording evidence of confidential access either to the supposed conspirators of 1767, or to the records of Hyder's police; and after a voluminous correspondence, Mr. Sullivan was authorised to conclude a treaty with Tremalrow, in behalf of the imprisoned Ranee: the main purport of which was, on the one part, the eventual restoration of the ancient family; and on the other, the payment of stipulated contributions, as the army should advance into the provinces of Mysore; with other ulterior considerations reciprocally advantageous but cautiously guarding the English Government against any inconvenient pledge. This treaty was sent for ratification to the Government of Madras, every member of which had entire confidence in the authenticity of the powers, and the reasonable prospect of success. Sir Eyre Coote, although originally inimical to the plan, had, before his departure to Bengal, encouraged Mr. Sullivan to persevere. General Stuart alone, after the departure of Sir Eyre Coote, a member of the Select Committee of Government; not only stated his opinion that the whole was a delusion, but converted into a source of festive merriment at his public table, this official proceeding of the secret department of the Government. The treaty was however ratified on the 27th November 1782, subject to the confirmation of the Governor-General."

Elucidation  
of connected  
facts.

To the above account, a few particulars may be added, to further elucidate matters. The treaty which Sullivan, the Political Resident at Tanjore, concluded with Tirumala Rao, acting on behalf of Maharāni Lakshmi Ammanni, the Dowager-Queen, was, as its recital relates, by virtue of powers delegated to him by Lord Macartney, then Governor of Madras, on the 27th of September 1782, to "conclude an agreement with Her Excellency the Rana of Mysore, subject to the approbation of the Governor-General and Council." The treaty itself bears date the 28th October 1782 and was signed at Tanjore

by Mr. Sullivan for the Governor and Tirumala Rao for the Maharāni and attested and authenticated by the Rev. C. T. Schwartz, the well-known Missionary. This treaty is printed in Aitchison's *Treaties, Sannads and Engagements* (Vol. V), and in the *Mysore State Papers* (Vol. I. 1-11). The treaty is in fifteen articles and recites that copies of it were "interchanged with Tirumala Rao, the Agent of Her Excellency the said Rana, and with me (John Sullivan) as representative of the Honourable Company." It is necessary to bear these facts in mind as Wilks, despite what he writes above, throws, in certain other parts of his work, doubts as to the authentic character of the envoyship of Tirumala Rao. In the very first article, the Company acknowledge that they "are well acquainted with the usurpation of Hyder Ali and the misfortunes which they have brought upon the family of the Raja of Mysore, whose servant he was." The article then states:—"They (the Company) are willing to assist with their troops in reducing Hyder Ali, and in re-establishing the Raja in his hereditary dominions upon the conditions proposed in the first, second, third and fourth Articles." In these articles, a successive scale of payment is prescribed as each place is taken over from the usurper and handed back to the Rāni. Thus, on the taking over and delivery of the Coimbatore country, three lakhs of Kantiray *Pagōdas* was to be paid; on the English army ascending the Balaghaut and taking Ardhanhalli and other forts, a further sum of one lakh of *Pagōdas* was to be paid; on "the surrender of the fort of Mysore and the Government of the country being given over to our Rana or whoever she may adopt" another one lakh was to be paid; and finally upon the fall of Seringapatam, another five lakhs was to be paid, "in all the sum of ten lakhs of pagodas" was to be paid. The English were also to maintain an army in the Mysore country, whose expenses were to be paid for by

the Rana's Government. The Company agreed not to interfere with the internal management of the country "nor with the business of the paligars, in the collection of the revenue or in the nomination of the killedars, etc., but will support and assist all officers who may be appointed by the Government of Mysore." If the Company failed "to reduce Hyder Naig," and were "obliged to make peace with him," the Company were to take over the protection of the loyalists and reimburse them of the money advanced by them "on account of our Rana for the purposes before mentioned." In the event of success, the Company engaged to put the Rana in possession of all conquests made by Haidar Ali and protect her and her successors in the same, except the territories taken by Haidar from the Mahrattas and the Nizam, in regard to which the Company retain liberty "to enter into such engagements with those powers relative to those countries as they may think proper."

The leading  
Loyalists in  
the move-  
ment.

In regard to those who took part in this attempt, the Maharāni Lakshmi Ammanni and Tirumala Rao, her Agent, deserve a few words. The Maharāni was the daughter of Gōpāl-Rāj-Urs, who had been at one time nominated Killedār of Trichinopoly. She was the widow of the late Rāja Chikka-Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar and survived the whole of the subsequent revolutions and signed the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam in 1799. Wilks describes her as living in August 1808 "in the perfect possession of her faculties, a sensible and amiable old lady, whose observations on the incidents of her eventful life are highly interesting and intelligent." Many accounts of her distinguished career have appeared in recent years, of which the most notable ones will be found in the publication entitled *Mysore Heroes* referred to in the *Bibliography* attached to this Chapter. She seems to have signed her letters,—at any rate to her agent and envoy—



as "Sreeranga," apparently after the name of the famous god at Seringapatam, of whom she is known to have been a great devotee. From a careful consideration of all the relevant facts, the opinion might be hazarded that she was the inspirer of the loyalists, if she was not, indeed, at their head. She was not merely astute; she was brave, diplomatic and energetic to a degree in the prosecution of the great desire that seems to have possessed her at this period of her life. She was a doggedly persevering lady and was endowed with patience and powers of endurance quite past understanding to mere men. Tirumala Rao, her Agent, was a descendant of a respected Srī-Vaishnava family long resident in the State. His real name appears to have been Tirumala Iyengār, a descendant of the Minister of that name who served under Chikka-Dēva-Rāja. He traced his descent from one Gōvindachāri, the hereditary *guru* of the ancient kings of Vijayanagar. The story of his endeavour on behalf of his sovereign at Tanjore and Madras is told in a pamphlet privately issued some twenty years ago by a descendant of his, which will be found referred to in the *Bibliography* under the title of the *Mysore Pradhans*. Tirumala Rao was undoubtedly a man of resource. He was not only capable of interesting others in the cause he believed in but also made them do their utmost for it. From authentic documents made public—documents vouched for by General Harris, Fallowfield, etc.,—it is clear that he spent large sums from out of his private purse for the good of the Mysore Ruling House and the East India Company. The Company too were generous in recognising his worth and services and not only reimbursed him of his expenses to some extent but also provided him with an allowance to meet his daily wants. Tirumala Rao was assisted in his arduous and dangerous labours by his brother Nārāyana Rao. Their reward in case of success was to be ten per cent of the revenues of

the restored districts and the office of *Pradhāna* (or Chief Minister) to be held hereditarily in their family. They got into touch with successive Governors of Madras and through their aid they made the position of the Royal House better known. The sympathy they won for the cause they believed in and worked for did not end in words. As stated above, the campaign of Lang and Fullarton in the south and west was the immediate effect of the Treaty of 1782 effectuated by Tirumala Rao on behalf of the Maharāni. When Karur was taken (2nd April 1783), the Mysore colours were hoisted on it and its possession transferred to Tirumala Rao. Likewise, when Coimbatore fell, Tirumala Rao was put in charge of it. The army at the latter place was ready to advance "at the word of command whenever it was to be given."

The second  
part of the  
Scheme.

Now, we come to the other part of the attempt: the projected taking of Seringapatam and preparing the way for the restoration of the ruling House. The full story is told by Wilks, who, whatever doubts he might have possessed about the direct connection of the Maharāni with Tirumala Rao's designs and actions, had none about his share in the correspondence that culminated in the Loyalist insurrection that broke out at this time in Seringapatam. Wilks writes:—

Wilks'  
account of  
same.

"Whatever doubts may have been entertained of the authenticity of the documents produced, and the communications reported by Tremalrow in 1782, while Hyder was still alive, there can be none of his correspondence with the members of this conspiracy, and of having aided in promoting a crisis, which if well combined, might have produced the most decisive results. To trace with any certainty the secret history of a combination, every member of which who was discovered, or even strongly suspected, was put to death, and every subsequent mention of which was treason, would, in every instance, be an arduous attempt; and the difficulty in this case is augmented by other circumstances. On the restoration of the

Hindu dynasty in 1799, Tremalrow was one of two candidates for the office of minister, and the effects of rival pretension on the principals as well as their adherents, gave plain and abundant cause for distrusting the statements of each. Seyed Mohammed Khan, the killedar of Seringapatam, who discovered the conspiracy, and directed the executions, became a pensioner of the East India Company, and was totally independent of every influence but theirs. His written and personal narratives, the published journals, and oral information of English prisoners, and conversations with numerous witnesses of the overt facts, have been the principal checks on a secret narrative, obtained by the author under circumstances which precluded the ordinary means of scrutiny.

"The advancement of *Shamia* to be minister of the post-office and police in 1779 has been stated, and we have seen that the influence of this office had even a wider range, and more perfect organisation than can readily be apprehended by the subject of a free State. The secret terrors of his active administration had even been felt by his colleagues, and produced a jealousy which sought for his removal. It was sufficient for this purpose to give obscure hints of the good fortune of his family, the means of accumulating wealth, and the power to expose every secret but their own; these insinuations were not long concealed from the emissaries of *Shamia*; but at what period he began to contemplate revolutionary plans has not been ascertained. Shortly after Hyder's death, he perceived the early certainty of ruin, and veiled his projects with augmented zeal in the service of his sovereign, whom he of course accompanied to Mangalore. His brother *Rungeia* was at the head of the department at Seringapatam, and the name of the relation is mentioned, whom he sent from Mangalore to concert with his brother, the plans of proceeding. At the period of his arrival *Singiea*, the provincial head of the department at Coimbatore, was on business at Seringapatam, and with Narsing Row (Choukee Nevees) a sort of muster-master, paymaster, and town-major, was called to the secret consultations. The Hindoo Raja was to be nominally restored, and *Shamia*, *Rungeia*, and *Narsing Row*, were to form the administration; the last-named person was included, on the ground of his undertaking the actual execution of the plot, for destroying the killedar, with Assud Khan, and the whole of his faithful

battalion, and seizing the gates and the treasury. The communications with the English army which was to ascend at the period agreed, was left to *Rungeia*, through the medium of *Singeia* at Coimbatore; all the Hindoo, and a few Mohammedan commandants of corps were gained, and sworn to secrecy; the English prisoners were to be released, and placed under the command of General Matthews; and *Rungeia* had for the first time visited the English prison, about ten days before the intended explosion; had enquired into their wants, and desired them to be of good cheer. It was deemed necessary that an instrument should be prepared of sufficient authenticity to convince the English of the nature and extent of the conspiracy, and to this the seals and signatures were obtained of the persons already named, of the commandants of corps, and of *Souberaj*, ostensibly the representative of the imprisoned royal family, but in fact a descendent, by the female line, of the late Dulvoy Deo Raj, (stated on the authority of Seyed Mohammed Khan). It is not clear from the narrative whether this instrument ever reached the English army, but the intelligence from *Singeia* at Coimbatore gave assurances of that army being ready to advance at the concerted notice whenever it should be given. The narrative states the attempt to have been premature, but that *Rungeia* considered farther delay to be hazardous, on account of the number of persons intrusted with the secret, and the danger of treacherous or accidental discovery; he therefore pressed *Narsinga Row* to strike the blow, and everything was prepared from nine o'clock on the 24th of July 1783. Seyed Mohammed states eight months' (lunar) after his appointment, which would bring it to about the first week in August. (I take the date in the text, from the journal published in "Memoirs of the War in Asia, 1789"; but advertng to the restraints under which that journal was kept, it may not be exact to a day). It was the pay-day of Assud Khan's and some other Mohammedan corps, he would be present to superintend its distribution to the corps in waiting and without arms at the Cutchery, where the killedar always attended before the appointed hour; the treasury attendants, the corps of pioneers employed in moving the treasure, a body of jetties who had the guard of that part of the palace, were all provided with daggers to commence the work with the destruction of killedar, and his attendants;

while large bodies of Hindoo peons were ready to fall, in every direction, on the unarmed Mohammedans. Matters being thus arranged, Seyed Mohammed Khan on returning from the hall of business to his house on the night of the 23rd, was accosted in a whisper by an obscure individual, who said he had something of importance to communicate; and on hearing his tale he was enabled in the course of the night to seize a despatch prepared for transmission to the English army; to secure the principal conspirators, and to adopt measures for defeating the intended explosion. Narsing Row made a full disclosure in the hope of pardon, which he did not receive; and all the minor agents confessed to the degree of their actual information. As an example to intimidate, a considerable number of conspirators were immediately executed, by the horrible process of being loosely tied to an elephant's foot, and dragged in that state through the streets of the town. Tippoo's orders were required for the disposal of the heads of the conspiracy, and on the arrival of these orders, *Narsing Row Souberaj*, and the heads of corps, and of the jetties, were executed. *Shamia* was sent in irons to Mangalore, and with his brother *Rungeia* was exposed to every contumely in separate iron cages, where they are said to have persisted to the last in denying their participation in the crime; although the torture extracted considerable treasures. Many adherents of their family continue to this day to interpret all the overt facts, into a pretended conspiracy contrived by the other ministers; on which most improbable supposition, *Narsing Row* must be considered as the voluntary victim of the calumny. *Shitaurb*, the former killedar of Seringapatam, superseded by Seyed Mohammed, was seized on the first alarm, simply on conjecture; and was released at the close of investigation on a perfect conviction of his innocence. Neither evidence, nor the unlimited use of the torture, had directed the slightest suspicion towards the imprisoned Ranee; it is just possible, that she might afterwards have been induced, by the political rivalry to which we have adverted, to assume a disguise in her confidential conversations with late Sir Barry Close, and with the author; but the absence even of suspicion, when so strongly excited by circumstances, added to her uniform and consistent assurances, convinced them both, of her entire ignorance of every part of the correspondence conducted in her

name. But that conviction must not be understood to impugn the reality of Tremalrow's projects for the subversion of the actual Government. Long before the usurpation of Hyder, the Hindu prince had been kept in ignorance of acts purporting to be his own, as profound as was the ignorance of the imprisoned Rane in 1783; and simulated authority had been the familiar habit of the Court.

"On a fair consideration of all the authentic facts which have been disclosed, we must ascribe to the conspirators at Seringapatam, a precipitancy rendered necessary by circumstances; and a more confident assertion for the encouragement of their friends, than they were justified in making, regarding the immediate advance of the English army; for we cannot ascribe to Tremalrow, the imprudence and impolicy of having encouraged that expectation, at the particular period when he knew the English to be restrained from action by the armistice of Cuddalore, when Colonel Fullarton was preparing to march from Trichinopoly (as he did on the 4th of August), in the opposite direction of Sivaganga. In what manner the conflicting pretensions of Tremalrow and Shamia, might in the event of success have been adjusted, it may not now be necessary to conjecture.

"Such, however, were the two circumstances, namely the execution of Mohammed Ali, at Mangalore, and the detected conspiracy at Seringapatam, which induced Colonel Fullarton to infer a disaffection in Tippoo's army favourable to the success of his enterprise; but there may be ground for questioning the accordance of this inference with the opinion raised by some authorities to the dignity of an axiom, that every detected conspiracy, instead of weakening, has a direct tendency to strengthen the hands of a despot; and exclusively of these two examples, there was certainly no sufficient ground for crediting the existence of defection, sufficient to form the ground of political action. The confidence of Colonel Fullarton was better founded, in officers eminently distinguished for talents and professional experience, and troops of an excellent quality, although containing too large a proportion of young soldiers. He had arrived, as we have seen at Coimbatore, on the 26th of November, and on the 28th, two days before his intended advance, he received instructions from plenipotentiaries, duly authorized, on their route to negotiate at Tippoo's Court, direct-



ing him, not only to suspend his intended operations, but unconditionally to abandon all his conquests and to retire within the limits possessed by the English on the 26th of the preceding July."

Thus failed the attempt. It is only necessary to add, by way of explanation, that Shāmaiya, who is mentioned above as the leader of the insurrection, was a Srīvaishnava Brāhman of Sulakunte, in the Kolar District, and that his real name was Shāma Iyengār, his brother being Ranga Iyengār. Though Wilks describes him as a human monster, there is reason to believe that he was an active Loyalist from the moment the usurpation hardened into a fact—*i.e.*, from the time that Haidar began to consolidate his position from a *de facto* administrator of his master's (Kartar's *i.e.*, Sovereign Lord's) kingdom, as he called it, into his own *de jure* rule of it. When Haidar virtually dispossessed the Rāja and displaced him in the public eye, Shāma Iyengār fell away from him and joined that band of Hindus and Muhammadans in the State who desired to end the unnatural condition of affairs set up by Haidar and what is worse, which Haidar tried to perpetuate in his own family. In the executions that followed the betrayal, it is said that over 700 families, who were described as the adherents of the Rāja in this connection, were put to death. Several fled out of the country while others went into self-chosen obscurity to avoid further troubles.

In Kirmāni's *History of Tipū Sultan*, the story of this attempt is told in a slightly different manner, which is worthy of note. In that work, the loyalists are said to have won over the Killedār of Seringapatam to end the rule of Tipū. "Anche Shama," we are told, "having united in heart and hand with the Governor of the fort, planned and concerted to effect the destruction of his master's (Tipū's) house," had excited "a great disturbance."

Kirmāni's  
account of the  
attempt.



Muhammad Ali, the Commandant, sent to the Capital to restore order, proceeded, we are told, by forced marches from Chengama by way of Bangalore and encamped at the Karighat hill, on the bank of the river and "after the fashion of the wolf-courtesy," began, following the path of intimacy, to show great regard and friendship towards the rebel Governor and sent a message to him to the effect, that if permission was accorded, he would enter the fort alone, and sleep one night at his house, that he might have the pleasure of seeing his family and children, and that the next morning, according to the orders of the Sultān, he would proceed by the route of Coorg to the attack of Nagar. Kirmāni then proceeds :—

"The Killedar lent a willing ear to the deceiving words of the commandant, and gave orders to the guards of the fort that he should be admitted; and he seeing all things favourable to his views and hopes, at night held his detachment in readiness, and crossing the rivers placed his men in ambush near the walls of the fort, and gave them orders that when he should enter the fort, and his Turee or trumpet sound the charge, they were immediately to enter and man the walls, bastions and gates. Accordingly he, accompanied by fifty brave and experienced men as a guard, immediately after entered the gate of the fort and sounded his trumpet, and having seized and bound the guard, posted his own men at the gate. In the meantime at the sound of the trumpet, the troops in the ambush swiftly advanced from their concealment, and entered the fort and extended their guards and sentinels on all sides.

"The brave commandant now quickly advanced to the houses of the Killedar, and his deputies, and to that of Anchi Shamia and his colleagues, and before they could open their eyes from the sleep of neglect and folly, they were dragged out of their beds and put in prison. The next morning, with the sanction of the Sultan's mother, some of the rebels were blown from a gun; the companions of Shamia impaled, and he himself loaded with irons and confined in an iron cage—a fit punishment for his villainy.

"The office of Governor of the capital was now transferred to Syud Muhammad Khan Mehdivi, a friend of the Sultan's and the defence of the City was entrusted to the care and responsibility of Assud Khan, Risaldar, a brave and very able man, and who was also an old servant. Muhammad Ali having effected this, immediately marched with his troops by long stages, taking with him the letters of the Sultan's mother, and his report of the arrangements made at the capital, and arrived in camp at Nuggur, and detailed all the circumstances to the presence.

"The Sultan was well pleased with his services and presented him with a gorget and a Khillat or dress of honour."

It will be seen from the above narrative, that the Killedār of Seringapatam was in league with the Loyalists and that he was not the person—as mentioned by Wilks—whom the loyalists aimed at. It is, however, difficult which Killedār, Kirmani had in view in writing his account. As he gives no name, it is possible that it was Sitab, the previous Killedār on whom suspicion had fallen and who was among those thrust into prison by Muhammad Ali, the Commandant.

Difference between Wilks' and Kirmani's account reconciled.

The Treaty of Mangalore has been denounced as much for the manner in which it was patched up as for its contents. Both the manner of making it and the conditions forming it have been adversely criticised. Innes Munro, who took part in the war and who was, as he puts it, "a sufferer" by it, thus criticises it:—

Treaty of Mangalore criticized.

"Peace is generally considered by those who have toiled through the hardships of war as such a blessing, that the acquirement of it is generally applauded, however humiliating or repugnant to the real interests of the State, the terms may be upon which it is obtained. To establish peace, upon a firm and lasting foundation, is an object that I should conceive requires the most profound deliberation. To begin a war is a matter of more serious import than the generality of mankind are capable of perceiving; but when once entered into upon

Innes Munro's views.

proper grounds, in order to secure a permanent peace, it should never be ended while the least prospect of advantage remains.

"It is to be hoped that the treaty of peace, which the Company have lately concluded with Tippoo Sahib, is only meant to be temporary. Such, I am certain, must be the wish of every Briton actuated by sentiments of patriotism, and capable of feeling the indignities which have been uniformly heaped upon the British name. Can any Englishman read of the sufferings of his unfortunate countrymen, in the different prisons of Mysore, without dropping a tear of sympathy?—Or can he peruse the account of the repeated indignity and contempt with which his nation has been treated by the present usurper of Mysore, without being filled with indignation, and burning with sentiments of retaliation and revenge?

"It must be allowed that the distresses in which we were involved during the war, in this quarter of India, were in a great measure occasioned by our own imprudence and misconduct. Want of unanimity amongst our rulers laid the foundation for miscarriage and defeat; and the ardour of our armies was invariably checked by the want of supplies, withheld through the anarchy and dissensions that generally prevailed in the councils of Madras. The rocks, upon which we have split, are now perceptible to every eye; and it is to be hoped that future rulers may be directed by them to shun the fatal disasters into which the affairs of this settlement have lately been plunged. To retrieve our sinking reputation in India must be the united effort of labour and of wisdom; and I should humbly conceive that no measure would be more likely to effect this desirable purpose than to crush the object of our just revenge, the present usurper of the Mysore throne; and, by an observance of rigid integrity in our future engagements with the country powers, to wipe off the odium and distrust now universally attached by them to the British name.

"In my humble opinion, the fairest opportunity that ever can offer of accomplishing this great end was lost by concluding a peace with the Mysoreans, at a period that seemed pregnant with every advantage to our arms. It must be acknowledged, that without money war cannot properly be carried on; and it will ever be felt as a subject of serious

regret, that the Company were not better prepared for the public expenditures before they involved themselves and the nation in such a labyrinth of difficulties. Had that attention been paid by those in power here to the true interests of the Company, I am confident that the most felicitous consequences would have ensued. Tipoo Sultan, the inveterate enemy of the English name, might have been effectually humbled, in place of appearing to treat our embassy with the arrogant pride of a conqueror. From the many proofs that the Company had experienced of the fidelity and obedient disposition of their troops, they might have ventured to impose another year's service upon them without incurring a great additional expense; and to this I am confident the troops would have readily assented, not only from a desire of revenge for the barbarous treatment of their brave fellow soldiers, but from the idea of novelty and advantage arising from a prosecution of the war in an enemy's country, where the lure of plunder would have animated their hopes. It can hardly be doubted, when we consider the reduced state of the Mysore army at that particular period, and the discontent and dissensions that very generally prevailed in it, but that success must have attended the efforts, of four formidable and well-conducted British armies, stationed nearly at the four extremities of the Mysore kingdom; one of which indeed had already penetrated a considerable way into the enemy's country, and had secured several very important posts; and none of them above two hundred miles from its metropolis. Four such armies advancing boldly and at the same time to one great object, *viz.*, Seringapatam, with a view of placing the rightful heir upon the throne, could not possibly have failed of success. But it is unpleasing to dwell upon circumstances that are now past remedy; I shall therefore only hazard one more observation.

"Prudence and policy will clearly dictate that the deposing of Tippoo Sahib, in attempting which little is to be dreaded, and establishing the lawful sovereign upon the throne of Mysore, are objects of the most essential consequence to the interests of the India Company in the Carnatic. By such means the Marrattas would be kept as much in awe as at present; and the Company, in the king of Mysore, would most likely secure a peaceable neighbour and a powerful ally."

It will be seen from the above that Innes Munro would not consider the Treaty as giving peace to the land or to the British until Seringapatam was actually attacked and taken, Tipū dethroned and the Hindu dynasty restored. That was the view of the time and that was the view that came ultimately to prevail.

Wilks' criticism.

Wilks criticises adversely the Treaty at great length and quotes Schwartz, who had been called in to act as Interpreter to the Peace Commissioners, but had been stopped by Tipū at the bottom of the Gajjalhatti Pass, as ridiculing the idea of a peace with Tipū without the means of enforcing it by the aid of an army ready to move on his territories if he did not abide by it. On meeting Colonel Fullarton, and learning the order under which he was acting, this venerable preacher of peace and Christian forbearance, in spite of a simplicity in the ordinary affairs of life sometimes amounting to weakness, thus described his astonishment. "Alas! said I, is the peace so certain that you quit all before the negotiation is ended? The possession of these two rich countries (Coimbatore and Malabar) would have kept Tipū in awe, and inclined him to reasonable terms. But you quit the reins, and how will you manage that beast? The Colonel said, I cannot help it." Such, indeed, Wilks adds, was the general tone of humiliation, that even Fullarton a few days before, had submitted to have a Captain and a small advanced guard cut off and to be satisfied with a lame explanation; "This affair," said Schwartz, "was quite designed to disperse the inhabitants, who came together to cut the crops, and to assist the English." Even the long-suffering and patient Lord Macartney, torn by dissensions at his Council table, lacking funds for energetically prosecuting the War, and with a Supreme Government too unsympathetic, if not exactly inimical, to his views and even hinting at his

suspension, was compelled to cry halt to his spirit of meekness and forbearance towards Tipū. The advances he had made for peace had, he saw, been plainly misconstrued. He peremptorily ordered Fullarton "not only to retain possession of Palghaut, should that fort not have been delivered, but likewise to hold fast every inch of ground of which he was in possession, till he should have received accounts of the result of the negotiation." Luckily for him, Fullarton had not completed his arrangements for the distribution of his troops into cantonments, and he carried out Lord Macartney's orders to the letter.

Lord Macartney has been blamed for making advances for peace and of not obtaining a full jail delivery from Tipū. As regards the former, it is to be feared that Macartney was too much obsessed by the peace idea. The causes for peace may have been of the impelling kind, but there was hardly any reason for him to appear as a suppliant for peace, as Tipū boastfully declared him to be. He need not have gone the length of sending Commissioners to Mangalore, an idea of that artful diplomat Appaj Rām, who represented Tipū at one stage of the negotiations, to which he readily succumbed. As to his failure to insist on an instant and complete jail delivery, it must be conceded that this was pressed at every stage of the negotiations. Mr. Staunton, the Private Secretary of Lord Macartney, who was one of the Peace Commissioners, positively declined his assent to the surrender of Mangalore and the other western conquests, until perfectly satisfied of the release of every prisoner, to be determined by the certificate of their existence by the other Commissioner in the form of an official message to Saiyid Sāheb, the General of Tipū. Again, a copy of the Treaty was delivered to Brigadier-General Macleod for his information and guidance, and

In defence of  
Lord Macart-  
ney.



he was ordered to hold Cannanore, with a strong garrison, until he should receive information of the release of all the prisoners. Lord Macartney, on discovering abundant ill faith on this head, even announced to Tipū that he would retain Dindigul, until the residue should be released. But so many of these unfortunate men had been doomed to death, by poison or assassination (full details of their sufferings will be found in the *Memoirs of the Late War in Asia*, referred to in the Bibliography to this Chapter); that the question of their "return" was altogether beyond the ingenuity of Tipū Sultān. The "final humiliation," as it has been called "of surrendering Dindigul," despite the non-return of the prisoners and the inhabitants forcibly deported from across the border, was apparently a necessity that could not well have been avoided in the circumstances in which Lord Macartney's government found itself at the time. Lord Macartney, at the same time, was most punctilious in his inquiries about the fate of various prisoners. For instance, he called upon Colonel Braithwaite, immediately after his release, for any information he might possess on the subject of the alleged murder of General Mathews, about which circumstantial accounts were then in circulation at Madras. The Colonel was of opinion, for certain reasons given, that no undue means had been resorted to in the case of General Mathews, though he could not "account for the deaths of several officers, without concurring in the general belief that they died of violence of some kind." Nor did the Madras Government drop the matter here. Having come to know in November 1789 that Captain Rutledge of the Artillery was still alive and in prison near Seringapatam, they applied for his release, and that of other prisoners handed over to Haidar by Admiral Suffrein, through General Conway, the Commandant of the French Settlements in India. Tipū, however, positively denied the existence of any such persons.



Before leaving the subject of prisoners, a word should be added of the *good Commandant*, Saiyid Ibrāhim, the theme of their prison songs and the object of their veneration, who animated the despondent, restrained the rash and furnished an example to all of cheerful resignation and ardent attachment. When removed from the prison to Kabbaldurg, he mildly bespoke attention to his family, if his fellow-prisoners should ever return, and some years elapsed after their release before accumulated sufferings brought him to the grave. Shortly after the restoration of the ancient Hindu Royal House, the Madras Government, by an order dated 26th May 1800, ordered the erection of a mausoleum over his remains at Kabbaldurg (not Channapatna, as stated by Mr. Rice in the previous edition of this work) and endowed by Lord Clive (later Earl Powis, then Governor of Madras) on behalf of the East India Company, "with a view to perpetuate the remembrance of his virtues and the benefit of his example." Saiyid Ibrāhim commanded the Tanjore Cavalry in 1781 and was made prisoner during that year. He was repeatedly invited by Tipū to accept service in Mysore with the most brilliant promises. He persistently refused these offers, and was removed to Kabbaldurg, as stated above, where "he suffered the hardships of a rigorous confinement and unwholesome food, intended to have produced that acquiescence which the Sultan's invitations had failed to produce." His sister, who shared his misfortunes in captivity, and was subsequently wounded in the storm of Seringapatam, was given a life pension of 52 *pagōdas* and 21 *fanams* per month.

It must be said in justice to Lord Macartney that he had to contend against many difficulties, among these the great scarcity of provisions and money, experienced by the army during the campaign of 1781-1782. The

Difficulties in  
the way of  
Lord  
Macartney.

arrears due to the Army were not in fact cleared until 1789. The fidelity of the Indian branch of the Army was so great that notwithstanding the extreme severity of the service, it steadily resisted the numerous offers conveyed by the emissaries of Haidar and Tipū. Such fidelity, under such circumstances, has been characterised as being "without parallel in the military history of any nation." Lord Macartney endeavoured to meet the situation by obtaining the assignment of the revenues of the Karnātic in 1781-1782. Macartney did not, it is to be feared, get from the Commanders-in-Chief of his time that co-operation in the field or at the Council table that he had reason to expect from them, and even in regard to Sir Eyre Coote, who was responsible for the earlier part of the war, Wilks reluctantly admits as much. He appears to have made a great deal of his position as a Member of the Supreme Council at Calcutta and appears to have insisted in having his own way at Madras. "Although this estimable veteran," says Wilks, "could not fail to discover through the fullest drapery of Lord Macartney's compliments, many intelligible insinuations, that much more might have been done, than was actually accomplished by the army; it must, with whatever reluctance, be allowed that the temper evinced by Sir Eyre Coote on this and other occasions, exhibited mournful evidence of his having outlived some of the most attractive qualities of his earlier career." Nor did Sir Eyre Coote's successor, Major-General Stuart, give better satisfaction to Lord Macartney. From the time of his succeeding to the command of the Army, he appears to have set himself in direct opposition to Government upon almost every subject. Without going so far as to profess absolute independence of the Civil power, he went very near it, and on one occasion when called upon to interfere in a case where an officer of His Majesty's troops had refused to comply with a requisition

from the Civil authorities, he stated he was of opinion that there were cases where the requisition of Government concerning the employment of His Majesty's troops might be refused by the Officer commanding. This conduct, as Colonel Wilson remarks, and his assumption of authority over the Royal troops, gave Government much uneasiness, but no active measures were taken until after the suspension of hostilities with the French, when General Stuart was directed to make over command of the army to Major-General Bruce, and to proceed to Madras, there to account for his dilatory and unsatisfactory conduct during the campaign, and other matters. He made over charge accordingly on the 3rd July (1783) and returned to Madras, where he continued his obstructive and contentious behaviour until it became so serious that Lord Macartney took the decisive step of dismissing him from the Company's service on the 17th September (1783) and appointed Major-General Sir John Burgoyne as the senior officer in His Majesty's service, to take command of the King's troops. Despite this order of dismissal, General Stuart determined to retain command of the King's troops, and Sir John Burgoyne informed that he would continue to obey the General. The Government accordingly resolved to arrest him before he could take any steps for the subversion of Government. Colonel Wilson remarks that it is difficult to say whether there were sufficient grounds for this apprehension. Although General Stuart had been one of the principal persons concerned in the arrest and deposition of Lord Pigot in 1776, it must be remembered that he was then acting in concert with the majority of the Members of Government, whereas in 1783, he possessed no adherent in that body. On the other hand, it was known that the suspension of Lord Macartney was contemplated by Warren Hastings, then Governor-General, and the prospect of the support of the Governor-General might

have induced an impulsive and arbitrary man to go to any length. The arrest of the General was effected by the Fort Adjutant and he was conveyed to the fort. Colonel Lang was appointed to assume command of the Army and he forthwith took over the duties of the Commander-in-Chief. There were at first some signs of murmur among the Royal Officers, but even they tendered their services shortly afterwards on being satisfied that the authority of General Stuart over the royal troops in India had only existed by virtue of his commission from the East India Company. Meanwhile, Government permitted Sir John Burgoyne to assume the separate command of the King's troops but as he began to issue orders not usually promulgated without Government's previous sanction, he was put under arrest on 31st December (1783) and the next senior officer placed in command of the Royal troops. At the same time, it was resolved by Government to send General Stuart to England, a proceeding against which he protested vigorously, alleging amongst other objections, that the vessel taken up for him was not seaworthy. General Stuart would not embark until coercive measures were applied and this was done by the sepoys laying hold of him. He then protested he was being carried away against his will by force and went on board ship. The vessel, it must be added, had been duly surveyed before being chartered and pronounced perfectly seaworthy. The arrangements for the General's comfort on board appear to have been made on the most liberal scale. General Stuart, however, made the application of coercive measures, rendered necessary by his own conduct, a personal matter between himself and Lord Macartney, whom he called out on his return from Madras. A duel was fought accordingly near Kensington on 8th June 1786, in which Lord Macartney was shot through the shoulder. Lord Macartney was attended by Colonel Fullarton and General

Stuart by Colonel Gordon. The story of the duel has been told by Sir Charles Lawson in his *Memories of Madras* and is of interest to-day mainly because of the personalities involved in it.

Apart from the troubles that Lord Macartney had from those at his own Council table, he had to deal with a Supreme Government which latterly became plainly inimical to him. Even Sir Vincent Smith, who criticises warmly Lord Macartney's Governorship of Madras, has had to admit that "the interference of Calcutta sometimes was practised in an irritating way." That seems a very mild way of putting the attitude of Hastings towards Macartney. Sir Charles Lawson suggests personal jealousy on the part of Hastings who saw something strange in the "handsome young nobleman in Madras, who had influential friends at his back, especially Hastings' remorseless enemy Charles James Fox." James Mill has remarked that Lord Macartney was not only of superior social rank to the Company's servants in India during the time he was Governor of Madras, but that he "set one of the finest examples of elevating a servant of the King to a high office in that country," and thereby of "intercepting the great prizes which animated the ambition of the individuals rising through the several stages of the Company's service." There was little disposition in Calcutta to give him credit for what Mill describes as his accomplishments, his talents, his calmness of temper, his moderation and his urbanity. He spared no pains to keep his Council well acquainted with his views about passing events; and he wrote despatch after despatch of a voluminous nature, and in courteous terms, to the Governor-General in Council, in view to inducing them to give up their poor opinion of, and their distrust of him. The India Office Library and the British Museum contain a large number of his papers and Sir Charles

Lord  
Macartney  
and the  
Supreme  
Government  
of India.

Lawson, after an examination of them, has been led to endorse the conclusion of Sir John Barrow, the biographer of Lord Macartney, that his minutes are "masterly productions," and that his "whole correspondence with the hostile and counteracting Government of Bengal is characterised by a clearness, closeness, and cogency of argument, and by a firmness and moderation which distinguish it, in a very striking manner, from the loose, the puerile, and fanciful reasoning, and the haughty, harsh and acrimonious language of the letters from Calcutta."

The relations of the Bengal Government with that of Lord Macartney were sufficiently friendly at first, and the pecuniary assistance of which Madras stood so much in need was afforded on more than one occasion, but this did not last long; the two Governments were soon at variance, and further aid was withheld.

The jealousy entertained by Warren Hastings against Lord Macartney as his probable successor, aggravated by the steady opposition of the Madras Government to certain measures advocated by that of Bengal, has been assigned as the principal cause of this state of matters.

The first of these proposed measures was the cession of the rich and extensive district of Tinnevely to the Dutch, together with the exclusive right to the pearl fishery on the southern coast, in return for which the Madras Government were to be furnished with 1,000 European infantry, 20 European artillery, and 1,000 Malays, to be paid and maintained by the East India Company. Seeing that Government were not in want of more troops, but of money wherewith to pay those they already had, the acceptance of this proposal would have increased their liabilities, while at the same time it diminished the means of meeting them. This negotiation, which had been carried on between the Bengal Government and the Director of the Dutch settlements



in Bengal, was suddenly dropped on receipt of the intelligence of war in Europe.

The cession of the Northern Circars to the Nizām on condition of being furnished by him with a body of horse was another of the measures pressed upon the Government of Madras. The Governor-General laid much stress upon the value of the aid to be received, while he depreciated that of the Circars as yielding only a moderate revenue, and the extent of frontier rendered it difficult of defence. In reply it was pointed out that the collections for the year had amounted to 612,000 pagodas, that the extensive sea-board of the Circars afforded every facility for landing reinforcements should they be required, and that the country was of great importance on account of the manufactures it produced, for which reasons Lord Macartney declined to give it up without the special orders of the Court of Directors.

Another important matter regarding which the two Governments were at issue, was the assignment of the revenues of the Karnātic, an arrangement which had been originally concluded with the approbation of the Bengal Government, and the results of which had been very advantageous. Nevertheless, early in 1783, on the strength of certain *ex parte* representations, the Madras Government were required to relinquish it. At this very time, orders had been received from the Court of Directors approving of the measure, and requiring the co-operation of the Bengal Government in carrying it out, but instead of obeying, that Government repeated their orders for the surrender of the assignment to the Nawāb. Lord Macartney, however, determined not to comply, and the matter rested until 1785 when it was surrendered in conformity with orders received from the Board of Control. The impolicy of this measure soon became apparent, but no change was made until 1790, when Lord Cornwallis and the Supreme Government, authorised



and directed the Governor and Council of Madras to assume the management of the revenues of the Karnātic during the war :

“ In order that the total amount of the collections might be applied with fidelity and economy, in the proportions that had already been settled, to defray the exigencies of the war, and to support His Highness' own family and dignity.”

Lord  
Macartney's  
political  
prescience.

This shows that Lord Macartney was in the main right in regard to the Karnātic question. Though Pitt took a different view of Lord Macartney's policy in this matter in which he was subsequently falsified, he praised his work at Madras and said that his conduct while there entitled him to the highest applause that words could possibly bestow. The fact also that he had a definite offer of the Governor-Generalship, in succession to Warren Hastings, while yet in India, from the Court of Directors, which he had to decline owing to reasons of health and that the offer was renewed to him shortly after he returned to England and only fell through because the Ministry of the day would not countenance his request for such a mark of Royal favour as would unequivocally show the world that he was going out with the combined support of the Crown, the Ministry and the Company, confirm this estimate of his services. Pitt, however, could not see his way to confer on him the British peerage he desired to receive and so the Governor-Generalship was, three days later, offered to and accepted by Lord Cornwallis. Lord Macartney was the type of a true nobleman ; he was an upright, an incorruptible man ; he returned home with absolutely clean hands ; he entertained decided views about the necessity of subordinating the Military to the Civil authority in India, and he was full of ideas of administrative reform. Of his political talents and military plans, contemporary opinion (see Wilks II, 39), was undoubtedly too critical. At any rate, modern opinion,

based as it is on a fairer appreciation of the difficulties of his position, differs very widely from contemporary opinion, which appears, in some respects, to have been influenced by the passions and prejudices of the time. He was a genuine statesman, as his conduct towards Mysore showed it, while the unlimited confidence he reposed in Mr. Sullivan, who carried through the Mysore negotiations and whose political sagacity won even the approval of Wilks, who is uniformly critical of Macartney's acts, shows that he could choose his men well and act fairly towards them. The highest justification of Macartney's policy towards Mysore—which had for its sheet-anchor the end of the usurpation and the restoration of the ancient Hindu dynasty—must be that it was the one that ultimately came to prevail; though it required two more wars to reach that goal. Political prescience cannot surely be denied to a man who could map out a policy of the kind that Lord Macartney laid down so early as 1782 for the solution of the problem that Mysore presented as much to its own people as to the Company, their neighbours. It should be remembered too that Lord Cornwallis has been adversely criticised for the mildness of his treaty with Tipū in 1792, which, because it did not overthrow Tipū in entirety, cost another war. General Medows (see below) would have preferred to dethrone Tipū in 1792 and restore the country to its ancient Hindu rulers, the policy adopted later by Lord Wellesley, who, it should be remembered, only executed what Lord Macartney, in 1782, had put down as the ideal policy for the effectual putting down of Tipū. (See *Cornwallis Correspondence II*, 78).

The reversion of Mangalore to the possession of Tipū was signalized by the forcible circumcision of many thousands of Indian Christians and their deportation to Seringapatam. A revolt in Coorg next year led to the same treatment of the greater part of the inhabitants,

Tipū's  
cruelties after  
the Treaty.

the occasion being marked by Tipū's assumption of the title of Pādshāh. All Brāhman endowments were at this period resumed.

Maharatta  
invasion,  
1784-1787.

On returning from Mangalore, a demand had been made upon Nizām Āli for the delivery of Bijāpur. He therefore formed an alliance with the Mahrattas, who not only countenanced the Deshāyi of Nargund in refusing Tipū's requisitions, but sent the latter notice that three years' tribute from Mysore was in arrears. On this he despatched a force against Nargund, which the Mahrattas failed to relieve; and, after operations protracted for several months, the Deshāyi, induced on a false promise to deliver himself up, was treacherously put into chains and sent off to Kabbaldurga in October 1785. Kittur was taken in a similar manner. War now ensued. The Mahrattas under Hari Pant, and the forces of Nizām Ali under Tohavar Jang, were on the banks of the Krishna early in 1786, prepared for the invasion of Mysore. They first attacked Badāmi, and took it on the 20th of May. Tipū, keeping close to the Bednur and Sunda woods, made a sudden dash across the country to Adōni. Two assaults had been gallantly repulsed, when the approach of the confederate armies forced him to raise the siege. But the rising of the Tungabhadra induced the allies to abandon Adōni and cross to the north of that stream, and the Sultān, hastening to glut his vengeance on the fort, found it evacuated. In August, Tipū boldly crossed the stream, a movement quite unlooked-for by the allies at that season, and formed a junction with the Bednur division. The hostile armies were now encamped in each other's view near Savanur. The unfortunate Nawāb of this place, who, as we have seen, had allied himself by marriage with Haidar's family, had been ruined by every method of exaction, and now threw himself into the hands of the allies.

Tipū was successful in his operations, especially in his night attacks, and the allies retiring from Savanur, he entered it without opposition. The Nawāb fled. A peace was at last concluded in 1787, by which Tipū agreed to pay forty-five lakhs of rupees, thirty at once and fifteen after a year; also to give up Badāmi, Adōni, Kittur and Nargund.

Returning by way of Harpanhalli and Rayadrug, after deceiving those *pālegārs* by repeated acknowledgments of their services, Tipū treacherously seized and sent them off to Kabbaldurga, plundering their capitals of every article of the slightest value, and annexing their territories.

Reduction of  
Harpanhalli  
and  
Rāyadrug.

On returning to the capital, Tipū ordered the destruction of the town and fort of Mysore, and commenced building another fortress on a neighbouring height, which he called Nazerbar. It goes by the name of Nazarbad, and is now a part of Mysore City. The very same stones were reconveyed to re-build the same old fort of Mysore, in 1799. The town was utterly destroyed, and the inhabitants were ordered to remove at their option to Ganjam on the island of Seringapatam or to Agrahār Bumoor, re-named Sultānpet, a little to the south of Seringapatam.

Destruction  
of Mysore  
town and  
fort.

In January 1788, Tipū descended to Malabār, and remained there several months arranging for its effective administration and the reformation of its people, calling upon them either to give up their sinful practices or be honoured with Islam. He also ordered the destruction of Calicut and the erection of a new fortress of the name of Furruckku (Ferkoe), and then marched to Coimbatore in the monsoon. He also now began to lay claim to the title of *Paighambar*, or apostle, on the ground of his

Tipū's visit  
to Malabār,  
Dindigul.

religious successes, and symptoms of incipient madness, it is said, appeared. From Coimbatore he visited Dindigul, and meditated, it appears, the conquest of Travancore. Laying waste with fire and sword the territories of refractory *pālegārs*, he returned to Seringapatam, and devoted four months to a classification of *Sayyids* and *Shekhs* in his army into distinct brigades, leaving for the time being the Patāns and Moghuls to be intermixed with the Hindus. A simultaneous rebellion occurred now in Coorg and Malabār, and the Sultān, passing through Coorg to quiet it, entered Malabār. Large parties of the Nāirs were surrounded and offered the alternative of death or circumcision. The Nair Rāja of Cherkal, who had voluntarily submitted, was received and dismissed with distinction, but immediately after, on a false charge of conspiracy, was killed in a skirmish, his corpse being treated with every insult. Over 8,000 temples were also desecrated, their roofs of gold, silver and copper and the treasures buried under the idols amounting to many lakhs, being treated as royal plunder. Before leaving Malabār, Tipū visited Cannanore, where the daughter of the Beebee was betrothed to one of his sons. He also divided the country of Malabār into districts, each of which had three officers, charged respectively with the duties of collecting the revenue, numbering the productive trees, and seizing and giving religious instruction to Nāirs. His orders were, that "every being in the district, without distinction, should be honoured with Islām; that the houses of such as fled to avoid that honour should be burned; that they should be traced to their lurking-places, and that all means of truth and falsehood, fraud or force, should be employed to effect their universal conversion." At the same time, Arshed Begkham, the Governor, who had administered the country so far, was dismissed from his position and thrown into prison, where he soon afterwards died of

grief and disgust. The spiritual and military officers who succeeded performed their duties "with every possible precision."

Nizām Ali now sent an embassy proposing an indis-soluble union between himself and the Sultān as being the only remaining Muhammadan power of the Deccan and the south. A splendid *Korān* was sent for Tipū's acceptance; and the return of a similar pledge was to establish the most sacred and solemn obligation of friendship and alliance. Tipū agreed but demanded as a preliminary an intermarriage in the families, at which the pride of Nizām Ali recoiled, and the negotiations came to nothing, despite the despatch of a special embassy for the purpose.

Embassy  
from Nizām  
Ali.

Meanwhile embassies with ludicrous pretensions had been sent twice to Constantinople, and once to Paris. The visionary character of the Sultān's views may be gathered from the objects sought by the second of the former, which cost about rupees twenty lakhs. They were either to deliver up Mangalore in exchange for Bassora on the Persian Gulf, or to obtain permission to erect a commercial factory at Bassora with exclusive privileges; and, lastly permission to dig a canal for the purpose of bringing the waters of the Euphrates to the holy shrine of Nejef. On this last proposition being translated, the Grand Vizier, it would appear, smiled, spōke Turkish to the Reis Effendi stating (as was understood) that if the thing was proper, it would be effected without the aid of the mighty Tipū Sultān, but he had the civility to answer, through the interpreter, that the application should be made to Solimān Pāsha, the Governor of Bassora. In fact they had sounded him regarding this position while waiting in Bassora; and the Pāsha, who appears to have been a man of wit as

Embassies to  
Constantino-  
ple and Paris,  
1785.



well as courtesy, replied with suitable gravity, that the suggestion had once been made in days of yore, but had been forbidden in a dream or revelation of a saint, and that without some communication of assent from the invisible world, the project could not be resumed!

III Mysore  
War—May  
1790 to March  
1792. Attack  
on Travancore  
Lines, 1789.

The conquest of Travancore had for obvious reasons been contemplated by Haidar, and was now resolved on by Tipū. The Rāja had, however, been specially named in former treaties as the ally of the English, and any attack upon him, it had been declared, would be considered ground for war. But a pretext was soon found. In 1759, when the Zamōrin of Calicut had overrun the territories of the Rāja of Cochin, the latter had applied for aid to Travancore; the Rāja of which, sending an army under his general, Rāma, had recovered the entire country and driven out the Zamōrin during 1760 and 1761. In return for this service, certain districts were ceded by Cochin to Travancore, across which lines for the defence of its northern boundary had been erected by the latter power, which now bought from the Dutch the forts of Jayakōta and Cranganore, situated at the extremity of the lines and essential to their security. Tipū, objecting to this step, set forth that the lines were erected on territory belonging to Cochin which was tributary to him, Cochin having submitted to Haidar in 1766 and proceeded to attack them on the 29th December, 1789. But, contrary to expectation, he was repulsed with great loss, the number of killed being estimated at about 2,000 men. Tipū was himself severely injured by falling into the ditch, into which he was forced by the rush of fugitives. He was saved with difficulty, his palanquin being removed into the ditch, his seals, rings and personal ornaments falling into the hands of the enemy as trophies. Beside himself with rage, he ordered the whole of his forces from Malabār and other



parts, with battering guns from Seringapatam and Bangalore, to be sent for. At the same time, he wrote to the Governor-General stating that the attack was an unauthorized raid of his troops. But Lord Cornwallis was not to be deceived. He called upon the Government of Madras, then presided over by John Holland, to make preparations so as to be able to take the field at once in the event of any demonstration of hostility against Travancore. These orders were not obeyed. John Holland was succeeded by his brother Edward Holland. He was suspended from the service and his place was taken by Major-General Medows, who was transferred from Bombay, where he had been Governor for less than a year. General Medows was not new to Madras, for in 1783, having heard at the Cape of Good Hope that the English were being hard pressed by Haidar's forces in South India, he took upon himself the responsibility of sailing with three ships, and a large body of troops, from the Cape to Madras. He accompanied Colonel Fullarton's expedition against Mysore. But peace being suddenly concluded, he returned home.

Tipū renewed his attack on the lines, which he carried by storm on the 15th April 1790. The fort of Cranganore was surrendered to him on the 7th May, and he had made himself master of nearly the whole province, when having received intelligence that preparations for war were being made by the English, he caused the ramparts of the lines to be demolished, and withdrew with his army into Mysore. An English force destined for Mysore was therefore assembled at Trichinopoly, and General Medows, who arrived at Madras on 19th February, took command of it on the 24th of May. The whole army, totalled about 15,000 men and it began its march on 26th May. The Sultān—who only ten days before had written lamenting the misrepresentations that

British  
declare War  
against Tipū.

had led to the assemblage of troops, and offering to send an envoy "to remove the dust which had obscured the upright mind of the General" now hastened to Coimbatore where he received the reply that "the English, equally incapable of offering an insult as of submitting to one, had always looked upon war as declared from the moment he attacked their ally the king of Travancore."

Alliance with  
Mahrattas  
and Nizām  
Ali.

An alliance had meanwhile been formed by the English with the Mahrattas and Nizām Alī, and treaties were signed in July, binding them to unite against Tipū, on the basis of an equal division of conquests, with the exception of any made by the English before the others joined.

The campaign  
opens:  
occupation of  
forts in the  
south, 26th  
May 1790.

The plan of the campaign was for the main division of the English, after taking the forts of Coimbatore and Palghāt, to ascend to the tableland from the south by the Gajalhatti pass, while another division invaded Baramahal. Karoor, Dhārāpuram, Coimbatore, Dindigul, Erōde and other places had been taken, when in September, the Sultān, leaving stores and baggage under charge of Pūrnaiya at the summit, descended the Gajalhatti pass with about 40,000 men and a large train of artillery and attacked Floyd's detachment at Satyamangalam. Tipū cannonaded the detachment and the fire could not be effectually returned owing to the small quantity of the ammunition with the detachment. Colonel Floyd was compelled to retreat, but being again attacked at Cheyur, 19 miles south of Satyamangalam, he beat the enemy off, after a severe and well contested action. Tipū then retired, and Floyd crossing the Bhavāni without opposition, proceeded to join the force with General Medows. While the several English detachments were forming a junction, Tipū retook Erōde

and Dhārāpuram, but finding an attempt on Coimbatore to be hopeless, set off with three-fourths of his army to Baramahal, which the English had invaded on the 24th of October. Colonel Maxwell had posted himself at Kāveripatnam, and by his skilful manoeuvres foiled all the Sultān's attempts. This movement of Tipū had been so well concealed by bodies of horse that it was not known in the English camp for some days, and General Meadows did not follow him until the 8th November, when he crossed the river near Erōde. He eventually joined Colonel Maxwell, by way of the Toppur Pass, at Pullanhalli, 12 miles south of Kāveripatnam, on the 17th November. After effecting the junction, General Meadows endeavoured to bring the enemy to action, but Tipū eluded the attempt.

Being advised by Krishna Rao, the head of the Treasury, the only person at this period admitted to his counsels, the Sultān now resolved to carry the war into the enemy's country, in order to draw them off in pursuit of him. He accordingly descended into the Karnātic and made rapid marches to Trichinopoly, and threatening that place, plundered Srirangam. On General Meadows's approach, he decamped on the 8th December northward, burning and plundering along his route; was repulsed in an attempt to take Tyagar, but took Tiruvannāmi and Perumukkal (23rd January 1791), and from there despatched an envoy to Pondicherry. The services of a French official (M. Leger) were there engaged as ambassador to Louis XVI, demanding the aid of 6,000 men and offering to pay all expenses. With this assistance, Tipū engaged to destroy the English army and settlements in India and insure their possession to France. The King of France, Louis XVI, however, on receiving Tipū's message, declined the assistance applied for. The envoy, we are told, addressed

Tipū descends  
into the  
Karnātic,  
December  
1790.

himself to Bertrand de Moleville, Minister of Marine, who informed Louis XVI of Tipū's proposals. Notwithstanding their advantages and the Minister's observation that the insurrection at St. Domingo would have furnished a good pretext for the unsuspected embarkation for India of the 6,000 men demanded, the natural probity of the King's mind would not permit him to adopt the measure. "This resembles," said he, "the affair of America, which I never think of without regret. My youth was taken advantage of at that time, and we suffer for it now; the lesson is too severe to be forgotten." In the midst of his distress, the king was amused, we read in M. Bertrand's work, with the shabby finery of Tipū's miserable presents to himself and the queen, "trumpery to dress up dolls," which he desired M. Bertrand to give to his little girls. On the west coast, Tipū's army was totally defeated on the 10th December. Cannanore was taken and the whole of Malabār was in possession of the English.

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MAdvances for  
Peace.

Tipū, in the course of the war, tried to sound General Medows for peace. He expected, as in the times of his father, that a commercial people like the English, actuated by interest only rather than continue a expensive war, would listen to overtures for accommodation when proposed in the heart of their dominions. It was thus, as Mackenzie remarks, that "Hydr dictated a peace in the vicinity of Fort St. George when the victorious Smith threatened the strong fortress of Bangalore." Tipū tried the ruse but miserably failed. On the 5th December 1790, he sent two *hircarras* (messengers) with a letter to General Medows, in which he suggested the restoration of friendship through the agency of two Commissioners on either side meeting at a place to be nominated by the General. He required a speedy answer for this request. The General sent

without delay, a reply through Captain Macaulay, his Aid-de-camp, informing him that he has powers to enter into a Treaty with him, "but that before he does so he must have some person or place of consequence put into his hands as security for the Sultān's being in earnest, when the 1st Article will be, the unequivocal release of every English officer, known to be still in existence, and in confinement in the Mysore Country." He informed Tipū that Earl Cornwallis was about to take supreme command and that "every nerve strained in the English Empire to bring the war to an honorable conclusion," and added the admonition :—"From the assistance of our Allies, but, above all, from our own resources, and what we have seen, little is to be dreaded from the war, though from sound policy as well as humanity, we wish for peace." Tipū perceived neither the significance of the terms proposed nor the earnestness of the person dictating them. From Tiagar, Tipū tried again for peace. Replying through his Dewan, he wrote to Captain Macaulay that an ambassador of consequence would be sent to the General for personally discussing "the points which require adjustment." To this the brief reply was caused to be sent that as "he had not complied with his request of having some person or place of consequence put into his hands to ensure the Sultan's being in earnest," he could not re-open the subject, which he would leave to Earl Cornwallis to deal with, who, he added, would "act in concert with our faithful allies." This terminated the correspondence.

Although much had been done by Major-General Medows to distress the Sultān and although many solid advantages had resulted from the campaign in the south, yet it had not been attended with either definite or brilliant results. He had no doubt decided to take that most determined measure, as he called it, of going up the ghāts to drive Tipū out of the Madras territory. His



idea was that if the English were once up the ghāts, Tipū would either fight or retreat. He had even determined to go up by the Kāvēripuram Pass by the 8th December. Before that date, however, he had been compelled to be in full march in the opposite direction in consequence of Tipū's demonstrations before Trichinopoly, which threatened that most important but weak and extensive depôt. The retreat of Colonel Floyd's corps and the loss of the artillery had produced a painful impression and had even given an opportunity to Tipū to lay claim to a victory. Tipū's irruption had interrupted the collection of provisions and the loss of the magazines which had resulted from it would in its turn, it was feared, delay the English army from entering the Mysore country before the rains. Lord Cornwallis, while acknowledging "General Medows' zeal for the public good as well as his professional abilities," declared, in a minute dated 5th November 1790, that if the English army could not before the ensuing January be able to act for "the execution of offensive operation which can alone produce an honourable termination of the war," "we should," he said, "not only be under great difficulties to account for the delay to the satisfaction of our Allies, but we should also have the most serious grounds for apprehension that Tippoo would avail himself of that opportunity to turn his whole force against the Marattas and the Nizam, and endeavour either to weaken their power, or to intimidate them in a negotiation for a separate peace." He, therefore, thought that "some immediate steps should be taken which may tend to animate and encourage our Allies to persevere with firmness in the favourable disposition which they have lately shown to perform their engagements." He added:—"I conceive it to be possible that my presence in the scene of action would be considered by our Allies as a pledge of our sincerity, and of our

confident hopes of success against the common enemy, and by that means operate as an encouragement to them to continue their exertions, and abide by their stipulations." He accordingly decided to proceed to Madras in December (1790) and there assume supreme command of the forces. His Council whole-heartedly agreed with him and they endorsed his decision to proceed to Madras as "a measure peculiarly called for at the present crisis." Lord Cornwallis took ship without delay and arrived at Madras on the 12th December 1790 and immediately directed General Medows to join him. The General marched from Trichinopoly accordingly by Ārni, where he left a division under Colonel Musgrave with most of the heavy guns and stores, while he himself proceeded to Vellore, near Madras, where the command was assumed by Lord Cornwallis on the 29th January 1791. On the 5th February, he marched towards Vellore, and on the 11th the army was concentrated at that place. About the middle of December reinforcements consisting of 50 European artillery men with their proportion of gun *lascars* had arrived from Bengal. Tipū on hearing of the march from Vellore, hastened up the pass of Changama to oppose the English advance. But Lord Cornwallis, by a feint of ascending by the pass of Ambur, conveyed the whole army with all its stores and baggage by the Mugli pass, near Chittoor, before there was time to opposition, and after taking Kolar on the 28th February arrived at Hoskote without firing a shot. From there he marched on rapidly to Bangalore. Tipū, dreaming of the 6,000 Frenchmen, had been outmanœuvred by the English. He was now alarmed for his *harem*, and with his whole army personally superintended their removal from Bangalore. The English encamped before it on the 5th of March, overcoming with ease the efforts of Tipū to capture their baggage. The Sultān deemed it prudent to draw off to Kengēri. On the 6th,

Lord  
Cornwallis  
assumes  
command,  
29th January  
1791.



the Cavalry brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Floyd, charged the rear of Tipū's infantry and guns, and was entirely successful at first. But he carried the pursuit too far and as the enemy rallied, he retreated and in doing so received a wound in the face and fell from his horse. Though the casualties were heavy and the loss in horses great, the reverse did not matter, especially as Floyd's brigade soon reached Major Gowdie's brigade of infantry and guns which had advanced in support on witnessing the disaster. On the 7th, the *petta* (or fortified town) was carried by storm and Tipū astonished and indignant moved out with his whole force for its recovery. But his forces were repulsed with great slaughter from every point, and so evacuated the town. Tipū's loss was 2,000 men killed and wounded, while the English loss amounted to only 129 killed and wounded, among the former being Lieutenant-Colonel Moorhouse of the Madras Artillery, a very gallant and valuable officer, highly respected throughout the army of Tipū.

Siege of  
Bangalore,  
6th March  
1791.

The fort of Bangalore was next besieged. "Few sieges," remarks Wilks, "have ever been conducted under parallel circumstances; a place not only not invested, but regularly relieved by fresh troops; a besieging army not only not undisturbed by field operations, but incessantly threatened by the whole of the enemy's force. No day or night elapsed without some new project for frustrating the operations of the siege; and during its continuance, the whole of the besieging army was accoutred, and the cavalry saddled, every night from sunset to sunrise." A practicable breach having been made by the 20th in the curtain to the left of the projecting works of the Delhi Gate and part of the adjoining tower, Lord Cornwallis resolved to give the assault on the night of the 21st. Wilks writes:—

"It was bright moonlight—eleven was the hour appointed, and a whisper along the ranks was the signal appointed for advancing in profound silence; the ladders were nearly planted, not only to ascend the faussebray but the projecting work on the right, before the garrison took the alarm; and just as the serious struggle commenced on the breach, a narrow and circuitous way along a thin shattered wall had led a few men to the rampart on the left flank of its defenders, where they coolly halted to accumulate their numbers till sufficient to charge with the bayonet. The gallantry of the killedar, who was in an instant at his post, protracted the obstinacy of resistance until he fell; but the energy of the assailants in front and flank at length prevailed. Once established on the ramparts, the flank companies proceeded as told off, by alternate companies to the right and left where the resistance was everywhere respectable, until they met over the Mysore Gate: separate columns then descended into the body of the place; and at the expiration of an hour all opposition had ceased.

"On ascending the breach, a heavy column was observed on the left, advancing from the embankment designed to attack the assailants in flank and rear; but this also had been foreseen and provided for, and they were repulsed with great slaughter by the troops reserved for that special purpose; a similar column, lodged in the covered way on the right, had been dispersed at the commencement of the assault by a body appointed to scour it and draw off the enemy's attention from the breach; and at the moment the flank companies had met over the Mysore Gate, another column was perceived advancing along the sortie to enter and reinforce the garrison; but a few shot from the guns on the ramparts announced that the place had changed masters. The carnage had been severe but unavoidable, particularly in the pressure of the fugitives at the Mysore Gate, which at length was completely choked." (Wilks II, 190-191.)

The Sultān had warned the garrison to expect the assault, and moving at nightfall from his camp at Jigani, had conveyed his whole army to near the Bull temple; in what is now known as Basavangudi within a mile

Bangalore  
taken.

and a half of the Mysore Gate, to support the place. But so rapidly was it carried that the fugitives crowding out of the gate gave him the first intimation of its capture. The loss on the British side was 103 killed and wounded. That of Tipū was not ascertained, but upwards of 1,000 bodies were buried by the British the day after the storm. Fears of an immediate advance on Seringapatam agitated the Sultān. He therefore despatched Krishna Rao, the treasurer, and Mir Sādak, the Dewān, to remove all the treasure and the *harem* to Chitaldrug; but his mother dissuaded from this step as betokening fear to the troops. But the obscene caricatures of the English, painted by his orders on the walls of the houses in the main streets, were effaced with whitewash; and the English boys, retained in violation of the treaty of 1784, who had been trained up to sing and dance, were strangled. His own people now began to fall away from him. Evidence of a further attempt to uproot him came to light, and Krishna Rao, with his brothers, as well as others of the Hindu ministers, were in the next few days strangled or dragged to death by elephants as mentioned below. Meanwhile, in order to form a junction with the cavalry from Nizām Ali, Lord Cornwallis moved north on the 28th. Devanhalli and Chikballapur yielded to the English, and several *palegārs* tendered their allegiance. On the 12th April, Lord Cornwallis effected a junction at Kottapalli, in the present Bellary District, about 84 miles north of Bangalore, with the Nizām's troops consisting of about 10,000 men, after which he returned to Bangalore.

British march  
on Seringa-  
patam.

On the 4th May, Lord Cornwallis marched for Seringapatam. Tipū took up a position on the Channapatna road, supported by the hill forts of Ramgiri and Sivangiri, with the view of opposing it. But Lord Cornwallis, unexpectedly taking a southern route by way of

Kankanhalli, arrived without opposition at Arikere, about 9 miles from Seringapatam, on the northern bank of the Cauvery, on the 13th of May, with the intention of crossing the river there. His route had been converted into a desolate waste, all the villagers and cattle being driven into the island of Sivasamudram, and every vestige of supplies or forage destroyed. The passage of the river at Arikere being impracticable, it was resolved to move to Kannambadi, higher up; for the double purpose of fording the river there and forming a junction with General Abercromby, who, advancing through the friendly country of Coorg, had taken Periyapatna.

Tipū had always avoided a general action with the English, but goaded on to risk a battle for the capital, he took up a strong position between Karighatta and the river, to oppose the march of the English. Lord Cornwallis planned a night attack to turn his left flank and cut off his retreat to Seringapatam, but the bursting of a tremendous thunder-storm threw the troops into confusion. All hopes of surprise were thus at an end, but Lord Cornwallis resolved to bring Tipū to action if possible, and continued his advance. Tipū, on his approach, changed front to the left, his right being covered by a deep ravine, and his left resting upon the lower spurs of the Karighatta hill. Lord Cornwallis, after crossing the ravine, which took nearly two hours, drew up his army in battle array and a general engagement ensued the next day, the 15th, in which the English were completely victorious, and Tipū's forces driven from every point, forced to take refuge on the island under the guns of Seringapatam where they could not be followed. Lord Cornwallis then moved to Kannambadi; but the incessant rain and exhausted supplies brought on so great a mortality of the cattle, and sickness in camp, as to put a stop to all operations. He resolved,

Tipū opposes  
the English at  
Karighatta.

therefore, to relinquish the attempt against Seringapatam for the time, and in that view burst the heavy guns, destroyed all stores for which carriage could not be found and on the 20th commenced to return towards Bangalore, there to rest until the rains were over. Abercromby was also forced to return to the coast. At Chinkurali, the two divisions of the Mahratta army, under Hari Pant and Parasu Rām Bhão, consisting of 40,000 horse and upwards of twenty pieces of cannon, accompanied by two Bombay battalions under Captain Little, most unexpectedly made their appearance, and the sufferings of the troops were somewhat relieved by the supplies they brought. But the destruction of the stores had nullified the advantage which Lord Cornwallis would otherwise have derived from this reinforcement. The Mahrattas had taken Dhārwar and reduced all the places north of the Tungabhadra. The army of Nizām Ali had captured Kopal (18th April 1791), Bahadūr Bandar and Ganjikota, and obtained the submission of all places in the north-east except Guramkonda, which was stormed and taken but changed hands twice again. Soon after this, the Nizām's army, computed at about 18,000 horse, under the command of Secunder Jah, a son of the Nizām, accompanied by two Madras battalions under Captain Read, marched southwards and joined Lord Cornwallis at Magadi, on the 25th January 1792.

Allies' plan of operations.

It was now arranged that the British should take possession of the hill forts and places in the east, in order to open free communication with Madras; that the Mahrattas, who obtained a loan from the Governor-General of 15 lakhs of rupees, should proceed to Sira under Parasu Rām Bhão and operate to the north-west, Hari Pant remaining with the English camp; and that the Nizām's force should operate to the north-east against Guramkonda. Between July and January, the



English, having taken Hosur, Rayakōta and all places to the east, succeeded in capturing the hill forts of Nandidurg and Savandurg, deemed impregnable, as well as Hutridurg, Ramgiri, Sivangiri and Hulyurdurg. The Mahrattas, bent on plunder, after placing a corps in Dodballapur and one near Madgiri, and making some fruitless attempts against Chitaldrug, went off towards Bednur at the time they should, according to the plan concerted with the allies, have been marching to Seringapatam. Hole-Honnur was taken by them, and near Shimoga a battle was fought, in which Tipū's forces were worsted. But the Mahratta detachment left at Madgiri was completely routed by a force under Kammar-ud-Dīn, on which the garrison of Dodballapur withdrew to Bangalore in alarm, leaving the way open for a relief of Guramkonda. Tipū's forces sent south to act upon the communications of the English were generally unsuccessful, but Coimbatore surrendered after a long and brave defence, under Lieutenant Chalmers and Nash (3rd November), the garrison being marched off as prisoners to Seringapatam in violation of the terms of capitulation

All the arrangements for the siege of Seringapatam being now matured, communications free and supplies abundant, the English army under Lord Cornwallis marched from Hulyurdurg on the 25th of January, 1792, accompanied by the Nizām's force (about 18,000 horse) under Sikandar Jah, and a party of the Mahrattas (12,000 horse) under Hari Pant. General Abercromby, who had returned to Malabār in November, also marched from the head of the western passes on the 22nd of January.

Campaign of  
1792: Siege of  
Seringapatam

On the 5th of February, Lord Cornwallis encamped behind the French Rocks, about 6 miles north of

Lord Corn-  
wallis' march

Seringapatam, with the allies at some distance in the rear. The Sultān had made every effort to strengthen the defences during the preceding six months, and was now encamped on the north. He had persuaded himself that nothing decisive would be undertaken until the arrival of General Abercromby's army, now at Periyapatna. But Lord Cornwallis resolved to attack at once, on the night of the 6th. The English force was formed into three columns, without artillery, the centre being commanded by the Governor-General in person. Under a brilliant moonlight, the three columns marched in dead silence, at about 8 o'clock, towards the Sultān's fortified encampment.

This was established on the northern side of the Cauvery immediately in front of the island on which the fort stands, and occupied an elevated piece of ground enclosed by a wide hedge of prickly-pear, and other thorny plants. This space was about three miles in length, 3,000 yards in breadth at the western extremity, diminishing to about one mile in the centre, and running nearly to a point at the eastern end where it was flanked by the defences on the Karighatta hill. One large redoubt, known as the Eedgah, stood at the north-western angle close to the hedge, two redoubts were in the centre, also near the hedge, with about 600 yards between them. A second line of redoubts, *viz.*, Lally's, Mahomed's, and the Sultān's, lay behind, nearly equidistant from the bound hedge and the river. All of these were armed with heavy cannon.

Tipū's infantry, computed at 40,000 men, with 100 field pieces, was drawn up nearly midway between the lines of redoubts, with about 5,000 cavalry in the rear.

The island, somewhat more than three miles long, and about one mile and a half in breadth at the widest point, contained the fort, two palaces within walled gardens, and a pettah also surrounded by a good wall. The fort,



about one mile long and 1,100 yards broad, occupied the western angle; next to it at the distance of about 500 yards, with one face resting on the northern branch of the river, was the Darya Daulat Bagh, then came the pettah (of Shahar Ganjam) at an interval of about 400 yards; the Lal Bagh, protected by lines of entrenchment and batteries, filled the eastern angle.

The guns in the fort and other parts of the island were estimated at 800.

The attack was made in three divisions, *viz.*, the right under Major-General Medows, the centre under Lord Cornwallis, with Lieutenant-Colonel Stuart as his second in command, and the left under Lieutenant-Colonel Maxwell.

The right division, consisting of 900 Europeans, and 2,400 Indians, was composed of H.M.'s 36th and 76th regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Nesbitt, the 3rd, 13th and 26th Bengal sepoy, and the 2nd Bengal Volunteer battalion under Lieutenant-Colonel Cockerell, and the 22nd Madras battalion under Captain Oram.

The centre division, consisting of 1,400 Europeans and 2,300 Indians, was composed of H.M.'s 52nd, 71st and 74th regiments under Lieutenant-Colonel Knox, the 7th, 14th and 28th Bengal sepoy under Major Russell, and the 2nd and 21st Madras battalions under Major Langley.

The left division, consisting of 500 Europeans and 1,200 Indians, was composed of H.M.'s 72nd regiment, and the 1st, 6th and 23rd Madras battalions under Lieutenant-Colonel David Baird.

Parties of artillerymen and of pioneers were attached to each division, the former being without guns, but provided with spikes and hammers.

The right division carried the Eedgah redoubt after a severe struggle, killing about 400 of the enemy, but sustaining the loss of 11 officers and 80 men killed and wounded.

Leaving four companies of H.M.'s 36th and the 22nd Madras battalion to hold the redoubt, General Medows moved to the left to join the centre column, but missing the way he got to the Karighatta hill, and did not meet Lord Cornwallis until after daylight.

The centre division was formed into three parties. The front party under Lieutenant-Colonel Knox, composed of six flank companies of Europeans, H.M.'s 52nd and the 14th Bengal battalion, was ordered to push through the camp, and to cross the river near the north-eastern angle of the fort. The bound hedge was forced about 11 o'clock under a heavy but ill-directed fire from cannon and musketry and a battalion company of the 52nd followed by the grenadiers of the 52nd, 71st and 74th with the light company of the 52nd, all under Captain Monson, crossed the river, and took post on the southern side of the island after having dispersed several bodies of the enemy.

Colonel Knox with the light companies of the 71st and 74th crossed immediately afterwards, and marched to the pettah, the gate of which was found open. Halting there he detached parties against the batteries which lined the bank of the river at that point, and as they were all open to the rear, they were carried at once without loss.

Captain Monson and Colonel Knox were soon followed by the seven battalion companies of the 52nd, and three of the 14th Bengal battalion, all under Captain Hunter, who took possession of the Daulat Bagh, but, as this position was untenable, he repassed the river and joined Lord Cornwallis.

The centre party under Colonel Stuart was composed of H. M.'s 71st, the 7th and 28th Bengal battalions, and seven companies of the 14th Bengal battalion which had separated from the front party during the confusion which followed the loss of Captain Archdeacon, the commandant, who was killed in the advance against the bound hedge.

Colonel Stuart marched against the Sultān's redoubt, and finding it abandoned he left Captain Sibbald of the 71st to hold it with two companies of that regiment, a party of sepoys, and a few artillery-men. He then proceeded towards the eastern boundary of the enclosure, and meeting the division under Colonel Maxwell which had descended from the Karighatta hill and turned the right flank of Tippū's line, he took command of the whole.

In the meantime, Lord Cornwallis, with seven companies of 74th and the 2nd and 21st Madras battalions, halted behind the Sultān's redoubt in the expectation of being joined by General Medows, who, as has been mentioned, passed towards Karighatta hill without having observed him. About two hours before day-light, the enemy advanced in great force against this party.

Fortunately, at this moment, Captain Hunter returned from the Daulat Bagh with the ten companies under his command and joined Lord Cornwallis. A desperate contest ensued, the enemy not having been finally repulsed until after several attacks. The following account of this part of the action is taken from Mackenzie's *History of the War* :—

“The force that His Lordship had collected bore no proportion to the number by which he was attacked. It consisted of seven companies of the 74th regiment under Captain Dugald Campbell, with the 2nd, and 21st Coast battalions under Captains Vigors and Montgomery. This handful of men withstood the furious and desperate onset of many thousands for some time. Three companies of Madras sepoys that had been detached under Lieutenants Kenny and Roberts to within fifty yards of the enemy, fired by platoons with a regularity and steadiness that would stamp credit on the best troops in Europe; and on being seasonably reinforced by Captain Hunter's division, the whole body came to the bayonet, and after repeated charges proved successful. The Mysoreans, however, on this occasion discovered no want either of discipline or valour. The reinforcement which fell suddenly on their right flank

instantly received a heavy and well-directed fire from a corps that changed front for that purpose, nor did this body give way until they felt the points of the bayonets from different directions."

After the repulse of the enemy, Lord Cornwallis drew off towards the Karighatta hill, so that he might not be exposed to the fire of the fort at daylight, and he there met the column under General Medows.

The left division under Colonel Maxwell, after having carried the defences on the Karighatta hill, descended towards the enemy's camp, crossed the river Lōkapāvani and the bound hedge, and met the party under Colonel Stuart a few hundred yards further on. Colonel Stuart then assumed command and advanced to cross the Cauvery into the island, a hazardous undertaking, as the river at that point was very deep, and the passage was under the fire of the batteries on the bank near the pettah. Fortunately at this very time these were taken by the parties detached by Colonel Knox, so that, although a number of men were drowned, the column crossed with comparatively little loss.

On the morning of the 7th, Tipū's forces were still in possession of the redoubts at the western end of the camp, and in considerable force in other parts of the enclosure. Their first attempt was to retake the Sultān's redoubt, and assembling round it, they kept up a constant fire. The gorge of this work being open towards the rear, all endeavours to close it were defeated by the fire of the fort, and about 10 o'clock the enemy made an assault, but were beaten back with loss. Notwithstanding they continued their fire; and about 1 o'clock in the afternoon a second and very resolute attack was made by a body of dismounted cavalry about three hundred strong; this was also repulsed. About an hour afterwards a third attempt was made, led by the Europeans of Lally's brigade. This attack, contrary to expectation, was the least formidable

of the three; for after having advanced a short distance and losing a few men, the assailants fell back in disorder. About 4 o'clock the enemy gave up the attempt and retreated into the island, thus giving the gallant defenders the opportunity to go in search of water of which there had not been a drop in the redoubt.

The reserve, which had marched in the morning from the French Rocks, was joined by two battalions detached by Lord Cornwallis, and encamped during the day behind the river Lokapāvani, with the left on the Karighatta hill.

Colonel Stuart, shortly after crossing into the island, assembled all the troops which had entered it and took up a position in front of the Lal Bagh facing towards the pettah, and covered by the river on each flank. Soon afterwards, he was reinforced by six companies of the 36th and the 3rd Bengal battalion. With the exception of some musketry fire from the pettah in the morning, which did not continue long, Colonel Stuart remained unmolested until about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, when two brigades of infantry, with a body of dismounted troopers, entered the pettah and advanced towards the line, but retired on the advance of the 1st Madras battalion under Captain Brown which followed them into the pettah, and being joined by the 71st, the enemy were driven through the streets, and ultimately out of the place.

Information having been received that an attack during the night was meditated, Colonel Stuart's men lay on their arms until daylight, but were not disturbed.

The loss of the enemy in killed alone was computed at upwards of 4,000, that of the British was only 535 killed and wounded.

Eighty pieces of cannon were taken in the camp, and on the island; 36 of brass, the remainder of iron.

On the morning of the 8th, it was found that the enemy had withdrawn entirely from the fortified camp, upon



which picquets were sent into the redoubts, and the army, exclusive of the detachment posted in the island, encamped parallel to the bound hedge at such a distance in the rear as to be out of range of fire from the fort.

The Sultān  
surprised.

The Sultān, at the commencement of the eventful night of the 6th May, had made his evening meal in a redoubt to the right of the spot where the centre columns had entered. On the first alarm he mounted, but before he could get news of the nature of the attack, the crowds of fugitives announced that the enemy had penetrated the camp. He fled precipitately to the ford, and barely succeeded in passing over before the advanced column of the enemy. Taking his station on an outwork of the fort which commanded the scene, he remained there till morning, issuing orders and spending one of the most anxious nights in his life. During the confusion, 10,000 Coorgs, who had been forcibly converted, made their escape to their own country; and a number of French and other Europeans, who had rendered unwilling obedience to Haidar and Tipū, seized the opportunity to gain their liberty. It so happened that a large treasure was in camp that night for the purpose of paying the troops next day. But it was all safely conveyed into the fort by the skill and ability of Pūrnaiya, although he was severely wounded.

The whole of the next day, the most vigorous attempts were made to dislodge the English from the island. The Sultān's passionate appeal, "Have I no faithful servants to retrieve my honour?" was gallantly responded to by a body of 2,000 cavalry; but being foiled at every point, all the redoubts north of the river were evacuated the same night, and promptly occupied by the English.

Efforts at  
negotiation.

Various efforts at negotiation had been made by Tipū since Lord Cornwallis took command of the army, but

they were not calculated to succeed. He now resumed the matter, but was informed that the release of the prisoners taken at Coimbatore, including Lieutenants Chalmers and Nash, in violation of promises was indispensable as a preliminary. He therefore set free the officers and sent letters containing offers of peace by them. But—at the same time—he secretly despatched a body of horse-men in disguise to penetrate to the English camp and assassinate the Governor-General. The plot was discovered and frustrated. The peace proposal fell through as nothing definite had been proposed for Lord Cornwallis' consideration. Accordingly, preparations for the siege were commenced.

General Abercromby crossed the river at Yedatore with the Bombay division and joined the main army on the 16th and encamped north-west of the fort. On the 19th, he crossed the river and took up a position south-west of the fort. A redoubt immediately in front of this position was taken the same evening after a feeble resistance and occupied as an outpost. On the 22nd, Tipū attempted to dislodge the General, but gave up the attempt after a fruitless struggle. By this time, the dispositions for the siege were rapidly pushed on. The second parallel had been completed, and the batteries in a forward condition. Negotiations at the same time continued, and on the 22nd the envoys of Tipū brought him the ultimatum of the confederates, requiring the cession to the allies, from the countries adjacent to theirs, of one-half of the dominions which he possessed before the war; the payment of three crores and thirty lakhs of rupees, one-half immediately, the remainder in three instalments of four months each; the unequivocal release of all prisoners of the four powers from the time of Haidar Ali; and the delivery of two of his eldest sons as hostages for a due performance of the treaty. On the mutual execution of these preliminary

General Abercromby joins the Main Army. The Preliminary Articles signed.



articles, hostilities were to cease and a definite treaty was to be adjusted.

Treaty of  
Seringapatam,  
19th March  
1792.

On the 23rd, Tipū assembled all the principal officers in the mosque and sought their advice. "You have heard," said he, "the conditions of peace and you have now to hear and answer my question : *Shall it be peace or war?*" They unanimously offered to lay down their lives in defence of the capital, but equally unanimously hinted with various shades of expression that the troops were disheartened and had become undeserving of confidence. After a great mental struggle, the preliminary articles, duly signed and sealed, were returned to Lord Cornwallis the same day. These were ratified on the 19th March, soon after which the army left the place accompanied by several thousands of Indians of the Karnātic given up under the Treaty with their cattle and effects. The two young princes surrendered as hostages, one aged ten and the other eight, were received in the English camp with every consideration due to their rank, and by Lord Cornwallis with all the tenderness of a father.

The Ceded  
territories.

The territories to be ceded formed a lengthened subject of discussion, and the claim of the English to Coorg so exasperated Tipū that the peace was on the point of being broken, when he yielded. "To which of the English possessions," he said, "is Coorg adjacent? Why do they not ask for the key of Seringapatam? They knew that I would sooner have died in the breach than consent to such a cession, and durst not bring it forward until they had treacherously obtained possession of my children and my treasure," for a crore of rupees had already arrived in Lord Cornwallis' camp. Though the cession of this province might have been unexpected by Tipū, there was nothing in the preliminary articles against the demand made for it, especially as it was not far

removed from Malabār, whose cession was not objected to by him. Moreover, he had no right to expect that Lord Cornwallis had the "intention of abandoning the only ally who had performed all his obligations with fidelity, efficiency and service." The English accordingly obtained Malabār and Coorg, Dindigul and Baranahal and other places; the Mahratta boundary was extended to the Tungabhadra, their frontier in 1779, Nizām Alī recovered his possessions to the north of that river and Cuddapah to the south, which he had lost about the same time. Thus ended the third Mysore War.

The treaty which ended this war has been adversely criticised both by contemporary and later writers. Mackenzie, among contemporary writers, refers to those who disapproved of the Treaty and the policy underlying it and defends Lord Cornwallis against them. The idea of the critics seems to have been that Tipū had been hemmed in by victorious allies and had to choose between a desperate defence against the storm and a submissive compliance with the dictates of his opponents. Within doors also, Tipū was by no means free from danger. However faithful in their allegiance, it was natural to conceive that the multitude of peaceful people who had flocked to the capital could not relish a struggle of so little expectance, whilst their families and property remained as a hazard on the issue. His favourite officer, with a large division of his best troops, continued still at a distance; nor was there aught of hope to cheer up the drooping spirits of his disconsolate garrison, or to dissuade them from surrendering his person as the best forfeit of his intemperate attack on Travancore.

Lord  
Cornwallis'  
Policy  
criticised.

In addition to the numbers that nearly encircled his capital, the division of Parusarām Bhão, which was hourly expected, by completing the line of circumvallation, would have entirely cut off all chance of supplies; whilst

the growth, as well of Mysore, as of the surrounding kingdoms, remained for the confederates without molestation. *Brinjaris* out of number conveyed grain imported from Bengal to Madras, with every species of produce from the districts to the northward. Nizām Ali and the Mahrattas, thoroughly bent on the overthrow of their ancient scourge, neglected nothing that could tend to whet every instrument of vengeance; the indefatigable exertions of General Abercromby, aided by the active and zealous prince of the Coorgs, from the nearness of their country, had established immense magazines close at hand to the westward; and whatsoever could be brought forward, as well from the districts conquered by Major-General Medows, as from the other countries in a southerly direction, was now advanced to Talamalai, a fort situated near the top of the Gajjalhatti pass, under an escort of fifteen hundred men, headed by Major Cuppage.

While the siege could thus have been easily turned by the Allies into an effective blockade and there was the opportunity of ridding themselves of Tipū, Lord Cornwallis, it was felt, lost it by showing kindness to one who had least deserved it. Mackenzie writing of these adverse critics says:—

“This glorious conclusion of the war was celebrated from the centre to the utmost extremities of the British empire, with the most brilliant rejoicings; few indeed affected to disapprove of the treaty, and these were actuated by a desire of seeing the House of Hyder totally extirpated, without attending to the danger of throwing an addition of power into the hands of our northern allies. With men of judgment and experience, the peace was evidently calculated to ensure permanent as well as immediate advantages to the several European settlements in the east, for, whilst the loss of half his dominions would be fatal to his plan of conquest, the tranquillity of India would, in all human probability, be out of danger from the restless disposition of Tipoo Sultān for many years. His

resources crippled, his treasures exhausted, his troops dispersed, his artillery reduced to wreck, the most stern policy could not have demanded further reparation for the insult offered to the British nation, in the attack of her ancient and faithful ally, the inoffensive Prince of Travancore."

Wilks writes at length on this identical subject and his opinion is the more valuable, for, it is based not only on authentic materials but it is eminently characteristic of him as a critic of policy :—

"In whatever degree the wisdom of those measures may have divided public opinion, the moderation of Lord Cornwallis was eminently conspicuous, and universally acknowledged. That the desire of maintaining or establishing a balance of power had, according to the prevalent opinion, influenced his Lordship's determination, can nowhere be traced in his official correspondence. The treachery or imbecility of his allies, of whom one (the Mahrattas), had exhibited a total disregard of every obligation necessary to the success of combined measures; and the other, an incapacity to take any effective part in their execution, had undoubtedly rendered him long anxious for an early termination of the war, but constituted no part of the question at issue at the date of the preliminary treaty, when he had only to determine, whether he should be satisfied with anything short of the extinction of the House of Hyder, which, according to every information and appearance, would have followed the capture of the capital. The approach of Mahdajee Sindea to Poona, with views inimical to the English, might constitute a very important object of future consideration, but did not affect the question, limited to ten or fifteen days, of urging the siege to extremity, or consenting to a smaller sacrifice. Without, therefore, seeking altogether to exclude the influence of these considerations, they are certainly more doubtful than those which remain to be described.

"General opinion in England was averse to all war in India and would censure with peculiar asperity any result which might be tortured into evidence of premeditated conquest. The expediency of the earliest practicable termination of the contest, a proposition self-evident in every war, disputable with reference to conditions alone, and never to the abstract

principle, had been strongly impressed on his Lordship's attention by the most recent despatches from the Court of Directors and the minister for Indian affairs; and the great national importance of being prepared to take any part that the exigency of events might require in those agitations which were about to convulse the whole European world, was too obvious to be absent from the mind of any statesman. But leaving, as is most candid in every practicable case, the author of a measure to assign his own motives, the decision itself, and the more immediate grounds on which it was formed, are stated with the greatest clearness and simplicity in his official despatches, before the negotiation, and during its progress. In the first of these documents he declares, "that to allow Tippoo to retain even a considerable portion of his present power and possessions at the conclusion of the war, would only, instead of real peace, given us an armed truce, and he should immediately reject any proposition of this nature: but that if such concessions were offered as would put it out of the enemy's power to disturb the peace of India in future, his Lordship would suffer no prospects, however brilliant, to postpone for an hour that most desirable event, a general peace." (Abstract of Lord Cornwallis' correspondence with the Government of Madras, given in their General Letter to England, dated 21st February 1792). In the second document, describing the nature of the measure in progress, he states his opinion "that it would be more beneficial to the public than the capture of Seringapatam, and render the final settlement with the allies much more easy;" a most important consideration, which has been overlooked or undervalued in all the discussions on the subject. Those (his Lordship adds—General letter, dated 15th March 1792), whose passions were heated, and who were not responsible for consequences, would probably exclaim against leaving the tyrant an inch of territory, but that it was his duty to consult the real interest of the Company and the nation.

"Although in the sequel of his communications with the Sultaun, after the conclusion of the peace, his Lordship's natural courtesy disposed him to the most conciliatory conduct and even to language indicating the direct hope of cordial amity, it is neither just nor necessary, to infer so superficial an estimate of human nature, as should really calculate on friendship as the fruit of deep mortification. No adequate



ground had intervened for changing the opinion delivered by his Lordship, in the official letter accompanying the definitive treaty, which describes Tippoo "as a faithless and violent character, on whom no dependence could be placed." It is necessary, therefore, to revert to his Lordship's professed determination to exact "such conditions as should put it out of the Sultan's power to disturb the peace of India"; and it only remains to decide, whether this legitimate purpose, of which the English General had been the acknowledged master, was or was not effectually attained. The evidence of subsequent events will probably be deemed to amount to a negative answer; but candour cannot fail to add, that if, under the political circumstances of the moment, the entire extinction of the Mysorean power were really inexpedient, no farther reduction of that power could have been attempted without the imminent risk of being forced into the extreme alternative."

Among modern writers, Lewin B. Bowring takes a view not wholly dissimilar to that of Wilks, though he has a word of defence for the soldier-statesman and the conditions under which he was acting. He observes:—

"In estimating Lord Cornwallis' policy, it must be remembered that soldiers are ordinarily more generous than other negotiators to a conquered foe and that he deprecated a further conflict which would entail a great sacrifice of life. Moreover, he was probably fettered by restrictions placed upon him by the E. I. Company, who, while unwittingly founding an empire, were still walking in commercial leading-strings. Tipū was undoubtedly an usurper, as his father had been before him; the lawful Mysore Rāja, though a captive, was still alive: and Tipū had not hesitated to avow himself the implacable enemy of the English. The Sultān was hemmed in on all sides, and Seringapatam must inevitably have fallen had the siege been prosecuted. It must be confessed, moreover, that it was a dubious policy to restore to power a bitter foe, thus enabling him to resume an hostile attitude which eventually compelled Lord Mornington to crush for ever the despot's arrogance.

"Cornwallis was of opinion that he had effectually curbed Tipū's power of disturbing the peace of India, a mistaken idea

of which subsequent events showed the fallacy. The restoration of the lawful Mysore dynasty does not appear to have been contemplated nor would the captive Rāja have been able to maintain his rule unsupported by British troops. The territory held by his predecessors at the time of Haidar Ali's usurpation formed but a portion of the Mysore dominions in 1792. These considerations were probably factors in inducing Lord Cornwallis to refrain from the extreme measure of dethroning Tipū Sultān."

Sir Vincent Smith, the latest writer on this subject, admits that subsequent events proved that Lord Cornwallis' policy cost another war, which could well have been avoided by a more drastic treatment of an implacable enemy. He refers to General Medows' view, which proposed the dethronement of Tipū and the restoration of the country to its Hindu rulers, the policy finally adopted by the Marquess of Wellesly, but does not enlarge on it. Adopting the opinion that the annexation of the whole of Mysore would have displeased both the Nizām and Mahrattas, he says it would have also offended public and official opinion at home and contravened the policy of the Act of 1784. The partial annexation effected was approved by the Ministry of the time and Lord Cornwallis was promoted to the rank of Marquess. Subsequent events proved that both Cornwallis and the Ministry had under-estimated not only the capacity of the enemy but also the possibilities of a settlement based on the Mysore Treaty of 1782 which was ultimately adopted by Wellesley. General Medows, who was conversant with this treaty and had been in close touch with its negotiators and who was amongst the first to conceive the idea of bearding the lion in his own den by carrying the war into the heart of the enemy's country and had actually followed Colonel Fullarton in his march on Mysore by the Gajjalhatti Pass on the eve of the Treaty of Mangalore, was nearer the mark, when he



suggested the restoration of the ancient Hindu Royal Family. Such a step, in his opinion, would not only have satisfied the altogether theoretical contention in favour of the balance of power but also done fair justice to the agreement of 1782, which, though to some extent based on expected ephemeral advantages which did not altogether materialise, was essentially fair as between the Company and the king of Mysore. The story has been told of the attempted suicide of General Medows, on the eve of the Treaty of Seringapatam, because it was a premature one, in the sense that it did not *follow* the capture of Seringapatam, but *preceded* it, thus countenancing the continuance of Tipū's authority in Mysore and postponing the Restoration of Hindu Rāj. (See *Mysore Pradhans*). Neither Mackenzie nor Dirom refers to this story; nor is it referred to in Wilks, who uniformly writes appreciatively of Medows. Kirmani, however, gives a circumstantial account of it in his *History of the Reign of Tipū Sultān*, which is worthy of note in this connection. After mentioning that the siege, which had just commenced, seemed to require "the sacrifice of multitudes of lives," the Allies knowing "the fortitude and courage of the Sultān," sought the means of making peace, while the Sultān sent ambassadors to them with the same view, he writes:—

"On this day, General Medows on returning to his tent, loaded a pistol and fired it off on himself; the ball, however, did not wound him mortally, but passed through the skin of his abdomen, and he had taken up another pistol (to put an end to himself), when Colonel Malcolm, the Adjutant-General, hearing the report, rushed into the tent, siezed the pistol and despatched an account of what had happened to the Commander-in-Chief. Lord Cornwallis immediately visited the General in his tent, and taking him by the hand returned thanks to God that he was safe, and after consoling and comforting him with kind words, said,—“at this precise period, peace is our best policy, for although taking the fort and

making the Sultān a prisoner be easy, and allowing both the Sultān and fort fall into our hands, still, I am not satisfied respecting our confederates, who are sharers with us in all things; for in such a case, what good will result to the Company's Government?—Indeed, after mature reflection, I am convinced this is the proper time to make peace," and the General now agreed to the truth of these words. (Col. Miles' Translation, 155–156.)

If the above story is true, it could only mean that General Meadows and Lord Cornwallis fundamentally disagreed on the policy adopted by Lord Cornwallis to which General Meadows gave only reluctant adherence, after making known his positive dislike for it.

Fourth  
attempt at  
restoration.

During the progress of the war, just about the time that Bangalore was taken, a fresh attempt appears to have been made by the Loyalists for the restoration of the ancient Royal family. The oppression and cruelty which Tipū exercised, especially his mad attempt at forcibly converting his own Hindu subjects, especially the highest classes amongst them, had driven them to seek desperate remedies to put a final end to his rule. The discontent among the dispossessed *Pālegārs* was so great that they became willing partners in a well organized attempt to uproot the usurpation. The highest officers serving under Tipū, too, had grown weary of his exactions and tortures and religious frenzy and Hindu and Moslem seem to have made up their minds that the time was ripe for ending the unbearable tyranny. Whether the Maharāni lent any support to the idea and if so, to what extent, is not by any means clear. The authorities—both Wilks and Kirmāni, whose accounts are based on contemporary information gathered within a short period of the final fall of Tipū—are wholly silent on the matter. From the general testimony borne by these authorities, it might be inferred that this latest attempt, unlike its

predecessors, was one in which officials, subjects and dispossessed *pālegārs* played a predominant part. The Intelligence Department organized by Lord Cornwallis, under Captain William Macleod, aided the Loyalist leaders to an extent that it is difficult to conceive at this distance of time. Colonel Alexander Read, who commanded at Ambur, and afterwards became famous as the preceptor of Munro in Revenue matters, proved highly active in winning over the discontented *Pālegārs*, who kept close connection through *hircarrahs* with the Loyalist leaders at the capital and elsewhere. The British Intelligence Department was not only efficient; it had also unlimited command of means for obtaining the best possible information at the most moderate expense. Kirmāni thus writes of Read's work :—

“Colonel Read, the Darogha of the Intelligence Department, who was appointed to the command of Amboor Gurh, with great address, and by the liberal distribution of money, sweet words, and kind actions, brought over to his side the whole of the Poligars of the Balaghaut, who from the oppression and cruelty of the late Nawab, and the tyrannical character of the Sultān had abandoned their own country, and had sought refuge in the towns of the Karnatic Peyanghaut; such as the Poligar of Gungoodi Pala (Kangundi Koppam); the sons of Bhyreh Koor, the Poligar of Chuk Balapoor; Pud Nair, the Poligar of Vinkut Giri Kote, who was residing at Charkul; Shunk Rayel, or Rawul, the Chief of Punganoor and besides these, the Poligars of Khut Koomnir; Mudunpalli, Anikul, Oonkus Giri, Cheel Naik, etc., all being dispossessed of their lands, received written assurances of protection, and were despatched to their own districts on condition they should collect and forward supplies of forage and provisions to the English army; and they also received authority to retake or recover (by any means) their own districts and Talookas; and, notwithstanding the severe restrictions in the Balaghaut, where without passes from the heads of districts, a man was not permitted to go from one town to another, he, Colonel Read, obtained maps of the whole of the country, by sending

clever spies and able *moonshis* at great expense, dressed as merchants into that country, and by their agency or mediation, also, several chiefs and officers of the Sirkar Khodadad, having been brought over to his interest, he sat waiting the arrival of the Governor-General, and although a certain Syud Imam, previously private intelligencer to Colonel Read, who was residing at the capital (Puttun) had obtained employment—in the Sultān's service; still, he wrote and despatched correct intelligence on all subjects, continually to Colonel Read and he also had assembled a number of traitors to his aid; when all at once the dish of his detection and shame appeared from beneath the blanket (in allusion to some Persian custom, or game, apparently), for his treachery by reason of some correction he had given to a boy, his servant, or slave, was published to the world; and at length certain of the Sultān's faithful servants seized him and his boy and brought them before the presence, and detailed all the circumstances of his treachery; this doomed man, therefore, fell under the heavy displeasure of the Sultān, and he was asked by him, what have you been doing? "If you tell the truth you may by that means save your life for a time." In these difficulties this foolish man made up a story with truth and falsehood intermixed, and wrote the names of several officers who had leagued with him in his treachery, and presented them to the Sultān, and according to this list of names, fifteen persons, such as Lalla Khan Bukhshi of Punganoor, Mir Nuzzur Ali, Mekkubdar, and his brother, and Ismael Khan Risaldar, etc., were seized and given over in charge to the executioner, and after the proof or establishment of the secret intelligence of writer's guilt (Islam Khan's), the Sultān asked him, "how he who had eaten his salt could have acted so treacherously, and what punishment he thought such conduct deserved?" The culprit, however, returned no answer, and the Sultān then said, "send this gentleman with the rest of his companions;" and he was also put to death.

"Another person also, named Imam Uddin, a newswriter, who had been employed in the same work and who resided at Kolar and Nundi Gurh, hearing this news at night, fled from that place to Kurumpaut, depending on Southgurh. Still, however, notwithstanding the disclosure of all this treachery, and the execution of his hired dependants, Colonel Read did not abstain from his intrigues and projects."

At Seringapatam, suspicion fell on Krishna Rao (the Kishen Row of Wilks). Krishna Rao from all accounts was one of the ablest and highly trusted officers of Tipū. He had served under Haidar as well and had risen from the ranks. He was, it would appear, a Mahratta Brahman, good at accounts and revenue matters and with an uncommon head for offering sound advice in matters military at the most critical situations. He had combined with Pūrnaiya in making easy the succession of Tipū on the death of his father. He was one of the two who kept secret Haidar's death and controlled the army until Tipū's arrival and taking over charge of the same. He had followed Tipū in his expeditions. He was present at the taking of Perumukkal, where, as head of the Treasury, he settled the ransom due from the people and collected on the spot a large sum of money from the people who had sought refuge in the fort. He it was that offered advice to Tipū to try a diversion on Trichinopoly to draw off General Medows from his design of invading Mysore from the Kaveripuram Pass, a ruse that was wholly successful. He was present at Bangalore when it was taken by Cornwallis and so far enjoyed the confidence of Tipū as to be deputed by him, on the eve of its fall, to go into the fort and bring away all the property in it, including guns and treasure, the *harem* and the families of his officers—the uniform pledge he exacted from them—a task which Krishna Rao executed with the promptitude that usually characterised his actions. Their removal effected, he arranged for their safe despatch to Seringapatam, where they arrived without accident. Such was the man who was suspected by Tipū of treachery towards himself, on the mere accusation of a discontented relation (of Tipū), whose defalcations he had made public. No wonder Wilks stigmatises in strong language what he calls “the mean and merciless character” of Tipū as disclosed in actions



of this nature. The story of how this able functionary was done to death is told by Wilks (*History* II, 198-99) in a passage which deserves to be quoted, both as illustrating certain aspects of the character of Tipū and the extent of the discontent that had resulted from his ill-judged and cruel measures:—

“One of his emissaries was unfortunately detected at this period, with a letter in the Canarese language, concealed in his hollow bamboo or walking stick. The Sultaun, as we shall hereafter perceive, in reviewing the measures of his reign, had reasonable cause for distrusting all Bramins, and such were all his secretaries for the languages of the south. A relation of his own (the brother-in-law of Seyed Saheb) who read the Canarese language, was entrusted with the examination of the letter, and the writer was seized; formerly a bramin, but forcibly circumcised, and now named Mohammed Abbas. The name of Sheshgere Row, brother of the treasurer Kishen Row, was implicated, and before he could be seized, he had heard of the accusation, and fled to his brother at Seringapatam; the treason seemed alarming and extensive, and Tipu ordered the writer of the letter to be brought into his presence; Abbas perceived his death to be inevitable, and he resolved that it should be exemplary; he denied no part of his own imputed guilt, but boldly declared that no torture should compel him to implicate others. “And how long,” said Tipu, “have you been a traitor?” “From the period,” replied he “that you began to circumcise bramins and destroy their temples.” He was put to death, by being publicly dragged round the camp, at the foot of an elephant; but the treasurer, Kishen Row, with three brothers, including Sheshgere Row, were privately tortured and despatched. With whatever mystery these affairs were conducted, the acknowledged execution of one of the most able and intelligent officers of the State, could not but excite very general observation, and one-half of the community continues under the impression, that as the letter was never submitted to the inspection of a bramin, the imputed participation of Kishen Row in any act of treachery, was a calumny invented by Seyed Saheb, in revenge for retrenchments made some years before, in the accounts of Dindigul.”

Wilks adds :

I could never get Pūrnaiya, his colleague, to give an opinion. He kept aloof from enquiry ; and of course from interposition, from the natural dread of consequences ; and professed to have had no opportunity of forming a judgment.

No wonder that Pūrnaiya kept away from the inquiry. If he had interested himself, he would have been implicated and what that meant is known from the fate that befell Krishna Rao himself. Later, but wholly untrustworthy, accounts have suggested that Pūrnaiya was jealous of Krishna Rao and left him to his fate without even putting a word of intercession on his behalf from entirely selfish motives, if he did not indeed connive at his unnatural despatch. There is no evidence whatever to support this belief still current in the land. Pūrnaiya had nothing to gain from the disappearance of Krishna Rao ; both were equals in the service ; and if anything, Pūrnaiya stood even higher than Krishna Rao in the esteem of Tipū and his mother, to whose word the son paid great respect. There being no motive for such unfriendliness, the charge laid against Pūrnaiya cannot but be dismissed as both unjustified and groundless. Accounts current to this day state that Krishna Rao was really innocent of the designs of the Loyalists and that his death was compassed by his enemies, who were many. The manner in which he was actually put to death is not mentioned by Wilks but tradition states that he was bodily lifted by jetties and thrown into a boiling cauldron of oil, in which he perished. The executions took place at Seringapatam before the departure of Lord Carnwallis from Bangalore.

Kirmāni, in his account of the affair, sets out the reasons that impelled Tipū to take extreme measures against Krishna Rao. His version suggests that he was

Kirmāni's  
account.



in league with the invading English army, to whom he supplied information. Though baseless, this version indicates what was popularly believed at the time both by Tipū and his informants. Kirmāni thus writes detailing Tipū's arrangements for the defence of Bangalore fort :—

“ It was, therefore, determined by the advice of certain of the Sultān's counsellors, that the defence of the fort, should be left to Monsieur Lally, and that Kumruddin Khan and Syud Sahib with a strong force should be appointed to make a demonstration against the English army, while the Sultān himself should march to arrest the progress of the Moghuls, the Nizam's troops and the Mahrattas. In pursuance of this arrangement, the French officer (Lally) actually marched, and had arrived at the tank or reservoir (Basavangudi) of the canal, when Kishn Rao, and some other traitors becoming acquainted with this plan gave a hint to the English Harkaras, who were always about them habited as their own servants, and they immediately apprised the guards in the trenches that now the time had arrived to make an assault and take the fort. Kishn Rao after this left the fort, and at the bank of the tank above mentioned, meeting Monsieur Lally, took him by the hand and kept him in conversation about trifles, while the officers in the trenches as soon as they received the information mentioned before, immediately got their troops in readiness and a little after midnight, all at once made their attack. Syud Humid the Sipahdar and the Killadars (commanders of the garrison) according to the directions of the traitor Kishu Rao, had allowed their men who were all prepared to defend the fort, to go to their quarters and cook their victuals, and, therefore, except a few sentinels, no one remained at their posts, but notwithstanding their helpless condition, they boldly advanced to repel their assailants, and drove them back from the chain of the gate. The Europeans, however, having been quickly supplied with the wine, (or rather spirituous liquor), which inspires courage, returned to the charge, and by the time the brave garrison had assembled, they had stormed and mounted the walls and towers. The Syud being without his men and seeing he could not maintain his ground, escaped and joined the army. The

two Killadars with forty or fifty of their men planting their feet manfully at the gate were there slain, as was Shaikh Boodhun Risaladar, after giving manifold proofs of his courage and fidelity. Shaikh Oonsur Sipahdar and the Naikwars (the Nairs or Hindu chiefs) and soldiers of the fort were taken prisoners. The fort, therefore, was captured and the garrison with their women and children, and their money and property of all kinds fell into the possession of the English soldiers."

After the loss of Bangalore, Kīramāni states Tipū lost his balance and ordered the indiscriminate execution of several of his officers. Among these were Jogiah Pandit, the nephew of Achanna Pundit, better known as Rāja Beerbul and Rāja Rāmachandra Phadak, the soubadar of Arcot, who was the Sheristedar of Bangalore and adjacent taluks who was also suspected of leaguings with the British; the Pālegērs of Rayadurg and Harpanhalli, "because" we are told by Kīramāni, "the fire of the Sultān's wrath burned fiercely, at the bare mention of the name of Poligars." At about this time, Krishna Rao was, we are told, sent by Tipū "to take charge of the capital (Seringapatam), and to despatch money for the payment of the troops, while the Sultān himself with army and its departments marched in pursuit of the English army at Balapoor Khoord."

What followed may be told in Kīrmāni's own words:—

"The brave and powerful Sultān with his victorious army had at this time turned the head of his generous steed towards the English army with the intention to attack it, when a jasoos, or spy dressed in a suit of mourning arrived, sent by his mother from Seringaputtun, and this man in private informed the Sultān that the villain Kishn Rao conspiring with some other traitors, had so concerted and arranged that probably by this time a sedition had broken out in the capital, or would soon break out, the repression of which it would not be very easy to accomplish,—he having followed the path of the rejected Khuudi Rao, and had sent for a large body of English troops from Bombay, and that the Queen, (the

Sultān's wife), had given up all hope or care of her life,—at hearing this intelligence the Sultān despatched Syud Sahib with a body of troops to provide for the security and order of his capital."

Kirmāni proceeds to relate:—

"When Syud Sahib received orders to depart, he proceeded forthwith by the route of the Makri Jungul and Rai Droog, and arrived at the capital of the Sultān, Seringaputtun, at midnight, and placed his encampment on this side of the river, while he himself with a few friends, and four or five hundred horse advanced to the gate of the fort, and before the appearance of the first light of the morning, called out to the guard at the gate to open it. As it happened, that Assud Khan Risaldar and other loyal subjects of the Sultān have been appointed to the charge of this gate, they, pleased at the arrival of the Syud, opened the wickets, and he entered; and having stationed parties of his horse over different departments of the state, he proceeded to pay his respects to the Sultān's mother, and she seated herself in the Hall of audience. At this time, the commander of the troops at the capital, who was deeply implicated in the treason of the Brahman, finding his secret disclosed to the world, immediately repaired to the Syud, and boasting of his own fidelity and loyalty, and condemning the folly and treason of the Brahman, persisted in demanding that he should be imprisoned. The Syud, therefore, despatched a Chobedar to summon Kishen Rao, to the Hall of audience or Durbar, and, as he being aware of his danger, returned for answer, that it was unusual and unreasonable the Syud should send him orders, that he had nothing to do with him,—his answer confirming the suspicion before entertained of his treachery, the Syud ordered the persons present to proceed to his house and seize him, and they forcing their way into his house and breaking open the door of his apartment, which he had bolted, or secured in the inside, they with their swords and muskets put him to death, and threw his body into the drain of the bazar, and his house was plundered, and the property found in it carried to the treasury. During the last moments, however, of this fiend, he said,—"I have lighted up a fire, which as long as the Sultān lives will not be extinguished,"—this, alas, was but too true."

Krishna Rao's wife, a beautiful, faithful and virtuous lady, was, according to one version, adds Kirmāni "tyrannically forced," after her husband's death, into the Sultan's own seraglio.

It is hardly necessary to invite attention to the radical difference that exists between versions of Wilks and Kirmāni in regard to the connection of Krishna Rao with the ever-active Loyalist group—necessarily described as "traitors" to Tipū—and to the different verdicts they pass on him. While Wilks holds him innocent, Kirmāni holds him guilty of walking in the footsteps of Khānde Rao and leaguings with the English at Madras and at Bombay. Whether Krishna Rao was in the attempt or not, it is clear that the moral basis—if any—had been sapped to its foundations by Tipū's own unbridled acts and people were not only tired of him but also actively against him. If only Lord Cornwallis had pressed his terms hard, he could have ended the tyranny at once and thus saved the people of Mysore and the Company another War. But as stated already, he was too noble, too generous, too high-minded and too much tied down by the Company's injunctions and by the barren theory of balance of power, rejected by so good an authority as Sir John Malcolm, to seem exacting with even such an unfaithful neighbour as Tipū.

After the departure of the confederates, the Sultān, brooding over the heavy losses he had sustained and the deep wounds that had been inflicted on his pride, shut himself up for several days in an agony of despair. His first public act was to make arrangements regarding the money due under the treaty. It was resolved that one crore and ten lakhs of the total amount should be paid from the treasury, that sixty lakhs should be contributed by the army, and one crore and sixty lakhs by the civil officers and inhabitants at large under the head of

Payment of  
the war  
indemnity.

*nazarana*. The oppression of the population in levying the last drove great numbers to seek an asylum in Baramahal and other neighbouring districts, though there was a large balance standing in the accounts for several years afterwards.

Prize-money  
and  
gratuities.

The prize-money realized from the sale of property captured during this war amounted £ 93,584, made up as follows :—

	£
First campaign, 1790 ...	19,804
Second campaign, 31st July 1791 ...	52,618
Third campaign, 1st August 1791 to 24th February 1792 ...	21,162

Lord Cornwallis added a gratuity from the sum paid by Tipū; and the Court of Directors made a similar grant and both Lord Cornwallis and General Medows magnanimously gave up their claims. In the result, the share of a Colonel amounted to £1,161, that of a Sergeant £29 and that of other ranks £14. As regards Indian troops, a Subadar got £27, a Havaldar £11 and other ranks £5.

The Sultān's  
innovations.

The Sultān's caprice, fanaticism and spirit of innovation increased with his misfortunes, and were carried to the verge of insanity. "The professed and formal regulations for the conduct of affairs had commenced before his departure from Mangalore, with the aid of his great innovator Zain-ul-Abidin; and embraced either directly or incidentally, every department in the science of government. Regulations military, naval, commercial and fiscal; police, judicature, and ethics; were embraced by the code of this modern Minos, and his reformation of calendar and of the system of weights and measures, was to class him with those philosophical statesmen and sovereigns of whose useful labours the Secretary (Zain-



ul-Abidin) had obtained some obscure intelligence. It may be briefly stated regarding the whole, that the *name* of every object was changed; of cycles, years, and months, weights, measures, coins; forts, towns; offices, military and civil, the official designations of all persons and things without one exception"—a singular parody of what was transpiring at the time in France. It was "a system of subversion," adds Wilks, "as sweeping and indiscriminate, as if the axiom were familiarly established that everything is wrong because it exists." The administration itself was named the *Sarkar Khodadad*, or God-given Government. Obsolete Persian was introduced for all English or French words of command in the military regulations, and the same language used for the revenue accounts in preference to that of the country. His reformation of the army ended in the increasing and improving of his infantry and artillery at the expense of the cavalry and this change became "the most decided source of inferiority in his contest with the English power." The construction of a navy to vie with that of England was proposed. The absurdity was not perceived of seeking to create a warlike fleet without a commercial navy. An improvement of the fortifications of Seringapatam was also commenced, and labourers impressed from all parts of the country for the work.

The commercial regulations were founded on the basis of making the Sovereign, if not the sole, the chief merchant of the dominions. Commerce with Europeans, especially with the English, was considered pregnant with danger in every direction. With this view, he prohibited the cultivation of pepper-vine in the maritime districts, and reserved those of inland growth to trade with the true believers from Arabia. Monopolies were numerous, those of tobacco, sandal-wood, pepper and the

Commercial  
arrange-  
ments.



precious metals being the most lucrative. Exports and imports were prohibited for the protection of domestic trade; and the interdiction of the growth of poppy-seeds, with the abolition of liquor-shops to check intoxication. A board of trade of nine Commissioners was also organized, with seventeen foreign and thirty home factories in the several districts, with a new code for its guidance; and it was in contemplation to have established something like a bank, while the State itself monopolized the profits of money-changers. When the person in charge of the bank reported that the dealers were keeping aloof from it, that the expenses far exceeded the profits and that it was necessary either to abandon the plan or to enlarge it, so as to embrace not only regular banking establishments, but commercial speculations necessary for their prosperity, he got the reply; "There is no regulation issued by us, that does not cost us, in the framing of it, the deliberation of five hundred years—do as you are ordered."

Changes in  
Civil and  
Military  
affairs.

Hindus were displaced by Muhammadans in the offices both at headquarters and in the taluks, and the order went forth that all accounts should be submitted in the Persian language. As these new officials, as Kirmāni plaintively puts it, "could scarce read or write," corruption increased all round. At this time, Tipū developed "a great aversion to Brahmans, Hindus and other tribes," and "he did not consider any but the people of Islām his friends, and therefore, on all accounts, his chief object was to promote and provide for them." Kirmāni adds: "When, therefore, for the sake of his religion, the Sultān withheld his hand from the duties of Government, and conquest, and ceased to inquire into the actions and conduct of his agents and servants, every one in his place did as he pleased fearlessly, and without restraint. The old Khans and faithful servants of the

State were now cast down from confidence and power and low men without abilities were raised to high offices and dignities.....From this cause, however, it was that disorder and disaffection forced their way into the very foundations of the State, and at once the nobles and Khans being alarmed and suspicious, became the instigators of treachery and rebellion." So unsettled did he become of the loyalty of those surrounding him that he organized a corps called Kerbeela at first and afterwards Zumra, to act as his body-guard, and prescribed an appropriate dress for it. Wilks in his brief comment tellingly sums up the position: "No human being was ever worse served, or more easily deceived," despite the oath of fidelity solemnly administered to each of them by the partaking of rice and milk with himself.

Lands and money allowances granted to Hindu pagodas, as well as the service ināms of patels, were confiscated; and an income was raised by dividing the houses in the fort of Seringapatam into separate wards for different classes, and putting prices upon them, the owners being ordered to shift for themselves outside, no compensation being paid to them. The revenue regulations of Chikka-Dēva-Rāja, however, remained unaltered; but they were republished as the ordinances of the Sultān himself. He strove, in short, to obliterate every trace of the previous rulers. For this purpose, even the fine irrigation works, centuries old, of the Hindu Rājas were to be destroyed and reconstructed in his own name.

Fiscal and  
Revenue  
arrange-  
ments.

As regards selections for offices, the Sultān fancied that he could discover by mere look the capacity of a person, which naturally resulted in the most absurd blunders. All candidates for every department were ordered to be admitted and drawn up in line before him, when, looking steadfastly at them, he would as if actuated

His adminis-  
trative and  
other  
blunders.

by inspiration call out in a solemn voice, "Let the third from the left be Asoph of such a district; he with the yellow drawers understands naval affairs, let him be *Mir-e-Yem*, Lord of the Admiralty; he with the long beard and he with the red turban are but Amils, let them be promoted." (Wilks, II, 289). The manner in which complaints were heard and disposed of may be illustrated by a single example. A number of raiyats appeared on a certain occasion before their sovereign to complain of exaction. Mīr Sadak, the Dewan, admitted the fact and said it was made on account of *nazarana*, which silenced the Sultān at once. The Dewān, however, holding out to the raiyats a hope of future immunity, succeeded in inducing them to agree to pay thirty-seven and a half per cent additional, and this circumstance being brought to the notice of Tipū as demonstrating the falsehood of their former complaint, the patel or head man was hung on the spot, and the increase extended to the whole of the Mysore dominions.

The return  
of the  
hostages.

By 1794, the money due under the treaty was paid, and the hostages were returned to the Sultān at Devanahalli, re-named Yusufabad.

Death of  
Chāmarāja  
Wodeyar;  
Palace again  
plundered.  
1796.

In 1796, Chāmarāja Wodeyar, the reigning Rāja, died of smallpox. The practice of his annually holding formal court at the Dasara had been kept up, but now Tipū considered the appointment of a successor unnecessary, removed the family to a mean dwelling and plundered the palace of everything, including the personal ornaments of individuals. Krishnarāja Wodeyar III, who was then two years old, cried bitterly at the attempt to take away his little golden bracelets and there was, writes Wilks "sufficient feeling among the instruments of tyranny to be touched at the distress of the child and to abstain from this last violation." Among the losses

sustained on this occasion was the valuable Mss. Library of the Palace in which lay by curious good luck *Nagar Pootia's History of Mysore* up to 1712, apparently compiled at the instance of Chikka-Dēva Rāja Wodeyar, on which, to some extent, Wilks' work is based.

Tipū next strained every nerve to form a coalition for the expulsion of the English from India. Embassies were despatched at various times to the Ottoman Porte and to the court of Kabul; letters were exchanged with Arabia, Persia, and Muscat; and agents employed at Delhi, Oudh, Haidarabad and Poona, the object sought in the two last-named courts being two-fold, namely, an alliance with the sovereigns themselves, and the seduction of their officers from them. Even the princes of Jōdhpur, Jeypur and Kashmīr did not escape an invitation to join this mighty coalition. The French in particular were repeatedly applied to.

IV Mysore  
War:  
Tipū's  
designs on  
the English.

At last, in the early part of 1797, stress of weather drove a French privateer to the coast of Mangalore, having on board an obscure individual by name Ripaud. This person represented himself to be the second in command at the Isle of France, and being sent to Seringapatam by Ghulām Alī, the former envoy to the court of France, was honoured with several interviews with the Sultān. In the course of these, he took occasion to extol the power and magnify the resources of his countrymen, and added that a considerable force was assembled at the Isle of France waiting for the Sultān's summons. Tipū took the hint, commissioned Ripaud to proceed to Mauritius, conveying with him two servants as ambassadors to the Government of that island, with letters. The embassy left Seringapatam in the month of April 1797, but did not embark till October.

His mission  
to Mauritius.

Its failure.

The embassy reached the Isle of France in January 1798, and, in spite of the obvious necessity for secrecy, was openly received by Malartic, the French Governor, with distinguished marks of respect. The *kurreetahs* were read with all solemnity in a council, and were found to contain a proposal for a coalition to expel the English. To the great disappointment of the ambassadors, there was not a single soldier available, but to make amends, the Governor sent the Directory at home a duplicate of the Sultān's *kurreetah*, and deputed two officers, by name Chapuis and Dubuc, to reside at the court of Seringapatam. At the same time, he issued a public proclamation, dated the 30th January, 1798, inviting the people of the island to join the Sultān's standard. The result of these measures was that the embassy, which was intended to have conveyed an armament sufficient to have swept the English off the face of India, returned with ninety-four men, the refuse of the Isle of France, burning with a zeal for "liberty and equality." A Jacobin club was formed in Seringapatam, a tree of liberty set up crowned with the cap of liberty, and the Sultān, who looked upon the general denunciation of kings and rulers as directed against the English alone, enrolled as *Citizen Tipū Sultān*. At the same time, M. Dubuc himself was sent in July 1798 with two Mubammadan envoys to the French Directory. Buonaparte's sudden invasion of Egypt now took place, encouraging the hope of immediate French intervention; and Dubuc, who did not actually sail till the 7th of February, assured Tipū that they must have already embarked on the Red Sea for his assistance.

Lord  
Mornington's  
preparations :  
Tripartite  
Treaty of  
1790  
restored.

But Lord Mornington (better known as Marquess Wellesley), then Governor-General, was fully aware of these hostile preparations; and when a copy of Malartic's proclamation reached his hands, deemed it high time to



put a check on the Sultān's designs. The French force at Haidarabad was dismissed by a masterstroke of policy on 21st October 1798, and the Nizām and Pēshwa united in stronger bonds of alliance with the British.

This being effected, the Governor-General determined on definite action against Tipū with a view to establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence. In a Minute dated 12th August 1798, he thus expounded his views on this matter :—

*"The rights of States, applicable to every case of contest with foreign powers, are created and limited by the necessity of preserving the public safety; this necessity is the foundation of the reciprocal claim of all nations, to explanation of suspicious or ambiguous conduct, to reparation for injuries done, and to security against injuries intended.*

Lord  
Mornington's  
view.

"In any of these cases, when just satisfaction has been denied, or from the evident nature of circumstances, cannot otherwise be obtained, it is the undoubted right of the injured party, to resort to arms for the vindication of the public safety; and in such a conjuncture, the right of the State becomes the duty of the Government, unless some material consideration of the public interest should forbid the attempt.

"If the conduct of Tippoo Sultaun had been of a nature which could be termed ambiguous or suspicious; if he had merely increased his force beyond his ordinary establishment, or had stationed it in some position on our confines, or on those of our allies, which might justify jealousy or alarm; if he had renewed his secret intrigues at the courts of Hyderabad, Poona, and Cabul; or even if he had entered into any negotiation with France, of which the object was at all obscure; it might be our duty to resort in the first instance to his construction of proceedings, which being of a doubtful character, might admit of a satisfactory explanation. *But where there is no doubt, there can be no matter for explanation.* The act of Tippoo's ambassadors, ratified by himself, and accompanied by the landing of a French force in his country, is a public, unqualified, and unambiguous declaration of war, aggravated by an avowal, that the object of the war is neither explana-



tion, reparation, nor security, but the total destruction of the British Government in India.

"To affect to misunderstand an injury or insult of such a complexion, would argue a consciousness either of weakness or of fear. No State in India can misconstrue the conduct of Tippoo; the correspondence of our residents at Hyderabad and Poona, sufficiently manifests the construction which it bears at both those courts, and in so clear and plain a case, our demand of explanation would be justly attributed either to a defect of spirit or of power. The result of such a demand would therefore be, the disgrace of our character and the diminution of our influence and consideration in the eyes of our allies and of every power in India. If the moment should appear favourable to the execution of Tippoo's declared design, he would answer such a demand by an immediate attack; if on the other hand, his preparations should not be sufficiently advanced, he would deny the existence of his engagements with France, would persist in his denial until he had reaped the full benefit of them, and finally, after having completed the improvement of his own army, and received the accession of an additional French force, he would turn the combined strength of both against our possessions, with an alacrity and confidence inspired by our inaction, and with advantages redoubled by our delay. In the present case, the idea, therefore, of demanding explanation must be rejected, as being disgraceful in its principle, and frivolous in its object.

"The demand of reparation, in the strict sense of the term, cannot properly be applied to cases of intended injury, excepting in those instances where the nature of the reparation demanded may be essentially connected with security against the injurious intention.

"Where a State has unjustly seized the property, or invaded the territory, or violated the rights of another, reparation may be made, by restoring what has been unjustly taken, or by a subsequent acknowledgment of the right which has been infringed; but the cause of our complaint against Tippoo Sultān, is not that he has seized a portion of our property which he might restore, or invaded a part of our territory which he might again cede, or violated a right which he might hereafter acknowledge; we complain, that, professing the most amicable disposition, bound by subsisting treaties of

peace and friendship, and unprovoked by any offence on our part, he has manifested a design to effect our total destruction; he has prepared the means and instruments of a war of extermination against us; he has solicited and received the aid of our inveterate enemy for the declared purpose of annihilating our empire; and he only waits the arrival of a more effectual succour to strike a blow against our existence.

“That he has not yet received the effectual succour which he has solicited, may be ascribed, either to the weakness of the Government of Mauritius, or to their want of zeal in his cause or to the rashness and imbecility of his own councils; but neither the measure of his hostility, nor of our right to restrain it, nor of our danger from it, are to be estimated by the amount of the force which he has actually obtained; for we know that his demands of military assistance were unlimited; we know that they were addressed, not merely to the Government of Mauritius but to that of France, and we cannot ascertain how soon they may be satisfied to the full extent of his acknowledged expectations. This, therefore, is not merely the case of an injury to be repaired, but of the public safety to be secured against the present and future designs of an irreconcilable, desperate, and treacherous enemy. Against an enemy of this description, no effectual security can be obtained, otherwise than by such a reduction of his power, as shall not only defeat his actual preparations, but establish a permanent restraint upon his future means of offence.”

In consonance with his above views, Lord Mornington wrote to the Sultān on the 8th November 1798, giving expression for the first time to the feelings awakened by his late proceedings in gentle and cautious language, informing him that certain precautions had been adopted for self-defence, offering to depute Major Doveton on the part of the three Allies to explain the means by which a good understanding might be finally established, and desiring Tipū to state when he intended to receive him, To this letter Tipū had the temerity to answer that the existing treaties were a sufficient security and that he

His  
admonition  
to Tipū.

could imagine no other means more effectual; thereby distinctly declining the reception of the envoy. The state of Tipū's mind at this time appears to have been one of resignation to his fate. "If his destruction was pre-ordained, let it come; the sooner the better." Every discussion was terminated by the professedly pious remark; "After all, whatever is the will of God, that will be accomplished." This state of passive contemplation, although materially disturbed, was not permanently changed, even by the receipt of the letter from Lord Mornington, dated the 8th of November.

His arrival  
at Madras.

On the 10th of December, Lord Mornington wrote again, calling the Sultān's attention to the above mentioned letter, and requesting to be favoured with a reply at Madras, whither the Earl of Mornington was about to proceed as being nearer the scene of action. On reaching Madras on the last day of the month, the Governor-General found a reply waiting for him, dated the 25th. This letter opened with the intimation of Tipū's joy at the brilliant naval victory of the Nile over the French, of which he had been advised by the Governor-General, and a wish for greater success. He explained away the embassy to the Isle of France as being simply the trip of a merchantman that conveyed rice and brought back some forty artificers, an incident which, it was alleged, had been distorted by the French. The Sultān added also that he had never swerved from the path of friendship, and could not see (as before mentioned) more effectual measures for establishing it than those that already existed.

His exposure  
of Tipū's real  
designs: War  
declared.

The Governor-General replied on the 9th of January, 1799, exposing the whole affair of the mission to the Isle of France, which had rendered the demand of further security necessary; expressing a wish still to listen

to negotiations, and allowing one day's time for a reply, with a significant warning that "dangerous consequences result from the delay of arduous affairs." This letter was accompanied by a copy of the manifesto issued by the Ottoman Porte, declaring war against the French. Tipū though roused from his stupor, was still not master of himself. The Governor-General's letter made him see the immediate pressure of the danger and even in a certain degree the folly which had produced it. The gratuitous folly of receiving a military contingent of ninety-nine Frenchmen was just dawning on him, but he still went on with "the procrastination naturally belonging to an impalatable resolve, hesitating from day to day to execute the determination of the last; and the lingering indecision of the fatalist, suggested the hope that, if at the last moment no favourable chance should arise, he might still be in time to submit to an alternative short of absolute destruction. At this very period, there were constant assurances to him from the French in his service that troops in aid of him should have actually embarked on the Red Sea and might be daily expected. Projects of resistance or submission held their alternate empire, as reason or passion prevailed; and it is believed by those who had the best opportunities of judging that the confident assurances of the French officers were the efficient cause of diverting Tipū's mind from the only wise resolution it was then in his power to form, and produced his ultimate destruction." How far these assurances were or could be reliable, he did not stop to enquire. It is certain that they could only have originated in vague inferences regarding the ultimate objects of the Egyptian expedition, and in an entire ignorance of the actual facts. After the destruction of the French fleet on the 1st of August 1798, Buonaparte could not have contemplated distant detachments; it was as much as he could do to preserve his first conquest.

But there is hardly any doubt that that General's letter to Tipū (written in February 1799 and beginning with the famous words "you have already been informed of my arrival on the borders of the Red Sea") professing the intention of liberating him from the iron yoke of England distinctly shows the intended execution of that design to be distant, which seems natural when we remember that he desires the despatch of a secret envoy to meet him at Cairo and the exactly contemporaneous character of the sieges of Acre and Seringapatam. After a lapse of more than a month, or on the 13th of February 1799, Tipū replied to the Governor-General's letter of the 9th of January, with utter disregard, that he was proceeding on a hunting excursion, and desired that Major Doveton might be sent "slightly attended." The Governor-General, interpreting this as contempt and as an effort to gain time, ordered at once the march of the troops, informing the Sultān of the same on the 22nd February. Intelligence of the invasion of Egypt by the French having reached the Governor-General on the 18th October 1798, he ordered the Madras Government to advance the army to some convenient place near the Mysore frontier, and advised them of the intended despatch from Calcutta of three battalions of Indian Volunteers. Instructions were sent to Bombay at the same time for the assembly of a body of troops in Malabār for the purpose of co-operating in the siege of Seringapatam should hostilities become unavoidable.

British Army  
marches for  
Mysore.

An army, consisting of nearly 21,000 men of all arms, had been assembled near Vellore under the command of General Harris, the Commander-in-Chief, and it marched for the frontier on the 14th February. On the 20th, when near Amboor, it was joined by the troops from Hyderabad, amounting in all to about 16,000 men. On the 23rd, Major-General Floyd was sent in advance,



with a strong body of cavalry, and the left wing of the army, in order to cover the passes of the Baramahal. General Harris followed, and on the 28th he joined the leading division at Karimangalam.

Immediately before entering the Mysore territory, General Harris considered it expedient to add a regiment of European infantry to the Nizām's Contingent, and H. M.'s 33rd was the one selected. This arrangement placed the Honourable Colonel Arthur Wellesley in command of the division, much to the dissatisfaction of Major-General Baird who believed himself entitled thereto; but the nomination of Colonel Wellesley was justified partly on political grounds, and partly because the Contingent was a Colonel's command.

Colonel  
Wellesley in  
Command of  
Nizām's  
Contingent.

The army arrived at Rayakōta on the 1st March, and on the 5th idem a detachment, under Major John Cuppage, 1st Battalion 6th Regiment, took possession of the small hill forts of Nildrug and Anchittydrug which lay on the route. Two or three days afterwards, the forts of Udaiyadurg and Ratnagiri surrendered; the former to the 2nd Battalion 3rd Regiment under Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver, and the latter to Six Companies 2nd Battalion 4th Regiment under Captain Irton of that corps.

Surrender of  
forts on the  
way.

The force from Bombay, assembled in Malabār under Lieutenant-General Stuart, had received instructions to ascend the ghāts into the province of Coorg, and to remain there until further orders. It marched from Cannanore accordingly on the 21st February, and on the 2nd March, the right brigade under Lieutenant-Colonel Montresor encamped at Seedaseer (Siddēsvara) on the Coorg frontier, about seven miles from the town of Periapatam, on the high road to Seringapatam, the main body remaining

The force  
from  
Bombay:  
action at  
Seedaseer.



about eight miles in the rear. Tipu, having received intelligence of these movements, determined to attempt to cut off the column, and on the morning of the 3rd he hastened from Maddur, where he left a detachment under Pūrnaiya and Saiyid Sahib to oppose the Karnātic army and on the 6th suddenly attacked Colonel Montresor with a select corps of about 11,800 men. On the 5th, the romantic Rāja of Coorg discerned from the summit of the Siddēsvara hill, the plain near Periyapatna dotted with tents, including a green one and flew to the English with the news. But the dawn following, Tipū's force was in motion. A fog and the dense jungle screened its approach till the advanced British line was attacked both in front and rear. The brigade, although completely surrounded, behaved with great resolution, and maintained the position until about 3 o'clock in the afternoon, when General Stuart coming up with the flank companies of the 75th, and the whole of the 77th, the enemy retreated in all directions with the loss of about 1,500 killed and wounded. The casualties on the British side only amounted to 143, killed, wounded, and missing.

On the 9th March, the army encamped at Kelaman-galam, and on the next day Lieutenant-Colonel Read, who had joined General Harris shortly before, was detached in order to protect the frontier of the Baramahal, to collect provisions, and ultimately to co-operate with a force under Colonel Brown, which had been assembled near Trichinopoly, and was about to march for Seringapatam by Karoor, Erode, and Kaveripuram.

General  
Harris'  
March.

After making the arrangements for Colonel Read's detachment, General Harris marched on the 10th, Colonel Wellesley's division moving at a considerable distance on the right flank of the army for the protection of the baggage and stores.

Soon after leaving Kilamangalam, the columns were harassed by bodies of the enemy's horse, one of which succeeded in cutting up the light company 1st Battalion 11th Regiment which formed part of the rear guard of the Nizām's Contingent. Twenty men were killed. Lieutenant Reynolds and thirty-six men were wounded.

Nothing of moment occurred until the arrival of the army near Malvalli, where an action took place on the 27th, thus described by General Harris:—

Action at  
Malvalli.

"On the 27th March, the army reached Mallvelly, to the westward of which place, but at a considerable distance, the army of Tippoo Sultān appeared, formed on a very commanding ground to oppose our further progress. I had previously arranged the march of the army so as to preserve the right wing and cavalry free from the incumbrance of baggage, and ready to act as occasion might require in conjunction with Colonel Wellesley's division, which, lightly equipped, moved at some distance on our left flank, the left wing under Major-General Popham being allotted to protect our baggage, provisions, and stores, in the event of an action, which although it was not my object to seek, I had determined not to avoid by any movement which might lead the enemy to suppose I could entertain a doubt of the event.

"Judging from the distance of the enemy that they did not intend an attack, I directed the ground to be marked out as usual for the encampment of the army, but at 10 o'clock guns were opened from the distant heights on the cavalry and the corps advanced for picquets on our right. The shot falling on the line, I ordered the picquets to be supported by H.M.'s 25th Dragoons and the 2nd Regiment of native cavalry, the three brigades of infantry to form line on the left of the picquets, and the whole to advance on the enemy's left and front, while Colonel Wellesley's division was directed to move towards the right flank of the enemy's line.

"The picquets under Colonel Sherbrooke, assisted by H.M.'s 25th Dragoons, were opposed to a large body of the enemy's cavalry, who hovered on the right flank of our troops during the advance which was too rapid to admit of the field

pieces attached to corps keeping their position in the line. Encouraged by this circumstance, a small corps of the enemy's cavalry hazarded a resolute charge on the European brigade commanded by Major-General Baird, but found it impossible to make any impression on H.M.'s 12th, and the Scotch Brigade, who received them with the greatest steadiness, and by a continued, close and well directed fire, repulsed them with considerable loss.

"This corps was accompanied in its precipitate retreat by a large body of horse, led, as we have since learnt, by the Sultān in person, which had been prepared to sustain the attack if successful; and by a brigade of infantry that for some time had maintained a heavy fire of musketry, principally directed, and not without effect, at H.M.'s 74th Regiment.

"Nearly at the same time that their cavalry charged our right, a large division of the enemy's infantry had advanced on our left to attack the force commanded by Colonel Wellesley, and was broken by H.M.'s 33rd Regiment which led his column.

"At this critical moment, H.M.'s 19th Dragoons and two regiments of native cavalry, commanded by Major-General Floyd, charged this retreating corps, and nearly destroyed it.

"The army continued to advance in a well-connected line, while that of the enemy retreated before it in the utmost confusion. Their cannon were drawn off, and after a short pursuit, the want of water not permitting to encamp upon the field of battle, the army returned to the vicinity of Mallavelly.

"The 19th Dragoons, the 12th, 33rd, 74th and the Scotch Brigade, which alone of H.M.'s corps were engaged, were equally distinguished by their steadiness and gallantry. The 25th Dragoons, although prevented by their remote situation from joining in the charge of the cavalry, was most eminently useful with the picquets under Colonel Sherbrooke in checking the advance of the large corps of the enemy's horse which menaced the right flank of the army till the conclusion of the action."

It was afterwards ascertained that Tipū's loss amounted to about 2,000 men killed and wounded. British

casualties were trifling, viz., 66 men, and 48 horses, killed, wounded, and missing.

Immediately after the action at Malvalli, General Harris determined to cross the Cauvery. Tipū, however, anticipating that the British army would take the same route to the capital which had been taken in 1792, had destroyed all the forage in that direction, but General Harris defeated his project by crossing the Cauvery at Sosile on the 29th and 30th March and resumed his march on the 1st April. When the intelligence of this skilful movement reached the ears of the Sultān, he was deeply dejected. Assembling a council of his principal officers at Bannur, "We have," he observed with great emotion, "now arrived at our last stage," intimating that there was no hope. "What is your determination?" "To die with you," was the universal reply, and the meeting broke up bathed in tears, as if convened for the last time. In accordance with the deliberation of this assembly, the Sultān hastened to the southern point of the island, and took up his position at the village of Chandagal; but General Harris again thwarted his plans, and making a circuit to the left, safely reached the ground towards the west, occupied by General Abercromby in 1792, and sat down before the capital on the 5th April, about 2 miles from the south-west face of the fort, or exactly in the space of a month from the date of his crossing the frontier.

Siege of  
Seringa-  
patam.

Since the year 1792 a new line of intrenchments had been constructed on this side of the fort, from the Daulat Bagh to the Periyapatam bridge, within six or seven hundred yards from the fort, thus avoiding the fault of the redoubts in 1792, which were too distant to be supported by the guns of the fort. The Sultān's infantry was now encamped between these works and the river,

The defences  
of Seringa-  
patam.

and on the same evening on which the British army took up its position, a portion was attacked by Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the future hero of Waterloo. Although this first attempt failed, success was achieved on the following morning, and strong advanced posts were established within 1,800 yards of the fort, with their left on the river and their right at Sultānpet. These two attacks are thus described by General Harris.—

The siege  
described:  
General  
Harris'  
despatch.

“His Majesty’s 12th Regiment, and two battalions Madras sepoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, attacked a post occupied by the enemy in a ruined village about 2,000 yards from the fort, and in front of our left.

“Colonel Wellesley, with H.M.’s 33rd Regiment, and two Bengal battalions, advanced soon after to scour, and occupy a wood near the village of Sultanpett about a mile to the right of the post attacked by Colonel Shawe, with which it was connected by a large water course then nearly dry, having a high strong bank, which winding round, and through, the wood, afforded perfect cover to a large body of the enemy’s troops. The attack under Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe was successful, but that on the wood failed from the intricacy of the position, and the darkness of the night. (Colonel Wellesley advancing at the head of his regiment, the 33rd, into the tope, was instantly attacked, in the darkness of the night, on every side by a tremendous fire of musketry and rockets. The men gave way, were dispersed, and retreated in disorder. Several were killed, and twelve grenadiers (these men were all murdered a day or two before the storm) were taken prisoners. (*Life of Sir David Baird*, Vol. I, page 191.)

“The enemy therefore continued to occupy the water course, whence, with musketry and rockets, they severely galled the troops posted in the village seized by Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, during the whole of that night, and part of the succeeding day.”

The attack on Sultānpet was renewed on the morning of the 6th by the same troops, strengthened by the Scotch Brigade and two Madras Battalions under Lieutenant-Colonels Bowser and Haliburton, the whole under



Colonel Wellesley as before. Lieutenant-Colonel Shawe, at the same time, pushed forward to the water course in his front with the 12th Regiment, supported by the flank companies of the 74th, and four companies of sepoys under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, which moved from the left of the camp along the water course, and turned the flank of the enemy. These attacks were successful and placed the British in possession of a strong line of posts in their front along the water course, extending from the river Cauvery on the left, to the village of Sultanpet on the right, a distance of about two miles.

While the attention of the enemy was occupied in the defence of these outposts, Major-General Floyd marched off from the rear of the camp towards Periyapatam with a strong detachment in order to meet the army from Bombay. He effected this on the 9th, and returned to Seringapatam on the 14th accompanied by that army. Major-General Stuart crossed to the northern bank of the Cauvery on the 16th, and took up a position with his right on the river, and his left on the rocks near the ruins of the Eedgah redoubt. The next day he detached Colonel Hart, with H.M.'s 75th Regiment, and two battalions of sepoys, to dislodge the enemy from a village near the bank of the river where it was intended to establish a battery to enfilade the south-western face of the fort, distant about 900 yards. From this day (17th April) the regular siege may be said to date. It was ultimately decided to storm at the western angle, across the river.

Colonel Hart having been joined by H.M.'s 74th, and a battalion of Madras sepoys sent across by General Harris, made his attack about sunset, and carried the village.

The position thus gained was called "Hart's Post," and was armed on the 18th with a battery of six 18 pounders, and two howitzers.

Simultaneously with Colonel Hart's attack, Major Macdonald, with the 2nd Battalion 12th Regiment Madras



Infantry, advanced from Shawe's post to drive the enemy from a stream about 700 yards in front, which running from the Cauvery some 1,200 yards above the fort, and nearly parallel to the works, afforded cover for an extent of about 600 yards near an entrenchment which the enemy had thrown up at the ruins of a powder mill on an island formed by the Cauvery, and the stream in question. This service was ably executed, and the position, which became of importance, was named "Macdonald's Post." On the next day, it was connected with "Shawe's Post" by a trench.

An examination of the provisions in camp having been made on the 15th, much anxiety was caused by the discovery that the supply of rice would not suffice for more than eighteen days' consumption at the rate of half allowance to each fighting man. It was therefore determined to detach Major-General Floyd towards Kaveripuram to meet, and bring on the detachment under Colonel Read which was escorting supplies. The General marched accordingly on the 19th, with all the regular cavalry, and the 3rd Infantry Brigade under Major Gowdie.

On the evening of the 20th, Tipū's entrenchment at the powder mill in front of Macdonald's Post was attacked and carried by H.M.'s 73rd, and a battalion of Bengal sepoys.

This detachment, under the general direction of Colonel Sherbrooke, was divided into three parties, one under Lieutenant-Colonel Money Penny of the 73rd, another under the Honourable Lieutenant-Colonel St. John of the same regiment, and the third under Lieutenant-Colonel Gardiner of the Bengal army. During the night, this post was connected by a parallel with the works already established on the south attack.

Tipū's  
negotiations  
for peace.

Tipū, in order to open communications, had written to General Harris on the 9th, affecting ignorance of the cause of hostilities; on which he was referred to the

Governor-General's letters. He now on the 20th proposed a conference, and was furnished in reply with the draft of a preliminary treaty, to be executed in twenty-four hours, the principal conditions of which were—the cession of half of his remaining territories, the payment of two crores of rupees in two instalments, and the delivery of four of his sons and four of his principal officers as hostages. But the time passed without his accepting it.

Before daylight on the 22nd, the advanced posts of the Bombay army were attacked by the besieged in force, but they were repulsed with loss. Many of the French troops, which led the assault on this occasion, were killed.

About 6 o'clock the same morning, fire was opened from a battery of four 18-pounders, and two howitzers which had been constructed at the powder mill. This fire was aided by that of some field pieces placed near the banks of the river to the left of Shawe's post, which dislodged the enemy from the positions from which they galled the Bombay troops in Hart's post.

On the 23rd, five 18-pounders from the battery at Hart's post enfiladed the works of the south-west face of the fort with great effect. On the same day, a small battery for two 12-pounders was erected about 400 yards in front of Shawe's post.

On the 24th and 25th, the battery at the powder mill was increased to 8 guns, and the approaches were considerably advanced, and further strengthened by a new battery for four guns, which commenced to fire on the morning of the 26th. The rest of the operations may be described in the words of General Harris' Report to the Commander-in-Chief in India :—

“ It now became necessary to drive the enemy from their advanced works in order to establish the breaching batteries on the spot they covered within 380 yards of the walls of the fort. upon the bank of the southern branch of the Cauvery, along which they extended nearly parallel to the south-west face of

the fort of Seringapatam, each flank strengthened by a kind of stockaded redoubt, that on their right placed on the angle formed by the separation of the river to embrace the island of Seringapatam, that on their left being a circular work nearly communicating with another a short distance in its front, built to defend a stone bridge over the rivulet which formed the island on which our works were placed.

"The enemy's attention was engaged by a well directed and continued fire from the batteries at Hart's post, and all those on the south attack which could bear on their entrenchments, or the works which commanded them, until the moment of attack. As the sun set, the troops, arranged in two columns, advanced from the trenches. That on the left consisting of four companies of the Scotch Brigade, and four of Bengal sepoys, was commanded by Major Skelly, and assaulted the right of the enemy's position. The right column commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny of H. M.'s 73rd Regiment consisting of 4 companies of that Regiment and an equal number of Bengal Sepoys drew them from a great part of the works on their left. The success of these attacks enabled Lieutenant-Colonel Moneypenny's division to occupy a water course, which running along the front of the enemy's entrenchment, afforded some cover to the troops, while that of Major Skelly took post at the work near the small bridge which was afterwards distinguished by his name.

"The enemy however still possessing the circular redoubt on the left of their late posts from which they galled our troops in the newly acquired position, by a constant fire of musketry, Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell of the 74th, who had just arrived from camp to relieve the corps on duty in the trenches, advanced rapidly with a small party of Europeans, attacked and routed the enemy, pursuing them over the great bridge across the Cauvery, penetrating a work raised for its defence, and spreading a general alarm. Profiting by the confusion occasioned by his advance, he retired with little loss within our posts.

"Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's conduct on this occasion merited the highest praise; the small party which he led consisted of the Light company of the 74th and a company of the Swiss regiment DeMeuron, a corps whose gallantry and zeal,

on this, and every other occasion during the siege, are fully equal to that of our national troops.

"Although every possible exertion had been made during the night to profit by the comparative quiet enjoyed by our posts after Lieutenant-Colonel Campbell's attack, and a double detail of troops was employed on this duty, they were, on the morning of the 27th, still exposed to a very destructive fire principally from the circular work, which, under the protection of the fort, was again occupied by a large body of the enemy's infantry. Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, with three companies of H. M.'s 74th regiment, was ordered to dislodge them. This service he performed with that gallantry by which he has ever been distinguished, and kept possession by securing his men behind the parapet of his post, which from this time bore his name. In the course of the succeeding night, the approaches were deepened, and Wallace's and Skelly's posts made perfectly tenable.

"On the 28th and 29th April, a battery for six 18-pounders was erected on the left of our most advanced trench, to bear on the western angle of the fort, from which it was distant 360 yards. The difficulty of conveying guns across the water course deferred its opening till the 30th in the morning when its fire commenced with effect. Before the close of the day, the outer wall was breached, and the main rampart of the angle bastion extremely shattered. During the night, another battery for five guns was erected rather to the right and front of that which had opened in the morning. A position for six howitzers was cleared in the trenches near the battery, and the nature of the bed of the Cauvery was ascertained by Lieutenant Farquhar of H. M.'s 74th, and Lieutenant Halor of H. M.'s 73rd Regiment who, attended by a small party of Europeans employed as pioneers, requested to be charged with this important and hazardous service.

"On the 1st May, a small battery of two 18-pounders to take off the defences of some low works which bore obliquely on the right of those already erected to breach, was constructed in their rear.

"The embrasures of the six gun battery were altered so as to concentrate the whole breaching fire on the curtain a short distance to the right of the western angle, and in front of a large cavalier which it was also intended to destroy. A

new battery was likewise commenced at Hart's post to increase the enfilading fire which had uniformly been kept up from the batteries there with the best effect, in order to favour the assault on the breach when practicable.

"On the 2nd May, the breaching batteries were opened early in the morning with admirable effect, and before the evening, the outer wall was perfectly breached, and the principal rampart considerably damaged.

"A magazine of rockets in the fort was, during the day, set on fire by a shot from the battery at Hart's post, which with all the other batteries, kept up an incessant, and extremely well directed fire on every part of the works within the range of the guns. This night a communication was made from the trenches to the edge of the river opposite the breach, and a sunken battery for four 12-pounders was commenced at a favourable situation between Shawe's and Skelly's posts, intended to enfilade the works on the southern face of the fort, and bear on some cavaliers which fired from a considerable distance, but with much effect, on our batteries.

"On the evening of the 3rd May, the breach, which the enemy had attempted to repair on the night of the 2nd, appearing nearly practicable; it was determined to make the assault in the course of the ensuing day; and the night was employed in drawing from the Bombay army the detail of that force destined to share in this enterprise, in forming the plan, in arranging the troops, and in making every other necessary preparation which could tend to ensure its success."

Renewed  
negotiations.

The Sultān now again attempted negotiation, and was informed that the terms previously offered would be held open until three o'clock next day, but no longer. From this time, despair seemed to brood over him. But his officers were more alive to their duty at such a crisis.

The Assault  
delivered.

Before daybreak on the memorable 4th of May, the assaulting party, consisting of two thousand four hundred and ninety-four Europeans, and one thousand eight hundred and eighty-seven Indians, under the command of General Baird, had taken their stand in the trenches



with scaling-ladders and other implements ready. The Sultān had persuaded himself the assault would never be made by day-light. One o'clock, however, had been decided on as the hour. At that precise moment, General Baird, eager to avenge the hardships he had suffered within the walls of Seringapatam and the secret massacre of his countrymen, stepped forward from the trenches in full view of both armies, and drawing his sword, called on the soldiers in a tone which thrilled along the trenches to "follow him and prove worthy of the British name." His men rushed at once into the bed of the river. Though immediately assailed by musketry and rockets, nothing could withstand their ardour, and in less than seven minutes, the forlorn hope reached the summit of the breach, and there hoisted the British flag, which proclaimed to the world that the fate of Tipū was decided.

The following extract gives the details of the troops warned for the assault :—

"The flank companies from the European (H.M.'s 75th and 77th, and the Bombay European regiment, 103rd Foot) corps serving in the Bombay army, under Lieutenant-Colonel Dunlop, H.M.'s 77th regiment. Four from the Scotch brigade, and regiment DeMeuron, under Colonel Sherbrooke. Ten companies of Bengal, eight of Madras and six of Bombay sepoy's under Lieutenant-Colonels Gardiner, Dalrymple, and Mignan of the Company's service on these several establishments; H.M.'s 12th, 33rd, 73rd and 74th regiments, 100 artillery under Major Robert Bell of the Madras artillery, 200 of the Nizam's infantry and the corps of European and Native poineers, commanded by Captain Dowse, formed the corps ordered for the assault; consisting of nearly, 2,300 European and 2,000 Native troops, under the immediate orders of Major-General Baird, whom, from a knowledge of his perfect merits as a soldier, I had selected to command on this important service. Major-General Popham was directed to occupy the trenches during the attack, in command of the battalion companies of the Swiss regiment DeMeuron, and four battalions of Madras sepoy's, forming a sustaining corps, to act if required in its support.



" On the morning of the 4th May, the batteries kept up an incessant, and well directed fire on the breach and remaining defences of the fort, which was warmly returned by the enemy till noon, when as usual their fire slackened, and their attention was in some degree turned from the principal point of attack by the fire of the new four-gun battery which opened on the cavaliers, and southern face of the fort.

\* \* \* \*

" From knowledge of the customs of the natives of India, I judged that during the heat of the day the troops of the garrison would not be apprehensive of an assault, or prepared to make that obstinate resistance which at any other time I might expect to be opposed to our attack. I therefore directed it to take place at 1 o'clock. The troops passed the rugged bed of the Cauvery, which opposite to the breach, was about 280 yards in breadth, exposed to a very heavy fire from the still numerous artillery of the fort, crossed the ditch, and ascended the breach in despite of all opposition from the enemy, many of whom rushed down the slope to meet them. The assailants divided, as they had been instructed to do, at the summit of the breach, and although obstinately resisted by the enemy posted behind a succession of traverses thrown up across the ramparts, particularly on the northern face of the fort; in two hours the whole of the works were occupied by our troops, and the British colors flying in the place.

" The utmost degree of humanity was shewn to such of the enemy as asked the protection of the troops, but the large force in the place, their perseverance in resistance, and the formidable army encamped under its walls, rendered rapidity and energy necessary to the safety of the troops, and the success of the assault. The slaughter was in consequence very considerable.

" So soon as the ramparts were occupied, a detachment was sent to secure the palace, and protect the family of the Sultan from insult. A battalion of the 8th regiment of Madras sepoy was already formed in its front, to whom Monsieur Chapuis had surrendered his colors, and many of the French party under his command. (The party of Monsieur Chapuis from the Mauritius consisted of 17 officers and 56 non-commissioned and privates. The party of Monsieur Questin, being the remains of Lally's corps, long in the service of Hyder and

Tippoo, consisted of 4 officers, and 45 non-commissioned and privates). After some communication made through Major Allan, the Deputy Quarter-master-General of the army, General Baird, with a detachment of troops, was admitted into the palace by two sons of the Sultan on his promise for their personal safety. These princes were sent to me in camp, and it was soon after discovered that Tippoo had fallen under the fire of a party of our troops who had met him at a small gate in the inner rampart on his retreat from the outer works on the northern face. His body being found in this place, amidst a heap of slain, was removed to the palace, and recognised by his family and servants." (See below).

\* \* \* \*

The right attack under Colonel Sherbrooke was accompanied by General Baird, and reached the eastern face of the fort in less than an hour without having met with any serious opposition except near the Mysore gate where many men were killed and wounded. Right attack.

The left attack met with more resistance, the traverses on the northern rampart having been resolutely held until the defenders became exposed to a flanking fire from a detachment of the 12th regiment, which had got on the inner rampart, and advanced parallel with the main body of the column. With this assistance, Captain Lambton, who had assumed command, *vice* Dunlop disabled on the breach, forced the traverses one after another, and drove the enemy to the northeast angle of the fort, where having perceived the near approach of the right column, they fell into confusion, and great numbers were killed. Immediately after this, Captain Lambton joined General Baird near the eastern gate. Left attack.

The intermediate military conduct of Tipū may now be glanced. It furnishes some aid to a just estimation of his character. For fourteen days preceding, the Sultān, who could not be convinced that the fall of his capital Sultān's military disposition.

was so near at hand, had taken up his quarters in the inner partition of the Kalale Diddi, a water gate through the outer rampart on the north face of the fort. The troops on duty at the several works were regularly relieved but the general charge of the angle attacked had been committed to Sayyid Sahib, his father-in-law, assisted by Sayyid Gaffur, formerly an officer in the British service, who was taken prisoner with Colonel Braithwaite and was now serving Tipū. The large cavalier behind the angle bastion was committed to the charge of Monsieur Chapuis. The eldest of the princes, with Pūrnaiya, commanded a corps intended to disturb the northern attack, and the second prince was in charge of the Mysore gate and the southern face of the fort, while Kammar-ud-dīn was absent watching Colonel Floyd. Among his own personal staff and attendants, it has been observed, that there was not one man of professional character. "He fancied, the attachment of men raised by his own favour, to be more genuine and sincere, than the support of persons possessing established character and high pretensions; and whenever a report was made of the alarming progress of the besiegers, these ignorant sycophants affected to ascribe it to fear. Seyed Ghoffar was early in the siege wounded in the hand, but did not confine himself. He saw distinctly what was to happen; "he is surrounded (said this excellent officer) by boys and flatterers, who will not even let him see with his own eyes. I do not wish to survive the result. I am going about in search of death, and cannot find it." In the forenoon of the 4th May, he saw in common with other experienced observers, that the trenches were unusually crowded, and concluded that the assault was about to be given; nothing could persuade the Sultān and his flatterers, that the enemy would dare the attempt by day-light, and the killedar, Nedeem, one of the new men, was so grossly ignorant and destitute of all

reflection, as to make an issue of pay to some of the troops on duty, which caused their absence at the moment of assault; the Sultān, however, in reply to the report from Syed Ghoffar, said it was proper to be alert, but that the assault would be given at night: meanwhile that officer had satisfied himself by farther observation, than an hour would not elapse before it should commence, and in a state of rage and despair hurried towards the Sultān: "I will go (said he) and drag him to the breach, and make him see by what a set of wretches he is surrounded; I will compel him to exert himself at this last moment." He was going, and met a party of pioneers, whom he had long looked for in vain, to cut off the approach by the southern rampart, "I must first (said he) show these people the work they have to do," and in the act of giving his instructions, was killed by a cannon shot.

"In the meanwhile, Tipū, as if despairing of human aid, was seeking those delusive means of penetrating into futurity, so familiar in the history of every country, and of even engaging supernatural aid, through the incantations of the Brāhmans, from whom he had merited the most earnest prayers for his destruction. The *Jebbum* (Japam) at an enormous expense, was in progress; and the learning and sanctity of the high-priest at Cenapatam (Chennapatna), was farther propitiated by costly offerings. The Sultān, in his early youth, treated with derision the science of astrology, and various statements are given regarding the completion of the particular prediction, which made him a convert to its reality; but it must have preceded the marriage of his son to the daughter of the Bebee of Cannanore, and his discoveries at Coimbatore, in 1789, which he relates with considerable ostentation of his own proficiency in the science. Either from chance, or from right judgment respecting objects more real than those of their pretended science,

the astrologers had exhibited to the Sultān a set of diagrams from which they gravely inferred, that as long as Mars should remain within a particular circle, the fort would hold out; he would touch the limit on the last day of the lunar month, the 4th of May, and on that day they dared only to recommend, that the Sultān should present the prescribed oblations, for averting a calamity; which oblations were ordered to be prepared on the 3rd of May. On the morning of the 4th, about nine o'clock, he proceeded to the palace, bathed, and presented the oblation, through the high-priest above mentioned with the customary formalities; and with the farther solemnity of attempting to ascertain the aspect of his fortunes by the form of his face reflected from the surface of a jar of oil, which constituted a part of the oblation; a result depending on mechanical causes, by which the reflection of any face may be formed to any fortune."

Having finished these ceremonies about the hour of noon, he returned to his accustomed station, and shortly afterwards ordered his usual mid-day repast, when intelligence was brought of the death of Sayyid Gaffur; he was greatly agitated at this event, but said "Seyed Ghaffar was never afraid to die," and ordered another officer to take his place. He then sat down to his repast, which he had scarcely finished when a report was made to him of the actual assault, and he hastened to the breach along the northern rampart. He mounted with a few attendants and *eunuchs*, and when within two hundred yards of the breach fired several times with his own hands at the assailants, under cover of a traverse. But seeing that his men had either fled or lay dead, and that the assailants were advancing in great numbers, he retired along the rampart, slightly wounded, and meeting one of his favourite horses, mounted him and proceeded eastward till he came to the gateway leading into the inner fort, which he entered with a crowd of fugitives.



A deadly volley was poured into this crowded passage by a portion of the storming party. Tipū received a second and third wound, and his horse was struck, while the faithful servant Rāja-Khan, who still clung to his master's side, was also hit. Rāja-Khān advised him to discover himself. "Are you mad? Be silent," was the prompt reply. He then made an effort to disengage his master from the saddle, but both master and servant fell in the attempt on a heap of dead and dying. Tipū's other attendants obtained a palanquin and placed him in it, but he contrived to move out of it. While he lay with the lower part of his body buried underneath the slain, the gold buckle of his belt excited the cupidity of a soldier, who attempted to seize it. Tipū snatching up a sword made a cut at him, but the grenadier shot him through the temple, and thus terminated his earthly career. He was then in his forty-seventh year and had reigned seventeen years.

The Sultān's death.

So long as the Sultān was present, a portion of his troops on the north side made efforts at resistance and his French corps persevered in it for some time longer, but they were, as noted above, soon quelled. Immediately after the assault, Colonel (afterwards Sir Alexander) Allen and General Baird hastened to the place in the hope of finding the Sultān. The inmates, including two princes who were themselves ignorant of his fate, solemnly denied his presence, but the doubts of the Colonel and the General were not satisfied. The princes were assured of protection and removed under military honours to the British camp, and the palace was thoroughly searched with the exception of the *zenāna*, but all to no purpose. At last, the General's threats extorted from the unwilling killedar the disclosure of the secret that the Sultān lay wounded in the gate; and here after a search in the promiscuous and ghastly heap of slain, the body was discovered. It

The search for the Sultān



was removed to the palace in a palanquin and next day consigned with all military honours to its last resting-place at the Lal-Bagh by the side of Haidar Ali. The solemn day closed with one of the most dreadful storms that ever visited this part of the country.

Although all accounts concur in describing the resistance to the right column as having been much less vigorous than that opposed to the left attack, yet the casualties in the former somewhat exceeded those in the latter.

Strength of  
Tipu's forces.

Tipu's force amounted to about 21,800 men, of whom 13,750 regular infantry were in the fort, and the remainder in the entrenchments on the island. Their loss was not accurately ascertained, but has been computed at about 40 men killed and wounded per diem during the siege.

Plunder of  
the town.

During the night of the 4th, almost every house in the town was plundered, and it was not until the 6th that Colonel Wellesley, who had been appointed to command in the fort, reported that the plundering had been stopped, the fires extinguished, and that the inhabitants were returning to their homes. In the *interim*, several men had been executed, and a number flogged for plundering.

Captured  
ordnance.

Nine hundred and twenty-nine pieces of ordnance were found in the fort, of which two hundred and eighty-seven were mounted on the works. There was also a very large quantity of gunpowder, round shot, small arms, and military stores of different kinds. The artillery, however, when examined in detail, does not appear to have been of a very formidable description, as there were no fewer than 436 guns throwing balls under five pounds. Out of 373 brass guns, 202 were from Tipu's own foundry, 77 were English, and the rest French, Dutch and Spanish; of the 466 iron guns, only 6 were from Tipu's foundry,

260 having been of foreign, and 200 of English make. Of 60 mortars and cohorns, 22 were Tipū's, the rest English and foreign. The howitzers, 11 in number, had, with one exception, been cast in Seringapatam.

A few days after the storm, the sons of Tipū, Pūrnaiya the Minister, Kammar-ud-dīn, and most of the Sultān's principal officers, came in, and surrendered.

Surrender of  
Tipū's sons  
and officers.

Major-General Floyd returned to Seringapatam on the 11th, having been joined near the head of the Kavēripuram pass by the detachments under Colonels Read and Brown.

Colonel Read, having delivered a large supply of provisions at the head-quarters of the army near Kilaman-galam on the 8th March, returned to Rāyakōta in order to complete the equipment of his detachment. This having been effected, he proceeded to make himself master of the forts on the frontier. He took Sūlagiri by storm on the 24th March with the loss of a few men, and on the 30th the fort of Peddanaikdrug capitulated on being summoned. A few days afterwards he received orders to make his way to Kaveripuram as quickly as possible, there to meet Colonel Brown, after which the united detachments were to move on through the pass to join General Floyd who was waiting to escort the convoy to Seringapatam, a precaution deemed necessary on account of the presence in the neighbourhood of a strong force under Kammar-ud-dīn. Colonel Read arrived at Kavēripuram on the 22nd April. The fort surrendered the same day, and as there were no signs of Colonel Brown, Read marched on the 23rd and reached Marenhalli at the top of the pass on the 27th, the distance being 30 miles, and the road extremely bad.

Col. Read's  
detachment.

The next few days were spent in getting the convoy up, and by the end of the month, Colonel Read joined General Floyd at Kowdahalli, a few miles further on.

Col. Brown's  
detachment.

Colonel Brown left Trichinopoly on the 29th March, and took possession of Karoor, Erode, and other small forts early in April. He was then directed to hasten his march to Kaveripuram, but owing to the badness of the roads, he did not reach the place until the 1st May. On the 6th, he joined General Floyd and Colonel Read at Kowdahalli, and on the 11th, the whole, together with the convoy, arrived at Seringapatam.

Lieutenant-General Stuart with the Bombay army marched for the Malabar Coast on the 13th May in order to occupy the province of Canara.

On the 17th, Colonel Read was detached to take possession of Savandrug, Kopaldrug, Bangalore, Nandidrug, and other places in the Mysore country, all of which were given up without resistance.

Colonel Brown's detachment, *minus* the Madras European regiment, left near Seringapatam, and the 1st battalion 2nd regiment ordered to join Colonel Read, returned towards the south on the 22nd, and took possession of the district of Coimbatore.

On the 25th of the same month, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser, with part of the Hyderabad Subsidiary force, *viz.*, the 2nd battalion 2nd regiment, and the 1st battalion 11th regiment, together with a body of the Nizam's troops, was detached to occupy Gurrunkonda, Gooty, and other places which it had been determined to make over to the Nizām.

H.M.'s 33rd regiment, the Scotch brigade, the 2nd battalion 3rd, the 2nd battalion 9th, and the 2nd battalion 12th regiment N.I., with a proportion of artillery, were placed in garrison at Seringapatam, while General Harris encamped in the neighbourhood with the main body, to prepare for further operations, and to make arrangements for the settlement of the Mysore country.

Prize Money. On the 2nd June, the Governor-General in Council

directed the immediate distribution of the treasure and jewels captured in the fort (estimated at £ 1,143,216), and the reservation of the ordnance, ammunition, and military stores, until the receipt of instructions from England.

Popular belief has long ascribed Tipū's final fall to the treachery of some of his officers. Mir Hussain Ali Kirmāni, who gives some colour to this belief, is not definite in his accusation, but he distinctly alleged that Sayyid Guffur was diverted from his successful and gallant defence of the Mehtab Bagh by the treachery of "the enemies of the Sultān" and that his recall from it, resulted in the English troops attacking and taking it and filling it with artillery and musketeers and run on their approaches towards the fort. Next, Kirmāni mentions that Tipū was prevented on acting on Mons. Chapuis' advice that he and his family should quit the fort and retire to Sira or Chitaldrug and detach a body of his troops to oppose the infidels, or if he thought best he might deliver him (Mons. Chapuis) and the rest of the French up to the English, and then an accommodation might be made between the contending parties, or if he chose, he could give up the breached walls of the fort to the charge of Mons. Lally, for defence, without, however, allowing Lally to be subject to the interference or control of the Sultān's Indian officers." Tipū, it is added, refused to accept the suggestion of the surrender of Chapuis and his countrymen, "even if our kingdom should be plundered and laid waste," and as regards the remainder of Mons. Chapuis' "excellent advice," as Kirmāni styles it, consulted his Dewan Mir Sadak (whom he invariably calls "the villain") who, he adds, "in furtherance of his own views and projects," said:—

Alleged  
treachery of  
Tipū's  
officers.

"It must be well known to your Highness that this people (the French) never kept faith with any one, and your

Highness may be well assured, that if you give up the fort to their care and defence, that at that very moment it will fall into the possession of the English, for both these people (the English and the French) consider themselves originally of the same tribe, and they are in one heart and language."

Tipū's mind was, we are told, by the "villain's" misrepresentations turned from "the right path." The city walls had been meanwhile battered and breached, and Tipū prepared to "quit the city with his treasure, valuables and *zenana* and also all his elephants, camels and carriages were kept in readiness to move at the shortest warning." Before acting on his resolve, Tipū, it is said, held a consultation on the subject of his departure with his Amīrs. Badruzaman Khān "inconsiderately" opposed it on the ground that it would discourage his troops and added that thereby "the bonds of union in the garrison of the capital will be broken asunder." Tipū, on hearing this, looked up—Kirmāni states—towards the heavens, and sighing deeply said, "I am entirely resigned to the will of God, whatever it may be" and forthwith abandoned his intention of quitting the capital. The articles packed, however, still remained, ready for removal in the treasury. About this time, Ghāzikhān, the celebrated commander of Haidar's irregular infantry and cavalry was, it is said, "put to death in prison by the hands of the Sultān's executioners at the instigation of the same traitor (the Dewan)." In fact, he adds, "though the walls of the fort were battered down, still the information was withheld from the Sultān." At length, however, we are told, "on the twenty-seventh of Zi Kad, from some secret source, he (Tipū Sultān) became acquainted with the treachery of certain of his servants; and the next morning he wrote with his own hand a list of some of their names and having folded it, gave it to Mir Moyiniuddīn; with instructions to put his orders therein contained into execution that night (that is, to put those



named to death) in order to strengthen his Government." The Mir, not knowing what it contained, opened the paper and perused it in full Durbar. A menial servant who could read and write, happened to cast his "unlucky eye" upon it and saw it contained "the name of the lying Dewan the first in the list." He immediately passed the news to the Dewan, who kept on the alert at his own quarters and at about mid-day sent for the troops stationed in the works near the breach under pretence of distributing their pay among them and having collected them near the Ali Musjid, remained looking out for what ill-luck might bring forth." Colonel Miles notes in connection with this passage that Kirmāni "evidently supposes some secret correspondence or intelligence between the Dewan Mir Sadik and the English General, or some of his staff." There is no confirmation of this suggestion in any other authority. Nor is there any confirmation either for the other suggestion also made by Kirmāni, that after he heard of the death of Saiyid Gaffur, the Sultān "immediately left off eating and washed his hands, saying, 'we also shall soon depart,' and then mounted his horse and proceeded by the road of the Postern on the river, which is called in the Kihiri (Kannada) language, Holi Vuddi, towards the flag or western battery. The Sultān's enemies, however, who were looking out for opportunities to betray him, as soon as the worthy Syud was slain, made a signal from the fort by holding out white handkerchiefs to the English soldiers, who were assembled in the river ready for the assault, informing them of that event, and accordingly at about twenty minutes after mid-day, the European and other regiments mounted the walls by the breach, and before the Sultān's troops could be collected to man the walls and bastions of that flank of the works, they with but little labour took the fort. The garrison, although they quickly came to the rescue and the repulse of their enemies, and with sword and



musket, steadfastly resisted them, still as on all sides so much disorder and confusion reigned, that remedy was hopeless, they mostly threw away their shields and dispersed and left their women and wealth to the soldiers of the enemy, covering their shameless heads with the dust of cowardice and disgrace. It was about the time that the Sultān's horse and followers arrived near the flag battery, that the lying Dewan followed in the rear and shut up the Postern before mentioned, blocking it up securely, and thereby closing the road of safety to the pious Sultān, and then under pretence of bringing aid, he mounted his horse and went forth from the fort and arrived at the third gate (of the suburb) of Gunjam, where he desired the gate-keepers to shut the gate as soon as he had passed through; while, however, he was speaking, a man came forward and began to abuse and revile him, saying, "Thou accursed wretch, thou hast delivered a righteous prince up to his enemies, and art thou now saving thyself by flight? I will place the punishment of thy offence by thy side"; this man then with one cut of his sword struck the Dewan off his horse on the ground, and certain other persons present crowding round him soon despatched him, and his impure body was dragged into a place of filth and uncleanness and left there. Mīr Moyiniuddīn being wounded fell into the ditch and died there. Shere Khān Mīr Asaf, also, was lost in the assault and was never after heard of,—when the Sultān, the refuge of the world, saw that the opportunity for a gallant push was lost (some copies say lost, and some not), and that his servants had evidently betrayed him, he returned to the Postern or sally port, but notwithstanding he gave repeated orders to the guards to open the gate, no one paid the slightest attention to him;—nay, more, Mīr Nudīm, the Killadār himself, with a number of foot soldiers, was standing at this time on the roof of the gate, but he also abandoned his faith

and allegiance, and placing his foot in the path of disloyalty (took no notice of his master)."

Kirmāni adds:—

"To be concise, when the storming party firing furiously as they advanced, arrived near the Sultān, he, courageous as a lion, attacked them with the greatest bravery, and although the place (said to have been a gateway) where he stood was very narrow and confined, he still with his match-lock and his sword killed two or three of the enemy, but at length having received several mortal wounds in the face, he drank the cup of Martyrdom."

In keeping with the charge of treachery that Kirmāni prefers against Dewan Mir Sadik, Mir Nadim and others, is his moralization at the burial of the Sultān's body in the mausoleum of his father, on the right side of his tomb—"There rested (the body) from the treachery and malice of faithless servants and cruel enemies."

Wilks, who had easy access to all the documents of the time and had enquired of those intimate with Tipū, and had survived the final struggle, nowhere suggests treachery. As regards Mir Sadik, he does not even mention his death, though Colonel Allan, in his account of the campaign, records the fact that he "was killed by the Sultān's troops endeavouring to make his escape." Colonel Allen writes:—"Raja Cawn (Tipū's favorite servant) is of opinion that Tippoo's object, when compelled to retreat, was to reach the Palace; and that he intended to have put an end to himself and his family, to avoid that disgrace, to which his women would have been exposed, in the fury of the storm. He had too much reason to dread the meeting of our Europeans." Similarly, in explaining the movements of Tipū after the English troops had gained the ramparts and the confusion that in consequence resulted among the besieged, which soon "became irreparable," Wilks says:—"The

Sultan had received a slight wound and mounted his horse a few minutes before this occurrence; if an attempt at flight had been his object, the water-gate was near, and his escape was more than possible; he took the direction of the body of the place through the gateway of the interior work, with intentions, which can only be conjectured, and were not perhaps distinctly formed in his own mind; the most sanguine hope could only have led to an honorable capitulation in the palace; to close the gate of the interior rampart, if practicable, would have been unavailing for the purpose of defending the inner fort; for these works were no longer defensible after General Baird had passed the point of their junction; and the rampart which he now occupied was itself a part of the interior work. Among the conjectures of those who were chiefly admitted to the Sultaun's intimacy, in the last days of his existence, was one founded on obscure hints which had escaped him, of the intention to destroy certain papers, to put to death his principal women, and to die in defence of the palace. He was destined to a fall more obscure and unnoticed." There is no smell of treachery here. But it must be remarked that Wilks habitually writes from what might be termed the "usurper's" point of view and not from that of those whom he oppressed. His justification must be that at his time there was no difference perceived between the *de facto* and *de jure* positions of the usurper and the ruling sovereign, to whom he owed allegiance and who was still in existence, though neglected and even plundered to the last degree. Whatever the truth in this charge of treachery, there is no doubt that the memory of Mir Sadak is still held in execration and his name has become a byword for treachery and scorn among the masses of the country. So vilely, indeed, is he regarded that the mere mention of his name is enough to rouse in people the worst sentiments against him ending in a

contemptuous spitting on the ground, indicative of their utmost contempt for him and his memory. His alleged faithless disregard for his master's interests appears to be the one thing remembered about him, despite the century and a quarter that has elapsed since his death.

Colonel Allan in a brief characterization suggests that

Colonel  
Allan's  
characteriza-  
tion.

"It is impossible that Tippoo could have been beloved by his people. The Musselmen certainly looked up to him as the head of their faith; by them, perhaps, his death is regretted but they could not have been attached to him, by affection; or why the necessity (he asks) of that barbarous policy, which Tippoo was constrained to adopt of keeping in close confinement in the fort at Seringapatam, the families of his principal officers and of his troops in general."

He records the fact that the report of Tipū having "inhumanly" murdered the unfortunate Europeans who fell into his hands during the siege, had been confirmed. Their bodies had been actually dug up. They had, it would appear, been strangled in the Fort by Tipū's orders on the 28th April (1799), the day, perhaps the very hour, writes Colonel Allan, that Tipū was writing a letter to General Harris, proposing to send ambassadors to camp to negotiate the peace, was this deed perpetrated! "Of the real character of this Prince," he remarks, "we hitherto have been ignorant! but now it will be placed in its true light. That he was suspicious, vindictive, cruel and hurried away by the sadder impulse of passion, to which he was subjected even without any apparent provocation, is certain and probably it will be found that he was more deficient in Military talents, and others as essential to govern an extensive kingdom than has been generally imagined."

The capture of Seringapatam and the glorious termination of the Mysore War were celebrated with great

Victory  
celebrated

rejoicings and a day of public thanksgiving throughout the British possessions, and the anniversary of the event was specially observed for many years after. As an indication of the progress made in communications since that time, it may be noted that the news did not reach London till the 13th of September.

Tipū's  
appearance  
and character.

There is a popular idea that as Haidar means lion (a name of Ali, the son-in-law of Muhammad), so Tipū means tiger, but this appears to be a mistake. He was named Tipū Sultān, which was his full name, after a holy man whose shrine is at Arcot, near which Haidar was when he heard of the birth of his son at Devanahalli. The tiger, however, was adopted by Tipū as emblematic. His throne was in the form of a tiger, with the head life-size, in gold (now at Windsor Castle; also the *humā*, or bird of paradise, covered with jewels, which glittered at the top of the canopy), and tigers' heads formed the capitals of the eight pillars supporting the canopy. His own uniform and that of his soldiers was covered with the tiger stripe, and this was also engraved on his guns and other articles. Tigers were chained at the entrance to his palace, and he is declared to have said that he would rather live two days as a tiger than two centuries as a sheep.

Wilks'  
estimate;  
comparison  
between  
Haidar and  
Tipū.

Tipū Sultān was born in 1753, and died in 1799 in his forty-seventh year, having held supreme sway seventeen years and four months. "In person," he was, according to Wilks, "neither so tall nor so robust as his father, and had a short pury neck; the large limbs, small eyes, aquiline nose, and fair complexion of Hyder, marked the Arabic character derived from his mother. Tippoo's singularly small and delicate hands and feet, his large and full eyes, a nose, less prominent, and a much darker complexion, were all national characteristics of the Indian



form. There was in the first view of his countenance, an appearance of dignity which wore off on farther observation; and his subjects did not feel that it inspired the terror or respect, which in common with his father, he desired to command. Hyder's lapse from dignity into low and vulgar scolding was among the few points of imitation or resemblance, but in one it inspired fear, in the other ridicule. In most instances exhibiting a contrast to the character and manners of his father, he spoke in a loud and unharmonious tone of voice; he was extremely garrulous, and on superficial subjects, delivered his sentiments with plausibility. In exterior appearance, he affected the soldier; in his toilet, the distinctive habits of the Mussalman; he thought hardness to be indicated by a plain unincumbered attire, which he equally exacted from those around him, and the long robe and trailing drawers were banished from his court. He had heard that some of the monarchs of antiquity marched on foot at the head of their armies, and he would sometimes affect a similar exhibition, with his musket on his shoulder. But he was usually mounted, and attached great importance to horsemanship, in which he was considered to excel. The conveyance in a palankeen he derided, and in a great degree prohibited, even to the aged and infirm; but in all this tendency, there was as much of avarice as of taste. He was a minute reformer in every department, to the extent of abridging, with other expenses of the palace, the fare of his own table, to the pleasures of which he was constitutionally indifferent; and even in the dress of his menial servants, he deemed respectable attire to be a mark of unnecessary extravagance.

“Of the vernacular languages, he spoke no other than Hindustani and Kanarese; but from a smattering in Persian literature, he considered himself as the first philosopher of the age. He spoke that language with



fluency ; but although the pen was for ever in his hand, he never attained either elegance or accuracy of style. The leading features of his character were vanity and arrogance ; no human being was ever so handsome, so wise, so learned, or so brave as himself. Resting on the shallow instructions of his scanty reading, he neglected the practical study of mankind. No man had ever less penetration into character ; and accordingly no prince was ever so ill-served ; the army alone remained faithful, in spite of all his efforts for the subversion of discipline and allegiance. Hyder delegated to his instruments a large portion of his own power, as the best means for its preservation. Tippoo seemed to feel every exercise of delegated authority as an usurpation of his own. He would familiarly say to the soldiers, "if your officer gives you one word of abuse, return him two." The revolutionary doctrine of equality imported from France, scarcely appeared to be a novelty. No person ought to be of importance in a State but the Sovereign alone ; all *other* men ought to be equal ; the murder of the Sovereign was not an extraordinary incident in the history of any nation, and probably arose from laxity in command.

"From constitutional or incidental causes, he was less addicted than his father to the pleasures of the harem, which, however, contained at his death about one hundred persons.

"From sun-rise until midnight he devoted his whole time to public affairs, with the interruptions necessary for meals, and for occasional exercise, seldom imitating his father's practice of a short repose in the heat of the day. But his occupation was not business ; he was engaged in the invention of new machinery never finished, while the old was suffered to decay. His application was intense and incessant ; he affected to do the whole of his own business, and to write with his own hand the foul draft of almost every despatch, however unimportant ; and he

suffered the fate familiarly known to attach to that absurd pretension; the machine stood still, because the master would not let it work. A secret emissary had been sent to Poona, he reported, and reported, and represented that his cash was expended; after the lapse of several months, Tippoo delivered a foul draft to the Secretary—let this be despatched to A. B., at Poona. Here I am, said the emissary; he had returned for some weeks from mere necessity; he had represented himself daily at the durbar, and could never before attract notice. The Sultaun for once hung down his head.

“The ruling passion for innovation absorbed the proper hours for current business: and failures of experiment, obvious to the whole world, were the topics of his incessant boast as the highest efforts of human wisdom. Hyder was an improving monarch, and exhibited few innovations. Tippoo was an innovating monarch, and made no improvements. One had a sagacious and powerful mind; the other a feeble and unsteady intellect:—

“There was (says one of my manuscripts) nothing of permanency in his views, no solidity in his councils, and no confidence on the part of the governed; all was innovation on his part, and the fear of further novelty on the part of others; and the order of to-day was expected to be reversed by the invention of to-morrow. It may be affirmed of his principal measures however specious, that all had a direct tendency to injure the finances, undermine the Government, and oppress the people. All the world was puzzled what distinct character should be assigned to a sovereign who was never the same. He could neither be truly characterized as liberal or parsimonious; as tyrannical or benevolent; as a man of talents, or as destitute of parts. By turns, he assumed the character of each. In one object alone he appeared to be consistent, having perpetually on his tongue the projects of jehad—holy war. The most intelligent and sincere well-wishers of the house concurred in the opinion of his father, that his heart and head were both defective, however covered by a plausible

and imposing flow of words; and they were not always without suspicions of mental aberration."

"Tippoo, like his father, admitted no associate in his councils; but, contrary to his father, he first determined, and then discussed; and all deviation from the opinion which he announced, or was known to favour, was stigmatised as obstinacy or incapacity.

"As a statesman, Tippoo was incapable of those abstract views, and that large compass of thought, embraced by his father's mind. His talents as a soldier, exhibited the same contrast. He was unable to grasp the plan of a campaign, or the conduct of a war; although, he gave some examples of skill in marshalling a battle. Unlike his father, whose moderation was ever most conspicuous in success, whose equanimity was uniform in every aspect of fortune, and, who generally extracted some advantage from every discomfiture, Tippoo was intoxicated with success, and desponding in adversity. His mental energy failed with the decline of fortune; but it were unjust to question his physical courage. He fell in the defence of his capital; but he fell, performing the duties of a common soldier, not of a General. The improvement in his infantry and artillery, would have been considerable, had it not been marred by incessant dislocations, and unmerited promotions: but, his army, as a whole, gradually declined in efficiency, as it departed from the admirable organization received from his father. The success of the campaign of 1786, may, in part, be ascribed to the remains of that organization. His failure against the English, arose from the policy of neglecting his most efficient arm, the cavalry.

"During the life of Hyder, it was the fashion to indulge in high expectations of the qualities of the heir apparent, but it was the homage of disappointed, uninformed, and generally of unworthy men. Hyder in his life-time was

stigmatized as a tyrant ; comparison made him almost seem merciful ; the English prisoners hailed the intelligence of Tippoo's accession ; and they learned to mourn for the death of Hyder.

"The tolerant spirit of Hyder reconciled to his usurpation the members of every sect ; appropriate talents regulated his choice of instruments, to the entire exclusion of religious preference ; and it may be affirmed that he was served with equal zeal by men of every persuasion. Hyder was seldom wrong, and Tippoo seldom right in his estimate of character ; and it is quoted as a marked example, that Hyder knew Seyed Saheb to be a tolerably good man of business, but neither a brave nor a sagacious soldier ; and accordingly, never employed him in an important military trust. Tippoo in the campaign of 1790, had himself degraded him for incapacity, but in 1799, committed the post of danger, and the fate of Empire to the same incompetent hands. A dark and intolerant bigotry excluded from Tippoo's choice all but the true believers ; and unlimited persecution united in detestation of his rule every Hindu in his dominions. In the Hindu, no degree of merit was a passport to favour ; in the Mussalman, no crime could ensure displeasure.

"In one solitary instance, the suppression of drunkenness, he promoted morals without the merit of virtuous intention ; bigotry exacted the literal version of a text generally interpreted with laxity ; arrogance suggested that he was the only true commentator ; and the ruling passion whispered that the measure was new. Both sovereigns were equally unprincipled ; but Hyder had a clear undisturbed view of the interests of ambition ; in Tippoo, that view was incessantly obscured and perverted by the meanest passions. He murdered his English prisoners, by a selection of the best, because he hated their valour ; he oppressed and insulted his Hindu subjects, because he hated a religion which, if protected,

would have been the best support of his throne; and he fawned, in his last extremity, on this injured people, when he vainly hoped that their incantations might influence his fate; he persecuted contrary to his interest; and hoped, in opposition to his belief. Hyder, with all his faults, might be deemed a model of toleration, by the professor of any religion. Tippoo, in an age when persecution only survived in history, renewed its worst terrors; and was the last Mohammedan prince, after a long interval of better feeling, who propagated that religion by the edge of the sword. Hyder's vices invariably promoted his political interests; Tippoo's more frequently defeated them. If Hyder's punishments were barbarous, they were at least efficient to their purpose. Tippoo's court and army was one vast scene of unpunished peculation, notorious even to himself. He was barbarous where severity was vice, and indulgent where it was virtue. If he had qualities fitted for empire, they were strangely equivocal; the disqualifications were obvious and unquestionable; and the decision of history will not be far removed from the observation almost proverbial in Mysore, "that Hyder was born to create an Empire, Tippoo to lose one."

A French  
view of Tipū  
M. Michaud's  
sketch.

Tipū had continuously in his service French Officers and artificers of every kind. Their help he valued and their alliance he sought at every step. A view of what a typical representative of that nation thought of him—of his military talents and political wisdom—seems necessary as a corrective to the English view set forth above. The following is a translation from the French of a sketch of Tipū's career and character, that was issued about 1816, being based on a work by M. Michaud published in Paris in 1809, entitled *Histoire des progrès de la chute de l'empire de Mysore, sous les regnes d'Hyder-Aly et de Tippoo Saib*.—



"Feth-Aly-Khan, commonly called Tippoo Saib, born about 1749, was the son of the celebrated Hyder-Aly-Khan, sovereign of a powerful empire which he had usurped from the young Rajah of Mysore, of which his genius and his conquests had given him possession. On the death of his father, December 7, 1782, the young Tippoo found himself heir to a territory of twenty-seven thousand square miles, of which the revenues amounted to nearly fifty million francs, and an army of one hundred and fifty thousand men. At the news of the death of Hyder-Aly, the English, commanded by General Mathews, entered Mysore. Tippoo Saib, forced to leave the Carnatic which he had just taken, hastened to the succour of his States; surprised the English in the plains of Canara; routed them: took prisoners the whole of General Mathews' army; and avenged with the greatest ferocity the cruelties the English had committed in the town of Aumapore (Anantapur). After some other successes, he concluded a peace with England, which lasted eight years. During this time, Tippoo occupied himself in ameliorating the internal condition of his empire; and continued to cultivate the friendly relations which had long existed between the French and the sovereign of Mysore. But impelled by the impetuosity of his character, and by the remembrance of his former successes, he resolved to put into execution the project of his father, and to again make fresh efforts to oust the English from India. With this object in view, he sent three ambassadors to the Court of Versailles. They were received with distinction, but failed to secure the help they had solicited. On their return to India, they unceasingly vaunted the riches, the power, and the happiness of France, until Tippoo, tired of their discourse, ordered two of them to be put to death.

"A fresh war soon arose between England and Mysore. In 1790, Tippoo was beaten in a battle in Travancore, and lost many pieces of cannon, his turban, his jewels, and his palanquin. The following year the English laid siege to Bangalore, and took possession of that place, where the general of the Sultan perished in the assault. Cornwallis marched against Seringapatam; but famine, floods and contagious diseases forced the English to raise the siege. The third campaign in this war was yet more disastrous to the Sultan. The Mahrattas and the Soubah of the Deccan joined forces with the English.



Many forts in the Bangalore country had been taken, when the loss of the fortress of Savendroog, until then deemed impregnable, completed the discomfiture of the Mysore army. In the month of January, 1792, the united forces of the allies marched a second time against Seringapatam. Tippoo was forced to make peace, with most stringent conditions. He gave up to the English the half of his States; undertook to pay them about seventy-five million francs; and gave them two of the sons as hostages, as a guarantee of the faithful execution of the treaty. Embittered by these reverses, Tippoo Saib banished the pleasures of his court, formerly so brilliant, and occupied himself solely in discovering means to avenge the indignity of his defeat. The old allies of his father had become the auxiliaries of the English. He sent many ambassadors to Zeman-Shah, Sovereign of the Empire of the Abdallis, to try and make him adopt his plans. Not succeeding on this side, he sent Hassan-Ali and Shaik-Ibrahim to the Isle-de-France, in order to open fresh negotiations with the French Republic. The feeble help he obtained only hastened his fall. The Marquis Wellesley, Governor-General of India, knowing the Sultan's preparations for war, assembled an army of seventy-five thousand men, commanded by General Harris. Tippoo only wished to temporise; counting upon the help which he expected from France, he tried to postpone war, and had put off under various pretexts the envoys of the Marquis Wellesley. But as soon as he learnt of the approach of so formidable an army, he only thought of defending his kingdom, and left at the head of sixty thousand men. He was defeated at Sedesear, and at Malaveli, and imprudently shut himself up in his capital. He wished to open negotiations with the English; but the conditions with which peace could only be obtained appeared so harsh to the haughty mind of the Sultan, that he determined to die, or to bury himself under the ruins of Seringapatam. This town was defended with the greatest courage. Tippoo during the whole of the siege, commanded the troops in person, betaking himself wherever danger appeared imminent. On the 21st April, 1799, the English began to make a breach, and on the 4th May the town was carried by storm. The French in the service of the Sultan disputed every inch of the ground, and several times they managed to rally the troops of Mysore. A large number of them were killed

whilst fighting bravely. The unhappy Tippoo displayed on this day all the valour of the bravest soldier. Driven to the foot of the ramparts, he leapt on his horse, and tried to reach his palace ; but, struck by shot, he fell, and his body was discovered under a heap of corpses.

“ Thus died,” says M. Michaud, “ Tippoo Saib at the age of forty-five. The beginning of his military career had covered him with very great glory throughout Hindustan ; fortune had favoured him in allowing him without opposition to sit on the throne of Hyder-Aly ; and she also did something for him on this occasion in not leaving him to survive the downfall of his empire. His height was five feet eight inches (English): he had a thick short neck ; his shoulders, square and massive ; his limbs were small, particularly his feet and hands ; his eyes large, and his eye-brows arched ; he had an aquiline nose, and a brown complexion. Tippoo Saib was a cultured man ; he was master of several European languages ; he possessed a deep knowledge of the sciences studied in India ; but he had not that power of perception, that farseeing and active intuition, which prepares for contingencies, or that wisdom which puts them to profit. Possessed of a boldness which braves all dangers, he had not the prudence which avoids them ; endowed with an impetuous and irascible spirit, he nearly always preferred violent to slow and prudent measures. In short, it can be said of this Prince, that he occupied himself too much with the means for displaying his power, and not enough with those for preserving and strengthening it.”

For a contemporary Muhammadan opinion, we may take, by way of contrast, the sketch of Kirmāni, which while not being extravagant is fair. He writes in the last chapter of his work :—

Kirmāni's  
sketch of  
Tipū's  
character.

In his courts the splendour of kingly magnificence and majesty were well sustained. He had profitted to a considerable extent in all the sciences. He wrote and composed with ease and elegance, and indeed had a genius for literary acquirement, had a great talent for business ; and, therefore, he was not obliged to rely on the aid or guidance of others in the management of public affairs. He had a pleasing address

and manner, was very discriminating in his estimation of the character of men of learning, and laboured sedulously in the encouragement and instruction of the people of Islam. He had, however, a great dislike to, or rather an abhorrence of, the people of other religions. He never saluted (or returned a salute to) any one. He held his Durbars from the morning until midnight, and after the morning prayers, he was used to employ some time in reading the *Kuran*, and he was to be seen at all times with his Tusbih or rosary in his hand, having performed his ablutionary duties. He made only two meals a day, and all his Amirs and the princes dined with him. But from the day on which peace was made between him and Lord Cornwallis, Buhadur, (to the day of his death) he abandoned his bed and bed-stead and slept or took a few hours rest on certain pieces of a coarse kind of canvas called Khaddi, (used for making tents) spread upon the ground. He was accustomed on most occasions to speak Persian, and while he was eating his dinner, two hours were devoted by him to the perusal (from standard historical works), of the actions of the Kings of Persia and Arabia, religious works, traditions and biography. He also heard appropriate stories and anecdotes related by his courtiers. Jests and ribaldry, however, from the repetition of which the religion of Islam might suffer disparagement, or injury, were never allowed in the courts or assemblies of that most religious prince. For the sake of recreation ( . . . . . ) as is the custom of men of high rank, he sometimes witnessed dancing (or was present at the performance of Bayaderes). He was not, however, lavish or expensive in any of his habits or amusements, not even in his dress, and contrary to his former custom, he latterly avoided the use of coloured garments. On his journeys and expeditions, however, he wore a coat of gold, or of the red tiger stripe embroidered with gold. He was also accustomed to tie a white handkerchief over his turban and under his chin, and no one was allowed to tie on, or wear, a white handkerchief in that manner, except himself.

Towards the end of his reign, he wore a green turban Shumlehdar, (twisted apparently) after the fashion of the Arabs, having one embroidered end pendant on the sides of his head. He conferred honours on all Professors of the Arts, and in the observance of his prayers, fasts and other religious duties, he was very strict, and in that respect the instructor.

or example of the people of Islam. Contrary to the custom of the deceased Nawab, he the Sultān retained the hair of his eyebrows, eye lashes, and moustaches. His beard, however, which was chiefly on his chin, he shaved thinking it not becoming to him. In delicacy or modesty of feeling, he was the most particular man in the world so much so that from the days of his childhood to that of his death, no one ever saw any part of his person except his ankle and wrist, and even in the bath he always covered himself from head to foot.

In courage and hardihood, the Sultān took precedence of all his contemporaries, and in the management of a horse and the spear, he had no equal in the world as will appear after an attentive perusal of this work. He was fond of introducing novelty and invention in all matters, (and in all departments) as for instance, the year called Muhammadi, an account of which has been before given, also the name of the solar months.....

Besides these inventions, his workmen cast guns of a very wonderful description, lion-mouthed; also, muskets with two or three barrels, scissors, penknives, clocks, daggers called *sufdura*,—also, a kind of shield woven and formed so as to resist a musket ball.

Besides these, he also instituted manufactories for the fabrication or imitation of the cloths of all countries, such as shawls, velvet, *Kimkhub*, (cloth of gold,) broad cloth (European), and he expended thousands of pounds in these undertakings.

His chief aim and object was, however, the encouragement and protection of the Muhammadan religion, and the religious maxims or rules of the *Soonni* sect,—and he not only himself abstained from all forbidden practices, but he strictly prohibited his servants from their commission.

He also formed regulations on every subject and for every department depending on his government, every article of which was separately written with his own hand. If, however, he dismissed any one from his office for any fault, or neglect, he after correction and punishment, was accustomed to re-appoint him to the same office again, and from this cause it was that during his reign, treachery gained head so far as to cast his kingdom and power gratuitously to the winds.

On the top of his firmans or public papers, he was accustomed to write the words—"In the name of God"—in the Toghra character in his own hand, and at the end, his signature.

The particular form of signature mentioned by Kirmāni is really a device or cryptogram, meaning "*Nabbi Mulik*" or the *Prophet is Master*. Lewin Bowring in his monograph on *Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* mentions an order bearing this cryptogram on it. Other orders are known containing not only the same signatures but also a square seal with his impression *Tipu Sultan*. The Moghul Emperor Shāh Ālam is known to have bestowed on him the title of *Fatah Alī Khān*, but he does not appear to have made use of it in his official correspondence. The French writer, M. Michaud, mentions this name in his account of Tipū. On his coins, Tipū does not recognize the great Moghul. Indeed he ordered the *Khutbah*, or daily prayer, to be read in the mosques in his own name, instead of the Moghul Emperor.

Later  
European  
views : Lewin  
Bowring's  
delineation.

Later European views of Tipū Sultān's character have been a little more sympathetic. Though by no means countenancing his cruelties or atrocities, the view has been suggested, that he should be judged as a product of his age. Lewin Bowring, writing nearly a century after the fall of Seringapatam, gives different instances, based on Tipū's own correspondence, to illustrate his "ferocious character" and then says :—

But enough has been said to show the character of a ruler, who urged on by religious bigotry, innate cruelty, and despotism, thought little of sacrificing thousands of lives to his ardent zeal and revengeful feelings. These darker shades in his disposition are not relieved by any evidence of princely generosity, such as Haidar Ali occasionally showed. Tipū would grumble at the expense of clothing his troops or even at the number of wax-candles needed for ship-stores. He once



rebuked an officer who complained of being supplied with old and black rice, by telling him not to engage in improper altercation.

Whatever indignation may be excited by the Sultān's vindictive character, it is enhanced by the miserable state of the prisoners who fell into his hands. Haidar indeed put his captives in irons, fed them sparingly, and treated them badly, but he rarely put an end to their lives deliberately. Tipū, on the other hand, had no compunction in cutting their throats, or strangling and poisoning them; while, as has been stated, numbers of them were sent to die of malaria and starvation on the fatal mountain of Kabāldrug. The English prisoners were specially selected as victims of his vengeance, not omitting officers of rank such as General Matthews; while, in direct contravention of the treaty made at Mangalore in 1784, he did not scruple to retain in captivity considerable numbers of Europeans. Many of these, particularly young and good-looking boys, were forcibly circumcised, married haphazard to girls who had been captured in the Coromandal districts, and drafted into the ranks of the army, or compelled to sing and dance for the amusement of the sovereign.

It must be admitted that the times were barbarous, and that the most atrocious punishments were frequently inflicted on malefactors. Even impaling was occasionally resorted to, and it would be unjust to attribute to Tipū alone the commission of crimes which were characteristic of the period. It has been mentioned that those who conspired against him were put in a cage. This was an imitation of Haidar's treatment of Khande Rao. The unhappy victims were allowed half a pound of rice a day, with salt, but no water so they soon expired under this frightful ordeal. There were other punishments nearly equally dreadful, such as making men bestride a wooden horse on a saddle studded with sharp spikes. On a spring being touched, the horse of torture reared, and the spikes penetrated the unfortunate wretches. A more common mode of punishment was to bind tightly the hands and feet of condemned men, and then to attach them by a rope to the foot of an elephant, which, being urged forwards, dragged them after it on the rough ground and painfully terminated their existence. Some again were ruthlessly thrown into the dens of tigers to be devoured, and it is said that three of Tipū's high officials met with this fate.



Cutting off of ears and noses was a general practice, and was frequently inflicted on defaulters, thieves, and peccant subordinates. . . . .

So many instances have been given of the atrocities which he committed in the name of religion, that it would be superfluous to add to them. In this respect, he rivalled Mahmud of Ghazni, Nādir Shāh, and Alā-ud-din, the Pathān Emperor of Delhi surnamed the Khūni, or the Bloody, all of whom were famous for the number of infidels slaughtered by their orders. For this very zeal for the faith, notwithstanding the cruelties which attended his persecutions, the name of Tipū Sultān was long held in reverence by his co-religionists in Southern India—a proof how readily crimes that cry to Heaven are condoned when the perpetrator of them is supposed to have been animated by a sincere desire to propagate the faith which he professed. On his tomb at Seringapatam, it is recorded, in phrases which, as in the case of Haidar Ali, commemorate by the *Abjad* system the year of his death, that the 'Haidari Sultān' died for the faith. The words are 'Nur Islam wa dīn z 'dunyā raft,' i.e., 'The light of Islam and the faith left the world;' 'Tipū ba wajah dīn Muhammad Shahīd shud,' i.e., 'Tipū on account of the faith of Muhammad was a martyr,' 'Shamshēr gūm shud,' i.e., 'The sword was lost;' 'Nasal Haidar shahīd akbar shud,' i.e., 'The offspring of Haidar was a great martyr,' all these phrases being supposed to represent the year 1223 Hijri, corresponding with A.D. 1799. The inscription was composed by Mir Hussēn Ali, and was written by one Abd-ul-Kādir.

Dr. J. R.  
Henderson's  
estimate.

A more recent estimate is not only appreciative of certain of the much criticised aspects of Tipū's character, especially certain of his innovations, but also pleads for a closer study of his life for a juster appraising of his character. Dr. John R. Henderson, C.I.E., who, it should be remembered, wrote during the time the Great European War was in progress, in his monograph on the *Coins of Haidar Ali and Tipu Sultan* observes:—

"It is difficult to form an accurate estimate of the character of Tipu Sultan, because the views of contemporary writers,

whether English or Muhammadan, are obviously biassed. His cruelty and religious bigotry are undoubted and he perpetrated many atrocities in the name of religion; he has been justly censured for his excesses in war, though they never perhaps exceeded a standard set elsewhere in more modern times. That he was a brave man cannot be doubted, and while on several occasions he showed considerable military ability, he fell far short of his father in this respect. Unlike Haidar, he was a man of education and the changes which he introduced into the calendar, the names of his forts, of Civil and Military offices, and of weights and measures, certainly display a considerable amount of ingenuity, though by more than one writer they have been held to afford evidence of his insanity. Nowhere else is Tipu's love of innovation better seen than in his coinage. It has been left to an English writer of fiction to give, in the words of one of his characters, the most favourable account of Tipu Sultan that I have been able to discover, and while no doubt reproducing contemporary Muhammadan opinion, it is perhaps nearer the truth than are some of the accounts which have been written in an entirely opposite direction. This imperfect notice may fittingly conclude with the extract in question.

"He was a great man—such as one as Hind will never see again. He had great ambition, wonderful ability, perseverance, and the art of leading men's hearts more than they were aware of, or cared to acknowledge; he had patient application, and nothing was done without his sanction, even to the meanest affairs, and the business of his dominions was vast. You will allow he was brave, and died like a soldier. He was kind and considerate to his servants, and a steady friend to those he loved. Mashalla, he was a great man'—(Meadows Taylor, *Tippoo Sultan*, p. 450)."

It must be acknowledged that Tipū has been groundlessly charged with what has been termed "a spirit of restless innovation." Almost the only innovation which has won the appreciation of Wilks is his attempt to put down the drink evil. His reform of the coinage, under French influence, has not received the praise it deserves. (See *Numismatics*, Chapter III above). Nor have his

certain other reforms received the examination they have certainly required for a just appreciation of their utility. It seems a singular misfortune that the darker side of Tipū's life and character should have so completely overshadowed the better and more enlightened side of it as to give a totally distorted view of it.

An analysis  
of Tipū's  
character: his  
defects and  
merits.

In judging of the character of Tipū, we should not only remember the points against him but also those in his favour. His ardent love for the French, for the aid he at one time freely got from them and for what more he expected from them was the cause of his ultimate ruin. He never for a moment had the political wisdom to see that the French were at the time the mortal foes of the British and that the British would treat the allies of the French as their own enemies. As Wilks has pointed out, Tipū inherited his friendship for the French from his father, who disappointed with the English at Madras, went over to the French at Pondicherry, and with them formed the design of driving the English out of India. Tipū's life-time was spent in the realization of this vain hope. He spared neither money nor opportunity to attain this object. His desire for foreign alliances and his despatch of embassies to foreign Courts had this sole aim in view. This hatred for the English led him to extreme measures against British prisoners. His barbarous cruelty towards them and towards his own subjects are blots on his character, which, from any point of view, are wholly indefensible. The above quoted European writer has tried to justify the atrocious cruelties of Tipū from the cruelties practised during the last World War. This view, however, cannot be accepted, for the convincing reason that cruelty, whether new or old, is cruelty and it is cruelty whether it is practised by an European or an Indian. One wrong cannot right another. Tipū's systematic breach of the terms of capitulations entered into by him with those who

surrendered to him and of solemn treaty engagements is equally repugnant to higher political and moral instincts. His religious fanaticism and the excesses he committed in the name of religion--both in Mysore and in the provinces, especially in Malabar and in Coorg in particular--stand condemned for all time. There is hardly any other aspect of his character that deserves greater castigation than this one. His bigotry, indeed, was so great that it precluded all idea of toleration to other's feelings in religious or social matters. He kept up intercourse with the Sringēri *Guru* but it was more for the political benefits he expected to derive from it than for allowing him unmolested the free exercise of his own religion. History records no instance of a like kind during any age. Equally cruel was Tipū's treatment of the *de jure* ruler of the State, whose professed servants he and his father long pretended to be. His repeated plunders of the Royal House and the indignities to which its members were subjected by him indicate a weakening of the moral fibre in him that is hardly compatible with the royalty and state he himself assumed. The infamous character of this particular crime so worked itself into the people that they made several attempts, time and again, to throw off his dreaded yoke. It must be acknowledged that Muham-madans were as much to the fore in these attempts as the Hindus and the entire collapse of his cause after his death shows Tipū had no hold either on his co-religionists or on the Hindus, whom he so much oppressed. Tipū held his kingdom by instilling fear in the minds of his subjects; he kept them down by the severity of his rule; and never felt bound by any ties of moral responsibility to his subjects. The people never felt, on their part, they owed any obedience to him. The tie of sovereign and subject was non-existent between him and his people. On the one side, Tipū never thought he owed any responsibility to his subjects, whom he involved in repeated wars

and the unbearable miseries resulting from them, whom he individually plundered as he desired, and whom he, without reason or justice, subjected to indignities so far unknown in the land. On the other hand, the people felt that they owed no allegiance to him for they failed to see any moral right attaching to his position, which, founded in usurpation, had been supported by open injustice, extortion and cruelty. This was the primary reason why on his death, the deposition of his family proved so easy. None—not even among the Muhammadans—was found to support the revival of the rule of his family in his descendants. As a matter of fact, as has been already stated, the generality of the Muhammadans were against his rule and some of them even took part in the several attempts made to dethrone him. Marquess Wellesley, the great Statesman that he was, perceived this cardinal fact in the situation immediately after the fall of Seringapatam and based his policy of after-war settlement of the country primarily on it. (See below). Another weakness in Tipū's character was his want of stability in administrative matters. His suspicion of his Generals, his lack of understanding of human nature, and his imperfect political wisdom were other radical defects in his character which wholly disabled him from grasping the essential facts of a situation. He was thus misled into adopting measures which disrupt an Empire which, had he exercised ordinary prudence and calmness of judgment, he could have easily conserved and added to even. His vanity, his boastfulness and his unpreparedness at a moment of crisis were other traits in his character which deserve mention. His conduct of the last war, which ended in his destruction showed how, in the midst of plenty, he was unprepared for the event. He did not lack men; he did not lack war materials; and he did not lack Generals; yet his preparations for checking the enemy's advance were, as we have seen,



hopelessly faulty, in that he gave no real thought to them, with consequences the most disastrous to himself. The enemy had literally a walk over, which one Persian historian describes in language which borders on the farcical. So downcast had he become after the loss of half of his territories and the exacting of his sons as hostages, that while he was endeavouring for strong measures against the British, he was not girding up his loins to the work in a truly military spirit. There are those who maintain that he got unhinged from that time forward and that he delivered himself into the hands of his Fate. His own actions in the height of the crisis not only confirm this surrender but also betray traces of a regret at his past conduct. His lack of military talents—despite the fact that he was a good soldier and died a real soldier's death fighting with sword in hand—disabled him to see the faults of his own generalship. Cornwallis was deeply disappointed at his lack of military prudence; while Colonel Allan frequently notes in his *Journal* how his want of foresight as evidenced in the dispositions of his forces and in the utterly disorganized manner in which the opposition to the advance was offered by him. He expresses his surprise again and again that a wiser Generalship would have opposed the British advance at various points and disputed every inch of the ground; even where he did offer some resistance, it was so weak that it made no impression on the enemy. While he was not himself equal to the task, he would not leave it to others; far worse, he attributed the effects of his own bad generalship to his officers, which, added to the suspicion with which he usually treated them, took the heart out of their service. The worst, however, of Tipu's faults was his want of regard for truth. While he meant one thing, he was doing another. His duplicity towards the English and his treatment of Nargund are illustrative of this trait in his character. It was a radical defect, it



stamped him as unfaithful as an ally, unreliable as a neighbour and unbelievable in warfare. If he had any regard for the treaty engagements he had entered into in 1792, he would have been less prevaricating with Marquess Wellesley in 1798-1799; if he had kept his word with his Pālegār chiefs, they would not have welcomed the enemy with open arms when the advance commenced; if he had not deceived those who had capitulated and broken the terms under which they had surrendered, his reputation with the British for honesty would not have been so low as it actually was in 1799.

His redeem-  
ing features.

But though the defects of character from which Tipū laboured were many and some of them wholly incurable, there were redeeming features in it, which made it less unloveable than it might easily have been but for their presence. The first among these was his habitual energy, which especially, before the losses of 1792, kept him restlessly marching from conquest to conquest and from battlefield to battlefield. His march to Karnātic from Malabar at the time of his father's death and from the Karnātic to Mangalore are good examples of this trait, while his general restless disposition shows that normally, under more favourable conditions, he might have proved himself an undoubtedly energetic ruler and leader. He did not allow himself a chance to make a good use of the boundless energy he displayed. If he had been a little more true to himself and true to others, his countrymen and opponents alike, he would have fared the better for the physical and mental energy he was endowed with by a bounteous nature. His soldier-like bearing, his personal bravery, and his absolute refusal to discover himself to the British at the time he was about to be felled down, show him in a character which wins our goodwill for him. His constancy to those whom he considered his friends was another loveable trait in his character. His haughty

refusal to deliver Mons. Chapuis and the handful of French soldiers with him, at the siege of 1799, when by so doing he could have saved himself, brings out in bold relief this particular characteristic of his. His zeal for his religion needs a word of commendation, though it over-stepped the bounds of reasonable restraint, especially as applied to conquered countries like Malabar and Coorg. His ardent desire for reform, which was real, was a prominent feature of his rule. It extended from the army to weights and measures, and in some respects (especially as to suppression of drink and coinage) was much in advance of his times. The admiration to be extended to this well-meant zeal should, however, be qualified with the observation that he often displayed a sad lack of human understanding in putting some of them through. While, for instance, his adoption of a stronger artillery arm to his army should be praised, his depreciation of the cavalry, led to the ruin of his Army and to his own final destruction. His powers of assimilation were great—whether in adopting European training or European methods of warfare—but he often did not realize the limits beyond which it would be impossible. His veneration for his mother was a leading trait in his character. Her advice he never disregarded even when it went against his own cherished views. He had, however, no tender feeling for women generally. Women, indeed, he classed with “other rubbish” in one of his admonitory epistles addressed to Burhan-ud-dīn. Though he had thirteen sons and an equal number of daughters, he was not susceptible, as Bowring remarks, to the charms of the fair sex. His strict, abstemious life, bordering on the puritanical, his devotion to the duties of a good Moslem, even to the detail of counting the rosary, reminds one of Aurangzīb, who is said to have earned the money required for his private expenses by multiplying copies of the *Koran* from his own hand. Though Tipū did not go to this

length, still there is no doubt that he was both a devoted and zealous Moslem. His eagerness to spread the religion he professed cost him dearly but it is to be feared that he was wholly unconscious of the price he was paying for it until the last moment. Even the repeated warnings of his mother, whose influence over him was manifestly great, proved unavailing in this respect. A valued public servant like Pūrnaiya did not escape his attentions in this respect, though he avoided extreme measures in his case, because of the solemn reproof administered to him by his mother in this connection. Praise is due to Tipū for his business-like habits, of which there is ample evidence in his correspondence. He was, it would appear, fond of reading, though he had no true literary instincts in him. The history that goes by his name was written, at least in part, to his dictation, and is in a style which has not won much appreciation from competent critics. It is, in some instances, devoted to the falsification of what actually took place. Despite this defect, it is worthy of attention because of the light it sheds on the state of his mind at the time of its composition. Considering the defects of his character and his bringing up—he was educated under a Maulvi who instilled more religion than culture into him—it cannot be denied that a kindly Fate permitted him to die fighting on the walls of the fort he knew so well and loved so greatly, without allowing him to fall into the hands of the enemy whose prisoners he had so ruthlessly and so mercilessly beheaded, even while he was fighting for his own life, for them to make him taste a little of that human misery that he, like his far-famed contemporary and would-be ally Napoleon, for so long had despised.

Criticism of  
Tipū's  
conduct of  
the war.

Opinion seems unanimous that Tipū showed an entire lack of generalship in the war. It was in keeping with his conduct of the previous war which ended with the

first siege of Seringapatam. Lord Cornwallis, ascribing to him firmness and decision, had apprehended that he would leave the defence of the Capital to a trusty Officer and ample garrison, and keeping aloof with a light and effective army, act on the communications of the besiegers, and dislodge them by the mere force of their own members. These apprehensions received additional force from the absence of the only branch of the confederacy—that under Parasuram Bhao—from which Lord Cornwallis expected efficient aid. But the actual presence of Tipū's army dissipated all alarms on that account, and enabled Lord Cornwallis to realize his best hopes of striking a decisive blow before the commencement of siege. The very same mistake of locking himself up in his fortress in the face of the advancing enemy was repeated by Tipū on the present occasion, with worse results. The curious reader will find in Colonel Allan's *Journal* of the march of the British army that it reached within sight of Bangalore, a distance of nearly 150 miles, from Vellore, from which it started, practically without firing a shot. Kelamangalam was the first place where the advancing army fell in with parties of Tipū's horse. Though some showed themselves daringly, they did not molest the British forces, but simply destroyed the forage round about the British Camp and retired, desiring that there was no need "to fire on them" as they had not been "ordered by the Sultaun" to do no more. At Garadipalli, they could have easily taken the Adjutant-General (Colonel Close) a prisoner, if Tipū's troops had only been a little active. He crossed them "at the distance of a few yards." While Tipū's troops were expecting the British troops at Bangalore, the latter evaded them by proceeding by way of Ānekal, within 9 miles of Bangalore, and then striking into the road leading to Kankanhalli, they crossed the rugged high grounds which run from Bangalore to the Cauvery and encamped at Kaglipuram ;

still there was no sign of any activity on the part of Tipū's troops. Almost the only thing so far done by a small party (about 60 horses) of the latter was to watch the motions of the advancing army and send daily intelligence of its progress. A few others were told off to breach the tanks or poison them—as in the previous war—by throwing quantities of milk-hedge into them. The advancing army was well prepared for it, expecting this mode of annoyance and rapidly repaired the tanks or removed the poisoning shrubs. At Maddur river, the British army was wholly disappointed in not being opposed. They had seen Tipū's forces encamping in the neighbourhood and Syed Ghaffar, one of his generals, was also there. Tipū had lately opened the road from this place to Kankanhalli and it is natural to suppose that it was his intention to oppose the advancing British forces there before they advanced any further. "That he did not at the Maddur river," records Colonel Allan, "is unaccountable. The ground was particularly favourable for him and had he sacrificed a few guns, which he might have placed to great advantage on the heights in our front, which command the passage of the river he might have given us a great deal of annoyance, killed and wounded a number of men and when pressed by our troops, as the country was quite open in his rear, he might have drawn off, in perfect security. He must have been aware of these and from all our information, it was supposed, he would have availed himself of them. Tippoo was advised by Mons. Chapuis to oppose our army at this place, and at the time had resolved to do so, but on the approach of our army he retired towards Mallavally (Malvalli). That he did not, can only be attributed to want of confidence in his troops; occasioned probably by the repulse he met at Sedaseer (about 20 days before). Hitherto we have met with scarce any opposition from the enemy, when he ought to have harassed us every day on the



march, and by retarding us, have gained time, which should be his principal object." That is cogent criticism of Tipū's inactivity at the supreme hour of his peril; it was due to want of confidence in his own generals, whom he never trusted; to indifference to sound advice by them; and to the malevolent influence of a consuming vanity which made him think that he was the best judge of what should be done. On the other hand, the British General was guided by a carefully prepared plan of action and the policy underlying it had been worked by the best available talent, Civil and Military, and it was strictly adhered to, except when the occasion required any alteration. At this very spot, orders for march had been given on the 24th March but on the morrow, they were countermanded by General Harris. He found that he was too near Tipū to be moving in separate divisions, and it would have been the height of imprudence to have left the artillery park stores and provisions in the rear. "Our object," as Col. Allan records in his *Journal*, "is to protect our equipment and to take up a position before Seringapatam as expeditiously as possible, not to seek an action. In our present almost crippled state for want of carriage, it would but add to our embarrassments, to have to carry perhaps two or three hundred wounded men . . . . At the same time, an action should not be avoided. I have more than once mentioned the conduct of Marquis Cornwallis, on the day we took up our ground before Bangalore in the face of the whole of Tippoo's army. Although we did not return one shot, it was one of the most brilliant days during the war." Tipū thus lost a great opportunity, with disastrous consequences to himself and to his power. It were futile to speculate what Haider would have done under identical circumstances. It is certain, in any case, he would never have risked the enemy's advance against the capital in the singularly



inept manner in which his son, lost in his fatalistic notions, did at the most critical moment of his life-time.

Kirmāni indeed charges the Officers of Tipū not only of incapacity but also of treachery in not foiling the British advance. He thus transfers the blame from Tipū's shoulders to those of his commanders. How far this is justified is evident from his own narrative. He mentions the fact that when he got information of the arrival of the British army at Ambur and Tirupattūr, he detached some of his Mīr Mirans, among them Pūrnaiya, to check its advance, while he himself gave orders to assemble his Amīrs and the remainder of his army. Except Pūrnaiya, there was no veteran of acknowledged ability or fame among those told off for turning back the invading hosts. At Rayakota, Tipū's forces attacked the British army "in a scattered and confused manner," and apparently failed of its purpose, despite the aid that it received from the cavalry. Kirmāni is so disgusted with the weakness displayed by those appointed to check the advance, that he openly suggests that it should have been due to treachery. "It appeared, therefore," he says, "to every one, after this that the intention of their Officers was to avoid fighting and consequently displayed no more zeal or enterprise, and more like an escort or safeguard quietly preceded and followed the troops of the enemy as they marched along." Colonel Allan's *Journal* leaves no doubt that it was not treachery that prevented the onward march of the British army as the want of generalship, of a carefully thought plan of operations, of military policy, in a word, on the part of Tipū. If he had not given up hope in advance and utilized the talents available to him, he could have easily despatched suitable detachments to check the advance. This he failed to do throughout this campaign, and the blame attaching to it can only be borne by him. He not only failed to plan in advance

how he should checkmate the British advance; he was hopelessly weak in his intelligence branch. He knew not what way the British marched; in fact, he got wrong, if not, false news of their movements. The march of the British troops by way of Kankanhalli and their crossing the Cauvery at Sosile, both against his expectations, are quite conclusive of this defect in his arrangements. At Malvalli, there were not lacking opportunities for Tipū to turn the tide in his favour but he utterly failed to perceive the moment. Several British brigades, even single columns, at that action, were advancing towards Tipū's forces so rapidly and in such unconnected fashion as to have left their guns behind. If at this period, Tipū's Horse had done its duty, it would have prevented the British gaining any advantage. On the other hand, it retired to the next rising ground, and the British brought up some of their field pieces and two brass 18 pounders to a commanding spot and fired with effect over the Right Wing as it advanced. At the same time, they took care to cover the field-pieces which had been left behind. Not only that, they pushed a cavalry regiment forward to within two hundred yards of Tipū's *howdah* elephant, and but for the order of retreat—unwillingly—given by General Harris for this particular regiment, the day at Malvalli would perhaps have ended with the capture, alive or dead, of Tipū himself. At Sosile, the British "did not see a horseman on the march"—so unexpected was the route and so ill provided with news was Tipū. The advance from Sosile, *via* Rangasamudram, Harohalli, Ankanahalli, Nava Shahe, and thence to Seringapatam, within 4000 yards its south-west face, was reached without any obstruction, except for a few occasional pickets thrown by Tipū's troops. If they had been properly prepared for it, they could have not only obstructed, but also made the enemy lose time, with the result that the siege would be delayed, if

not made infructuous, through the advance of the season. At Rangasamudra, the Nizām's troops were in front and so near were Tipū's forces to it, that if they should have chosen to attack, those troops would have fallen on the main British line and created the greatest confusion. At Harohalli, the march proved so tedious, the troops having to cross several times a dry *nullah* with high banks and that with a heavy park of artillery, that it is hard to conceive what an attack at this spot by Tipū's forces might have meant. Similarly on the march of the British forces to Nava Shahi, a very large body of Tipū's regular cavalry showed themselves in front near the Chendgal fort, but made no attempt whatever to annoy the advancing hosts. The junction of the Bombay army with the main army was equally without incident *via* Periapatna, Kattemalavadi, and Belagula. This rapid review of the advance shows that Tipū allowed himself to be hopelessly out-generalled and out-manouvered, with the consequence that he allowed the British forces to sit down before his walls well in advance of the monsoon, and batter them down.

Prize  
Property at  
Seringa-  
patam.

The prize property seized at Seringapatam immediately after its fall was estimated at 40,30,300 star pagōdas, equivalent to £1,600,000. This property was thus made up:—

Actually counted and valued—					Star pagodas
In specie	...	...	...	...	... 16,00,000
In jewels	...	...	...	...	... 6,50,000
Not valued but estimated by Prize Agents—					
In jewels	...	...	...	...	... 4,50,000
Grain	...	...	...	...	... 3,00,000
Clothes, etc.	...	...	...	...	... 10,00,000
The Throne	...	...	...	...	... 30,000
Total Star pagodas					... 40,30,000

The jewels were subsequently estimated at 9 lakhs. Apart from this property, the military stores seized were

valued at 10 lakhs. The total number of ordnance captured was 929, including guns, mortars and howitzers, 176 of which were twelve pounders and over. The booty in the Palace included a magnificent throne, a superb howdah, curious and richly-jewelled match-locks and swords, solid gold and silver plate, costly carpets and china ware, a profusion of fine gems and a very valuable Library. The Library was at first ordered to be given to the Court of Directors for the foundation of their Eastern Literature, the duplicate copies being sent to the Asiatic Society at Calcutta. But subsequently, except one precious copy of the *Koran*, referred to below, the greater part of it was transferred to the newly founded College at Fort William, Calcutta. A diamond star and ornaments were presented by the British Army to Marquess Wellesley. Tipū's war turban, one of his swords, and a sword of Morari Rao, the famous Mahratta ruler of Gooty, were sent to Marquess Cornwallis. A sword found in Tipū's bed-chamber was publicly presented by General Harris to General Baird, who had led the assault. The sword of Tipū, *i.e.*, the one he usually used and reckoned distinctively his own, being one usually placed in his Musnud, was presented, on behalf of the British Army, by Major Allan, Deputy Quarter-Master-General in person, at Madras, to Marquess Wellesley. Major Allan was the first to visit Marquess Wellesley after the conquest of Seringapatam. (Seringapatam fell on 4th May and he visited the Governor-General at Madras on 30th May). He was made Honorary Aide-de-camp to the Governor-General in recognition of his meritorious services. On the handle of the sword presented by him to Marquess Wellesley was the following inscription:—

"My victorious sabre is lightning for the destruction of the unbelievers. Haidar, the Lord of the Faith, is victorious for my advantage. And, moreover, he destroyed the wicked

race who were unbelievers. Praise be to him, who is the Lord of the Worlds! Thou art our Lord, support us against the people who are unbelievers. He to whom the Lord giveth victory prevails over all (mankind). Oh Lord, make him victorious, who promoteth the faith of Muhammad. Confound him, who refuseth the faith of Muhammad; and withhold us from those who are so inclined. The Lord is predominant over his own works. Victory and conquest are from the Almighty. Bring happy tidings, Oh Muhammad, to the faithful; for God is the kind protector and is the most merciful of the merciful. If God assists thee, thou wilt prosper. May the Lord God assist thee, Oh Muhammad, with mighty victory."

On most of the *furzees* and blunderbusses found in the palace of Tipū, the following inscription in Persian, was seen:—

"This is incomparable piece, belonging to the Sultan of the East, which has no equal but in the most vivid lightning, will annihilate the enemy that it strikes, although Fate should otherwise have ordained him to live."

On some gold medals, also found in the palace, the following legend, in Persian, was seen on one side:—"Of God the bestower of Blessings" and on the other, "Victory and conquest are from the Almighty." Apparently they were struck in commemoration of some victory—probably after the war of 1780. The following is a translation of an inscription on the stone found at Seringapatam, which was to have been set up in a conspicuous place in the Fort:—

"Oh Almighty God! dispose the whole body of infidels! Scatter their tribe, cause their feet to stagger! Overthrow their councils! change their state! destroy their very root! Cause Death to be near them, cut off from them the means of sustenance! shorten their days! be their bodies the constant object of their cares (*i.e.* infest them with diseases), deprive their eyes of sight, make black their faces (*i.e.* bring shame



and disgrace on them), destroy in them the organs of speech ! Slay them as Shedaud (*i.e.* the Prince who presumptuously aimed at establishing a Paradise for himself and was slain by command of God) ; drown them as Pharoah was drowned ; and visit them with the severity of thy wrath. Oh Avenger ! Oh Universal Father ! I am depressed and overpowered, grant me thy assistance."

This inscription should have been engraved after the conclusion of the Cornwallis Treaty. It shows Tipū's inveterate rancour and determined enmity to the English, of which there are numberless proofs. On this occasion, one might suppose that he had taken a leaf out of Ernunphus' book of Curses.

The Throne which formed part of the booty was a newly made one. Its principal ornament was a tiger's head of life-size, wrought in gold, which served as the support of the throne. The bas-reliefs of the throne, which was approached by silver steps, were decorated with tigers' heads worked in gold and adorned with precious stones. Over it was suspended a *humā* or bird of Paradise, whose brilliant wings, encrusted with diamonds, rubies and emeralds, hovered over the Sultān. The *humā* formed the apex of a canopy, fringed with pearls, which was attached to a gilt pillar seven feet high. At Windsor Castle are preserved the royal footstool of Tipū and the richly-jewelled bird, the *humā* above mentioned. Among other relics of Tipū, there are portions of his tent with silver holes, ivory chairs, elephant and horse trappings, a *palankeen*, two richly ornamented field-pieces, and various weapons including the sword and shield which were found with his body after the siege. In the Library of the Castle is a copy of the *Koran* formerly belonging to the Emperor Aurangazib, which was found in Tipū Sultān's Library. It is said to have cost Rs. 9,000, and is beautifully written in the *Naksh* character, with elegant ornamentations. The rest of



Tipū's Library contained many curious and interesting manuscripts, of which the following is a summary :—

“Koran, 44 volumes; Commentaries on Koran, 41; Prayers, 35; Traditions, 46; Theology 46; Sufism, 115; Ethics, 24; Jurisprudence, 95; Arts and sciences, 19; Philosophy, 54; Astromomy, 20; Mathematics, 7; Physics, 62; Philology, 45; Lexicography, 29; History, 118; Letters 53; Poetry 190; Hindi and Dekhani poetry, 23; Hindi and Dekhani prose, 4; Turkish prose, 2; Fables, 18.”

Some of these manuscripts belonged to the Kings of Bijāpur and Gōlkonda, but the majority were acquired by plunder at Chittoor, Savanur, and Cuddapah.

The town  
plundered;  
order  
restored.

The town suffered plunder for a day, and at last guards having been placed over the houses of the respectable persons, and four of the plunderers executed, by order of the Provost Martial in the most conspicuous place in the fort, the soldiery was effectually restrained, and tranquillity restored. Colonel Arther Wellesley, who had meanwhile been appointed to command in the Fort, was mainly responsible for this restoration of order.

Submission  
of Tipū's  
officers.

This was followed by the surrender of Fatteh Haidar, the eldest of the sons of Tipū, and of Pūrnaiya, Kamar-ud-dīn Khan and other officers, on the following day. Circular orders were issued by General Harris, accompanied by communications from the Meer Soodoor, to the officers in charge of the different forts in the territories, to deliver their charges to the British authorities, and giving them general assurance of favour and protection. By these means, the country submitted, the ryots returned to their peaceful occupations, and the land had rest from the incessant warfare of the past fifty years.

Submission  
criticised by  
Kirmāni.

The submission of Tipū's sons and officers has been severely criticised by Kirmāni, who probably reflects

current Muhammadan opinion in this matter. He states that when Futteh Haidar "saw the symptoms of fear, distress and despair, prevailing among his followers, and at the same time heard the consolatory and conciliatory language used by the English General and others of his officers, included in which were hints or hopes held out of his being placed on the throne" he "abandoned all intention of fighting or further opposition, although several of his bravest officers, such as Mullik Jehan Khan, (better known as Dhoondia Waugh) who after the death of the Sultān had been released (by the British troops) and had presented himself to the service of Futteh Hydar Sultān, also Syud Nasir Ali Mir Miran and other Asofs dissuaded him from peace, and strenuously urged him to continue the war. They represented to him that the Sultān had devoted his life only to the will of God, but that his dominions, his strong cities and forts were still in the possession of his servants, and that his army with all its artillery and stores was present. That if there were any intention to reconquer the country, or if any spirit or courage remained, now was the time (for exertion), and that they were ready and willing to devote their lives to his service. This descendant of Hydar, however, notwithstanding his constitutional or hereditary bravery, . . . . .

. . . . .  
at once rejected the prayers of his well wishers, and consequently washing his hands of kingly power and dominion, he proceeded to meet and confer with General Harris."

The glorious and decisive victory over Tipū Sultān placed the whole kingdom of Mysore, with all its resources, at the disposal of the British. The only power in India, to which the French could look for assistance, or which could be deemed formidable to British interests, was deprived of all vigour, if not entirely extinct.

Partition  
Treaty Ar-  
rangement.

All this was achieved within four months from the date of the arrival of the Marquis of Wellesley at Fort St. George and within two months from the period of the British army's entrance into Mysore. Wellesley was thus neither deficient in alacrity nor diligence in the prosecution of the war against Tipū Sultān. The success was not only due to his quickness of perception of the realities of the situation but also to the ample manner in which he invested General Harris when he took the field with the most efficient and extensive powers which it was possible for him to delegate. Harris, indeed, carried with him, as Wellesley intimated the Court of Directors, to the gates of Seringapatam, the full vigour and energy of the Company's Supreme Government in India. To the judicious exercise of this ample authority combined with the liberal supplies which had been provided for the army, may be ascribed, in a great measure, the unparalleled rapidity and promptitude of its operations and the great signal victory they ended in. The problems that the conquest presented were, however, of a character entirely different from those that confronted Wellesley at the time he declared war against Tipū. Previous to General Harris' departure from the Karnātic, he had appointed a Commission to assist him in all matters relating to political negotiations and had furnished them with instructions applicable to every contingency he could then foresee. Though the Commission had, under General Harris' orders, given him complete satisfaction, the circumstances created by the victory seemed to call for his immediate presence at Seringapatam "for adjusting," as he said, "the affairs of the kingdom of Mysore on such a foundation as shall permanently establish the tranquillity" of the Company's possessions in the South of India. He accordingly intimated General Harris that he was proceeding to Seringapatam *via* Royakottah and asked him to send a detachment of his army to meet him

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at that place as soon as he could prudently spare it. In the meantime, he directed Henry Wellesley, his brother and Private Secretary, and Lieut.-Col. Kirkpatrick, his Military Secretary, to proceed direct to Seringapatam, with requisite orders for the guidance of General Harris. This was on the 12th May 1799. On the 13th May, General Harris wrote to Wellesley that Pūrnaiya had seen him and had suggested to him an arrangement, the adoption of which, in his opinion, would restore immediate order and tranquillity. The outline of his plan was (1) that one of the family of Tipū should be placed at the head of the Government to be established in the country; (2) that he should pay to the English such tribute as should be agreed upon; and (3) that the English troops should garrison such forts as they might deem necessary for the security of the country. Pūrnaiya proposed that the prince chosen should be Futteh Haidar, while he, as Dewan, should be charged with the administration of the revenues of the new Government. It should be added that this arrangement was proposed by Pūrnaiya as he seems to have felt that "under any other plan," the troops, which had not yet been disbanded, "would become a lawless banditti pillaging the country and only to be quelled by force, which would under this (arrangement) remain quiet, in the hope of future employment in the service." He also seems to have suggested that by this means "the family of Tippoo Sultān would be preserved in a respectable rank and the power of the English established by an arrangement, the moderation of which would do honour to the National character." General Harris promised to communicate the proposals to the Marquis of Wellesley and in the meantime informed Pūrnaiya that Futteh Haidar should repair to Seringapatam and that he should arrange, on certain conditions, to disperse the troops to their homes. In communicating Pūrnaiya's suggestions to the Marquis of Wellesley,

General Harris intimated that he had suggested in the course of the conversation the possibility of an arrangement for "the establishment of a Hindu Government in favour of the ancient family of Mysore, but Pūrnaiya cautiously evaded entertaining this idea, in the slightest degree." General Harris indicated Pūrnaiya's reasoning for this "evasion" thus:—

"The Muhammadan interest is so intimately blended with every Department of the State in this country, that no plan by which it is set aside in favour of an Hindu Prince would produce the very desirable effect of restoring tranquillity, and reconciling the troops and most powerful class of the inhabitants to the change of Government."

The Marquis of Wellesley, however, was against the restoration of any one of a family which had had a hand in the establishing of a French alliance. He, therefore, desired on 20th May 1799 that enquiries should be made of "the state of the family of the ancient Rajahs of Mysore, and the character and disposition of the persons composing it." He preferred that mode of settlement which would have "united the most speedy restoration of peace and order with the greatest practicable security for the continuance of both." For this purpose, he would not only conciliate the interests of the Company, but also of those of the Nizām, the Mahrattas and of the leading chieftains in Mysore. Among other objectives aimed at by him were that the military power of Mysore should be "absolutely identified with that of the Company," Seringapatam must in effect be a British Garrison, and Malabar and Coimbatore, with the heads of the passes on the table-land, should be in the Company's hands. By 4th June 1799, Wellesley had made up his mind in favour of a settlement which included the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. He wrote to the Commissioners of Mysore on that date:—

"The restoration of a representative of the ancient family

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of the Rajahs of Mysore, accompanied by a partition of territory between the allies in which the interests of the Mahrattas should be conciliated, appeared to me, under all the circumstances of the case, to be the most admirable basis on which any new settlement of the country can be rested. I have resolved to frame, without delay, a plan founded on these principles; and I hope, in the course of to-morrow to forward to you the articles of a Treaty with proper instructions annexed, for the purpose of carrying the above mentioned plan into effect."

In order to facilitate the intended arrangement, he asked the Commissioners to induce Kummer-ud-dīn to leave for Gurramkonda, which he obtained for him, with the aid of Meer Allum and the Nizām; to conciliate Tipū's Sirdars on the basis of their being employed and provided by the Allies and the Maharaja of Mysore collectively; the Killedars to be paid off their arrears with liberal gratuities for the purpose of conciliation; the devising of necessary measures for removing Tipū's family to Vellore, the details of which "painful but indispensable measure" he left to Col. Arthur Wellesley.

Marquess Wellesley had by this time—4th June 1799—resolved upon making over a portion of the conquered territory to a descendant of the ancient royal house of Mysore, and to divide the remainder between the Company, the Nizām, and the Peishwa. For this purpose, he appointed a Commission of five officers—General Harris, the Hon. Colonel Arthur Wellesley, the Hon. Henry Wellesley, Lieut. Col. Kirkpatrick, and Lieut.-Cl. Barry Close, with Captains Malcolm and Munro as Secretaries and Edward Golding as Assistant Secretary—to conduct the details of the arrangement and to conclude the treaty with the Nizām. They were styled Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, were bound to secrecy and vested with full powers to negotiate and conclude, in the Governor-General's name, "all such

Disposal of  
conquered  
territories:  
Restoration  
of Mysore  
Dynasty  
resolved  
on by  
Marquess  
Wellesley.



treaties, and to make and issue all such temporary and provisional regulations, for the ordering and management of the civil and military Government and of the revenues of the said (conquered) territories as may be necessary for the immediate administration and settlement thereof." The result was the Partition Treaty of Mysore concluded on the 22nd June 1799, and ratified by the Nizām on the 13th July of the same year. The basis of this Treaty was explained by Marquess Wellesley himself in a letter dated 5th June 1799 which is worth noting. Kirkpatrick had proposed a complete cession of all the conquered territories to the Royal House of Mysore, to which they belonged, and suggested the cession from him again of certain of them to the allies who had helped in his Restoration. Wellesley, however, thought it more advantageous to put the arrangement on a different footing. "I think," he wrote back to Kirkpatrick, "the whole transaction would be more conveniently thrown into a different form, from that which you have given to it. I do not see any necessity for ceding the whole country in the first instance to the Rajah of Mysore, and accepting again as a cession under his authority, such districts as must be retained by the allies. I think it will be more convenient and less liable to future embarrassment, to rest the whole settlement upon the basis of our right of conquest, and thus render our cession the source of the Rajah's Dominion. (This was the view of Col. Arthur Wellesley, afterwards Duke of Wellington, who wrote from Seringapatam, on 8th May 1799, to the Marquess Wellesley, stating that his view was "to take it all as a conquest," subject to certain "restrictions," which he mentioned in that letter. How far the Marquess was influenced by his distinguished brother's views, it is difficult to determine). For this purpose, the proceeding should commence with a Treaty between the Nizām and the Company, with power to the

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Peishwa to accede under certain conditions. The next step should be a Treaty with the Rajah, containing all that relates to his connection with the Company and to his interior Government. The Rajah after his accession made a party to the general guarantee contained in my draft accompanying this letter (This was substantially the Partition Treaty of Mysore as finally concluded)." Marquess Wellesley also objected to Kirkpatrick's plan of holding a number of fortresses in absolute sovereignty in the Mysore territories. He limited that demand to the fortress of Seringapatam which, he said, he would not "consent to part with." His view was that the possession of Seringapatam and the Subsidiary Treaty with His Highness the Rajah would give the Company "a sufficient command over them." It is worthy of remark that the Marquess Wellesley was moved not only by high considerations of policy in the settlement he determined upon but also by the essential justice of the claims of the Mysore Royal House. He thus explained his exact motives in this connection to the Rt. Hon. Henry Dundas, in a letter dated 7th June 1799:—

"To have divided the whole territory equally between the Company and the Nizam, while it would have afforded strong grounds for jealousy to the Mahrattas, would have aggrandised the Nizam's power beyond the bounds of discretion and would have left in our hands a Territory so extensive, as it might have been difficult to manage, especially in the present state of the Company's service at the Presidency. To have divided the Territory into three equal portions allowing the Mahrattas who had taken no part in the expense or hazard of the war, an equal share in the advantages of the peace, would neither have been just towards the Nizam, politic in the way of example to our other allies, nor prudent in respect of aggrandisement of the Maharatta Empire. To have given the Mahrattas no larger a Territory than is now proposed, while the Company and the Nizam divided the whole of the remainder to the

Motives  
underlying  
his policy  
of Restora-  
tion.

exclusion of any central power would have been liable nearly to the same objection as that stated against a total exclusion of the Mahrattas from all participation. The establishment, therefore, of a central and separate power in the ancient territories of Mysore appeared to be the best expedient for reconciling the interests of all parties."

Moral justification of the Restoration.

After dismissing the claims of Tipū's sons to be the "Central power" suggested by him, on the ground of the hereditary connection of their family with the French and the probable dangers of a renewed combination on their part against British interests in India, Marquess Wellesley wrote :—

"In the exercise of this right (of conquest), if I were to look to moral considerations alone, I should certainly on every principle of justice and humanity, as well as of attention to the welfare of the people have been led to restore the heir of the ancient Rajah of Mysore to that rank and dignity which were wrested from his ancestors by the usurpation of Hyder Ali.

"The long and cruel imprisonment which several branches of his family have suffered, the persecution and murder of many of their adherents, both by Hyder and Tippoo, and the state of degradation and misery in which it has been the policy of both these usurpers to retain the surviving descendants of their lawful sovereign would have entitled the representative of the ancient family of Mysore to every degree of practicable consideration; but it is also evident that every motive must concur to attach the heir of the Mysore family, if placed on the throne, to our interests, through which alone he can hope to maintain himself against the family of Tippoo."

Nor did Marquess Wellesley anticipate any the least opposition to the restoration of the ancient Royal House of Mysore, for the jealous policy of Tipū and the brilliant and rapid success of war had dissipated such fears. Accordingly on the 8th June 1799, he wrote to the Commissioners to proceed with the conclusion of both

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the Tripartite and the Subsidiary Treaties on the lines sketched out by him and he added :—

“ I authorise you to place the Rajah formally upon the Musnad, and to appoint, in the Rajah's name, Purniah to be his Dewan.”

He also directed that they should fix up the “ fortress of Mysore ” as “ the most acceptable seat of the Rajah's residence.”

Finally, he wound up by asking them, in the event of their placing the Rajah upon the Musnad, to appoint in his name, Lieut. Col. Close to the office of the Resident in Mysore. The intentions of Marquess Wellesley were made known to the Royal House and the Commissioners waited on His Highness the Rajah to pay their “ personal respects ” to him and to his family on 26th June. Mahārāni Lakshmi Ammanni, called the Rāna in the correspondence of the period, received them with becoming grace and expressed to them, through one of her attendants, “ the lively sense ” which she entertained of the Marquess' clemency and added that the “ generosity of the Company in having restored the ancient rights of her House in the person of her grandson, had opened to her a prospect of passing the remnant of her days in peace.” The Commissioners also saw the youthful Rajah, of whom they wrote to the Marquess Wellesley that he was of “ a delicate habit ; his complexion rather fair than otherwise and his countenance is very expressive.” The Treaty and elevation of the Rajah were also proclaimed the same day. The captive sons of Tipū were provided with liberal allowances and they were, on 18th June 1799, removed under military escort with their families, from Seringapatam to the fort at Vellore, which had been, under the orders of the Marquess Wellesley, prepared for their reception. The principal officers of Tipū were pensioned. Mir Kamar-ud-din received two Jaghirs, one from the Company and another from the

Nizām and he was permitted to reside at Gurramkonda. The principal officers were pensioned according to their ranks. It was resolved upon to appoint Pūrnaiya, to the post of Dewan in view of the knowledge he possessed of the finance and resources of the country, in preference to Tirumala Rao, the Agent of Mahārāni Lakshmi-Ammanni already referred to. It would appear from certain despatches of Marquess Wellesley that Tirumala Rao was known to the latter from a time prior to the fall of Seringapatam. (See *Wellesley Despatches*, I, 442-448, letter dated 22nd February 1799). There can be no question that he had been, as Henry Wellesley remarked, "the channel of communication in all the most secret transactions of that family (Mysore Royal family) with the British Government." (Letter of Henry Wellesley to Col. Arthur Wellesley, dated 7th August 1801). Soon after the conquest of Seringapatam, he was allowed by the Madras Government to proceed to Seringapatam but "he arrived in the British camp two days after the Commissioners had communicated to the different members of the Mysore family the intensions of the British Government in their favour." The declared object of his journey was "to obtain the situation of confidence in the new Government which the Commissioners had allotted to Pūrniah. He had several interviews with the Commissioners, in all of which he deprecated the idea of Pūrniah being appointed Dewan to the new Government," describing him in rather vivid colours and as unwelcome to Mahārāni Lakshmi Ammanni. (*Ibid*). The Commissioners had, however, already made their choice and Tirumala Rao, for one thing, was too late in urging his claims on them. Apart from that fact, Henry Wellesley has definitely left on record that "it had always been determined to place him (Pūrnaiya) at the head of affairs—a circumstance of which he was well aware," (*ibid*) and so it did not require any special effort on his

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part to win the good-will of the Commissioners so far as his nomination was concerned. Col. Arthur Wellesley has hinted in some of his letters his dislike of people connected with Madras. (See letters dated 8th July 1801 and 10th October 1801). He has expressly stated that the introduction of Tirumala Rao would have meant the introduction of "*dubashery* corruption (management through *dubashes* or agents) into this (Mysore) country, with a scene of desperate confusion." And he described one of the Madras officials interested in such enterprize as "a most notorious jobber" and as one who would not fail to endeavour, if an opportunity offered itself, to disturb the arrangements arrived at, "if any fellow will give him half a crown for doing so." (Letter dated 10th October 1801). While the official referred to might have fully merited the stinging rebuke applied to him by Col. Wellesley, there is scarcely any doubt whatever, that apart from the single error of describing his competitor in adverse terms, Tirumala Rao was anything other than an honorable, upright and self-sacrificing person, who had, against tremendous odds, done much to advance the interests of the Mysore Royal House. It is worthy of remark that his services were recognized by the British Government after the Restoration. Marquess Wellesley directed that he should be placed, so far as allowances were concerned, on a footing of equality "with the officers of the late (Tipū's) Government, distinguished by the title of *Mīr Meeran* (*Mīr Amīr or Lord of Lords*) and that his allowance be secured by the Company." In addition to the recognition and the monthly stipend which he was to receive from the Company, the Court of Directors directed the presentation of 4,000 Pagodas to him as a compensation for all his demands on the Company and as a recompense for his past exertions and services. (Letter dated 11th November 1801, from Madras Government to Tirumala Rao. See *Records*



of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence, Political Department, letter No. 59). He retired to Madras and there died in 1815.

(iii) PERIOD OF RESTORATION, 1799—1831.

Installation  
of His High-  
ness Krishna-  
rāja  
Wodeyar, III.

The Brāhmans having fixed upon the 30th June as the most auspicious day for placing His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar on the *musnad* of Mysore, the ceremony was accordingly performed at the ancient town of Mysore, where special preparations were made for the function. An open *pandal* was erected and a numerous concourse of people gathered at the place to witness the ceremony. General Harris specially rode from camp attended by his suite and an escort of European cavalry to assist in person on the occasion. The Commissioners accompanied by Mīr Alam proceeded to the spot—not far away from the Palace—preceded by His Majesty's 12th regiment of foot, and there General Harris, the senior member of the Commission, placed His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar on the *musnad*, about noon, under three volleys of musketry from the troops on the spot and a royal salute from the guns of Seringapatam. General Harris, sometime after, delivered to His Highness the seal and signet of the Rāj. "The deportment of the young prince," reported the Commissioners to the Marquess Wellesley, "during the ceremony was remarkably decorous." In justifying the restoration of the ancient Royal House of Mysore, Marquess Wellesley wrote to the Court of Directors about a month later, on 3rd August 1799, a long despatch from which the following deserves to be quoted :—

Marquess  
Wellesley's  
vindication  
of the claim  
of the Mysore  
Royal House.

"Between the British Government and this family an intercourse of friendship and kindness had subsisted; in the most desperate crisis of their adverse fortune, they had formed no connection with your enemies. Their elevation would be

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the spontaneous act of your generosity, and from your support alone could they ever hope to be maintained upon the Throne, either against the family of Tippoo Sultan, or against any other claimant. They must naturally view with an eye of jealousy, all the friends of the usurping family and consequently be adverse to the French or any State connected with that Family, in the hereditary hatred of the British Government. The heir of the Rajahs of Mysore, if placed on the throne, must feel that his continuance in that state depended on the stability of the new settlement in all its parts; his interest must, therefore, be to unite with cordiality and zeal in every effort necessary to its harmony, efficiency and vigour. The effect of such arrangement of the affairs of Mysore would not be limited to the mere distribution of hostile power which menaced our safety; in the place of that power, would be substituted one, whose interests and resources might be absolutely identified with our own, and the kingdom of Mysore, so long the source of calamity and alarm to the Carnatic, might become a new barrier of our defence and might supply fresh means of wealth and strength to the Company, their subjects and allies."

Every object above mentioned was realised, as will be shown below, in the next twenty-five-years when the Mahratta and Pindari wars were fought. Marquess Wellesley concluded thus :—

"In addition to these motives of policy, moral considerations and sentiments of generosity and humanity favoured the restoration of the ancient family of Mysore. Their high birth, the antiquity of their legitimate title and their long and unmerited sufferings, rendered them peculiar objects of compassion and respect, nor could it be doubted that their Government would be both more acceptable and more indulgent than that of the Mahomedan usurpers, to the mass of the inhabitants of the country composed almost entirely of Hindus.

Soon after the enthronement of His Highness Krisnha-Rāja-Wodeyar, Pūrnaiya was appointed by the Commissioners to be His Highness' Dewan, while Lieut.-Col. (afterwards Sir Barry) Close became, under the orders of

Appointment  
of Pūrnaiya  
as Dewan  
and Col.  
Barry Close  
as Resident.

the Governor-General, Resident at the Court of His Highness, immediately after the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam was signed. The Mysore Commission itself was then dissolved on the 3rd July 1799.

Division of  
Territories.

Under the Partition Treaty of Mysore, dated 22nd June 1799, the Province of Canara and the districts of Coimbatore and Wynaad, the annual revenue of which was estimated at Pagodas, 7,77,170 fell to the share of the Company, subject to a deduction of Pagodas 2,00,000 per annum on account of the maintenance of the families of Haidar and Tipu, leaving a balance of Pagodas 5,37,170.

The revenue of Gooty and other places assigned to the Nizam estimated at Pagodas 6,07,332 was charged with an annuity of Pagodas 70,000 payable to Kumur-ud-din, leaving a balance of Pagodas 5,37,332.

The revenues of the districts in Mysore granted to His Highness Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar were estimated at Pagodas 13,74,076 per annum. The Mahrattas not having taken any active part in the campaign, the share offered to the Peishwa was comparatively small, viz., the districts of Harpanahalli (included in the present Bellary district), Soonda, Harihar, etc., yielding an annual revenue of Pagodas 2,63,957.

Under the Subsidiary Treaty, concluded on 8th July 1799, with His Highness Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar, the Company bound themselves to maintain a force for the protection of the dominions of His Highness, in consideration of an annual subsidy of seven lakhs of Star Pagodas.

Marquess  
Wellesley's re-  
affirmation of  
the principles  
underlying  
his Policy of  
Restoration.

In his Despatch of 3rd August 1799, which has been above referred to, the Marquess Wellesley estimated the clear increase to the revenues of the Company at £459,056 per annum as the result of his settlement.

He wound up this Despatch in words which reiterate the sound moral and political principles on which he based his arrangements :—

“I entertain a confident expectation, that the recent settlement of the Dominions of Tippoo Sultan will prove not less durable than I trust, will be found, equitable in its fundamental principles, beneficial in its general operation, and conformable, in every point of view, to the liberal character of the English East India Company, and to the just and moderate policy prescribed by Parliament, for the Government of the British Empire in the East.”

This enunciation of the principles which guided the Marquess Wellesley not only indicate the far-seeing statesmanship that he displayed in working them out but also the deep sense of justice that actuated his policy and dominated every act of his in this connection. In giving effect to them, he over-ruled, as only he could do, the views of many others, including among them of Col. (after Sir Thomas) Munro which, read to-day, show how even gifted men could go wrong and help to buttress their preconceived views by a reference to the history of the country of which they had little or no real knowledge.

His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III thus commenced his reign under the most inspiring auspices with Pūrnaiya as Dewan and Col. Close as Resident at his Court. His Highness' actual reign extended up to 19th October 1831, though he lived up to the 27th June 1868, on which date he died universally lamented by his subjects. During the first period of 12 years from 1799 to 1811, Pūrnaiya was both Regent and Dewan. From 1811 to 1831 His Highness ruled with the aid of Dewans referred to below. From 1831 to 1867, the British Commission administered the State. In 1867, fully a year before His Highness' death, his adoption of His

Krishna-Rāja  
Wodeyar,  
30th June  
1799—27th  
June 1868.

Highness Srī-Chāmarājendra-Wodeyar was recognized by His Majesty's Government, and on the death of His Highness Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar III on 27th March 1868, he was acknowledged by the Government of India as his successor and as Mahārāja of the Mysore territories.

During the first twelve years of His Highness' reign, Pūrnaiya, as Regent and Dewan, was in charge of the administration of the State. He was guided by the friendly counsel of successive British Residents, of whom the first was, as above stated, Col. Close. Till about the beginning of 1805, he had also the helpful advice of Col. Arthur Wellesley, who commanded the division, with head-quarters at Seringapatam.

Memorandum  
of Instruc-  
tions to Col.  
Close.

Marquess Wellesley appears to have realized the conditions under which the administration could be rendered successful. Immediately after appointing Col. Close to the office of Resident, he caused to be forwarded to him a memorandum of instructions for the regulation of his conduct in that position. This memorandum laid down the fundamental principles on which he was to act and to guide the administration of the new ruler and his Dewan. He desired him to know that the first object of his duty was the effectual protection of His Highness' Territories. The strength of the Subsidiary Force not being fixed, he was to note that the military strength of the two Governments should be considered as common and as mutually applicable at all times (as far as may be judged proper and practicable) to the service of each other. To attain this unity of force, he empowered the Government of Fort St. George to send, according to exigencies, reinforcements from the Karnātic into Mysore or *vice versa*. Agreeably to this principle, Col. Close was allowed to augment the force in Mysore as might be required from time to time by writing to the Government



of Fort St. George. Though he was thus placed under the immediate authority of the Government of Fort St. George, Marquess Wellesley reserved to himself the right nevertheless occasionally to send him direct orders, transmitting copies of the same to the Government of Fort St. George for their information. In such cases, he was to obey all such orders without further reference to that Government beyond intimating the receipt of such orders. For securing the tranquillity of His Highness' Territories, he was to distribute the forces in Mysore as circumstances might require. He was to have respectable British garrisons in Seringapatam, Chitaldrug and if necessary at Bednore, Sira and Nagar while the rest of the troops were to be kept together in some general camp or cantonment. Subject to this provision, the mode of garrisoning was left to be carried out by him in consultation with the Commanding Officer, but without any further reference to the Government of Fort St. George, except that in regard to demolition or repair of any forts, he was to act with their previous approval. The second object he was to bear in mind was the realization of the Subsidy stipulated in the second article of the Treaty of Seringapatam and the payment of the stipends provided for in its 11th article. Of the latter, the Company was, for the time being, to bear an equal share, as His Highness' Government could not bear the full burden in the first year. As regards the Subsidy, Marquess Wellesley was equally sympathetic in view of the finances of His Highness' Government. He was content to limit the demand in this respect to 7 lakhs of Kantirāi instead of 7 lakhs of Star Pagodas, and directed the collection of a similar or a proportionately less amount for the second year also if he was satisfied such remission was fully requisite in the interests of the State's finances. The third point to be attended to was the general administration, *i.e.*, the conduct and management of His



Highness' Dewan. Col. Close was directed to constantly superintend with the utmost diligence and vigilance the Dewan's administration "with a view not only to the punctual realization of the Subsidy and the improvement of the resources of the country but also the prevention of any necessity on the part of the Company to assume charge of the country, an extremity to which it is on many accounts to be wished they may be never reduced." The branches of the Government which was to claim the most immediate and strict attention were those relating to the revenues and commerce of the country. Closely and necessarily connected with these was, in his opinion, such an administration of justice as shall be calculated to encourage industry and thereby promote population. To provide for a suitable system of revenue administration, he was to study the local conditions and to transmit to the Government of Fort St. George full information about the existing system of revenue, of the products of the country and of the genius and usages of its inhabitants, with his own suggestions for improvements or alterations. In the meantime, he was to restrain the officers of His Highness' Government from abuse of authority and to correct any erroneous or corrupt practices endangering the resources of the country and the happiness of the people. In regard to Pālegars, he gave the specific instruction that they were "on no account to be put in possession of the countries they lay claim to, whatever other concession in the form of pensions or otherwise may be made to them." Information was also to be furnished about the state of the manufactures of the country, its exports and imports, with the measures required to improve both its external and internal trade. The expediency of abolishing the *rahadāri* duties throughout the State, was to be urgently considered, especially those which were felt to be a burden on the necessities of life or which, at the time,

obstructed the transmission of articles which entered into the Company's investment. He was further to report on the system of judicial administration prevailing and the state of the Police, with his own suggestions, for improving them. He was to insist on due economy in expenditure and to prevent alienation of lands for religious purposes. Muhammadan religious endowments were to be protected, the personal respect due to His Highness and his relations from the Dewan was to be secured, arrangements were to be made for His Highness' household establishment, detailed statements of the probable annual expenditure of His Highness' Government according to the most economical arrangements were to be drawn in consultation with the Dewan, the 7th Article of the Treaty of Seringapatam in regard to vagrant Europeans was to be strictly observed, a good understanding with the Rāj of Coorg was to be cultivated, correspondence with Poona and Haiderabad was to be maintained, and a survey of the State was to be undertaken, Captain (later Colonel) Mackenzie (of Mss. fame) being deputed for the purpose.

Such, in brief, were the instructions issued by Marquess Wellesley to Col. Close when he entered on his duties. They were not only comprehensive but also circumspect to a degree. The administration of Pūrnaiya was generally based on the principles enunciated by Wellesley in the above instructions to Close and the success it attained was as much due to Wellesley as to Pūrnaiya who translated them into action in a manner which won appreciation from every quarter. Only one other point mentioned in the Wellesley Memorandum of Instructions deserves to be noted in this connection. Acting on the recommendations of the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, he authorized Pūrnaiya as Dewan to His Highness the Mahārāja to receive a commission of one

Their  
comprehen-  
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half per cent upon the net revenue of His Highness' Territories, besides a fixed allowance of 500 Kantirāi Pagodas per month.

No sooner the restored Government of His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III began to function than it was troubled by insurrection and wars. Among these were the following in chronological order:—

- 1799. Dhoondia Waugh's Insurrection.
- 1800-1802. Insurrection in Bullum (Manjarābād) created by the Rāja of Bullum (called also the Aigur Chief).
- 1802. Insurrection in Wynaad.
- 1803. The Mahratta War.
- 1804. Suppression of free-booters at Munkassir in which the Mysore Horse took part.
- 1805. Rebellion of the Chittoor Poligars, which was suppressed with the aid of the Mysore Horse.
- 1806. Mutiny at Vellore and the attempt to restore Muhammadan sovereignty in the South.
- 1809. Mutiny of European officers, which spread to Mysore and was put down by the use of the Mysore Horse.

To contend against these, there was the Subsidiary Force under Col. Arthur Wellesley and the cavalry and the infantry raised by Pūrnaiya for maintaining internal tranquillity. These insurrections and wars are briefly referred to below, in so far as they relate to Mysore or to the services rendered on the field by the Mysore troops.

Operations  
against  
Dhoondiah,  
1799-1800.

The territory acquired by the conquest of the kingdom of Mysore was taken possession of without opposition with the exception of the districts of Nagar and Balam (also written Bullum) in Mysore, Wynaad and Cotiote in Malabār, the fort of Jamalabad in South Kanara, and the fort at Gooty, situated in what were afterwards known as the Ceded Districts.

During the confusion attending the storm of Seringapatam, Dhoondiah Waugh, a notorious free-booter who had been imprisoned by Tipū, managed to escape, and

having collected a body of horse, about 5,000 strong, and proclaimed himself "King of the two Worlds," he took possession of Shimoga and other forts in Nagar, and having thus provided himself with artillery, ammunition, and money, he increased his force, and asserted his right to the sovereignty of the province. Dhoondiah was a Mahratta by descent, and not a Pathān as supposed by some. He was a native of Channagiri. From 1780 he served as a horseman in Haidar's army, but during the invasion of Lord Cornwallis decamped with a few followers and as much booty as they could get hold of to Dhārwar, where he lived by plundering. In 1794 he was induced to come to Seringapatam with the prospect of being received into Tipū's service with all his followers, consisting of 200 horse. But refusing to embrace Islam, he was forcibly converted and thrust into prison. The story of his subsequent career may be told in the words of Mīr Hussain Ali Khān Kirmāni:—

"Nevertheless, the favour of the Sultān towards that worthy man still continued to increase, as for instance he was allowed ten *fanams* Sultāni a day, which sum amounts to three rupees, and a teacher was appointed to instruct him, (in the Muhammadan customs and religion) but, although after a time, a *kutcheri* or brigade was named after him, and orders were issued for his release, it was to no purpose, for the Dewan like a scorpion still continued to strike at him with his venomous sting, making a representation to the Sultān to the following effect:—"King of the World, find another man equally insolent, enterprising and brave, as he (Dhondajee) and then let him go. For it is known to all that when he was weak and of no account, he then beat the troops of Hyderabad, Poona, and the servants of the Sultān, and, therefore, after this to make him an officer of high rank in your army and independent, is far from good policy, for with his power and rank it is possible he might raise such a disturbance that the hand of redress might not be able to quell, or remedy." The opinion of this fool was, therefore, accepted by the Sultān and that faithful servant and well-wisher was

left in prison. At first he was named Shaik Ahmud, but latterly at his own desire he was entitled Mullik Juhan Khan."

At the capture of Seringapatam, he was found chained to the wall like a wild beast, and the British soldiers out of pity at once released him. (Colonel Beatson says that Doondiah was released by the inconsiderate humanity of the British Troops.) He then escaped to the Maharatta country, and collecting a large force committed many depredations in the north-west.

Many designs were attributed to Dhoondiah. One was to carry off, through the agency of a special gang employed for the purpose, Colonel Arthur Wellesley, who was then commanding at Seringapatam, while he was out hunting. Though Wellesley scoffed at the idea, and stigmatized it as a "bazaar" report, he kept a close watch on those alleged to be engaged in its carrying out. This gang was supposed to have "some designs upon Mysore" as well. But "as nothing could be more unpleasant than any accident to the family at Mysore," Colonel Wellesley informed the Officer in Command at Mysore of the information. It was also given out at the time that another gang of these men was working to murder Purnaiya, the Dewan. Though Colonel Wellesley took all this information with a good deal of suspicion, he made adequate arrangements to deal with the conspirators. Apart from these alarms and rumours, Wellesley was distinctly of the opinion that Dhoondiah's success would mean the disturbance of the peace either of the Mysore territory or of the Company's territories. He was accordingly for prompt and effective action against him.

Occupation of  
Chitaldrug.

Two field detachments were immediately equipped against him. One, under Colonel Pater, composed of the 4th cavalry, the 1st battalion 1st, and the 1st battalion



8th N. I., advanced to the fort at Hassan in order to check any possible incursion from Nagar, and to act according to circumstances. The other, under Lieutenant-Colonel James Dalrymple, who had succeeded to the command of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force after the capture of Seringapatam, was composed of the 1st cavalry, the 2nd battalion 7th, the 2nd battalion 11th, and a party of Bengal Artillery. This detachment obtained possession of the hill forts at Chitaldrug on the 6th July 1799 without opposition. Colonel Dalrymple gave a minute description of the place in his report to the Adjutant-General, from which the following is an extract:—

“The lower fort is very extensive, and contains within it several other smaller forts, and a great number of inhabitants. Some parts of the old Hindoo fortifications are still remaining in the upper and lower forts, but by far the greatest part of the works are all done in the modern style of solid masonry, and built under the inspection of our unfortunate prisoners during their confinement at this place.”

A few days after the occupation of Chitaldrug, Colonel Dalrymple was joined by the 2nd cavalry, and both battalions of the 10th regiment of Bengal Sepoys. On the 14th, he marched with the two regiments of cavalry and 400 grenadier sepoy in pursuit of a body of Dhoondiah's men who had been plundering the country. He came up with them on the 15th, about twenty miles from Chitaldrug, and having halted his infantry and guns, he attacked with the cavalry, and destroyed nearly the whole party, the number of which was estimated at about 250 horse and 400 foot.

This service was accomplished after a march of 40 miles in 24 hours. The marauders having been guilty of many atrocities, more especially after their capture of the small fort at Goondair, the Commander-in-Chief directed that the 40 prisoners taken by Colonel Dalrymple, should be



hanged at that place, with the exception of one man who was to be set at liberty after having witnessed the execution of his comrades.

On the 17th, Colonel Dalrymple again surprised a small body of horse and foot near the fort of Channagiri in Nagar and dispersed it with his cavalry, killing 40 men and taking 40 prisoners. He then attacked the fort and carried it by a *coup de main*. On the 29th, he captured about 6,000 head of cattle from Dhoondiah's brinjarries, together with a quantity of grain. Colonel Dalrymple received the thanks of the Commander-in-Chief for these services, and was authorised to grant the captured cattle and grain to his detachment.

Capture of  
Shimoga and  
Honnali, end  
of July 1799.

About the end of July, Colonel James Stevenson relieved Colonel Pater, and advanced towards the fort of Shimoga in order to co-operate with Colonel Dalrymple. By the 7th August both detachments had crossed to the western banks of the rivers upon which the forts of Shimoga and Honnali are situated, and on the morning of the 8th, these places were attacked and taken by storm, the former by the detachment under Stevenson, the latter by that under Dalrymple. General Harris, in his report to the Commander-in-Chief in India, remarked that "the gallant behaviour of the native troops, who alone were employed, was highly honourable to them, and reflected great credit on Colonels Stevenson and Dalrymple, and the officers, who, under their orders, conducted the attacks." Colonel Stevenson was thanked in General Orders of the 10th August, as were also Captain Macfarlane, 1st battalion 8th regiment, Captain Strachan Staff Officer, and Lieutenant Whitney McCally, 1st battalion 1st regiment.

Storm of  
Hoolal.

The head-quarters of the Army left the neighbourhood of Seringapatam on the 10th July, reached Chitaldrug on the 24th, and early in August advanced to Harihar

on the east bank of the Tungabhadra, a fort which had surrendered to Captain Willet of the 1st battalion 10th Bengal Sepoys, on the 30th July. On the 14th August, a detachment, under Lieutenant-Colonel Wallace, H. M.'s 74th regiment, was sent against the fort of Hoolal, about 20 miles direct north of Harihar. The place was carried by storm on the 16th, and most of the garrison were killed, either during the assault, or in their attempt to escape. Colonel Wallace and the detachment were thanked in orders.

Early on the morning of the 17th August, Dhoondiah's collected force, amounting to 1,200 horse, and 300 infantry, posted under the walls of the fort at Shikarpur in Nagar, was attacked and defeated by Colonel Dalrymple, aided by a part of Colonel Stevenson's detachment. The action was thus described by General Harris:—

Defeat of  
Dhoondiah at  
Shikarpur,  
17th August  
1799.

“The infantry and artillery of Dhoondiah were formed behind a small river, which, swelled by the rains, had become almost unfordable from the depth and rapidity of its current. His horse, separated by this stream from the infantry, formed, and steadily waited the attack of the regiments of native cavalry which led Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple's detachment. These instantly charged, and in a short, but arduous conflict, drove the enemy into the river, who left 600 men and horses killed or drowned. Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple's infantry at the same time assaulted and took the fort by storm, assisted by part of Colonel Stevenson's detachment, whose march had been retarded by the badness of the roads. The Killadars of the fort, when taken, were hanged on its walls in sight of the enemy's troops, who fled in the utmost disorder, while the depth of the river prevented an immediate pursuit.”

The effect of this blow was decisive. Colonel Stevenson, who had assumed command of the united detachments, pursued Dhoondiah as far as the frontier of the Mahratta country, in which he took refuge on the 20th August. That very night his camp was attacked by a

chief named Doondah Punt Gokla, who dispersed his remaining followers and captured his elephants, camels, bullocks, and guns.

The province of Bednur was then occupied without further opposition.

Colonel Dalrymple, who was responsible for the expulsion of Dhoondiah from Mysore territory, was a distinguished and popular officer. He rendered many important services to the State, amongst which may be mentioned the storm and capture of the fortress of Raichūr in 1795. He was selected to lead the 8 flank companies of M. N. I. employed at the storm of Seringapatam. General Wellesley wrote of him as follows in a letter to the Resident at Hyderabad, dated 17th December 1799 :—

“ I join in the general regret for the loss of Lieutenant-Colonel Dalrymple. I fear that it will be difficult to replace him ; indeed, on public as well as private grounds, his death is looked upon by all as a public misfortune.”

Final operations against Dhoondiah, 1800.

Dhoondiah, after his defeat by Gokla in August 1799, soon collected his scattered followers, and having been joined by nearly the whole of Tipū's cavalry, and a number of disaffected men from the Hyderabad country and from Cuddapah, he obtained possession of several places in the Southern Mahratta country, and threatened to enter Mysore. The Pēshwa sent a force consisting of 5,000 horse and a large body of infantry to oppose his further progress in Savanūr, but this force was beaten, and a large number of horses captured. Such being the state of matters, orders were sent to Colonel Arthur Wellesley on the 2nd May 1800, directing him to assemble a field force as speedily as possible, and giving him authority to pursue Dhoondiah into the Mahratta country or elsewhere. In conformity with this order, a body of troops was assembled at Chitaldrug during the

early part of June, and by the 23rd of that month, they had crossed the river Tungabhadra at Harihar, and encamped in the Mahratta country. A detachment of the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force under Lieutenant-Colonel Maclean, 2nd battalion 9th regiment, was sent to co-operate in the Raichūr Doab, and this was reinforced soon afterwards by another detachment from the same force, composed of a regiment of cavalry and 8 companies of infantry under Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser, who assumed command of the whole.

Colonel Wellesley marched for Rāni-Bennur, about 14 miles N-W of Harihar, on the 27th. The advanced guard having been fired at from the fort, it was immediately attacked by the picquets under Colonel Moneyppenny, consisting of 50 Europeans and 150 Indians, supported by the 1st battalion 1st regiment, and carried by escalade without the loss of a man. The cavalry having surrounded the fort so as to cut off retreat, Dhoodiah's garrison, amounting to about 500 men, were nearly all killed. The following order was issued to the troops:—

Capture of  
Rāni-Bennur.

“ RĀNI BENNUR, FRIDAY,

“ 27th June 1880.

“ Colonel Wellesley received much pleasure from observing the vivacity with which the attack of the fort of Rāni Bennur was conducted this morning under the orders of Lieutenant-Colonel Moneyppenny. To this is to be attributed the immediate success of the attack without any loss on our side, although it appears that the fort contained a large garrison.”

Dhoonda Punt Gōkla, the Mahratta leader, with 10,000 horse, 5,000 foot and 8 guns, who was at this time in the vicinity of Kittur for the purpose of co-operating with the British, was suddenly attacked by Dhoondiah

Dhoondiah  
attacks  
Gōkla's  
forces;  
Gōkla's  
death.

the 30th June, and defeated with the loss of his guns. He himself was killed. It was said that Dhoondiah dyed his moustaches in the heart's blood of Gōkla, in fulfilment of a vow of revenge made after his defeat by that chief in August 1799.

Capture of  
Kundgul,  
July 1800.

Colonel Wellesley crossed the Wardah near Deoghur on the 8th and 9th July, and after having constructed a redoubt upon the river, in which he left a small detachment, he marched to Savanūr on the 12th. Leaving his heavy baggage and stores in that place, he proceeded against the fort of Kundgul, in which Dhoondiah had left a garrison of 600 men, and carried it by assault on the evening of the 14th with trifling loss.

The following is an extract from his report to the Adjutant-General, dated 18th July :—

“The troops attacked Koondgul after a march of above 22 miles, and that they had been under arms above 12 hours. The cavalry surrounded the place ; the gateway was attacked by the 1st of the 12th, and an endeavour was made to blow it open, while the grenadiers of the 73rd regiment under Captain Todd, supported by those of the 1st of the 8th, escalated the curtain on the opposite side with a spirit which overcame every obstacle.”

Relief of  
Sirhatti.

On the 16th, Colonel Wellesley relieved the fort at Sirhatti, which was besieged by one of Dhoondiah's adherents, and he then returned to Savanūr for the baggage and stores.

Pursuit of  
Dhoondiah.

Dhoondiah, who had fled from Kundgul on the approach of the detachment, being reported to be in the forest in the neighbourhood of the fort of Dummul, Colonel Wellesley moved in that direction from Savanūr on the 22nd, having been joined a day or two previously by a body of Mahratta horse recently under Gōkla. He came



before the fort on the morning of the 26th, and the garrison, consisting of about 1,000 men, having refused to surrender, the place was immediately attacked and carried by escalade.

The following is an extract from Colonel Wellesley's report to the Adjutant-General:—

“ CAMP AT DUMMUL,  
“ 26th July 1800.

“ The fort was surrounded by the cavalry under Colonel Stevenson, and by the Mahrattas under Goklab, the leader who had succeeded his namesake. It was attacked in three places : at the gateway by Major Desse with the picquets, supported by two companies of the 2nd; on the face by Lieutenant-Colonel Capper with the grenadiers and light infantry of the 73rd, and the battalion 4th; and on the other face by Captain Macpherson with the grenadiers and light infantry of the 77th, and the remainder of the 2nd of the 2nd Bombay regiment. It was impossible to force the gateway, and the party on that attack entered the fort by escalade; and the other two attacks likewise succeeded nearly at the same time.”

“ The fort is strong and well built, the wall about 30 feet high, with a dry ditch, in some places of considerable depth. I cannot say too much in favour of the troops, who, by this exploit, have added to the reputation which they have already gained in this country.”

The fort at Gadag was evacuated after the arrival of the accounts of the fall of Dummul, and was occupied by the British on the 27th. Dhoondiah, having thus lost all his forts in Savanūr and in the Dhārwar country, moved northwards with the intention of crossing the river Malaprabha at Manoli, and encamped near Sundatti, about six miles south of that place. While there he heard of Colonel Wellesley's approach, and broke up his army into three divisions. One division and the baggage marched towards Manoli and encamped in front of it, but

Gadag  
occupied.

Dhoondiah  
pursued.



without crossing the river. In this hazardous position, it was surprised on the afternoon of the 30th and destroyed. The following is an extract from Colonel Wellesley's report :—

"I arrived here with the cavalry at about 3 o'clock in the afternoon and found the camp standing, and that we had surprised the enemy. I instantly attacked his camp with the cavalry only. Lieutenant-Colonel Torin attacked their left with the 1st and 4th regiments, and Colonel Stevenson and Colonel Pater their front and right with the 25th Dragoons and 2nd regiment of cavalry."

"The camp was strong, with its rear to the Malpurba, covered by the fort of Manowly on the other side of it, and a deep nullah along its front and left. The 2nd regiment of cavalry, under these circumstances, was the only corps which got into it; but every person there was either killed or driven into the river. All the baggage, 2 elephants, many camels, horses, bullocks, etc., fell into our hands. (In a letter to Major Munroe, dated 1st August, Colonel Wellesley gave the number at about 5,000. A number of arms and accoutrements belonging to the 25th Dragoons and the Scotch Brigade, which had been stolen at Vellore, were found in the same). Numbers of people were drowned or shot in attempting to cross the river, and many prisoners, women and children, etc., were taken."

Pursuit  
continued :  
position of  
the Parties.

This exploit was performed after a march of 26 miles.

On the 2nd, August, the detachment from Hyderabad, augmented by the 4th cavalry, was placed under the command of Colonel Stevenson with instructions to follow Dhoondiah up the river Malaprabha; Colonel Wellesley moving in the same direction, but at the distance of about 15 miles from the river. A few days later, it was ascertained that Dhoondiah having crossed the Malaprabha near its sources had again turned eastward, and reached a place named Cowdelghi, about 24 miles east of the fort of Gokak on the Gutprabha. In consequence of this

intelligence, the following disposition of the troops was ordered :—

Colonel Capper, with his brigade strengthened by the 1st battalion 4th Bombay regiment recently arrived in camp, and a body of Mahrattas, was directed to move down the southern bank of the Malaprabha towards Jellahal, while Colonel Wellesley was to march along the northern bank by Manoli. Colonel Stevenson was to move down the river Gutprabha from Hanur by Chowdelghi towards Bagalkôte. The Mahrattas were to move between Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson.

On the 22nd August, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper arrived at the fort of Hooley, the garrison of which had carried off the baggage of the Dragoons as it was passing on the march to Sundatti on the 1st. Colonel Capper attacked the place at once and carried it by escalade, after which he marched to Syringhi, a fort about 8 miles east of Hooley. The place was strong, the scaling ladders too short, and the resistance determined, but it was taken after a sharp struggle.

From Syringhi, Colonel Capper proceeded towards Būdhāl, a short distance above the junction of the Malaprabha with the Krishna, and he had got within 20 miles of Dhoondiah when the Malaprabha fell suddenly. Dhoondiah, taking advantage of this, crossed near Būdhāl on the night of the 24th, and marched towards the Raichūr Doab. His escape was attributed to the misconduct of the Mahratta troops with Colonel Capper, who refused to proceed in advance and guard the ford as had been directed by Colonel Wellesley.

On the 5th September, Dhoondiah and his pursuers occupied the undermentioned positions :—

Dhoondiah was at Moosky, nearly in the centre of the Doab ; Colonel Stevenson was at Hunagunda, close to the north-western frontier ; Colonel Wellesley near Hanumansagar, at the south-western frontier ; and the Mahratta and Nizām's horse in the centre ; the intention being to drive Dhoondiah into the

narrow fork between the Krishna and Tungabhadra, by which the Doab is bounded on the east.

Dhoondiah  
defeated and  
killed at  
Konagal 10th  
Sep. 1800.

The next few days were passed in getting nearer to the fugitive, and on the 10th he was defeated and killed at Konagal (Conahgul). The following is an extract from Colonel Wellesley's account of his proceedings from the time of his entering the Nizām's country up to the conclusion of the action :—

“ CAMP AT YEPULPERVY,  
“ 10th September 1800.

“ After I had crossed the Malpurba at Jellahal, I marched on the 3rd instant, and entered the Nizam's territories at Hunmunsagar on the 5th. As Colonel Stevenson was obliged to cross the Malpurba in boats, he was not able to advance from that river until the 4th. It appeared to me probable that when Dhoondiah should be pressed by the whole of our force on the northern side of the Doab, he would return into Savanoor by Kanagherry and Copaul, and would thus impede our communication ; or, if favoured by the Patans of Kurnool, and the Poligars on the right bank of the Toombuddra, he would pass that river and enter the territories of the Raja of Mysore. I therefore determined to bring my detachment to the southward, and to prevent the execution of either of these designs, if he had them ; and afterwards push him to the eastward, and to take such advantage of his movements as I might be able ; while Colonel Stevenson should move by Moodgul and Mooski, at the distance of between 12 and 20 miles from the Kistna, and the Maharatta and Mogul cavalry collected in one body between his corps and mine.”

“ I arrived at Kanagherry on the 7th, and on the 8th, moved with the cavalry to Buswapoor, and on the 9th to this place ; the infantry being on those days at Hutty and Chinnoor, about 15 miles in my rear. On the 9th in the morning, Dhoondiah moved from Mudgherry, a place about 25 miles from Raichoor at which he had been encamped for some days, towards the Kistna ; but on his road having seen Colonel Stevenson's camp, he returned and encamped about 9 miles in my front, between me and Bunnoo. It was clear that he did

not know that I was so near him ; and I have reason to know that he believed that I was at Chinnoor. (This alludes to the discovery of the fact that the headman of Chinnoor had been furnishing Dhoondiah with intelligence of Colonel Wellesley's movements)."

"I moved forward this evening, and met his army at a place called Conagul, about 6 miles from hence. He was on his march, and to the westward ; apparently with the design of passing between the Mahratta and Mogul cavalry and my detachment, which he supposed to be at Chinnoor. He had only a large body of cavalry, apparently 5,000, which I immediately attacked with the 19th and 25th Dragoons, and 1st and 2nd regiments of cavalry."

"The enemy was strongly posted, with his rear and left flank covered by the village and rock of Conagul, and stood for some time with apparent firmness ; but such was the rapidity and determination of the charge made by those four regiments, which I was obliged to form in one line in order at all to equalize in length that of the enemy, that the whole gave way, and were pursued by my cavalry for many miles. Many, among others Dhoondiah, were killed ; and the whole body dispersed, and were scattered in small parties over the face of the country."

"Part of the enemy's baggage was still remaining in his camp about 3 miles from Conagul, I returned thither, and got possession of elephants, camels, and everything he had."

"The complete defeat and dispersion of the enemy's force, and above all, the death of Dhoondiah, put an end to this warfare, and I cannot avoid taking this opportunity of expressing my sense of the conduct of the troops. Upon this last occasion, their determined valour and discipline were conspicuous, and their conduct, and that of their commanding officers, Colonel Pater, Major Paterson, Major Blaquiere, Captain Doveton and Captain Price, have deserved my most particular approbation. At the same time, I must inform you that all the troops have undergone, with the greatest patience and perseverance, a series of fatiguing services."

Colonel Stevenson came up with the retreating enemy the same evening near Deodrug, and entirely dispersed them, capturing their remaining guns, baggage and cattle.

Colonel Wellesley in his report stated that he attributed "the opportunity which was given of destroying the enemy's army to the movements of the detachment under Colonel Stevenson; in no part of the army has there been greater exertion or more fatigue, or has it been more cheerfully borne, and I conceive Colonel Stevenson, Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser, and the officers and troops under their orders, to be entitled to my approbation, and to the favourable report of their conduct which I now make to you."

The information as to the position of Dhoondiah on the night of the 9th September was given by a sepoy of Lieutenant-Colonel Bowser's regiment, *viz.*, the 2nd battalion 2nd. Colonel Wellesley presented the man with a reward of 200 pagodas, and recommended him for promotion.

Colonels Wellesley and Stevenson, as well as the officers and men, received the thanks of the Madras Government and of the Governor-General; the latter desiring that it might be particularly expressed "to the officers and men of the detachment of cavalry employed in the action of the 10th September, the high sense entertained by the Governor-General-in-Council of the eminent courage and discipline manifested by them in the attack of the army of Dhoondiah Waugh, which terminated in the fall of that insurgent, and in the complete destruction or dispersion of his force."

Insurrection  
in Bullum,  
1800.

About the end of March, a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel Tolfrey was sent against Krishnappa Nāik, the Palegar of Bullum, who had taken possession of the Bisle or Subramanya ghāt leading from Mysore into Canara, and interrupted communication with Mangalore. Colonel Tolfrey arrived at Aigur, about 3 miles South-East of Manjarābād, on the 30th March, and finding it abandoned, he destroyed the place and advanced to



Arakere, where the Palegar occupied a strong stockaded position in thick forest. The barriers were attacked on the 2nd April, but the detachment was repulsed with the loss of 47 men killed and wounded. About the end of the month, a reinforcement arrived under the command of Colonel Montessor, H. M.'s 77th regiment, and the place was carried by storm on the 30th after a stout resistance. The following is an extract from Colonel Montessor's report :—

"I accordingly marched to Munzerabad on the 28th, and on the following morning (this day) after leaving my equipage and stores under the protection of the guns of that fort, and of the Raja of Mysore's cavalry, I attacked and carried Arakerry, dispersed the Polygar's adherents, and burnt several of his villages and magazines of grain. I am much indebted to the troops under my command for the zeal and gallantry displayed throughout the day."

"The column of attack, consisting of the flank companies of H. M.'s 73rd and 77th regiments under Captain Mc Pherson, three companies of the 2nd of the 3rd, and the grenadiers of the 1st of the 12th, was led by Major Capper with a degree of spirit and gallantry which overcame a continued range of obstacles and resistance for near a mile and a half through a most intricate country."

The Palegar of Bullum re-occupied his position at Arakere immediately after the departure of Colonel Montessor's detachment in June 1800, and recommenced his predatory incursions. The operations against Dhoondiah, those in Malabār and Wynaad, and in the Ceded Districts, prevented Government from taking any notice of his conduct until January 1802, when Colonel Arthur Wellesley marched against him from Seringapatam. On arriving in the neighbourhood of Arakere, he divided his own infantry into three parties for the attack of the stockaded posts in the forest, and placed that of Mysore so as to cut off the retreat of the enemy towards the ghâts. The cavalry

Final  
Operations in  
Bullum, 1802.



under Lieutenant-Colonel Macalister occupied all the open ground. The attack was made at 10 A.M. on the 16th by the three divisions, *viz.*, one under Lieutenant-Colonel A. Cuppage, 1st battalion 5th regiment; one under Major English, 2nd battalion 10th regiment; and one under Lieutenant-Colonel Spry, H. M.'s 77th foot. Each party was successful, and all the posts in the forest were carried with trifling loss. Colonel Wellesley and the officers and men employed on this service received the thanks of Government, conveyed in an order dated 16th March. A detachment was left at Arakere while Colonel Wellesley proceeded towards the Bisle Ghât to destroy other strongholds which the Pālegar was reported to possess in that direction, and also to open roads down the several passes leading into Canara.

The Pālegar was captured on the 9th February by some horsemen in H. H.'s service and executed the next day, together with six of his followers, after which Colonel Wellesley broke up his detachment, and marched on his return to Seringapatam, having first made the following arrangements for the occupation of Bullum, and certain adjoining districts of the Mysore territory. (See Arthur Wellesley's Letter dated 13th February 1802).

Five companies 1st battalion 5th, three companies 2nd battalion 10th, two guns, and a detachment of pioneers were left at Arakere, under Captain Macfarlane of the 5th, for the purpose of making a road down the Sissul Ghât, constructing defensible posts at the heads of the Sisle, Bisle, and Sampaji Ghâts, clearing the jungle, and destroying the stockades, and filling up the ditches by which the villages were surrounded. These Ghâts lead down into Kanara, the Sisle being the northernmost.

Major English, with seven companies 2nd battalion 10th, and five companies 1st battalion 5th, with two guns, and a party of pioneers, was to encamp at Bellur (Vastara, Bellur, and Mahārājdrug bound Bullum on the

east and hence the need for this arrangement) in order to support the authority of H. H. the Mahārājah in that district, and in those of Vastara and Mahārājdrug.

The inhabitants were to be disarmed, roads were to be made, and the fortified villages dismantled as in Bullum.

The result of the operations was the country began to settle down fast. The inhabitants returned to their villages and delivered up their arms and ammunition. They also dismantled their fortifications. Pūrnaiya assembled the Gowdas and completed the Settlement without difficulty, so much so that there was every chance of his collecting the revenue due for the last two years. (Arthur Wellesley's Letter dated 2nd February 1802).

Colonel Arthur Wellesley was warm in his praise of the assistance he had received in the putting down of this insurrection from His Highness' Government. Pūrnaiya's troops, he wrote to Col. Close, were indefatigable. They ran the Bullum Pālegar (styled as "Rāja" in the records of the period) into the jungles on the Western side of the Ghāts, into which it would have been useless to follow him if the commanding officer could not have got intelligence of the place in which he was concealed. Small parties of troops were accordingly placed in every village in the country in which it was possible for the Pālegar to get his provisions. In one of these he was, as mentioned above, caught by a few horsemen of His Highness' troops. (Letter dated 13th February 1802).

On the 11th October 1802, the post at Panamurtha Kōttah in north Wynaad, about 7 miles South-East of Manantoddy, was surprised by a body of Nairs, about 400 in number, divided into three parties, one of which seized the barrack in which the arms were kept, and another attacked the sepoys, while the third surrounded the houses of the Officers.

Insurrection  
in Wynaad,  
1802.

Inactivity of  
the officer in  
Command in  
the Wynaad.

The detachment consisted of about 70 men of the 1st battalion 4th Bombay regiment, with two European Officers. Both of these, *viz.*, Captain Dickinson and Lieutenant Maxwell, were killed. Twenty-four sepoy shared the same fate, and twenty-one were wounded. All the buildings were set on fire and destroyed. The head-quarters, and about 360 men of this battalion were at Poolingall, about nine miles west of Panamurtha-Köttah, but the Major in command neither moved from his post nor took any steps for the security of the district. This was not the only instance of such inactivity, for Colonel Wellesley, when writing on the 20th to the officer commanding the Bombay troops in Malabar, animadverted upon the general want of energy on the part of the officers, and went on as follows:—

“I beg that you will urge the officers to active measures. Let them put their troops in camp forthwith, excepting the number of men that may be absolutely necessary for the defence of the small posts against surprise. If the rebels are really in force, let a junction be formed, and then not a moment lost in dashing at them, whatever may be their force.”

At this time, there were no Madras troops either in Wynaad or Malabār, but the first battalion 8th regiment, under Captain Gurnell, with a party of pioneers, and 200 Mysore Horse, was ordered from Seringapatam immediately the disaster became known. Captain Gurnell was directed to enter Wynaad from Kakenköttah for the relief of Manantoddy, and the general support of the Bombay troops in the district. The battalion marched from Kakenköttah on the 27th, and on reaching the frontier at Sungaloo on the Bawally nullah, it was opposed by a body of Nāirs who had occupied an old stockade. Captain Gurnell passed the *nullah* on both flanks of the stockade under cover of the fire of a third party, and carried it without loss; the Nāirs suffered considerably.

The next day he marched 17 miles to Manantoddy, and reached that place with trifling loss, although opposed nearly the whole way. On the 30th, five companies of the 8th returned to Sungaloo as an escort to the Mysore Horse, which were sent back. A few days later, Captain Gurnell was ordered to construct a stockade for one company at Sungaloo, and two similar stockades between that place and Manantoddy. The main body of the battalion was to keep moving in the neighbourhood of Sungaloo, and to attack the insurgents wherever they could be found. These arrangements produced so much effect that Colonel Wellesley halted a detachment of H. M.'s 33rd, and the 1st battalion 14th N. I., which were moving towards the Wynaad as a further support.

About the 12th November, a smart skirmish took place between a detachment of the 8th and the Nairs near Sungaloo, thus described by Colonel Wellesley in a report to the Commander-in-Chief:—

“Since I wrote to you on the 9th instant, a detachment of the 1st battalion 8th regiment has had a smart action with the Nairs in Wynaad, in which they sustained a considerable loss. They had marched to Manantawaddy (Manantoddy) with a despatch to Lieutenant-Colonel Lawrence, and on their return were attacked near a swamp at which the battalion had been hard pressed heretofore. The Nairs took advantage of a *nullah* which was impassable, across which they fired at them, and killed nine and wounded eighteen. The officer in command of the battalion, however, at Sungaloo, sent out three companies to the support of the other detachment, and the Nairs were driven off with considerable loss. Many of those on this side of the *nullah* were put to death in the road. By all accounts the troops behaved remarkably well on this occasion.”

Intelligence having been received about this time of the defeat of the armies of the Pēishwa and of Scindia, by that of Hōlkar at Poona, it became necessary to assemble a strong force on the Tungabhadra, in consequence of

Troops  
withdrawn  
from Wynaad.

which orders were issued for the withdrawal of the troops in the Wynaad.

Mysore's  
help in  
putting down  
the  
insurrection.

In the suppression of the above mentioned insurrection in Wynaad, the Mysore State, besides sending troops, also helped materially in the organization of the Commissariat under Purnaiya.

Maharatta  
War, 1803.

In the meantime, an army, numbering 19,798 regular troops, was being assembled at Harihar, on the north-western frontier of Mysore, for the protection of the Company's territories, and the eventual establishment of the Subsidiary Force at Poona, in accordance with the Treaty of Bassein. In conformity, however, with instructions subsequently received from the Governor-general, the troops destined to advance into the Mahratta country were limited to 10,617 men under the command of Major-General Arthur Wellesley, who retained, under the express orders of the Governor-General, the command of Mysore during his absence on service, in consequence of a representation made by the General to the effect that he could not otherwise be certain of receiving the necessary supplies for his army. Major-General Wellesley was supported in this campaign by the Hyderabad Subsidiary Force under Colonel Stevenson, which was ordered to Perindah, on the western frontier of the Nizām's dominions, there to remain pending instructions from the General. This was the commencement of the Mahratta war in 1803, which ended with the treaty with Hōlkar in 1806. It was during this war, that there occurred among other engagements the memorable battles of Assaye and Argaum. So far as Mysore was concerned, it gave material assistance in the shape of men and money. "I cannot conclude this letter," wrote Arthur Wellesley to Col. Close, "without letting you know how amply Mysore has contributed to the supply and equipment of



the army to be assembled on its frontier, and how readily our little friend Purneah (Pūrnaiya) has come into all my plans for the service." With his aid, Wellesley raised in Mysore, 8,000 bullocks before they could get one at Madras. Besides the bullocks for the cavalry, a sufficiency of gram, 7,000 loads, were supplied at once, and when the cavalry reached the frontier, they had ready for use 500 loads for each regiment, besides 6,000 loads for their consumption while they remained there. A rice depôt was formed at Harihar with 7,000 loads of rice ready for use. Thirty-two thousand brinjary bullocks loaded were to meet the General at the back of the Chitaldrug hills before the end of the month (January). Sixty thousand were assembled in different flocks between Sira and Chitaldrug. Finally, a body of 5,000 Silledar Horse were got ready for service and placed at the General's immediate disposal. (Letter dated 1st January 1803.) The Mysore Horse took part in this campaign against the Mahrattas with the General, and in what has been called as the affair at Umber, actually joined in beating off the Rāja of Berar's troops which endeavoured to intercept a convoy of 1,500 bullocks carrying grain for the army under its protection. The assailants were repulsed with considerable loss, particularly in horses, and the convoy joined the General on the next day. Captain Baynes, who was in command, was thanked for the able disposition he had made of his small force in this affair, and the steadiness of the Officers and men was favourably noticed in the same order. Col. Wellesley particularly brought to the notice of the Governor-General the gallant conduct of the Mysore Cavalry under Bisnapah Pundit (Bishtopant Bādāmi). "This Corps," he wrote, "which consists of 2,000 men have performed all the light troop duties of this division of the army since I was detached from the Toombundra (Tungabhadra) in the month of March last. They have performed these



duties with the utmost cheerfulness and a zeal which I have never before witnessed in troops of this description. They have frequently been engaged with enemy's light troops, have conducted themselves well, and have lost many men and horses." (Letter dated 2nd November 1803.) Immediately after this failure, the Rāja of Berar retreated hastily towards his own territories. The Mysore Horse also took part in the capture of the town of Pokrle, Surengaum and Karalla, about 10 to 20 miles from General Wellesley's camp, before he fought the battle of Argaum. It is interesting to recall the fact that this great engagement actually began with a skirmish with the Mysore Horse. On the 25th November, the General entered Berar, on the 27th he reached Akōla, and on the 29th he joined General Stevenson at Parterly, for the purpose of undertaking with their united divisions, the siege of Gawilghar, a strong fortress between the sources of the Tapti and the Poorna, about 25 miles north-west of Ellichpoor. Shortly after arriving at Parterly, bodies of the enemy's cavalry approached, and commenced to skirmish with the Mysore Horse, in support of which the infantry pickets were sent out and it was then discovered that the enemy were drawn up in force on the plains of Argaum, 38 miles west-south-west of Ellichpoor, immediately in front of the village of that name, distant about 6 miles from Parterly. The great battle was fought, the enemy was defeated and pursued for several miles, many being killed and a quantity of baggage, together with many elephants and camels, being captured. The pursuit was continued for two days, and with great effect, by the irregular Horse belonging to Mysore State and a few others. This was followed by the capture of Gawilghar itself and with it the Rāja of Berar sued for and signed a treaty of peace at Deogaum on 17th December 1803. As this event enabled the General to prepare to direct his whole force

against Scindhia, that chieftain also sued for peace and on the 30th December 1803, the treaty of Surjee Arjen-gaum was concluded with him. Though in the words of Duff, the historian of the Mahrattas, the Mysore Horse had little or no share in the conflict at Assaye, having been formed at a distance across the Kaitna, the justice due to it for its part in this campaign of Wellesley, as set out above, especially its success during the pursuit of the enemy after his defeat, cannot but be conceded. Duff, however, barely mentions the name of the Mysore Horse in this connection, though he records the cold fact that after the battle of Argaum had been fought, the whole army (of the enemy) retired in confusion, pursued by the British Cavalry and by the Mysore Horse. (*History of the Mahrattas* III. 186.) All the more dramatic details of the pursuit by the Mysore Horse are given in the Military records of the period, from which this narrative is made up.

After the conclusion of these treaties, Major-General Wellesley turned southwards. He arrived at Jaulna on the 19th January 1804 and there received a deputation from the town of Bheer, 70 miles East of Ahmednagar, soliciting protection against a numerous and formidable band of freebooters, who, after having beaten a body of the Nizām's troops and taken their guns, were then plundering the country, and threatening Bheer. In compliance with this requisition, the General crossed the Godavari on the 24th, and on the 2nd February, while in camp at Nīngām, about 30 miles south-west of Ahmadnagar, he received information to the effect that the marauders were in the neighbourhood of Perinda, upon which he resolved to attempt to surprise them. He accordingly left Nīngām on the 3rd with all his cavalry, which included the Mysore Horse, and a select body of infantry, and arrived at Sailgaon, about 18 miles

Suppression  
of free-  
booters at  
Munkaisir,  
1804.

north-west of Perinda, on the 4th. He resumed his march that night, and came up with the enemy about 9 A.M. on the 5th, just as they had moved off from their engagement at Munkaisir. They were immediately followed and dispersed by the cavalry, who killed great numbers. All their guns, ammunition and stores were captured. The infantry arrived at Munkaisir with the cavalry, but from the nature of the action they were unable to co-operate further than by taking possession of the enemy's camp. The General in a letter to Major Malcolm, dated the 7th, thus described the conduct of the detachment :—

“The exertion made by the troops is the greatest I ever witnessed. Everything was over by 12 o'clock on the 5th, and, I think that, by that time, the infantry must have marched 60 miles from 6 in the morning on the 4th. We halted from 12 in the day till 10 at night on the 4th, so that we marched 60 miles with infantry in twenty hours.”

In a letter of the same date to Colonel Murray, he observed :—

“I think we now begin to beat the Mahrattas in the celerity of our movements.”

General Wellesley quitted the army near Perinda on the 23rd February and then proceeded to Bombay. He rejoined the army on the 22nd May and made preparations for attacking Hölkar's possessions in Kandeish. He then resigned command of the Subsidiary Forces, and left Poona on the 24th June to Calcutta. The Resolutions of the House of Commons in which the Officers and men were thanked for their services during the above war, were republished in India on 10th November 1804.

Return of  
Mysore  
Troops, and  
Wellesley,  
1804.

Meanwhile the General, in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General, ordered the Mysore troops (under Bishtopant, the Bistnapah Pundit of the

Wellington *Letters*) to march towards Mysore. They returned *via* Harihar. General Wellesley himself reached Seringapatam about the close of 1804. On 9th March 1804, while still in Camp at Chowke, he wrote to the Governor-General, commending the services rendered in the War by His Highness' troops and of their officers, more particularly of the excellent conduct and character of Govinda Rao during the negotiations with the Mah-rattas and of Bishtopant, the Commander of the troops, and urging the grant of special pensions for them. In concluding his letter, he thus acknowledged the services of the Government of Mysore in connection with the War:—

“ While writing upon this subject, I cannot avoid advert-  
ing to the conduct of the Government of Mysore during the  
late War, and congratulating Your Excellency (Marquess  
Wellesley) upon the success of all your measures, and the  
accomplishment of all your objects in establishing it. In con-  
sequence of the regularity of the system of Government esta-  
blished by the Dewan, and the improvements of the Country,  
its resources were so much increased as to enable him to  
provide for all the calls made upon him, either for the equip-  
ment of the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, for the subsist-  
ance of the army on its march from the Carnatic to the  
frontier, for the supply of the magazines formed in Mysore,  
or for the large quantities of grain required for the Cavalry,  
and by the Brinjaries. All the supplies were furnished with a  
facility and celerity hitherto unknown in this part of India.  
He has since continued to forward supplies to the army under  
my command, as fast as the Brinjaries have been found to  
take them up; and, besides contributing to the subsistence of  
the corps under Major-General Campbell, he has lately for-  
warded large quantities of grain to Canara, in order to enable  
the Collectors in that Province to export larger quantities for  
the supply of Bombay and Poonah.”

Mysore  
Administra-  
tion thanked  
for its services

Besides the troops employed under General Wellesley,  
whose services have been referred to above, Pūrnaiya

had a respectable corps of troops on His Highness' frontier since the time General Wellesley marched from the Tungabhadra, which he commanded in person. A detachment of these troops, under Khan Jehan Khan, distinguished themselves, in March 1804, by destroying, a numerous band of freebooters who had assembled in the Savanūr country, and threatened Mysore.

About March 1805, General Wellesley prepared himself to return to England, and on the eve of his departure, he wrote the following letter, dated 2nd March 1805, to Dewan Pūrnaiya, which bears eloquent testimony to the success of the Administration established under the Partition Treaty of Mysore, 1799 and to the great services rendered by His Highness' Administration to the success of British Arms in the Wars that followed its signing :—

To

THE RESIDENT IN MYSORE.

SIR,

As I am about to depart for England, I have written a letter to the Dewan, which I inclose together with a copy and translation thereof for your perusal and I beg that you will do me the favour to deliver the letter to the Dewan.

I have the honor to be,

Sir,

Your most obedient servant,

ARTHUR WELLESLEY.

*Fort St. George,  
2nd March 1805.*

To

POORNEAH.

Lt. Colonel Malcolm will have informed you that affairs having begun to have a settled appearance in the Deckan, I have obtained permission to go to England, and I commence my voyage in a few days.



I part from you with the greatest regret, and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honor and prosperity of the Government of the Rajah of Mysore, over which you preside.

For six years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore Government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration.

Experience has proved the wisdom of the arrangement which was first made of the Government of Mysore; and I am convinced that under no other arrangement would it have been possible for the British Government to derive such advantage from the country which you have governed, as I have enjoyed in the various difficulties with which we have contended since your authority was established.

Every principle of gratitude therefore for many acts of personal kindness to myself, and a strong sense of the public benefits which have been derived from your administration, make me anxious for its continuance, and for its increasing prosperity; and in every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it, that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits, upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass by, which I may think favourable for rendering you service.

Upon the occasion of taking my leave of you, I must take the liberty to recommend to you, to persevere in the laudable path which you have hitherto followed; let the prosperity of the country be your first object. Protect the Raiyats and Traders, and allow no man whether vested with authority or otherwise, to oppress them with impunity; do justice to every man; and attend to the wholesome advice which will be given to you by the British Resident; and you may depend upon it that your Government will be as prosperous and as permanent as I wish it to be.

I recommend to your constant favour and protection Bisnapah Pundit, Govind Rao, Ragenaut Row Ranary, and all the Sirdars and Troops who served meritoriously with me in the last war; and Seshiah, and the hircarrahs belonging to you who accompanied me. They are all deserving of your favour.

You know that for some years I have had under my protection Salabhut Khan, the supposed or adopted son of



Doondiah Waug. I have given him a sum of money, and have placed him under the guardianship of the Court at Seringapatam, and I request you to take him into the Rajah's service hereafter if you should find him to be worthy of your favour.

As a testimony of my sense of the benefits which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention, I request your acceptance of my picture, which will be sent to you from Bengal."

A. W.

Rebellion of  
Chittoor  
Pālegars,  
1804-5.

In the operations against the Chittoor Pālegars, 1804-5, the Mysore Horse served under Colonel Monypenny. They took a conspicuous part in the pursuit that followed their repulse at Mograul, 16 miles north of Chittoor. The only capital punishments inflicted in these operations were in the cases of the chiefs of Yedergundu and Cher-gul captured by the Mysore Horse. These men having been tried and found guilty of having plundered certain villages in the taluk of Āmbur, were sentenced to be hung, which sentence was carried out. The disturbances were effectually suppressed by the close of February 1805.

Attempt at  
restoration of  
Muhammadan  
power;  
Mutiny at  
Vellore,  
1806.

The Mutiny at Vellore which occurred in 1806, was not directly connected with Mysore but as one of the two principal causes which appear to have led to it, was said to be the residence of the family of the late Tipū Sultān at that place, it is necessary to refer to it briefly here. Though the origin of the Mutiny and its suppression by the timely arrival of Col. Gillespie from Arcot, are matters belonging to the general history of India, and need not therefore be gone into here, it is necessary to direct attention to one or two particular aspects of it. The garrison of Vellore at this time consisted of four Companies of His Majesty's 69th regiment, six Companies 1st

battalion 1st, and the whole of the 2nd battalion 23rd regiment North India. The 1st battalion was the oldest in the service, and had always maintained a high reputation. It is stated by Wilson (*History of British India*, I. 133) that the 1st regiment had been *chiefly raised in Mysore* and that many officers and men had served in the armies of Haidar and Tipū. As Col. Wilson has pointed out (*History of the Madras Army* III. 176 *f.n.* 2), this statement seems questionable. The 1st battalion was formed in 1758 from the independent companies, forty years before the British had any connection with Mysore: in fact, long before Haidar rose to prominence. It distinguished itself in the first campaign against Haidar, 1767-69. It was nearly destroyed at Baillie's defeat in September 1780, and was re-formed at Tanjore in 1781. It served in the Mysore campaign of 1790-92, and again during the final campaign of 1799, but it was never stationed in the Mysore territory until long after 1806. The 23rd Regiment N. I. had, however, been recently raised in the District of Tinnevely, and contained in its ranks a number of the followers of the Palegār chiefs, whose possessions had been forfeited in 1801 for rebellion. The 69th were quartered in the fort, while most of the sepoys lived in the *pettah*, though their arms were lodged in the fort. The men for general duty on the night of the 9th July—the Mutiny occurred at half past two o'clock on the morning of the 10th—were taken from the 69th and the 1st regiment. It is on record that before the mutiny actually occurred, there were seditious meetings at Vellore. These meetings were, it is stated, attended by the majority of the Indian Officers and by several of the sons of Tipū, then confined in the fort. Another statement on record is that Tipū's flag—an old one, green stripes on a red field with a sun in the centre, which was supposed to have been bought at one of the sales of Seringapatam booty, a considerable time

before the mutiny—was hoisted by his retainers. In the course of the counter-attacks delivered by the European troops, a soldier, in attempting to take down this flag, was shot from the *pettah*. Shortly afterwards, however, the flag was taken down by two men who were requested to volunteer for the occasion, under a very heavy fire from the *pettah* and the fort. Lieutenant-Colonel Marriott (1st Battalion 5th) the Officer in charge of the sons of Tipū, who lived in the fort, miraculously escaped. In his report, he refers pointedly to the cries raised by the sepoys as they went from his house. They were, he says, heard to call out "Come out, Nawab, Come out, Nawab, there is no fear." This was supposed to be addressed to Futteh Haidar, the eldest of the four sons of Tipū, who lived in the palace close to Colonel Marriott's quarters.

The quelling of the Mutiny was followed by the punishment of the ring-leaders and by the trial of the retainers of Tipū's sons. Eight of these were tried before a Special Commission at Chittoor in April 1807, and the proceedings confirmed by the Madras Government in May following. One was sentenced to death, two to transportation for life, one to imprisonment for ten years, and three were acquitted. The sons of Tipū were sent to Calcutta, their complicity not having been established to such a degree as to warrant more extreme measures. Here they continued to reside as stipendiaries till 1860. A large sum was then capitalised as a provision for them, with a view to terminate their dependence on the liberality of the British Government and to absorb them in the general mass of the population.

A Special Commission was also appointed, on 12th July, with Major-General Pater as President to enquire into the causes of the outbreak. Among the four members, who were equally divided between the Civil and Military services, there was Mr. Webbe. The

Commission submitted its Report on 9th August, from which the following extract is taken :—

“ There are two principal causes which appears to us to have led to the mutiny. The late innovations in the dress and appearance of the sepoys, and the residence of the family of the late Tippoo Sultan at Vellore.”

After enlarging on the first cause, which they felt to be an unnecessary innovation affecting religious prejudices, they wrote :—

“ We shall now remark on the second cause, *viz.*, the residence of the families of the late Tippoo Sultan at Vellore. Accommodations were here provided for them nearly resembling a palace in magnificence, and an establishment allowed them on a very extensive scale of liberality. Their followers had emigrated in great numbers to Vellore, and husbands for the Princesses were allowed to come from different parts of the country. These persons naturally brought along with them, their former attachments and prejudices and the interests of Seringapatam were transplanted with its inhabitants to the Carnatic. Speaking the same language, and following the same religion, connections were easily formed amongst men who were not much occupied with engagements of trade or business, schemes of power and ambition would naturally occur to those who had been born to enjoy them.”

The conclusion arrived at by the Commissioners was concurred in by the Government of Madras and by the Supreme Government, the only dissentient voice being that of Sir J. F. Cradock, the Commander-in-Chief, who, in a Report to the Court of Directors dated 21st September 1806, expressed the opinion that the alterations in dress had been nothing more than a pretext; the real object having been the restoration of the Muhammadan power. Major Hazlewood of the 2nd battalian 24 regiment had also pressed the latter as the cause of the mutiny on the Government of Madras. In view of this expression of opinion, a further Court of enquiry

composed of Mr. A. Scott of the Civil Service, Lieutenant-Colonel (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm, and Lieutenant-Colonel John Munro, were appointed in 1807 to go into the matter. This Commission closed its proceedings on 19th March 1807, when they came to the conclusion that "the inferences drawn by Major Hazlewood were not supported on any sufficient grounds." The Government of Madras expressed on 2nd April their entire concurrence in this conclusion. However, the Court of Directors do not appear to have agreed with this view. They sent out on 15th April an order directing the removal of Lord William Bentinck, then Governor of Madras, and Sir J. E. Cradock, the Commander-in-chief, from their respective posts. On 29th May, they reviewed the several reports regarding the mutiny in a lengthy despatch in which they formulated their opinion that the:—

"Immediate cause of the discontent among the Sepoys was the introduction of certain innovations in their dress, which were offensive, and, as they held, degrading to them; and that the captive sons of the late Tippoo Sultan, with their adherents and abettors took occasion, from the dissatisfaction of the Sepoys, to instigate them to insurrection and revolt, with the view of effecting their own liberation, and the restoration of the Mahommedan power."

Excitement at  
Bangalore,  
Nandidrug  
etc.

The excitement caused by the proposed alterations in dress extended to the troops at a number of stations, of which Bangalore and Nandidrug were the chief ones in the State. They were, however, not of such a nature as to cause any great anxiety. Beyond the dismissal of a few men at these stations, nothing of moment occurred at either station. So ended the attempt to restore the Mahammadan power in the South of India.

Mutiny of  
the  
European  
Officers, 1809.

From the beginning of 1807, if not from an earlier period, a spirit of discontent had existed among the Officers of the Madras Army, of which the two princi-



pal causes were the higher allowances granted to the Officers of the Bengal army and the undue proportion of commands which had been recently bestowed upon the Officers of the Royal Army. This feeling was aggravated by the discontinuance, in July 1807, of certain allowances paid to Officers commanding districts, stations, and cantonments, out of the duties levied in military bazaars; and by the abolition of the tent contract in May 1808. Though the Mutiny which broke out in May 1809, cannot fairly be attributed to these grievances, but rather to the somewhat harsh and arbitrary measures of the Government of Sir George Barlow, who had assumed charge of office in December 1807, yet there is no doubt that they were real and important enough to exercise considerable influence over the events which followed. The abolition of the tent contract was followed by a memorial signed by a number of Officers, which was forwarded by the Commander-in-Chief on 28th January 1809, but was returned to him by Government. The matter would, in all probability, have ended here but for the unfortunate submission of a report marked "private and confidential" which gave serious offence to Officers commanding corps. This was followed by the laying of a charge, signed by five Commandants of cavalry and twenty-three of the infantry, against Lieutenant-Colonel John Munro, Quarter-Master-General of the Army, and Captain in the Madras European Regiment. He was placed under arrest on 20th January 1809 by order of Lieutenant-General Hay Macdowall, the Commander-in-Chief. Colonel Munro appealed to Government urging that the report had been prepared by him under the orders of the late Commander-in-Chief and that it was a confidential communication. As General Macdowall refused to forward the appeal, the Colonel sent it direct. The Government took legal opinion and requested the Commander-in-Chief to release



the Colonel, but the Commander-in-Chief refused to do so without a positive order from Government. The Government through their Chief Secretary ordered that Col. Munro should be released forthwith, which order was accordingly obeyed. General Macdowall had also put himself in opposition to the Government in urging that the loss of his seat on the Executive Council disabled him from efficiently advocating the interests of the Officers. He had, besides, made a highly inflammatory speech to the European Regiment at Masulipatam (24th December 1808). The action of the Madras Government in ordering the release of Col. Munro appears to have incensed the General not only against him but also against the Government of Sir George Barlow. He resigned the service on his way home and signified his annoyance at Government by leaving for publication to the army, an order dated 28th January 1809, in which Colonel Munro was severely reprimanded for having appealed to the Civil power, "an act of disrespect for which he would have been brought to trial had General Macdowall remained in India." On becoming acquainted with this order, Government directed that it should be expunged from the public records. Not satisfied with this, they anticipated the expected receipt, from Negapatam, of the Commander-in-Chief's official resignation, and publicly dismissed him, on the ground that the order of the 28th January contained insinuations grossly derogatory to the character of the Government, and subversive of Military discipline, and of the foundation of public authority." Major Boles, Deputy Adjutant-General, who had signed the order in the absence of his principal, Lieutenant-Colonel Capper, who had accompanied General Macdowall on board ship, was suspended from the service for having knowingly acted in direct violation of his duty to the Government by giving currency to an order of so offensive a character. Colonel

Capper, who, on his return, had immediately avowed himself to be responsible for the circulation of the order, was suspended on the 1st February. General Macdowall and Colonel Capper were both lost at sea in March 1809, when on the voyage to England. Major Boles refused to acknowledge he was in the wrong and his refusal was made the subject of a fresh complaint against him, but he was subsequently publicly exonerated by the Court of Directors from all blame on that account. Meanwhile, the Government of India, at the head of which was Lord Minto, entirely approved of the whole of the proceedings of the Madras Government and condemned the conduct of General Macdowall. They also assured the Madras Government of their fullest support. It appears, however, that Lord Minto heard of the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles "*with the greatest possible regret*" and that he foresaw the consequences which would follow that "*most unfortunate and unpolitic measure.*" He abstained from reversing it partly because he did not wish to "*put Sir George in the wrong on any point,*" and partly because he thought the suspension was justifiable from a legal point of view. In this, however, Lord Minto, seems to have laboured under a misapprehension. The weight of opinion, even at the time, was against the legality of the suspension. General Maitland, then Governor and Commander-in-Chief in Ceylon, vindicated the course followed by the staff officers, and several other officers of experience and distinction, dwelt upon the impolicy of encouraging officers to debate upon the propriety of orders issued by their superiors, or upon the relative powers of different authorities. The Court of Directors, too, on hearing of the suspension, immediately ordered that it should be suspended and later (in February 1811) recorded their opinion that they "could not discover any such interest or obvious irregularity as could justify the Adjutant or Deputy

Adjutant-General in refusing to obey the command they had received from Lieutenant-General Macdowall that the said order should be circulated to the army."

The summary punishment of Colonel Capper and Major Boles created great excitement in the army. It was maintained that the illegality of the order of the 28th January was by no means evident, in which case alone, could these officers have been justified in refusing to issue it. It was also thought that they had the same claim to immunity as had been accorded to Colonel Munro, and they were consequently regarded as the victims of an unjust and vindictive resentment. Colonel Capper, as mentioned before, had left India immediately after his suspension, but Major Boles received addresses from several quarters in which he was apprised of the intention of his brother Officers to organise a fund for his support. They also denounced the punishment meted out to him as "severe and unmerited," and ended by saying that "such mutual support must be expected and accepted by all, who, like yourself, have, or may, suffer through any such exceptionable measures on the part of the Civil Government of Fort St. George, as have rendered necessary the painful step we have now taken." Early in February (1809), a memorial was secretly prepared for transmission to the Supreme Government, in which after complaining about the exclusion of the Commander-in-Chief from Council, the release of Colonel Munro, and the suspension of Colonel Capper and Major Boles, the memorialists observed that the general discontent produced by local and partial injuries had been falsely represented as public disaffection, and they concluded that they "could not suppress the expression of their concern at the manner in which the exclusive rights of the army have recently been violated, and of their sanguine hope and earnest entreaty that the Supreme Government may, in its wisdom, be

induced to appease their just claims, and to anticipate the extreme crisis of their agitation by releasing them from a ruler, whose measures guided by the councils of their implacable enemies, are equally detrimental to the interests of the State, as they are repulsive to the feelings of a loyal and patriotic army." The circulation of this memorial which demanded in plain terms the removal of Sir George Barlow from the Governership, was, however, restricted almost entirely to the Officers in Travancore and the Southern Division, and the intention of forwarding it was abandoned about the middle of March, when the general indignation had begun to subside. A copy of the memorial reached Sir George Barlow's hands through a private channel, which he refused to reveal, and though well aware that the idea of transmitting it to Bengal had been abandoned, he prepared to punish the Officers concerned in signing and promoting its circulation. At about the same time, he came to know of the existence of the addresses to Major Boles of which no secrecy had been made. On 1st May, accordingly, he placed his matured plans before the Council. This included the dismissal, suspension or removal from command of as many as fourteen Officers in the different army Divisions. In the Mysore State, Officers affected by the order were Captain Coombs, Assistant Quarter-Master-General in Mysore, who was ordered to be removed from his command and Lieutenant-Colonel Rumley, commanding at Bangalore, who was ordered to be removed to the 7th cavalry at Arcot. These recommendations were agreed to in Council and the same published in a General Order dated 1st May. Several of the Officers named above denied having had anything to do with the obnoxious documents, but all were summarily punished on the strength of private information, not having been allowed the opportunity of offering any defence. No sooner had the order referred to become

public than the great majority of the Officers placed themselves in opposition to Government, an attitude from which, at several stations, including Hyderabad, Masulipatam, Jalna, Seringapatam, Chitaldrug, etc., they speedily passed into actual mutiny. Hyderabad proved the real storm-centre. There, the Officers issued an address to the army on the 18th May in which they condemned the action of Government and announced their resolution to contribute towards the support of the suspended Officers, as well as to join in any legal measures calculated to remove the cause of the existing discontent. This was followed by a letter to the Governor in Council, forwarded on the 23rd June, and bearing the signatures of 158 Officers. In this letter, it was asserted that with the exception of a few individuals holding confidential staff situations, or otherwise dependent upon the favour of Government, the whole body of officers considered themselves pledged to support each other for the purpose of obtaining redress, and that unless the order of the 1st May was recinded, they had strong reason to fear the most disastrous consequences. The letter concluded by promising that if the suspended officers were restored, the army would patiently await the decision of the Court of Directors. A Committee of Officers was also formed, at the same time, for the purpose of conducting correspondence and concerting ulterior measures, an example which was followed at most other stations. On the 21st of the same month, the Officers presented a document, styled their "ultimatum" to Colonel Montessor, commanding the troops at the station, in which they demanded :—

- (1) the repeal of order of the 1st May,
- (2) the restoration of every officer who had been suspended or removed.
- (3) The trial of Lieutenant Colonel Innes who had proved highly obnoxious to the troops at Masulipatam.



(4) The removal from office of every officer of the General Staff supposed to have influenced Government in their several recent measures.

(5) A general amnesty.

This paper was signed by every officer in the force except those on the Staff.

The acuteness grew apace and Government did not know where they were. About the end of July, the Governor-in-Council, with the view of ascertaining the exact state of feeling in the army, resolved that all the European officers in the Company's service should be called upon to sign a declaration, afterwards known as the test, which required them "in the most solemn manner," to declare from their word of honour as British officers, that they "will obey the orders and support the authority of the Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George agreeably to the tenor of the commissions which they held from that Government." Such officers as might decline to comply were to be removed from doing duty with the troops, and to proceed to any station on the sea-coast, between Sadras to Nagapatam that they might select there to reside, until the state of affairs should admit of their being re-employed. The declaration was only signed by about 150 officers out of 1,300, which showed the extent of the dissatisfaction prevalent among the officers.

Meanwhile, Colonel Barry Close, who had meanwhile become Resident at Poona, had been appointed to command at Haiderabad in the hope that his eminent political talents and influence with the army might enable him to win the officers over to reason and restore order in the force. To him a copy of the test was sent; on approaching Haiderabad, however, he was warned to halt at the last stage as his services were not required. He heeded not and continued his march. Arrived at the Residency, he had a consultation with Colonel Montessor and determined, at all hazards, to attempt



to place himself at the head of the troops. He addressed the troops but without any apparent effect. They neither would sign the declaration nor withdraw from the performance of military duty. He then declared that he felt himself at liberty to communicate directly with every Indian soldier in the cantonment, and advanced with that intention towards the troops which had turned out, and were turning on the general parade under their officers. His attempts proving unsuccessful, he left the parade and going to the quarters of Colonel Montessor, he relinquished the command, as the object of his appointment had been frustrated. Though the officers subsequently protested that his conduct, as they put it, was "highly prejudicial to that confidence which subsists between the sepoys and their officers" and as "subversive of the discipline they are anxious to maintain" and even demanded that he should "leave the place in the course of the day lest more unpleasant decisive measures should be necessary," the Colonel had left a deep impression on the officers and his alleged "conduct" had told on them and the men. The result was that the officers sent in their submission a few days later. They attributed the want of success of the Colonel's mission in their letter of submission, dated 11th August, addressed to Lord Minto, whose arrival at Madras had by then become generally known, to "the sudden and unexpected manner in which he presented the test," for their signature. They accordingly subscribed to the test and requested "a general amnesty" to all those engaged in the late unhappy events, leaving the rest to his "justice, clemency, and wisdom." Their submission had a salutary effect on the other stations. At Masulipatam, where Lieutenant-Colonel Malcolm had unsuccessfully tried a policy of conciliation as opposed to the policy of coercion adopted at Haiderabad, the news of the submission at Haiderabad had a soothing effect and the officers agreed to sign the test. The rest of

the stations similarly followed in the wake of Haiderabad, but at Seringapatam, before news from Haiderabad could reach the station, disastrous events had occurred, to which a reference is here necessary.

Lieutenant-Colonel Davis, H. M.'s 22nd Dragoons, commanding the Mysore Division, the Head-quarters of which were at Bangalore, happened to be at Mysore on the 24th July, when he received a letter from Lieutenant-Colonel John Bell of the Artillery, then in command at Seringapatam, requesting that certain recent orders for the march of a Company of artillery, and the 2nd battalion 19th regiment, might be countermanded on account of the severity of the duty which their removal would throw upon the remaining Company of artillery and the 2nd battalion 15th regiment, which corps together with two companies H. M.'s 80th foot, composed the garrison. This request was accompanied by letters from the officers expressing their alarm in consequence of the prevalence of a report to the effect that it was in contemplation to separate the native corps, and to seize the European officers. It was well-known, however, that the officers of the garrison were in communication with those at Haiderabad and at Masulipatam, and pledged to support them; hence their principal objection to reduce the strength.

Affairs at  
Seringa-  
patam:  
state of the  
Garrison

Colonel Davis, being without the means of enforcing compliance with his orders, consented to their postponement pending a reference to Head-quarters, and on the 29th, he entered the fort with the view of using his personal influence with the officers. On the morning of the 30th, he called them together, and after having addressed them without effect, he was told that he must not only remain in the fort, but that he must not quit his house.

Colonel Davis  
addresses  
the officers  
without effect

However, they changed their minds during the day, and allowed him to return to Mysore the same evening. The public treasure belonging to the department of the acting Collector, Mr. James A. Casamaijor, to whose spirited remonstrance no attention was paid, was seized, under the immediate direction of Captain Cadell, the Town Major, on the same day.

The declaration sent to the fort for signature.

On the 31st, Colonel Davis sent the declaration of fidelity to the fort with instructions to Colonel Bell desiring that it might be tendered to the officers for signature, and that in event of refusal he should use his endeavours to prevail upon them to abstain from the further exercise of their military functions. The envelope and the letter were returned along with the note given below, the copy of the declaration having been abstracted, and retained.

"Seringapatam, 31st July 1809

"My dear Colonel. You must be perfectly aware of the state of the garrison which I reported to you long since, and it is at the peril of my freedom, to open any public communications.

(Signed) J. Bell."

Further seizure of treasure.

On the 2nd August, the sum of Rupees 1,40,000 on the way from the Ceded Districts, was seized by a party sent from the fort for that purpose.

The detachment H. M.'s 80th sent out of the Fort.

On the third August, the detachment of H. M.'s 80th regiment was sent out of the fort with instructions to march to Bangalore. It was duly provided with camp equipage and sick carriage, and the garrison went through the form of presenting arms as it left. These companies proceeded along the Bangalore road for some marches, and then changing their route, they joined Colonel Davis at Mysore on the 7th August.

Upon this trying and unprecedented occasion, Pūrnaiya "afforded to the Resident that ready and cordial support which might have been expected from his known fidelity and attachment to the British Government. A body of 3,000 Silladar Horse which had previously received orders to hold itself in readiness was directed to invest the fort, and to cut off all its supplies, and the whole of the resources of the Mysore Government were immediately placed at our disposal." (Letter from the Governor in Council of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 10th September 1809).

The declaration was signed by Colonel John Bell on the third August, upon which he was invited by Colonel Davis, and the Resident, to abandon the mutineers and come to them at Mysore, but he declined, and announced his intention to remain in the fort as long as he could be of any service. With the exception of Colonel Bell, the whole of the officers refused to sign the declaration for the reasons given in the following resolution which was subscribed to by the officers of the artillery, and those of the Indian battalions :—

Colonel John Bell signs the test, while rest refuse it.

"The moment the grievances of the army are redressed, we, the undersigned, will, with the greatest satisfaction, sign the proffered declaration of Government under date the 26th July 1809: but as the intention (at present) of that obligation is evidently to bind us down to shed the blood of our own brother soldiers, we must decline affixing our names thereto."

The staff officers, *viz.*, Captain de Havilland of the Engineers, Captain Cadell, Town Major, and three others, recorded their dissent in the following terms:—

"We never can pledge ourselves to obey the orders of Sir George Barlow and his advisers which so clearly tend to the total destruction of the British Empire in India. In this declaration, we are actuated alone by principles of regard for the safety and the welfare of the State"

The European officers of the detachment doing duty at Mysore as the Resident's escort, and who belonged to the 2nd of the 15th, resigned their military functions rather than sign the test, but the Indian officers and men remained steady.

Investment of  
the Fort.

Government, on the 15th August, sent orders for the investment of the fort, and on the 10th, a detachment from Bangalore, consisting of two squadrons H. M.'s 25th dragoons, three companies H. M.'s 59th regiment, the 5th regiment cavalry, and the first battalion third regiment, with a party of artillery, all under Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbs H. M.s' 59th, arrived, and encamped about three miles from the fort.

Extraordi-  
nary conduct  
of Colonel  
Bell.

About this time, Colonel Bell, when called upon to surrender, wrote several letters of an extraordinary character to Colonel Davis and to Government. He complained of neglect, of his not having been made acquainted with the real objects which the Government had in view, and feigned to believe that an attack on the fort was contemplated by the troops of His Highness' Government, for which reason he declared that he could not give it up without the special order of the Governor-General. It was difficult to discover the real object of this address. Colonel Bell, at the same time, despatched a letter to Purnaiya, the Dewan, complaining of his preventing provisions from passing into the fort of Seringapatam, accusing him of having broken the Treaty with the British Government, and threatening him with vengeance, if he persevered in his operations against the garrison. In answer to this letter, Purnaiya, with great propriety, referred him to the Resident as the proper channel of communication with the Mysore Government. This answer, it is supposed, led to the measure adopted by the officers of "placing a guard over the Dewan's house in the fort,



in which the whole of his private property and part of the Rajah's was deposited." (Letter from Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, dated 10th September 1809).

Although the fort was amply supplied with artillery and military stores of all kinds, the garrison was scarcely equal to the defence of so extensive a place, and the officers were therefore anxious to obtain an addition to their strength. With this object, they placed themselves in communication with the 1st Battalion 15th regiment stationed at Chitaldrug, about 150 miles north of Seringapatam, and also with the 1st battalion 8th regiment, then on the march from Bednore to Wallājabād, and they succeeded in persuading the officers of these corps to join them. The 1st of the 8th left their families at Chitaldrug, having been informed by their officers that their services were emergently required to assist in the defence of Seringapatam against the troops of His Highness' Government, who were about to attack the fort.

Troops at  
Chitaldrug  
and Bednore.

The 1st of the 15th were misled in a similar manner. The two battalions left Chitaldrug accordingly on the 5th August, and on the morning of the 10th, while approaching Nagamangala, 26 miles from Seringapatam, they fell in with a body of 3,000 Silladar Horse, which, together with about 1,500 armed peons, under Rama Rao, an able and spirited officer of the Mysore Government, had been sent by the Honorable Arthur Cole, then officiating as Resident, with instructions to retard the progress of the detachment, and to prevent it from entering into Seringapatam. No collision took place that day, and the battalions encamped at Nagamangala.

The march was resumed at 10 o'clock the same night, and next morning, when about 10 miles from Seringapatam, the rear guard, which had fallen behind, was

Attacked by  
the Mysore  
Horse and  
European  
troops.



suddenly attacked by the Mysore Horse, a few men wounded, and the baggage taken. The Horse then made several charges which were repulsed, and the battalions had arrived at their destination, when they were simultaneously attacked and broken by H. M.'s 25th dragoons and the Mysore Horse. The sepoys were completely surprised and made no attempt to defend themselves against the Europeans, whom they believed to be their friends. Captain McIntosh, who commanded the troops from Chitaldrug, was wounded, and taken prisoner, and a number of the men killed and wounded. But a very large proportion, *viz.*, 20 European officers, 19 native officers, 46 havaldars, and 785 rank and file, made their escape into the fort under cover of the guns. Mr. Cole, in a report dated 12th August, says, "a very considerable number of the Silladar Horse have been killed, this body having skirmished with the detachment during the last 20 miles before the action took place." The actual casualties in the Silladar Horse were 125 men and 150 horses killed and wounded.

The conduct of the officers of the Chitaldrug battalions, and that of those in Seringapatam seems to have been equally discreditable. The former induced their men to march by means of false representations, and the latter treacherously kept their advancing comrades in ignorance of the arrival of the troops from Bangalore. Indeed, had it not been for the receipt of a pressing requisition from the fort, it may be assumed, as nearly certain, that the lamentable conflict would never have taken place. It appears from a report to Government, from the Resident, dated 14th August, that a few hours before the action, Captain McIntosh received a letter from the garrison, in which he was urged to push on. In consequence of this, he made a forced march which was the cause of his missing a despatch from the Resident mentioning the arrival of the force under Colonel Gibbs, and the determi-

nation of Colonel Davis to prevent the entrance of the battalions into Seringapatam. It cannot be supposed that Captain McIntosh, at the head of about 1,120 Indians, would have ventured to oppose such a force as that under Colonel Gibbs.

During the attack, the guns in the fort opened upon the camp, and a party under Colonel Munro of the 15th sallied in that direction, but was driven back. The camp was again cannonaded, at intervals during the night, and a few camp followers and horses were killed, and wounded, but no further damage was done. Another sally was made upon the Mysore troops on the 13th in which Captain Turner, of the 15th battalion, was wounded and several of his men killed.

Sallies from  
the fort.  
Surrender of  
the fort.

The next few days were passed in negotiations, during which the intelligence of the submission of the officers at Haiderabad having been received, the fort surrendered at discretion, and was taken possession of by Colonel Davis on the 23rd August, the declaration having been previously signed by the officers of the garrison.

Disposal of  
the  
Company's  
officers in  
Mysore.

The officers of the fifth cavalry, and 1st battalion third regiment, at Bangalore, having refused to sign the test, they had been removed from their respective corps, by Lieutenant-Colonel Gibbs before his march upon Seringapatam. The officers of the 2nd battalion third regiment, which had relieved the 8th at Bednore, also refused to sign, and Major Lucas made over charge of the battalion to the senior Indian officer on the 9th August, pending the nomination of a European Commandant.

Lord Minto arrived at Madras on 11th September and his advent at once inspired confidence in the army. It

Lord Minto's  
arrival at  
Madras.

was, indeed, felt that if he had arrived a little earlier, the disastrous affair at Seringapatam would not have taken place. The mutiny, indeed, had been literally quelled before his arrival. He had strongly supported the Madras Government and had reviewed the situation in an elaborate despatch dated the 27th May in which he had entirely condemned the memorial which had excited the wrath of Sir George Barlow. On the 25th September, a general order was published, in which the Governor-General, after having dwelt on the desperate character of the contest in which the officers had been engaged, granted a general amnesty to all concerned, with the exception of certain officers, including among others those at Seringapatam. These were all tried on 1st November at a General Court Martial assembled at Bangalore, with the following result so far as the principal officer in Mysore was concerned :—

Colonel John Bell was found guilty on the 9th December 1809 and sentenced to be cashiered. The proceedings were returned for revision, but the Court adhered to the original sentence. The Commander-in-Chief, when confirming it, remarked that the punishment awarded bore no proportion to the atrocity of the crime.

The measures of the Government were debated at length at the India House from opposite sides. The contest went on for three years, when the attacking party having obtained the majority side, orders were sent out in December 1812, nominating Lieutenant-General Hon. John Abercromby to be Governor of Fort Saint George, and annulling the provisional appointment of Sir George Barlow to succeed to the office of Governor-General. These orders having been received at Madras in May 1813, Sir George Barlow vacated office on the 21st of that month. With the exception of Lieutenant-Colonel John Bell and the commandants of the battalions which had marched from Chitaldrug, every surviving officer

who had either been suspended, dismissed, or cashiered, was ultimately restored to the service. Even those excepted at first were restored during 1812 and 1813.

Pūrnaiya's administration proved eminently successful. The chief problems that confronted him as he took charge of the office of the Dewan were :—

Pūrnaiya's  
administra-  
tion.  
The problems  
that confron-  
ted it.

(a) the pacification of the country; (b) the setting up of an administration suited to the needs of the country; (c) repairing the damage done to the country during a century of warfare; and (d) carrying out the conditions of the Subsidiary Treaty in such a punctilious manner as to give entire satisfaction to the Company's Government, especially by providing for the obligations rendered incumbent on the State by Article 3 of that Treaty.

According to this Article, it was stipulated that whenever it became necessary for the protection or defence of the territories of the contracting parties, or either of them, that hostilities should be undertaken or preparations made for commencing such hostilities. His Highness the Mahārāja was to contribute towards the discharge of the increased expense incurred by the augmentation of the Military forces and the unavoidable charges of war, such a sum as should appear to the Governor-General in Council, on an attentive consideration of His Highness' means to bear a just and reasonable proportion to his actual net revenues. This was an onerous clause and had to be rigidly adhered to, if the Treaty was not to be broken. Every one of these tasks was diligently and honorably carried out by Pūrnaiya, who by his successful administration, not only made a reputation for himself but also brought increasing fame to the State.

Owing to the successive wars that the country had to endure and the character of Tipū's administration—described by Wilks as a “complicated system of fraud

(a) The pacifi-  
cation of the  
country: the  
Pālegar  
question.

and malversation of every kind, which grew out of the bigotry and gross barbarism of his Government"—the greater part of the country had by collusion between the Pālegars and the Amils passed into the hands of the former. On the re-establishment of His Highness' Government, there were accordingly few districts which did not at least furnish one claimant, possessing or pretending to the hereditary jurisdiction. In some cases, the Patels and in others the officers of Police emulated the Palegar character and sought to obtain independent rule over their respective villages and the privilege of encroaching on their neighbours. Influential raiyats who could afford a bribe were generally successful in procuring a false entry in the books of the district of the quantity of land for which they paid rent. When the newly appointed Amils endeavoured to check these abuses, they were systematically assassinated. This terrified their successors. There were, besides, a large number of turbulent characters let loose over the country as the result of the cessation of war and these added to the difficulties of the administration. Such were some of the initial troubles that the new administration had to contend against. But the distinguished triad—Col. Barry Close, Col. Arthur Wellesley and Dewan Pūrnaiya—were not to be baffled by them. Among their first acts was to proclaim an unqualified remission of all balances of revenue and the restoration of the ancient Hindu assessment on the lands and in the Sayer (*i.e.*, in the duties levied on the interior trade of the country). This had the effect of encouraging the well affected and allaying unnecessary alarm among the people generally as to the objects and motives which actuated the new Government. To enforce public authority, a small but select body of Cavalry, Infantry and Peons was collected from the ruins of the Sultān's army, while for the preservation of interior tranquillity,



the plan of Candāchār peons was devised. The last of these constituted the ancient military force of the country. The necessity for providing against their becoming the instruments of commotion compelled Pūrnaiya, in the first year of his administration, to entertain as many as 20,000 of these, but he gradually reduced their strength. These peons received a village pay of from two to three rupees a month according to local circumstances, half in money and half in land, and three Rupees and a half in addition, when called out from their respective villages within the limits of Mysore; with batta when sent on foreign service. The establishment, as fixed by Pūrnaiya, was based on the principle of having at least one individual of every family of the ancient military class in the pay of the State, the family being permitted to relieve the individual according to its convenience. This arrangement was well calculated to insure the allegiance of the whole and in case of emergency, 20,000 men of this regular description of force could be assembled at a few days' notice. As every Candāchār peon was a cultivator, Pūrnaiya endeavoured to limit the service of this force ordinarily to local duty. This duty consisted in being ready to obey the call of the officers of Police, and take their round of duty in the village fort to which they were attached. The establishment of this force had a four-fold effect:—

(a) it secured the tranquillity of the country which did not for long, since its formation, suffer the least interruption; (b) it checked the system of private depredation under which a portion of the crop was uniformly paid by the raiyats as the price of exemption from plunder; (c) by its means a system of Police was automatically organized throughout the country, not yielding in vigour and efficiency to any known at the time in India; and finally (d) it enabled the assembling at short notice of an irregular force of 20,000 well affected men for use.



Pūrnaiya and  
Resident  
Close tour the  
country ;  
policy  
towards  
Pālegars  
evolved.

While these preliminary measures were in the course of being effected, Pūrnaiya and Col. Close began their tour through the State accompanied by a small body of troops which Pūrnaiya had to manage, collect and equip. They gave their first attention to the Pālegar question, to which the Governor-General had drawn pointed reference in his instructions to the Resident. These opinions being entirely in accordance with the previously formed ideas of the Dewan, they received precedence over the rest of the urgent subjects that awaited solution. In this arduous task, Col. Close gave the most essential aid. The impediments were numerous, perplexing and hazardous, but Col. Close, with the unassuming efficiency which belonged to his character, enabled Pūrnaiya soon to surmount all these obstacles without reporting a difficulty. The direct authority of His Highness' Government was thus introduced and effectually maintained in all Pāliyams situated in the State. The refractory and the turbulent retired from the country; a smaller number of the same type were imprisoned but the greater portion accepted the gratuitous pensions, civil offices or military command, on the condition of residing at Mysore, or accompanying the Dewan when absent from that place. Pūrnaiya treated these last with a degree of deference and attention which appears to have been both judicious and acceptable.

(b) Setting  
up an  
efficient ad-  
ministrative  
system.

In the rest of the State where the Palegars were non-existent—the old corrupt administration soon gave place to the new system. The introduction of the authority of Government was rendered feasible by the efficient police force organized by Pūrnaiya. So effective, indeed, became the Police that the experiment of assassinating an Amil, tried in the early stages of the new Government, was found impossible of repetition. The old

tenures of land were maintained everywhere, so that so far as the main source of sustenance to the people and the principal source of revenue to the new Government were concerned, there was no cause for complaint. In the greater part of the country, the hereditary right of cultivation was recognized, subject to the payment of the rent customary in the District. In Bednore and Bullum, the property of the soil is held in great respect. The rent was paid in these provinces in money and the Government could not claim anything further than receive the fixed money rent. But military service had been a condition of this tenure until Haidar in 1764 commuted such service by an additional rate. His son attempted to increase this rate with disastrous consequences to himself. Pūrnaiya restored the rates of 1764 in Bednore as the land tax in that province, a measure which gave general satisfaction. In Bullum, which had not been brought into subjection even by Haidar and Tipū, the rates of land tax fluctuated. In this province, disturbances occurred in 1801-2 and they were, as will be found mentioned elsewhere, put down by Col. Arthur Wellesley. This suppression of disorders was followed by the destruction of forts and the opening up of roads and the settlement of the country. Pūrnaiya visited this Province in person and fixed the land tax on a basis which was acceptable to the landholder. Since then, no part of the State has been more tranquil than Bullum. The policy of Pūrnaiya in this matter of land taxation was hereditary landed property and fixed rents. But this was subject to one qualification: he showed a general disposition to accede to the proposals of individuals, for fixing the rents, and securing the property on every description of land, but did not press it as a measure of Government, which the raiyats habitually receive with suspicion. He held the view that people must be made gradually to understand and wish for such a measure

before it can be conferred and received as a benefit. The whole of the revenue was under *Amāni* management, a system which though attended with inconvenience, was difficult to abolish at the time. On a rough calculation, it would appear that even under this system, an industrious husbandman in Mysore paid to the Government an average rent equal to nearly 40 p. c. of the gross produce of his crops, while about 60 p. c. remained to replace the charges of husbandry and to requite his labour. Allowing about 27 p. c. for charges of husbandry, there would have remained to him about 33 p. c. of the gross produce of his crop, without reckoning the profits arising from live-stock, which Adam Smith considers to be so invariable a source of advantage to the farmer as to be reckoned among the products of land which always furnish rent.

The internal structure of the Government that secured, so soon after the disastrous wars of the preceding century, such an advantageous position to the cultivators needs only a brief mention. The Civil Government was divided into three departments:—

(1) Treasury and Finance: (2) Revenue and (3) Miscellaneous, which included heads which did not belong to the two former.

The military establishment had two distinct departments, Cavalry and Infantry. Finally, there was the *Candāchār*, or establishment of peons, which formed a department by itself, partaking of both Civil and Military functions, in its relation to the Police, the Post Office and the Army. *Pūrnaiya*, as *Dewan*, presided over every one of these six Departments of Government. The operations of the first of these was extremely simple. Each district had its own chief *Gollar* who kept the key of the Treasury, the *Sheristedar*, who had the account and the *Amil* (modern *Amildar*) who affixed his seal. The Treasury

could not be opened except in the presence of these three persons. The Shroff examined the cash, affixed his seal to the bags of treasure despatched to the general treasury and was responsible for all deficiencies in the quality of the coin. A similar process, sanctioned by the sealed order of the Dewan, attended the disbursement of cash at the General Treasury, where the accounts were kept in the same style of real accuracy and apparent confusion usual everywhere in India. The Government did not anticipate its revenues and declined on religious grounds to receive any interest for money and so was not troubled by the theories of finance which modern Chancellors of Exchequer have to grapple with. As regards the Revenue Department, its administration was committed to three principal Subadars and to Amils presiding over Districts, sufficiently limited in extent to admit a diligent personal inspection of the whole of their charge. These latter varied in number from 116 to 120, as convenience required. Their salaries were fixed by the Dewan, at rates considered by him to be adequate, and they were augmented on tried good conduct. Fraud or peculation on their part was met by the single punishment of being declared for ever incapable of serving Government again. Pūrnaiya was "inflexible" in working out this "rule," with the result that the general conduct of the Amils became fairly high before very long. The miscellaneous department comprised primarily of two heads: first, the regulation of His Highness the Mahārāja's establishment of State and of his House-hold and secondly, the custody of judicial records. Col. Close made an examination of His Highness' Establishment, but they were small during his minority. His House-hold was under the charge of Mahārāni Lakshmi-Aminanni, who, as Wilks has remarked, "presided over the ceremonial part of this department with great sense and a due attention to splendour and ceremony." As regards administration of justice,

due regard was paid to the ancient institutions of the country and to the doctrines of the Hindu Law. The Amils in the districts were the heads of the Police and decided minor cases of complaint for personal wrongs. The establishment of Candāchār peons imparted great efficiency to this department. The three Subadars stationed at Bangalore, Chitaldrug and Bednore, exercised general superintendence over their respective areas, and directed the proceedings in all important cases, civil and criminal. Criminal cases were tried with the aid of Panchāyats in open Cutcherry. The proceedings of each Panchāyat, with the special report of the Subadar or Amil, were forwarded to the Dewan, who made his decision on the inspection of these proceedings. In matters of difficulty or affecting the life or liberty of the prisoner, the final hearing was held before the Dewan, who pronounced his sentence, assisted by the judgment of the Resident. Sentence of death was pronounced only in cases of murder or plunder on the frontier. Theft and robbery were punished with appropriate terms of imprisonment and hard labour. Fines were discouraged as unsuited to subordinate authority, while corporal punishment was prohibited. Civil justice was administered in a manner analogous to the criminal, with the aid of Panchāyats. The proceedings were held in open courts and the more respectable inhabitants were encouraged to attend as assessors according to their leisure and convenience. The Amil confirmed the award of the Panchāyat where they were unanimous and forwarded it to the Dewan; in cases of difficulty or differences, the proceedings were forwarded by him or the Subadars, as the case may be, to the Dewan who pronounced the final decision on it in communication with the Resident. If he saw cause for it, he ordered a rehearing before himself. In every case, the parties had the right of appeal to the Dewan, whose frequent tours through the country



facilitated the exercise of this right. It will be seen that though extensive powers, in matters civil and criminal, were thus committed to the Subadars and Amils, the degree of protection afforded to the people in matters appertaining to the Revenue and in the enjoyment of their civil rights depended ultimately on the Dewan himself and on the extent of the interference which the Resident may have found it necessary to interpose. Speaking from personal knowledge, Wilks, in his Report dated the 5th December 1804, bore personal testimony to the Dewan's high personal probity and to the frivolous character of the complaints preferred against his administration before him. After investigating every case put before him, he thus summed up his views for the information of the Governor-General (Marquess Wellesley) :—

“I have the satisfaction to state to your Lordship my firm belief that the substantial objects of the administration of justice and the protection of the people in the enjoyment of their most important rights, are attained in a respectable degree by the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty, and that so long as the constituted authorities shall preserve the confidence of their superiors, these blessings are not liable to material interruption except from the depravity or supineness of both the Dewan and the British Resident.”

His interference strictly limited by Policy.

That is certainly high testimony to the success attained by Purnaiya in the working of the administration he evolved. Wilks, however, was not for undue interference by the Resident in affairs affecting the internal administration. He was anxious to establish a convention limiting such interference to cases absolutely demanding it.

He wrote in words which deserve to be quoted :—

“The Treaty which established the present Government of Mysore, confers on the representatives of the British Government the right of interposing its advice, in all cases whatever; and the spirit of the alliance seems no less to require, a discreet



forbearance in the ordinary routine of the Government than the firm and efficacious exercise of this right when the occasion shall demand it. The knowledge that such a power exists, and that it will be employed on proper occasions for the protection of the people, is sufficient of itself, to prevent any frequent or urgent necessity for its exercise; and where the personal characters of the Dewan and of the British Resident are such, as to ensure a proper degree of mutual confidence, the direct authority of the former will not be impaired by the seasonable interposition of advice. If, therefore, the Resident shall employ the proper precautions for being easily accessible without the intervention of a third person; and if to temper and probity, he joins an ordinary degree of vigilance, it does not seem to be probable that oppression of any magnitude can long exist in Mysore without detection and redress. Every trait in the character of the Dewan (Pūrnaiya) marks him as an extraordinary man; but Your Lordship will not infer from the general praise to which I most cheerfully add the tribute of my humble testimony, that it is intended to represent him, in the visionary view of a character without a fault, himself divested at once of the previous habits of his whole life, and capable of working a similar miracle upon others. But I venture with entire confidence to represent him to Your Lordship as a character very far surpassing the reasonable expectations of experienced men; and if an order of things has been established, competent upon the whole to correct abuses, when discovered, it may seem to Your Lordship, to constitute some approximation to the sober views, and practical ends of good Government."

(c)  
Repairing the  
damage done  
to the  
country.  
Revenue and  
Finance.

While the revenue system was restored to what it was anterior to the usurpation, steps were also taken to place the finances of the State on a sound basis in order to meet its responsibilities under the Treaty. The chief sources of revenue were classed under four heads:—Land-tax; *Sayer* or duties levied on the interior trade of the country; *Sēndi*, toddy and spirituous liquors; and tobacco. The land-tax included not only the assessments levied on land but also the house and plough taxes, imposts which ranged

in their incidence from district to district, according to ancient practice, but which averaged about one Kantirai fanam annually on each house and plough. The tax on land was paid in money in Bullum, Bednore, and a few other places and on all dry lands in every other part of the State. Lands under tanks paid the tax in kind, under the *vāram* tenure, payment to the Government being limited to a moiety of the actual crop. Under the Cauvery, however, payment of assessment in cash was introduced and was beginning to become popular. Steps were taken to make payment of the assessment regular and possible by the grant of Takavi advances when necessary, the Amils being authorized in this behalf, and by an extensive restoration of irrigation tanks and channels, which Pūrnaiya most assiduously carried out. During the latter part of Tipū's administration, they had been grossly neglected, with the result that in his regime, he had to expend considerably more than in the next three years as can be seen from the figures given below:—

Year.			Pagodas expended.
1st year	...	...	1,32,918
2nd year	...	...	1,54,325
3rd year	...	...	95,650
4th year	...	...	74,856
5th year	...	...	65,600

The restoration of irrigation works was so systematically carried out that Pūrnaiya soon realized that he had done more than what the actual state of the population admitted. But the utility of the work was great; it made revenue from land certain and popularised His Highness' Government as nothing else could have done. The second head of Revenue was *Sāyer*. It was in some Districts farmed and in others held in Amāni. Following on the advice of Col. Close, it was in the earlier part of the administration abolished, in so far as grain was concerned. But it did not take him long to find out that Pūrnaiya

was right, when he opposed its abolition even in part. In a country where commerce was ill-developed and there was little or no export trade, the loss in the revenue derived from road transit duties could not be easily compensated. For instance, in the year 1802-1803, it aggregated Pagodas 2,57,439 and formed next to Land Revenue, the chief source of State Revenue. The chief objection urged against it at the time was that it was "extremely inconvenient to traders." But Pūrnaiya was justified in not viewing with favour the suggestion of its abolition. Apart from the loss of revenue to be sustained from such a step, it was, in his opinion, likely to affect the supplies required for the Military at the time. The Military needs being imperious at the time, he was, indeed, accustomed to consider all civil regulations with reference to the exigencies of Military supply. He contended, with reason, that when road duties are general, the declaration of a general exemption in any given direction would draw thither the trade of every article which should there be in demand. As a matter of fact, Mysore met, during the years 1799 to 1804, the needs of all the troops so situated as to admit of drawing their supplies from it, in an abundance altogether unknown in other parts of the peninsula. It is true that more detailed attention was given at the time to objects of this nature in Mysore than was usual elsewhere, and that the satisfactory result achieved cannot be exclusively referred to the *Sāyer* system in vogue in it. But it has to be conceded that the effect of that system proved powerful and contributed not a little to the facility of forwarding military supplies. These considerations convinced Col. Close of the utility of *Sāyer*, quite apart from its revenue yielding capacity, and agree to its restoration even in the case of grain. The third head of revenue was *Sēndi*, toddy and spirituous liquors. *Sēndi* was produced from the wild date which grows spontaneously in the State and toddy from the palm. The

drawing of toddy from cocoanut was prohibited in every part of the State, as destroying the fruit which has always been reckoned an article of human consumption everywhere in India. The spirituous liquors used were produced in a variety of ways but principally by distillation from the macerated bark of the white thorn. The revenue from this head was generally farmed. The fourth source of revenue, tobacco, was also generally farmed, with suitable restrictions as to its selling price. Betel was everywhere free except in Chitaldrug, where the revenue derived from it was included under the head of Tobacco.

The system of revenue and finance organized by the restored Government of His Highness proved eminently successful from every point of view--both for the people and for the State as a whole. It enabled the people to obtain that much longed for peace that they had sought for in vain for some half a century or so and enabled them to enjoy the fruits of their labour unmolested. It helped the State and those responsible for its administration to maintain their good faith with the Company and to find without undue strain on or oppression of the people they governed the money required for keeping up their engagements under the Treaty of Seringapatam. For the sake of illustration, we may take the progress made by the orderly system of Government established during the first four years of the new administration. This period, as will be shown below, synchronized with the period of the stay in the State of Col. Arthur Wellesley as Commanding Officer and Col. Barry Close and his two immediate successors Messrs. Josiah Webbe and Col. Malcolm as Residents and of the Marquess Wellesley as Governor-General of India (1798-1805) and witnessed a number of wars in which the help of Mysore was sought and obtained, in the shape of men, money and supplies. These were

(d) Carrying out the conditions of the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam.

given with a readiness which astonished as much Col. Arthur Wellesley as the Marquess Wellesley. This progress may be set down in the following tables:—

### I. RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURE.

(In Kantirai Pagoda).

Year		Gross Revenue	Net Revenue
1799-1800	...	21,13,609	15,99,872
1800-1801	...	24,10,521	17,94,102
1801-1802	...	25,47,096	19,78,899
1802-1803	...	25,01,572	12,89,436
1803-1804	...	25,81,550	21,97,522

### II. TREASURY BALANCES.

(In Kantirai Pagodas).

Year			Balance at its end.
1799-1800	...	...	2,38,557
1800-1801	...	...	1,79,811
1801-1802	...	...	4,15,585
1802-1803	...	...	6,39,985
1803-1804	...	...	8,44,645*

\* Of this sum, Kantirai Pagodas 4,00,062 was due by the Company to the Mysore Government on account of Silladar Horse.

### III. COMPARATIVE STATISTICS RELATING TO PROGRESS OF THE COUNTRY UNDER CERTAIN HEADS.

		1801	1804
Peopled villages and hamlets	...	506	25,303
Houses	...	12,847	5,76,459
Families	...	12,041	4,82,612
Population (at 4½ persons to a family)	...	54,184	21,71,754
Ploughs	...	9,173	3,24,548
Looms	...	640	30,942
Shops	...	195	13,840



The above figures speak eloquently to the success of the new administration. A study of the first of the above tables shows the care with which expenditure should have been guarded. A head of expenditure that had specially attracted Marquess Wellesley's attention was alienations of land for religious purposes. To this head he had specially invited the attention of Close in his instructions. In the details furnished by Pūrnaiya to the Commission for Mysore Affairs, this had stood at Kantirai Pagodas 2,33,954. On the new Government taking over charge, Pūrnaiya, evidently in conformity with the advice conveyed to him, assumed possession, in the first instance, of all lands of all descriptions, principally with a view to revising the grants and alienations of every kind. This step enabled him to make commutations of land for money payment with the consent of the parties. In the first year, he reduced the expenditure under this head to Kantirai Pagodas 56,993; in the third it stood at 55,150; and in the fourth and fifth years, owing to the restoration of certain ancient places of worship, at 57,450. The expenditure under the head of restoration of tanks and channels, though heavy in the first two years, went down in the fifth year to Kantirai Pagodas 65,600, which was fifty per cent less than what it was in the first year. Pūrnaiya paid unceasing attention to this eminently useful work. Col. Wilks has left on record a comparison of what they were in 1799 and in 1804 respectively. In the former year, they had universally fallen into the most lamentable state and decay. Tanks which had been broken and disused from two to two hundred years, were visible in every part of the country and very many were overgrown with jungle and forgotten or unknown. By 1804, every embankment and *nullah* then in use had been put in perfect repair; many hundreds of each of the several descriptions of these works which were useless in 1799 had been restored and tanks forgotten for two hundred years

The progress  
made briefly  
indicated.



had been reclaimed from the depths of the forest. The expenditure incurred on Amildars and their subordinates, on whom the District administration rested, averaged in the fourth and fifth years about Kantirai Pagodas 1,72,600. Leaving out of account all such expenditure as that incurred on the rebuilding of the Bangalore and Channapatna forts, because of possible Maharatta invasions, which were still feared, and on the construction of the requisite accommodation for His Highness the Mahārāja and his relations and the Public Departments of Government, which were expected to be removed in 1804 to Mysore, to be nearer to the head-quarters of His Highness, and the expenses incurred for the rebuilding of the Mysore Fort, and the expenditure on Ināms and Jahgirs, which cannot, for any reason, be brought under the head of "expenses of management," the total expenditure incurred in the fifth year (Kantirai Pagodas 4,86,011) would be about  $13\frac{1}{2}$  p. c. of the gross revenue realized in that year. That seems most moderate, judged from any point of view.

Military  
Administra-  
tion.

It was, however, in the Military Department that Pūrnaiya's arrangement was most perfect, so perfect, indeed, that it won the admiration of Col. Arthur Wellesley and other European contemporaries of his time. Not only that; he so deeply impressed Marquess Wellesley, the Governor-General, in this regard that he recorded a Minute in which he declared that he was "decidedly of opinion" that the Government of Mysore had "fulfilled the obligations imposed upon it by the third article of the Subsidiary Treaty, in the most complete and satisfactory manner." In the Memorandum presented by Pūrnaiya to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, in 1799, he estimated the number of troops necessary to be kept in His Highness the Maharaja's service for the security and tranquillity of the country, excluding the

Company's troops maintained under the provisions of the Subsidiary Treaty, at 5,000 Barr Sepoys (or regular Infantry) formed after the manner of the Company's Sepoys, and 2,000 Peons. After the lapse of five years in 1804, experience suggested that the establishment might be thus made up:—Two thousand Horse, 4,000 Barr Sepoys, and peons in constant pay 2,500 with a garrison battalion of 1,000 men on inferior pay for Mysore and about an equal number of the same description for Manjarabad. The 2,000 Horse proposed was to be inclusive or exclusive of 500 stable horse, according to the circumstances. Approximately the force maintained totalled 10,500. The annual expenditure incurred on these troops aggregated approximately in the fifth year to Kantirai Pagodas 400,000 or about 40 Pagodas annually per head. This works out to about Rs. 17 a month per head, which even making some allowance for the higher purchasing power of the Rupee in those days, is an extremely moderate figure. As regards the efficiency and the utility of these troops, the records of the period are full of praise for the services rendered by them in the Mahratta and other wars which had then to be fought. During the extensive operations of 1803-04, the Company was enabled by the presence of these troops to draw out for field service, nearly the whole of the force intended for the protection of Mysore, leaving but two battalions of Indian Infantry to occupy the principal post in His Highness' dominions. A respectable body of the same troops were assembled during these operations for the protection of the frontier. A detachment from this corps also attacked and dispersed a considerable body of predatory troops which threatened to disturb the tranquillity of the country. The cavalry organised by Purnaiya enabled His Highness' Government by an easy augmentation to provide for the service of General Wellesley's army, that body of Silladar Horse, to whose efficient services he has borne such

honourable testimony in his public despatches. Col. Wilks, the then Resident, in his report dated 5th December 1804 to the Governor-General in Council, confirmed in unequivocal terms that testimony. "And finally," he wrote in that Report, "I submit to Your Lordship in Council, without the apprehension of stating a questionable proposition, that no equal expenditure for the maintenance of troops of the regular establishment of the Company, would have provided with the same efficacy, for the objects which have been described." This report shows that the extraordinary expenses incurred by His Highness the Maharaja's Government in consequence of the war amounted to Kantirai Pagodas 4,91,911, including Star Pagodas 100,000, estimated to be expenditure involved in the gradual demobilization of the special troops raised for the purpose, which was, on all hands, admitted to be a legitimate special charge incurred on them. These extraordinary expenses incurred by His Highness' Government were "entirely spontaneous." Wilks has recorded the "agitation" displayed by Purnaiya when he was asked to furnish the materials necessary for preparing the accounts required by the Governor-General in Council for judging the help rendered by the Government of His Highness under Article 3 of the Subsidiary Treaty "lest it should be supposed that he was too deficient in allegiance and zeal for the common cause, as to require repayment." The same authority has set down his deliberate opinion, formed after a careful and close examination of all the relevant facts and figures, that with reference to that Article of the Treaty, "it will be found that *the Government of Mysore has expended in eighteen months for the general service of War, the average surplus of its resources of upwards of thirty-nine months.*" Apart from all arithmetical calculations of the help rendered by His Highness' Government, there was, in his opinion, an infinitely more important aspect of its relation

Article 3 of  
Subsidiary  
Treaty fully  
and satisfactorily  
complied with.  
Testimony of  
Col. Wilks.

to the objects aimed at by the Governor-General (Marquess Wellesley) in restoring the ancient Royal House of Mysore and setting up an administration eminently suited to the purposes he had in view. Col. Wilks wrote:—

“ In whatever relation to its resources Your Lordship may be pleased to view the spontaneous expenditure by the Government of Mysore, of nearly *five lakhs of Pagodas in eighteen months for the service of the War*, I trust that I do not err, in considering the fact itself to speak in plain, but in eloquent language, the sense which is entertained by that Government, of the wisdom, the purity and the permanence of the present arrangements; and that it will be appreciated by Your Lordship, as a true and substantive value, very far exceeding its pecuniary amount.”

Writing on the same subject—how far His Highness' Government had performed the stipulations of the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty—General Arthur Wellesley giving an account of the ordinary resources and expenses of that Government and the extraordinary expenses it had incurred during the War, said, in his despatch dated 18th July 1804 :—

Confirmed by  
General  
Arthur Wel-  
lesley in a  
Despatch to  
the Governor-  
General in  
Council.

“ It appears the Rajah's gross revenue is about twenty-four lakhs of Canteray Pagodas. It has been raised to this sum by the superior management of the Dewan (Pūrnaiya) by his attention to the repairs of tanks and water-courses, and the construction of roads and bridges; by the encouragement he has given to strangers to resort to and settle in Mysore; and by his general endeavours to improve the agriculture of the country, and the situation of the people under the Government of the Rajah.....The expenses for the repairs of the tanks and water-courses and the construction of roads and bridges, for the buildings of the Rajah's accommodation, and other public works; the remissions for the unfavourable seasons, and the Military and Civil expenses of the Government, are liable to fluctuation. But the Dewan, at an early period of his administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rajah's Government to comply with any requisition which the British Government might make for

assistance in War, under the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore and he has saved annually a sum of money amounting to one lac of star Pagodas. He has made this saving the criterion, by which he had endeavoured to regulate his disbursements and he has considered the sum resulting from the saving to constitute the fund for answering any eventual demand under this Article of the Treaty."

After giving a description of the peace establishment of His Highness' Military Department, as set out above, and mentioning the details of the extraordinary expenses incurred by His Highness' Government, aggregating Pagodas 3,59,188, he referred to the "material assistance" that that Government had afforded to him during the Mahratta War of 1803-1804 in equipping the corps fitted out at Seringapatam, in despatching the supplies required for the troops on the march to the frontier and to the cavalry and the Brinjaries in supplying the magazines formed in Mysore, and generally in providing for all the calls made upon them. He also spoke approvingly of the services rendered by the corps of troops on His Highness' frontier under Purnaiya's personal command, which throughout the time the War lasted kept the enemy out of Mysore limits, and then concluded as follows :—

"I now take the liberty of congratulating Your Excellency (Marquess Wellesley) upon the success of all your measures respecting the Government of Mysore, and upon the practical benefits which the British Government has derived from its establishment. I cannot avoid, at the same time expressing an anxious hope, that the principles on which that Government was established and has been conducted and supported will be strengthened and rendered permanent."

Marquess  
Wellesley's  
commendation  
of His  
Highness'  
Government  
and its loyal  
fulfilment of  
the Treaty  
obligations.

Shortly after receipt of the above letter dated 18th July 1804 from General Arthur Wellesley, the Marquess Wellesley drew up, on 5th October 1804, a minute in which he sketched out the circumstances under which the liabilities mentioned in Article three of the Subsidiary Treaty came to be imposed on the restored Government of



His Highness and the circumstances as well under which, at the time of the Mahratta War, about the close of 1802, His Highness' Government were requested by the Madras Government, under instructions from the Supreme Government, an augmentation in His Highness' Cavalry establishment. He also bore testimony in it to the ready manner in which His Highness' Government raised an additional cavalry force of 1200 Silladar Horse, to which subsequently were added by it at different periods additional levies of Silladar Horse aggregating 1045. He further duly noted down in the Minute the facts that the actual disbursement of His Highness' Government on account of these additional levies and on account of the extra charges incurred in the equipment of the whole force of cavalry employed in co-operation with the British troops during the War greatly exceeded the amount charged to the Company and that it had, besides, incurred various other extra expenses in the prosecution of the War and was still bound to incur further charges owing to the necessity of having to gradually reduce the body of Silladar Horse thus raised and bring it down to peace establishment, the total of all which charges, he said had been mentioned in the annexure to General Wellesley's letter as amounting to Pagodas 3,59,188. He then proceeded to endorse the appraisalment of the faithful manner in which His Highness' Government had carried out their obligations under Article 3 of the Treaty and in doing so used words not of mere praise but of warm appreciation, words too which will long be remembered as a just requital of help received at a moment when it was most opportune. He wrote:—

“The third article of the Subsidiary Treaty was not intended to establish a precise rule to determine the proportion, which the pecuniary aid to be afforded by the Rajah of Mysore to the British Government on occasions of joint war should bear to the resources of his country; it would indeed



have been difficult, if not impracticable, to have formed such a rule. I am of opinion that the question of the Rajah's complete execution of the third article of the Subsidiary Treaty on the occasion of the late war, should be determined with reference to the general exertions of the Government of Mysore in support of the common course, as well as the extent of its pecuniary contributions.

"The despatch from Major-General Wellesley to which I have referred in this Minute, contains a just and most honourable testimony of the zeal, judgment and fidelity which regulated the exertions of the Government of Mysore in co-operating with the British Power, and of the degree in which these exertions contributed to the successful prosecution of the War. In my judgment, therefore, the Government of Mysore must be considered to have afforded to the British Government and its Allies in the late war, a degree of aid, greatly exceeding that which the British Government and its Allies could have derived from a mere pecuniary contribution on the part of the Rajah of Mysore, equal in amount of the extra charges actually incurred by the Rajah of Mysore on the occasion of the late War.

"The amount, however, of the extra charges incurred by the Rajah of Mysore, viewed as a pecuniary contribution, appears to me to be as considerable as could be reasonably and justly required from the Rajah of Mysore, under the provisions of the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty.

"After deducting seven lacs of Pagodas payable to the Honourable Company on account of the Subsidiary Forces stationed in Mysore, the amount of these extra charges is nearly equal to one-fifteenth of the gross revenue of Rajah's dominions. That amount also nearly equals the aggregate of the sums intended by the Dewan of Mysore to be annually set aside for the express purpose of meeting the contingency of War, as described in the fifteenth paragraph of Major-General Wellesley's despatch, and may, therefore, be considered at the commencement of the War, to have constituted nearly the whole of the disposable funds of the Government of Mysore."

"For these reasons, I am decidedly of opinion, that the Government of Mysore has fulfilled obligations imposed upon it by the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty, in the most complete and satisfactory manner.

“With a view to obviate the embarrassments which might hereafter arise from the difficulty of defining the extent of the aid to be eventually required from the Rajah of Mysore, under the provisions of the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty, I purpose, that the aid actually afforded by the Government on the occasion of the late War, be considered as the standard by which our future demands on the Government of Mysore shall be regulated on similar occasions.

“I have great satisfaction in availing myself on this occasion to record my deliberate declaration, that every object which I contemplated, in the settlement of the Government of Mysore have been conducted with a degree of regularity, wisdom, discretion and justice, unparalleled in any Native State in India. The benefits of this system of administration, combined with the conditions of its connection with the British Government, have been manifested in the general tranquillity and prosperity of the Rajah of Mysore’s dominions, in the increase of population and resources of the country, in the general happiness of the people, and in the ability of the Government of Mysore to discharge with zeal, and fidelity, every obligation of the subsisting Alliance.

“Under the operation of the Treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam in the course of five years, that country has acquired a degree of prosperity, which could not possibly have been attained under any other system of political connection, and has been enabled in some degree to repay, by the efficiency of its assistance in the hour of emergency, the benefits which it has derived from the protecting influence and power of the British Government.”

“I discharge a satisfactory part of my duty in availing myself of this occasion to record the high sense, which I entertain of the merits and services of the Dewan Pūrniah. To the extraordinary abilities, eminent public zeal, integrity, judgment, and energy of that distinguished Minister, must be ascribed, in a considerable degree, the success of measures, which I originally adopted for the settlement of Mysore and the happy and prosperous condition of that flourishing country. The merits and services of the Dewan have been peculiarly conspicuous in the promptitude and wisdom manifested by him in the application of the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the public service during the late War with the

confederated Mahratta chieftains: and I deem it to be an act of justice to acknowledge that the expectations which I formed in selecting Pūrniah for the important office of Minister of Mysore, have been greatly exceeded by the benefits which have resulted from his excellent administration."

Marquess Wellesley's declaration that His Highness' Government has fully and satisfactorily complied with the third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty was finally given formal effect to by the supplementary Treaty concluded between the Company and His Highness the Maharaja on 29th January 1807, which rendered specific His Highness' pecuniary obligation in the event of War by commutating it to the maintenance of a body of 4,000 Horse at all times.

According to Sir John Malcolm, it would seem that this modification of the Treaty was to some extent due to Sir George Barlow as well. The following passage from his writings (see his *Political History of India, 1784-1829*, I, 544-7) render this point clear:—

"From the hour when the Government of Mysore was established, the whole attention of its *able minister Pūrniah* had been directed to the object of saving the Country from such internal troubles as are the common consequences of those changes which throw the Military part of the population suddenly out of employ. Besides some battalions of regular Infantry, he kept in service a very numerous local militia and a large and efficient body of irregular Horse formed of the very best of those Troops who had served Hyder Ali and Tipū Sultān and (had been) commanded by the Officers most distinguished in the service of those Princes. The measure grounded, as it were, on a knowledge of human nature and of the peculiar feelings and habits of the Natives of India had the complete success which it merited. The internal tranquillity of the country was undisturbed and the Troops of the Rajah of Mysore, particularly the Horse, were found useful and efficient auxiliaries.

"A consideration of the above circumstances and of the just title to favour which the Mysore Government had

established, induced Sir George Barlow, then Governor-General, to consent to the modification of the article of the Treaty of Mysore which gave to the British an indefinite power of calling on the Rajah for pecuniary assistance on the occasion of War. This article, which was alarming to the dependant State, from its being undefined, was commuted for a contingent of four thousand Horse upon whose services we had a right at all times to call, paying only a small extra allowance necessary for their support when employed beyond the limits of the Mysore Dominions.

"The above engagement negotiated and concluded in the true spirit of those principles on which the connection was formed by rendering that specific which was indefinite, and by making that which was before a question of expediency or policy, an article of faith, not only confirmed the benefits derived from this alliance but gave it durability by placing beyond the power of the Rajah the means of diminishing his own responsibility and his utility as an ally.

"The constitution of that body of men, for whose permanent support this arrangement provided, corresponded with the character of the Government which they served. The Commanders of these Horse form a part of the aristocracy of the State to which they belong and by their good conduct with the British Armies they obtained a title to our favor and protection which, without trenching on the right of their Prince to raise or degrade them, renders such an act when opposed to justice so ungracious that there is hardly an instance of its occurrence; and in every case where an officer of distinction dies, the command of his men devolves, according to the usage of the service, on the son or the next heir."

Marquess Wellesley's description of his acknowledgment of the services rendered by His Highness' Dewan as an "act of justice" was apposite. He followed up the Minute in which he made this acknowledgment by a letter, indited on the same date (5th October 1804), to Lord William Bentinck, then Governor of Madras, in which he announced to him that an important change had been resolved upon. This was the placing of the Government of Mysore, under the direct authority of the Supreme

Result of  
Supreme  
Government's  
approbation :  
Mysore placed  
directly under  
the Supreme  
Government.  
5th October  
1804.

Government instead of, as heretofore, (under his orders dated the 4th September 1799), under the Government of Fort St. George. The reason for this change was the great alteration which had taken place in the political situation by about 1804 and more especially the improved connection which had been established between the British Government and the Peishwa, whose dominions became, as the result of the late War, contiguous to those of His Highness the Maharaja of Mysore. The order was to take immediate effect and Lord Bentinck was requested to appraise the British Resident in Mysore of it and ask him to address all his correspondence direct to the Governor-General in Council and to inform him that he was to receive immediately from that authority all such orders and instructions as it might be necessary to issue to him for his guidance. How far this change was due to the influence of General Arthur Wellesley, it is difficult to determine. But there is evidence enough in the Wellington Despatches to infer that it should have been largely his work. He had no high opinion of the capacity of the then Madras Government. In a letter dated 8th July 1801, he had bitingly referred to the *dubashery* (management through *dubashes*) and the corruption which was prevalent there. Writing again, on 10th November 1801, to his brother Henry Wellesley (afterwards famous as Lord Cowley and as Ambassador at Paris) he had spoken of "Madras sharks." In January 1804, he made it known to the Marquess Wellesley that Malcolm's successor at Mysore should be "a gentlemen from the Bengal Civil Service." He added:—

"The Government of that country should be placed under the immediate protection and superintendence of the Governor-General in Council. The Governors of Fort St. George ought to have no more to do with the Rajah, than they have with the Soubah of the Deccan or the Peishwa. The consequence of the continuance of the present system will be, that the Rajah's



Government will be destroyed by corruption ; or if they should not be corrupt, by calumny. I know no person, either civil or military, at Fort St. George, who would set his face against the first evil ; or who has the strength of character or talents to defend the Government against the second. In my opinion, the only remedy is to take the Rajah under the wing of the Governor-General ; and this can be done effectively only by appointing, as Resident, a gentleman of the Bengal Civil Service, and by directing him to correspond only with the Governor-General."

The Court of Directors, however, did not eventually approve of this arrangement. Shortly after the recall of Marquess Wellesley, they sent out orders to the Supreme Government reversing the same. These orders were made known to the Government of Fort St. George and the Resident at Mysore on 15th December 1806, and agreeably to them the Madras Government, obtained, once again "the immediate controlling authority over the Residency of Mysore."

Court of Directors reverse the arrangement and restore the controlling authority to the Madras Government, 15th December 1806.

Meanwhile the country began rapidly to recover from the ravages of a century. The prosperous appearance it put on within a year of the restoration of the ancient Royal House cannot be better described than in the words of Colonel Arthur Wellesley, in a letter dated 26th May 1801 :—

Increasing prosperity of the country.

"The Rajah's Government is in the most prosperous state. The country is become a garden where it is inhabited, and the inhabitants are returning fast to those parts which the last savage had forced them to quit. The family have moved into old Mysore, where their ancient Palace has been rebuilt in the same form in which it was formerly and I believe, on the old foundations. The whole family appear as happy as we wished they should be when this Government was established. Mysore is become a large and handsome Native Town, full of inhabitants ; the whole Country is settled and in perfect tranquillity. I believe the Rajah's treasury is rich, as he pays his kists with regularity ; but Purneah (Pūrnaiya), who has an eye to the future prosperity and revenue of the country, has



repaired numberless tanks, particularly that large one near Milcottah (Melkote); has rebuilt many towns, and forts: and, I understand, encourages the inhabitants of the Country in all parts by advance of money and remissions whenever they require them. Thus the establishment has succeeded in a manner equal to our most sanguine expectations; and there is every prospect that its prosperity will be permanent."

The tank near Melkote referred to above by General Wellesley should be the splendid tank of Moti Talab at Tonnur, 10 miles north-west of Seringapatam. Writing of its restoration to Lord Clive, Governor of Madras, Pūrnaiya remarked on 13th November 1800:—

"The Mutti Talak (for Talab or tank) situated in the village Tunnaiyer (Tonnur), which tank had remained in a state of ruin for a series of years, has been recently rebuilt in the strongest manner, and at present contains a body of water of about sixty feet deep" (the words in the original letter mention the depth as "twelve men's depth"). (See *Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence, Pol. Dept.* 1801, letter No. 21).

That General Wellesley's description of the increasing prosperity of the country was a just appreciation of the eminently practical and utilitarian character of the administration of Pūrnaiya is well established by the records of the period, referred to below.

Public works  
carried out by  
Pūrnaiya.

Besides the restoration of tanks and water courses throughout the State, and the rebuilding of the Mysore Palace, Pūrnaiya carried out the reconstruction of the forts of Mysore, Bangalore and Channapatna. He also made arrangements for a suitable residence for His Highness at Seringapatam. This residence cost about Pagodas, 11,000 and appears to have been finished in the fourth year of His Highness' reign (1802-1803). Under his fostering care, Bangalore grew in importance and its population grew to such a degree that it was reported that there was "scarce room sufficient to erect more houses"

and owing to want of water, a new tank was begun in 1801, "near the rampart" (evidently the Sampigai tank, not far away from the Wesleyan School and the Cenotaph). In April 1802, it was stated to be so far advanced that it was expected it would be shortly finished and laid "to convey water within the town, which will contribute to the comfort of the inhabitants" (*Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence, Pol. Dept.*, 1802, letter No. 28). Another public work of considerable importance carried out by Pūrnaiya was the construction of what has been described in the records of the times as the "Great Bridge" over the Cauvery, which appears to have cost over Pagodas 64,500. This is the Wellesley Bridge, still in existence, to the north of Seringapatam. Writing of it on 15th June 1803 to Lord Clive, the Governor of Madras, Pūrnaiya said :—

"The Bridge having been commenced in a situation selected by General Wellesley is to consist of 70 cheshmahs, each having three pillars. Seventy pillars and a third part of the bridge are already erected, in a manner so strong and of stones so massy that it will be a very durable work; this is the season in which the river fills; during the rains, the further stones and materials which are necessary shall be got ready and in the course of the next year, the work will be completed." (*Records of Fort St. George 1803, l.c.*, letter No. 19).

A year later, in another letter dated 20th June 1804, Pūrnaiya, thus reported its completion to Lord William Bentinck, the successor of Lord Clive, in the Governorship of Madras :—

"Major Wilks (the then Resident) and myself on our arrival here (at Seringapatam), having surveyed the new bridge constructing in the name of the Governor-General, observed what has been executed and what remained undone. After causing the necessary materials to be procured and giving the most express and positive injunctions about the work, it is now finished, except a small part of the parapet, which in a month or six weeks will also be accomplished. The river being

now three-fourths full, a passage is afforded for men, merchandise, grain and other articles. The passage by boats is suspended and the people with satisfaction and gratitude acknowledge the utility of the Lord's Bridge. It is constructed in the strongest manner, is calculated to endure for ages without decay. It is through the auspicious destinies of its great patron that it hath been executed with this degree of expenditure and permanency." (*Records of Fort St. George, 1804, l.c. letter No. 16*).

The Sagarkatte dam across the Lakshmantirtha, a tributary of the Cauvery, was another work of public utility undertaken by Purnaiya. This dam is near the village of the same name and gives rise to the Anandur Channel on the right bank. This channel was originally carried as far as Mysore, it having been Purnaiya's object to supply the town with the river water. The design, however, failed, and the channel is in order only for 20 miles. It irrigates about 1,300 acres and the revenue derived from it has averaged about Rs. 7,200 per annum. (See *Vol. V.* of this work under *Lakshmantirtha*).

The execution of improvement works like these attracted considerable attention at the time. They won universal approval. General Wellesley's commendation of Purnaiya's activities in this connection has been quoted above. Lord Clive in his farewell letter, dated the 15 July 1803, was equally strong in his praise of them. On hearing of the projected Wellesley Bridge, through Josiah Webb, the Resident, he wrote to Purnaiya that he received the information "as a fresh proof of your unwearied attention to promote the intents (interests) of the Country entrusted to your charge, and to apply the increasing wealth and resources of Mysore to works calculated to combine public utility and magnificence." (*Records of Fort St. George, 1803, l. c. letter No. 20*).

The practical effect of improvements introduced by Purnaiya were perceived when a severe famine broke out about the middle of 1804 in the districts north of the

Krishna and the Tungabhadra rivers. The inhabitants of the affected provinces—outside the frontiers of this State—repaired in great number to Mysore, some 500 to 1,000 being reported to be found in each Taluk and people still pouring in. The abundance of grain was, at the time, so great in Mysore, that it was able to furnish these immigrants with grain, which was largely exported to the Northern districts. Lord William Bentinck, on hearing of the help afforded by Mysore on this occasion, spoke highly approvingly of the Administration here. He wrote to Purnaiya on 4th July 1804:—

“While I lament the fatal effects, which have been experienced in other parts of India from a deficiency of grain, it has been a source of gratification to me to observe that the territories of Mysore have been preserved from that calamity and that in continuing to enjoy the blessings of abundance, they have been enabled to administer to the wants of the neighbouring States, and to afford shelter to the inhabitants suffering under the affliction of the famine.

“In tracing the cause of such effects, they cannot fail to afford satisfactory evidence of unremitting zeal and vigilance in the internal administration of the affairs of Mysore; and I look forward with a degree of pleasure proportioned to my confidence in your qualifications for the trust reposed in you, to the progressing augmentation of the wealth and happiness of that country.

“I am happy to learn that you continue to direct your attention to works of public utility and magnificence (Bentinck was evidently referring to the Wellesley Bridge, whose completion had just been reported to Lord Clive, his predecessor); and I consider it to be a proof of the expansion of your mind, that you study to promote such undertakings as are equally calculated to augment the productive powers of the Country, to exalt the honour of the Government of Mysore, and to distinguish the era of your administration.” (*Ibid*, 1804, letter No. 17).

The country became so prosperous indeed under the new administration that it was able to find funds not only

for the regular payment of the subsidy due to the Company for the maintenance of the Subsidiary Force which, under the Treaty, had to be remitted in twelve equal monthly instalments, but also for meeting the extraordinary Military charges that His Highness' Government had to provide in connection with the Mahratta War and for the public improvements that were vigorously pushed on by Purnaiya to bring the country to its former position. More than that, Purnaiya's financial methods enabled the State, as he states in a letter dated 30th October 1801 to Lord Clive, to reimburse the Company in the amount of the remission in the subsidy of the first year, "which the unsettled state of the country in the commencement of my management, appeared to render a proper indulgence." (*Records of Fort St. George, 1801*, l. c. letter No. 58). As this offer was made "without the danger of inconvenience to the affairs of the Rajah," His Lordship desired the Colonel (Close, the Resident) to accept Purnaiya's proposal. (*Ibid*). In his letter dated 28th April 1802 in accepting the offer, His Lordship cordially congratulated Purnaiya on the success that had attended his administration and remarked :—

"The reimbursement of the money remitted in the first year affords a satisfactory testimony of the success which has attended the endeavours of the Rajah's Government to restore the prosperity of Mysore and the voluntary tender of the money was made in that spirit of cordial union which binds the interests of the Rajah to those of the Company and under a just appreciation of the relations established by the Treaty of Seringapatam. I have therefore great pleasure in expressing my entire satisfaction at this arrangement and in assuring you that it will be equally acceptable to the Most Noble the Governor-General."

He added :—

"Knowing your personal anxiety to discharge the obligations of the engagements subsisting between the Rajah of



Mysoor and the Honourable Company, I have great satisfaction in informing you that recent dispatches from England make honourable mention of the punctuality observed in the performance of those engagements, and I avail myself of this occasion to convey to you the assurance of my confidence in your zealous exertion to discharge the duties committed to you, and to secure to His Highness the Rajah all the benefits resulting to the Government of Mysoor from its connexion with the British Nation." (*Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence, Pol. Dept. 1802*, Letter No. 29, dated 2nd April 1802).

Certain of the works erected and to be erected by Pūrnaiya in connection with the use of the water of the Cauvery, within the State, especially the new anicut at Sagarkatte, which had not yet come into use at the time, evidently caused some misapprehension, between the years 1804 and 1807, in the Tanjore District. On a reference from the Collector of that District, in 1807, the Madras Government caused inquiries to be made in Mysore in regard to the truth of the allegations. In a despatch dated the 27th March 1807, Major Wilks, the Resident, pointed out that the irrigation works of the State had been neglected by Tipū Sultān during the latter part of his administration and that the new Government in Mysore had only restored them "to the extent that the population of the several districts at present admits." He also drew attention to the fact that the dreadful famine that followed in the wake of the war of 1790-92 had swept off a large part of the population, particularly in those districts which were the scene of the military operations, the river districts being, apart from Chitaldrug, the worst sufferers in this respect. As the population could not be increased by any artificial means in these districts, it was pointed out that very many years would have to elapse before the culture of these districts could be brought up to the level even of the faulty administration of Tipū Sultān previously to

Unfounded  
misapprehen-  
sions about  
the effects  
of the  
improve-  
ments aimed  
at in Mysore.



1790-92. As a matter of fact, Major Wilks added, by a reference to authentic village accounts, the cultivation in 1804 was actually 12,764 English acres less than that of 1789-90, the year preceding the war above referred to. It was thus obvious that the failure, real or imaginary, of water in the Cauvery below the Ghauts in 1802-03 and 1804, could not have arisen by an increased consumption of water in Mysore during these years, unless the same causes had also operated with much superior force in 1789-90 and the preceding years, which the Collector of Tanjore expressly stated not to have occurred and indeed was, at the time, matter of general notoriety. "The waters have been abundant," said Major Wilks, "in Tanjore during a larger consumption in Mysore and they have been diminished in Tanjore during a smaller consumption in Mysore. The simple enunciation of these two propositions is sufficient to disunite them for ever as cause and effect." He also drew attention to the fact that the quantity of cultivable land under the twenty-six out of the thirty-five anicuts mentioned in the village accounts exceeded the quantity cultivated in 1804 by 36,118 English acres, excluding the acreage cultivable under the seven other anicuts for which the details were not available and excluding also the increase under each of the thirty-three anicuts beyond the village estimates which, it was known, many of them would admit, and which would be resorted to before undertaking the erection of expensive new works. Even if the suggestion that the river works above Seringapatam would influence the cultivation of Tanjore be admitted as a serious proposition and even if the political reasoning that His Highness' Government was entitled to no greater expenditure of water than what they were entitled to as the former possessors of the old river works be adopted, for the sake of argument, Major Wilks argued that it would be many years "before the period shall arrive for

arresting the spirit of improvement which at present exists in Mysore."

What appears to have troubled the good folk of Tanjore was more what was going to be done in the future rather than what had been accomplished in the past by the new Administration in Mysore. Major Wilks had little difficulty in disposing of this aspect of their objection. The question of erecting new works on the Kapila and Kabbini had not yet arisen, the more so as there were so many old works "unemployed for want of hands." He made it plain that the trouble then in the State was not so much land or works as the want of population to put them to use. Major Wilks made it also clear that the projected canal for conveying the water of the Cauvery from Tippoor across the Lakshminatirtha to Mysore had not cultivation for its primary object. "The serious distress experienced by the inhabitants of this populous and rapidly increasing town (*i.e.*, Mysore)," he wrote, "for the common purposes of life, first suggested the idea. It was of course strengthened by the hope of introducing into a Hindu town, the holy stream of the Cauvery; and it was expected that an extent of cultivation would be procured which should yield some return for the first cost of the undertaking. Little or no new cultivation is intended above Mysore. From that town to the Kapila above Nanjangud, where the channel will discharge itself to join the general stream, is about 12 miles, and in approaching some villages in that direction which are tolerably well peopled, it is proposed to make use of a portion of the surplus water to the extent which experience will justify." This was the object of Purnaiya's Nallah Scheme, a scheme much misunderstood at the time and ever thereafter.

In formulating his opinion on the subject, Major Wilks had a special memorandum on the subject drawn up after an elaborate survey by Major Colin Mackenzie

(of Mss. fame), afterwards Surveyor-General of India. He conclusively brought out in his memorandum that at the period subsequent to November, the Cauvery at Seringapatam had for the past seven years (1800-1807) been an insignificant stream and could not furnish to Tanjore what it did not possess, while the river below the Ghauts was generally well supplied at the same period. He suggested that the river at Trichinopoly had a supply distinct from that at Seringapatam not only in the later portion of the season but also in the earlier. It is an observation familiar to the people of Trichinopoly that the Cauvery fills at that place before it fills at Seringapatam. "And I knew," adds Wilks, "on unquestionable authority that it did so in 1805." The magnitude of the whole Cauvery at the place where the new Nulla was to receive its supply was estimated by Major Mackenzie to be one-tenth part of the volume which is divided by the island of Seringapatam. Though Major Mackenzie had not calculated the proportion of the water flowing into the Nulla to the water at the above mentioned place, his final conclusion furnished the data for such calculation. Without going into further details, it might be useful to state Major Mackenzie's final conclusion in the matter. "I am induced to think," he wrote, "that no injurious effect can follow from the work at present in execution from Tippoor nor from the repairs of the anicut works within Mysore and that the cause of the failure and continuance of the usual rise near Trichinopoly must be sought in some other sources, if it does not appear to have been owing to the failure of the usual fall of rain at the heads."

As regards the Nulla itself, Major Mackenzie records that he inspected the same and made notes about it on the spot. Writing on 22nd March 1807, he said:—

"From Tippoor to the new anicut measures 23 miles; from thence the new Nulla is now cutting to Mysore in a

winding course of  $48\frac{1}{2}$  miles, the whole length when completed to Mysore Fort, will be  $71\frac{1}{2}$  miles. Its general breadth from 25 to 30 feet and the greatest depth of water it is expected to drain off at its first outlet.....is reckoned at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet but probably it will seldom amount to that depth. Of this line.....I shall only add that the greatest depth of water carried by it can only take place at the height of the floods." (See Major Colin Mackenzie's *Remarks on the Heads and Courses of the Cauvery*, dated 22nd March 1807).

Under the Partition Treaty of Mysore, certain districts on the northern frontier of Mysore were reserved for the Peishwa, but as he did not accede to the treaty, these districts (Holalkere, Mayakonda and Harihar), which now form part of the Chitaldrug District, were temporarily placed in charge of His Highness' Government for purposes of management. Purnaiya managed them for the Company and made over the net revenue derived from them, during the year 1800 (see *Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence (Pol. Dpt.)*, 1800, Letter No. 21). In April 1801, as will be found mentioned below, these districts, were under the Supplementary Treaty then concluded, transferred over to His Highness' Government in lieu for certain districts which had fallen to Mysore under the Subsidiary Treaty. Lord Clive (later Earl Powis), then Governor of Madras, complimented Purnaiya, in acknowledging the accounts sent by him, on his "prudent and just management" of these districts and every part of Mysore." (*Records of Fort St. George, Country Correspondence*, l. c.).

Management  
of British  
Districts by  
Purnaiya,  
1799-1800-

The management of these districts was entrusted to Purnaiya in accordance with a suggestion made by Col. Arthur Wellesley to the Governor-General in a letter dated 14th June 1802. "I think," he said in this letter, "that it would be advisable to give over to the Rajah's

Government the management of the Countries which it is intended eventually to cede to the Mahrattas, because they will fall more naturally under it and will be likely to be productive immediately than if we take possession of them. Our gentlemen must have new establishments of all kinds suited to their systems, which, however they may excel those of the natives in the long run, are not likely to suit the people of the country immediately. I think it is to be apprehended that if we take those countries, it will create a jealousy at Hyderabad. This ought to be avoided, particularly as nothing can be gained by taking them."

The Three  
Supplemen-  
tary Treaties,  
1801, 1803  
and 1807.  
Supplemen-  
tary Treaty  
of 1801.

The three supplementary treaties of 1801, 1803 and 1807 may be conveniently referred to here.

As the Peishwa refused to accede to the Partition Treaty of Mysore, the districts reserved for him under it, fell, by right of conquest, to the Company and the Nizām. On the principle of mutual convenience, the Company (represented by Col. Close, the Resident) and His Highness the Mahārāja signed in the Fort at Mysore a Treaty on 6th April 1801, to exchange territories of equal value belonging to them. Under this Supplementary Treaty, His Highness ceded portions of Gudekota (now included in the Bellary District), the Ēlu-Sāvira-Sīme, portions of Punganur (in the North Arcot District), and Pangur and Hulhal to the Company, who ceded to His Highness in exchange the Districts of Holalkere, Harihar and Mayakonda.

Supplemen-  
tary Treaty  
of 1803.

This Supplementary Treaty of 1801 was, however, superseded by another such Treaty concluded between the two parties (Josiah Webbe, the Resident, representing the Company) on 29th December 1803, under which His Highness the Mahārāja ceded to the Company



Wodduntapur, Ēlu-Sāvira-Sime, the greater part of Punganur, Wynaad, Hulhal and part of Gudekota in lieu for Holalkere, Mayakonda and Harihar. It was by this Treaty that the Company obtained the undisputed possession of the districts of the Wynaad, which was one of its primary objects. Malabar was one of the Districts ceded to the Company by Tipū Sultān in 1792. Whether the hill tract of Wynaad, which was part of the estate of the Pichi Rāja, who held the Kotiote taluk of Malabar, was included in this cession was a disputed point. When Marquess Wellesley arrived in India in 1798, it was settled that Wynaad still remained part of Tipū's possessions. By the Partition Treaty of 1799, Wynaad was ceded under one name to the Company, under another, *viz.*, Ahmednagar Chiklur, to His Highness the Mahārāja of Mysore, its revenue being assessed at Pagodas 10,000. But though allotted to both parties the Company alone retained possession of it. Under the Supplementary Treaty of 1803, His Highness resigned all claim to it on the cession to him by the Company of certain districts of equivalent value.

A third Supplementary Treaty was concluded on 29th January 1807 between the Company (represented by Major Wilks, the Resident) and His Highness the Maharaja for modifying and defining the provisions of the Third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, in the light of the despatch of the Marquess Wellesley dated the 5th October 1805, which has been referred to above. The object of this Treaty was to render specific this particular Article of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, the indefinite contribution in war agreed to in it being commuted for the fixed maintenance of a certain body of horse in peace and war. His Highness was, under this Treaty, relieved from the pecuniary contribution to which he was liable under the Third Article of the

Supplementary Treaty of 1807.



Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, His Highness in consideration of such relief, engaging to maintain at all times, fit for service and subject to muster, a body of 4,000 effective horse, of which 500 were to be Bargeers, and the rest Silladar Horse. Such part of this body of 4,000 horse as in the opinion of the British Government was not necessary for the internal protection of the State of Mysore, was at all times to be ready to accompany and serve with the Company's army, all extra expenses of their maintenance beyond the Mysore territory after one month from the date of crossing the frontier, being paid by the Company at 4 Star pagodas for each effective man and horse. His Highness was also to use his utmost endeavour to augment the 4,000 horse if required by the Company, the whole expenses of such augmentation and of the maintenance of such additional numbers, at 8 Star pagodas for each effective man and horse, while within the territory of Mysore, and of an additional batta, at the rate of 4 Star pagodas a month, after the expiration of one month from crossing the frontier of Mysore, being borne by the Company. As His Highness was, at the time that this treaty was concluded, provisionally maintaining, in conformity with the wish of the Governor-General, a body of 4,000 horse, since the conclusion of Mahratta War of 1803-04, it was also declared that His Highness had fully and faithfully performed the obligations of the Third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty until then (the date of the Supplementary Treaty) and thereby absolved from all retrospective claims on that account. An important effect of this Treaty may be noted here. While it rendered definite the obligation of the Government of Mysore, it reserved for the State a respectable part of the excellent cavalry of Mysore, which in the intermediate period had been employed with distinguished credit under General Wellesley in the Deccan and prevented from swelling the numbers of that confederation of

disbanded armies which, under the designation of Pindaris, did so much havoc, as will be shown below, in 1817. Indeed, this cavalry became useful in putting those very Pindaris and restoring peace in the land.

Among the graceful acts done by Pūrnaiya in the first year of his office was one relating to the Ānegundi Rāja, which deserves special mention. The territory of that Prince, which had been captured by Tipū Sultān, who, as has been narrated above, even sacked his capital, fell, under the Partition Treaty of Mysore, to the share of the Nizām. That Prince's House, however, had been from ancient times connected with the Mysore Royal House and the cessation of that connection was doubtless painful to both parties. The Prince of the time was Tirumala-Rāya, probably identical with Tirumala, the son of Vira-Venkata, the son of Gopāla. (See above under *Vijayanagar* : Successors of Śrī-Ranga VI). Pūrnaiya presented to him, in the name of His Highness, on the eve of the transfer of his country to the charge of the Nizām, presents to the value of Kantirai Pagodas 2,375. An entry to this effect appears in Col. Wilks' *Report on the Administration of Mysore*. (See details for Receipts and Expenditure for 1799-1800). Thus ended the historic relationship between Mysore and Ānegundi, the last relic of the ancient Vijayanagar Empire.

Presents to Prince of Ānegundi on his transfer to the charge, of the Nizām 1799.

As the new administration struck deeper root in the soil, it offered increasing opportunities for improving its material resources.

Survey of Mysore, 1799-1810.

Under the orders of Marquess Wellesley, Lieut.-Col. Colin Mackenzie, of Mss. fame, carried out a survey of the State, which he began in 1799 and completed in 1810. The first accurate map of Mysore was laid down by him in 1808.

Buchanan-Hamilton's Journey and report on the agricultural and other resources of the State, 1800-1801.

Francis Buchanan-Hamilton, a member of the Bengal Medical Establishment and a Fellow of the Royal Society, travelled through the State and the adjoining areas with a view to investigate the state of its agriculture, arts and commerce. His observations are recorded in three large quarto Volumes headed *A journey from Madras through the countries of Mysore, Canara and Malabar*. Though thus styled, it is devoted largely to this State and to its agriculture, trade, industries, antiquities, tradition, etc. The journey began at Madras on the afternoon of the 23rd April 1800 and ended at the same place on 5th July 1801. He gratefully records in it (I. Chapter II, 61), the cordial assistance he received in his work from Col. Close and Dewan Pūrnaiya, the latter of whom he interviewed at Seringapatam on the 18th May 1800. A Brahmin Assistant was given to him and he was directed to accompany him "with orders to call upon every person that I shall desire for information." His journey is recorded in the form of a Diary, which is a veritable mine of information on the state of the country immediately after Tipū's fall.

Abbè Dubois commences his labours in Seringapatam, 1799-1800.

The peaceful and settled character of the country attracted wide attention. The famous Abbè Dubois, then in the south, came towards the close of 1799, by invitation, to Seringapatam and became eventually the founder of the Catholic Church in Mysore and of the Christian agricultural community at Sathahalli, near Hassan. He laboured in Mysore for about 23 years. He is said to have introduced vaccination into the State. (See *Vol. I* of this work, Chap. VIII, *Religion*).

Lord Valentia's visit to Seringapatam and Mysore, 1804.

Lord Valentia, in the course of his travels in India (1802-06), paid a visit in 1804 to Seringapatam and Mysore. At Seringapatam, he was received by Bachche Rao, the Assistant of Dewan Pūrnaiya, and

Col. De Meuron on behalf of General Wellesley, both Pūrnaiya and Wellesley being away from the place on duty in connection with Mahratta War then in progress. He describes the ceremonial visit to His Highness at Mysore on February 23rd, 1804. He was received in a special Durbar, at which he presented His Highness with a fine sword with a handle set with precious stones. His Highness honoured him with a beautiful pearl necklace, a pair of whisks, a couple of fans and two bottles of sandal-oil, for which Mysore has always been famous.

The only Department in which Pūrnaiya made any change in what he first introduced was the judicial. Experience having proved that separate Departments for dispensing justice were necessary, he established in 1805 a Court of Adalat consisting of two Judges, two Sherestedars and six persons of respectability who formed a standing *Panchayet*, with one Kazi and one Pandit, to assist them in the regular administration of justice.

Changes in  
the Judicial  
System, 1805.

An event of importance during this period of His Highness' reign was the formal introduction of vaccination into the State in 1806. The first person to be vaccinated was the intended bride of His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III, the operation being performed at the instance of Mahārāni Lakshmi Ammanni by the Residency Surgeon. Col. Wilks, the Resident, influenced the decision no little. The royal example attracted considerable public attention. On hearing of it from Dewan Pūrnaiya, Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras, and his Council gave wide publicity to it as holding forth "to all persons in India an interesting and illustrious example of the safety with which that practice may be extended." Lord William Bentinck expressed the hope that "the example of a Government, which is administered on principles so enlightened as those of the Government of

Introduction  
of  
Vaccination  
in the State.  
1806.

Mysore will not fail to have salutary influence on the minds of the natives of this country," a hope that has been most fully realized in it.

Official  
changes in  
the Residency  
between  
1801-1807.

Col. Barry Close, who had been chosen as the first Resident of His Highness' Court and had so closely co-operated with Purnaiya and General Wellesley in making the new Government a great success, was transferred as Resident at Poona in 1801. He was, in some respects, one of the most remarkable men of his time. His transfer to Poona was urged by General Wellesley on the ground that he was "the only man" who managed Indians properly and "that merely from his perfect knowledge of their language." (Letter dated 23rd June 1799). He was most jealous in the public cause and though, as General Wellesley remarked, his temper was not the best and his mode of reasoning not the most agreeable, it was impossible not to agree with him where the public interests were concerned (see letter dated 26th May 1801). General Wellesley regretted exceedingly Close's departure. "Although there is no doubt whatever," he wrote to his brother Henry, "that he is the ablest man in the diplomatic line in India, and that his knowledge of the languages is so extraordinary, and so superior to that of any other European in India, that alone renders him the most fit for a diplomatic situation; and besides that qualification he has others in an equal, if not a superior, degree to other candidates for those situations. Nevertheless, I consider that his presence in Mysore for a few years longer would have been of great benefit and would have established the new Government on so firm a foundation that nothing could hereafter shake it." (Letter dated 10th October 1801). He was greatly admired by Purnaiya, who built and named Closepet, near Bangalore, after him (1800). Close handed over charge to Mr. J. H. Peile, who, after a few



months, was succeeded by Mr. Josiah Webbe, who had been Chief Secretary at Madras. He, however, left for Nagpur, as Resident there about the close of 1802, much to the sorrow of Pūrnaiya. Pūrnaiya and he were great friends, and the obelisk to the north-west of Seringapatam, known as the Webbe monument, was erected by Pūrnaiya as a memorial to him, when he died at Gwalior, while Resident there, in 1805. He was succeeded by Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm. But as he was engaged in the Mahratta War, he did not join until November 1804, up to which date Lieut.-Col. Wilks, the future historian of Mysore, was Officiating Resident. Wilks was a great classical scholar, a keen observer and an officer imbued with the highest sense of public duty. He ably filled the vacant position, a position which, with infinite pains, he used for gathering in the materials required for his *magnum opus*. He stayed until about 1807, when he left for England. Malcolm took over the office about the same time, but he was called away in 1808 for going on a second mission to Persia. The Hon. Arthur H. Cole, who had been, since 1806, Secretary to the Resident and then Assistant Resident, officiated in the post until about 1812, when he was confirmed in it, and he continued in the post till 1827. In that year, he was succeeded by Mr. J. A. Casamaijor, who continued till 1832.

Concurrently other changes had also occurred. Earl Powis, who had been Governor of Madras at the taking of Seringapatam, had been succeeded on 30th August 1803 by Lord William Bentinck. About 1805, the policy of Marquess Wellesley, involving as it did vast annexations of territory and consequent financial embarrassment to the Company, which was more bent on commercial "investment" than on territorial aggrandizement, had ended in his recall by order of the Court of Directors. He accordingly laid down his high office

Concurrent gubernatorial changes.



about the middle of 1805, some nine months after he had ordered the placing of Mysore directly under the Supreme Government. He had been preceded in his departure by General Arthur Wellesley a few months before. Marquess Wellesley was succeeded by Lord Cornwallis, who was appointed Governor-General for a second time. He died shortly after his arrival, in October 1805, and Sir George Barlow took his place. He continued as Governor-General up to 31st July 31, 1807, when Lord Minto took over charge. Meanwhile, in September 1807, Lord William Bentinck, Governor of Madras, had also been recalled, owing to the dissatisfaction felt by the Court of Directors over his conduct of the Vellore Mutiny. Sir George Barlow was, as some compensation for his supercession, appointed Governor of Madras, and he took over that post in December 1807. It was during his period of office as Governor that the Mutiny of European Officers referred to above occurred.

*List of Residents and other Company's Officers at  
Seringapatam and Mysore, 1799-1832.*

1799-1801	...	Col. (afterwards Sir Barry) Close, Resident at Mysore; (assumed charge July 22, 1799).
1799	...	J. H. Peile; Head Assistant under the Resident; also Postmaster at Mysore, from 1800.
1801-1803	..	Josiah Webbe, Resident at Mysore, (took charge March 31st 1801).
1803	...	Major (afterwards Sir John) Malcolm Resident at Mysore. Appointed March 1803 but did not join at once. Owing to his indisposition, Josiah Webbe was reappointed to officiate from 23rd October 1803 to 1st February 1804, when Major (afterwards Lieut.-Col.) Mark Wilks was appointed. He officiated as Resident from April 1803 to December 1804.
1805 (May)-Oct. 1, 1809.		Major M. Wilks, Resident.
1803-1806	...	Secretary to the Resident: J. H. Peile.
1806	...	Secretary to the Resident: Hon. A. H. Cole.
1809 (Oct. 10)	...	Ag. Resident at Mysore: A. H. Cole.
1809	...	Register at Seringapatam; also Judge, Magistrate and Collector of Seringapatam: J. A. Casamajor.
1811 (Jan. 20)	...	Resident at Mysore: (Permanent) Hon. A. H. Cole.
1812-1827	...	Resident at Mysore: Hon. A. H. Cole.
1813	...	Judge, Magistrate and Collector of Seringapatam: J. A. Casamajor.

1818-1815	... Head Assistant to the Resident at Mysore: E. R. Sullivan.
1818	... Assistant to the Resident: J. A. Casamaijor.
1822-1824	... Register and Assistant Collector of Seringapatam (called the Zillah of Seringapatam): Henry Vibart.
1824-1827	... Register and Assistant Collector at Seangapatam: F. M. Lewin.
1827-1834	... Resident at Mysore: A. J. Casamaijor (assumed charge: 23rd March 1827).
1831 (Oct.)	... Two British Commissioners take charge of the Administration.
1830-1832	... Assistant to the Resident at Mysore: G. L. Prendergast.
1832	... Officiating Resident at Mysore: G. E. Russell, (officiated only for a short time).
April 1834	... One of the posts of the two British Commissioners in Mysore was abolished.
1834 (May 30)	... Resident at Mysore: Col. Mark Cubbon. (Temporary).
1834	... Resident at Mysore: Col. J. S. Frazer. (Appointed in June but took charge in October).
1836 (Jan. 19) to 1842 (Dec.)	... Resident at Mysore: Major R. D. Stokes.
1843	... Post of Resident abolished.

Seringapatam was, during this period, both the administrative capital of the State and the head-quarter of the Subsidiary Force maintained by the Company. The fortress was, between 1799-1804, governed by General Wellesley. The Lal-Bagh was assigned as the residence of the Resident, while the principal Mint, the General Treasury, the Huzur Cutcherry of His Highness' Government were, partly for the convenience of communication with the Resident and chiefly because Mysore, the residence of His Highness, was yet unprovided with any buildings for these purposes, stationed close to it. About the close of 1804, these deficiencies were supplied at Mysore and these offices were subsequently transferred to that place. The Lal-Bagh was about the same time pronounced to be uninhabitable from its extreme unhealthiness, and proposals for the transfer of the Residency to Mysore were also in hand. The Resident was assisted by a Secretary and a subordinate officer styled the Assistant Resident; there were besides a Head Assistant Resident and a Postmaster. Besides the Officer

Internal  
Administra-  
tion of  
Seringa-  
patam.

Commanding the Fortress and the British Resident, there were the following officers maintained at the place:— Judge, Magistrate and Collector of Seringapatam, who was also Register (or Registrar) of Seringapatam. He had evidently too much to do and had an Assistant, who was also a covenanted servant of the Company.

During the time that General Wellesley was Governor of the Fort, Thomas Hickey, the well-known portrait-painter, who had exhibited at the Royal Academy, visited Seringapatam and painted between 1799-1800, several historical pictures at the place.

Proposed  
destruction  
of the  
fortifications  
of Seringa-  
patam. 1805.

Before the departure of Marquess Wellesley, General Wellesley was called upon, in view of the peace then expected in Europe, to report on the proposal whether the fortifications of Seringapatam should be destroyed, not only as a measure of precaution to prevent a fortress so difficult to access from falling into the hands of the French, but also as a measure of general advisability. General Wellesley condemned the proposal as an "improper one" and suggested that it should be repaired and retained in preference to any other place—even Bangalore—as the head-quarters of the Army. (See his *Memorandum on Seringapatam*). He would not agree that Seringapatam was "really more unwholesome than Bangalore." He attributed a great part of the sickness at Seringapatam to the nature of the buildings which the officers and troops had occupied. "Open choultries and buildings, which do not keep out the weather, cannot be supposed," he said, "to answer in this country, and have been equally fatal in all parts above the Ghauts. Since the buildings have been improved, the health of the troops has improved; and, in this season, we have not had any sick officer, or more sick men than there have been in other garrisons." He therefore refused to subscribe to the statement that "Seringapatam is

unwholesome, and that art cannot remedy that defect; but that Bangalore is otherwise. (*Ibid*).

Four years later, the continued ill-health of the British troops at Seringapatam, Sira and other places, however, suggested the formation of a Cantonment at Bangalore, the salubrity of the climate of which place had by then come to be widely appreciated. Accordingly, this place was fixed upon as the proper place for cantoning the troops. This was about 1809. (In the Kannada work, the *Annals of the Mysore Royal Family*, Part II, the date of the foundation of the Cantonment is given as 1807. This seems a slip). Seringapatam, however, continued as a military centre for some years longer. In 1804-5, the island town, was found to be so unhealthy that the European part of the garrison, consisting of His Majesty's 34th Regiment, and a detachment of Madras Artillery was reduced to such a state of inefficiency that it was withdrawn during July 1806. The Indian troops had also suffered, but not to so great an extent and it was therefore resolved to limit the garrison to a detachment of Indian Infantry and a small detail of Artillery, to be relieved from Bangalore every three months. This resolution, however, was not carried into effect, and two Battalions of Indian Infantry remained at Seringapatam until 1819, when the garrison was reduced to a single Battalion.

Foundation of  
Bangalore  
and  
Cantonment :  
transfer of  
British  
Troops to it,  
1809.

Reduction in  
the garrison  
at Seringa-  
patam,  
1804-05.

About the close of 1806, Pūrnaiya frequently expressed a solicitude to Col. Malcolm, the Resident at the time, that his office should be rendered hereditary. The matter was put before the Supreme Government, who, while admitting that Pūrnaiya had "a just claim for some hereditary provision," held that his request for making his office hereditary in his family was upon "obvious grounds" "inadmissible." They thought that

Grant of  
Yelandur in  
Jaghir to  
Pūrnaiya by  
His Highness  
the Maharaja,  
1807.

the best provision would be afforded "by the grant of an hereditary Jaghir." After recounting his claims, the Supreme Government remarked that "the extraordinary merits of Pūrnaiya entitled him to distinguished reward." Finally, they wound up by saying that they were "of opinion that his merits and his claims should be rewarded and satisfied by the grant of a small Jaghir. This should be the act of both States (Mysore and the Supreme Government), although, the lands should of course be assigned from the territory of the Rāja of Mysore." They accordingly intimated to the Madras Government that they had directed Col. Malcolm, on his arrival at Mysore, to report to the Governor-in-Council at Madras the extent of the hereditary Jaghir which it would be proper to assign to Pūrnaiya. They also directed that on receipt of Col. Malcolm's report in the matter, the Madras Government should "proceed to accomplish the object in question in communication with the Resident." (Letter from Supreme Government dated 18th December 1806). Col. Malcolm, after careful investigation, recommended the grant of "an hereditary Jaghir yielding a revenue of 10,000 Star Pagodas *per annum*," which, he thought, "would not be considered more than a just reward of his service." He also intimated that Yelandur Taluk, which Pūrnaiya had himself chosen, had an annual income, which he set down at Star Pagodas 8,307. (Letter dated 2nd November 1807). On the Madras Government agreeing with the proposal (letter dated 13th November 1807), a grant was duly drawn up in Persian and the same presented to Pūrnaiya by His Highness the Mahārāja in a special Durbar graciously held by him, on 27th December 1807, to mark the occasion. Col. Malcolm was present on the occasion and stated to His Highness "the causes which had led the British Government to recommend to him a measure, which was as honourable to him as to that valuable servant, whose great services he



had so generously rewarded." He also expressed to Purnaiya "the sense which the English Government entertained of his character, and how completely all those expectations, which had been formed, of benefit from his appointment, had been answered," and congratulated him "upon the noble and solid mark of approbation, which he had that moment received from his Prince," and concluded by giving him, in the name of the Honourable Company, a present of an elephant, a horse, and a rich *khillat*. (Letter dated 4th January 1808). He also affixed his seal and signature to the *sannad* in a manner that would distinctly mark the sanction of the Supreme Government as well to the grant.

Purnaiya continued as Dewan during the next four years. An event of importance during this period was the mutiny of European officers, which occurred in 1809 and spread to Mysore as well. This has been referred to above (see *ante*).

Purnaiya's  
Administration,  
1808-  
1811.

Another was the receipt, in January 1811, by His Highness the Mahārāja, of the Seringapatam Medal, which was struck to commemorate the capture of Seringapatam. The following extract from a letter from the Court of Directors, published to the Madras Army on the 6th July 1808, describes it in full:—

The  
Seringapatam  
Medal.

"Some time ago we caused a medal to be executed by one of the most eminent artists in the country, in commemoration of the brilliant success of the British Arms in Mysore in 1799, for distribution amongst the officers and soldiers (European and Native) employed on that glorious occasion. On one side of it is represented the storming the breach of Seringapatam from an actual drawing on the spot, with the meridian sun denoting the time of the storm, with the following inscription in Persian underneath: The Fort of Seringapatam, the Gift of God, the 4th May 1799. On the reverse side is the British Lion subduing the Tiger, the emblem of the late Tippoo



Sultan's Government, with the period when it was effected, and the following words in Arabic, on the banner: 'Assad-Oollah-ul-Ghalib, signifying the Lion of God is the Conqueror, or the conquering Lion of God.'

Of these medals, gold ones were struck for His Majesty, the Rt. Hon. Lord Melville, the Governor-General of India at the time, Marquis Cornwallis, the Nizām and his two Ministers, the Peishwa and his Minister, the Nabōbs of Arcot and Oudh, His Highness the Mahārāja of Mysore, the Rājahs of Tanjore, Travancore, Coorg and Berar, Doulat Rao Scindiah, the Commander-in-chief, General officers on the staff employed on the service, and the Oriental Museum.

Silver gilt for the members of Council at the three Presidencies, the Residents of Haiderabad and Poona, the Field officers, and the General Staff on the service.

Silver for the Captains and Subalterns on the service.

Copper bronze for the Non-Commissioned, and pure gravin tin for the privates.

These medals were received in January 1811, when they were distributed to the survivors, whether effective or otherwise, and also to the heirs of the deceased persons who had been entitled.

His Highness  
Krishna-  
Rāja Wodeyar  
in his 6th  
year.

Of His Highness Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar himself, we get a few glimpses from those who visited or saw him during this period. Thus, Dr. Buchanan-Hamilton, writing of his visit to him at the Mysore Palace, when it was being restored, in May 1800, says:—"It is now so far advanced as to be a comfortable dwelling, and I found the young prince seated in it on a handsome throne. He had very much recovered his health, and though he is only between six and seven years of age, speaks and behaves with great propriety and decorum. From Indian etiquette, he endeavours in public to preserve a dignified gravity of countenance; but the attentions of Colonel

Close, the Resident, make him sometimes relax, and then his face is very lively and interesting." His Highness was only about 6 years old at the time.

From Major James Welsh, who was serving at Serin-  
gapatam at the time, we have in 1806 an account of a  
procession from Nanjangud to Kalale in which His  
Highness showed his skill at horsemanship, when he was  
but 12 years of age. "The Young Rājah," he writes,  
"was now twelve years old, and as promising a boy as I  
ever beheld; indeed, Major Wilks, who was a man of  
sense and refinement, declared he had never known a  
finer youth, European or native. His manners were far  
above his age, but he was then under the tutelage of the  
celebrated Pūrnaiya. During the procession, which took  
place on horse back, old Pūrnaiya checked the ardour of  
the Rājah, and we moved at a snail's pace for the first  
three miles, when this fine boy, longing for a gallop,  
obtained his guardian's leave, exchanged his star turban  
for a plain one, and disengaging himself from several  
valuable chains and jewels which decorated his person,  
gave his horse the whip, and commenced a *lunge*, which  
he managed with grace and dexterity, while we formed a  
ring outside and enjoyed the exhibition. After indulging  
himself for a few minutes, in which we much admired  
his manliness, he resumed his dress, and we proceeded  
in state to the end of the march." (Col. James Welsh,  
*Military Reminiscences*). In his 12th  
year.

His Highness lived at Mysore in the Palace, whose  
rebuilding was commenced in 1799-1800 by Pūrnaiya.  
In that year, Pūrnaiya expended Kāntirai pagodas 29,503  
on the materials required for the fort and the Palace. In  
1800-1801, he spent on them Pagodas 33,000. In the  
succeeding year, he expended on the garrison stationed  
in the rebuilt fort and on the officers employed for its  
His Palace  
at Mysore  
rebuilt,  
1799-1800.

repair and the palace Pagodas 42,572, apart from Pagodas 59,522 incurred as extraordinary expenditure on their reconstruction work. In 1802-3, pagodas 43,160 were appropriated for the same purpose, while in 1803-4 a further sum of Pagodas 39,530 was spent on them, besides Pagodas 8,300, for providing His Highness a residence at Seringapatam. In view of the nature of the work undertaken in connection with the Fort and the Palace at Mysore, Col. Wilks thought in 1805, that the expenditure "must for many years be continued" at a rate "at least equal to the average of the last five years, and exceeding that average when all the public departments of the Government shall be permanently removed to Mysore." Wilks suggested to the Governor-General that such removal was a necessity if His Highness was not to be dissociated from his officers. Up to 1805, the chief offices of His Highness were, as mentioned before, held at Seringapatam but Col. Wilks desired that they should be transferred to Mysore as soon as the necessary buildings could be made available there for them. He wrote :—

"It appears to be essential to the respect and consideration, which is due to His Highness the Rajah, even during his minority, that he should be surrounded by the principal departments, and officers of his Government; the establishment of those departments, and the residence of those officers at Seringapatam, has not only the exterior appearance, but the virtual effect, of holding His Highness's Court at a distance from his person. This arrangement becomes the more indecorous, as His Highness advances in years; and it seems to be expedient on every account, to direct the permanent removal to Mysore of all the public departments of the Government."

Relations  
with  
Purnaiya.

The attitude of Purnaiya towards His Highness was, as might be expected from one like him, both loyal and dutiful. The personal respect he showed to His Highness

and to the members of the Royal House to which Marquess Wellesley had desired attention on the part of the Resident, in his Memorandum of Instructions, was one becoming his station and His Highness' dignity. "I have uniformly remarked in the Dewan," wrote Col. Wilks in his report of 1805 to the Governor-in-Council of Fort St. George, "a very decorous attention to these observances" (of personal respect). Two years later, Col. Malcolm bore similar testimony. Purnaiya, he said:—

"Placed at the creation of this Government (the restored Mysore Government), in the possession of all its authority and the charge of its infant Prince, has not only exercised his great power in a manner that has promoted the prosperity, and increased the Revenue of the State he ruled, but by his unabating attention to the happiness of the inhabitants of Mysore, and the Education of the Young Prince, and his undeviating adherence to the principles of the alliance with the English Government, he has merited and received the uniform support of that power; nor can I call to mind, during the period of eight years that he has governed Mysore, one instance in which his conduct has been censured by those authorities to whose inspection and control he has been, during the whole of that period, immediately subject," (Letter to Governor-in-Council, Fort St. George, dated Mysore, 2nd November 1807).

Purnaiya's time was occupied in incessant labour for the State. But in the midst of his administrative work, he did not forget his primary duty. It is interesting to know from Malcolm "the unabating interest" he showed "in the education" of His Highness. There is a tale told of Purnaiya which suggests the *modus operandi* he adopted in regard to the grounding he gave His Highness in the matter of the disposal of public business. Not only did he insist on his reading every paper placed before him for his orders but also he made him never to

Educational  
and Admin-  
istrative  
training.

Retirement  
and death  
of Purnaiya,  
28th March,  
1812.

pass it on to those under him without showing that he had read and pondered it. There may be exaggeration in this statement but it is fairly well ascertained that His Highness never allowed, during the whole period of his rule, any order to go out until and unless he made himself personally responsible for its issue. A high sense of responsibility was thus early sought to be inculcated in him, which stood in great stead with His Highness in his later years. His Highness was brought up in the traditional code of Hindu learning and he soon became proficient in Kannada, Marāthi, Persian and Sānskrit. As he grew to manhood's estate—he was about eighteen in 1811—he had had a good practical insight into the details of the administration. Purnaiya made him take a personal interest in the disposal of public business since His Highness reached the age of sixteen. With the increase in years and the growth of knowledge, the desire was kindled in His Highness to take a more direct share in the daily work of the administration of the State. Purnaiya, unaccustomed to control, misapprehended the Prince's ardour. Age and continued work had told on the great Minister's health. In 1811, His Highness expressed to the Hon. A. H. Cole, the Resident, his wish to assume the reins of office. Mr. Cole, as might be expected, endeavoured to secure a share in the Administration for Purnaiya which would have made for continuity in it. But Purnaiya had made up his mind. He declined further office, and in December of the same year, he retired to Seringapatam, where he soon after died, on the night of 27th of March 1812. Old and infirm, after a life of unusual activity and care, "I am going to the land of my fathers," was the tranquil message he sent a few days before to his friend Col. Hill, the Commandant of the fort. "Say that I am travelling the same road," was the reply returned, and he survived the Minister but a short time.



So passed away Pūrnaiya. Mr. Cole, the Resident, was at the time camping at Nanjangud. Immediately he despatched news of the sad event from there to the Government of Madras on the 29th March. The Governor-General in Council were intimated of it without delay. Both the Governments sent messages of sympathy with *Khillats* of condolence to Ānanda Rao, the eldest son of the deceased Minister. (See Hon. Cole's letter dated 29th March 1812; William Thackeray's letter dated 26th June 1812; N. B. Edmonstone's letter dated 1st May 1812). Sir George Barlow, then Governor of Madras, sent also a special personal letter of sympathy to him together with a *Khillat* of his own with the instruction that Mr. Ānanda Rao should be invested with it in his name. The letter of the Governor-General in Council (the Earl of Minto was then the Governor-General) contained the following passage:—

Condolences  
from Earl  
Minto and  
Sir George  
Barlow.

“The Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council has received the intelligence of the decease of Pūrnaiya with the feelings naturally excited by a contemplation of the eminent service which he must be considered to have rendered to the British Government as well as to that of Mysore, by the wisdom, integrity and ability of his distinguished and brilliant administration, and by a recollection of the virtues of his character and signal merits of his conduct in the discharge of the duties of that high and responsible situation, merits of which the general lustre cannot be thought to have been obscured by the errors that unfortunately marked the latter period of his age, and his infirmity.”

Appreciation  
of services  
by the  
Governor-  
General in  
Council.

His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar was deeply touched by the all too sudden death of the great Administrator. With the magnanimity for which he was always famous, he directed his Palace, in the Fort at Seringapatam, to be placed at the disposal of Pūrnaiya's family during the usual funeral ceremonies. He also

Sympathy  
shown by  
H. H. the  
Maharaja  
with the  
family.



proposed "of his own accord," wrote Mr. Cole to the Governor-in-Council at Fort St. George, "to continue to Anunta Rao, eldest son of Pūrnaiya, the pension enjoyed by his father, viz., 500 pagodas per mensem under this Government." (Letter dated 4th April 1812). Both the Madras and the Supreme Governments approved of the latter proposal, the Governor-General-in-Council observing that it was "highly creditable to His Highness the Rajah, who indeed, with regard to the family, has lately manifested a degree of magnanimity and liberality singularly honourable to his principles, his judgment and his character." (Letter dated 1st May 1812).

Pūrnaiya's  
early life and  
career.

Buchanan-Hamilton, writing under date Seringapatam 18th May 1800, in his *Journey from Madras*, has left an account of the early life of Pūrnaiya from which we learn that he was a Brahman of the Mādhva sect, and descended from a family of the Coimbatore country. His talents were recognized by Haidar, and he was made not only minister of finance, but was also put in charge of the commissariat. He was short and stout in person, of active habits and well versed in the affairs of the country. Haidar rewarded him with a grant of the village of Maruhalli, south-west of Mysore. His tact and the influence he had acquired are well illustrated by the course he pursued, already related, at the death of Haidar, and the means he took to secure the succession of Tipū. His services to the latter were of the highest value, and next to Mīr Sadak, he enjoyed greater power under the Sultān than any other person. But he was in no small danger from the bigotry of his master. For the Sultān, it is said, once proposed to him to become a follower of the Prophet of Islam. As all proposals from a Sultān are tantamount to orders that should be obeyed, Pūrnaiya replied, "I am your servant," and immediately retired. The Sultān's mother, who was a very respectable lady and had great influence with her son,

and others who knew him on hearing of what had occurred, represented to him how dangerous such a proceeding was, and how, it would, if persisted in, would throw everything into confusion. The apparent acquiescence of Pūrnaiya was mere courteous formality, of course, and his influence among the people was considerable. Tipū, realizing his folly, allowed the affair to rest, and nothing more was said on the subject. (I. 60-61). It must have been with a sense of relief, therefore, that Pūrnaiya, when, after the fall of Seringapatam, he was summoned to surrender, and assured that he had no cause to be alarmed, replied, "How can I hesitate to surrender to a nation who are the protectors of my tribe from Kasi to Rāmēsvaram?" The subsequent distinguished career of Pūrnaiya has been narrated above.

Different versions of the differences that arose between His Highness and Pūrnaiya have come down to us. What the exact causes were which led to these differences, are not by any means clear. According to the Hon. Mr. Cole, the Resident at the time, Pūrnaiya would seem to have developed certain "failings incidental to his declining years of infirmity" (letter dated 29th March 1812 to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George), a statement which seems to be confirmed by the letter of Mr. W. Thackeray, Chief Secretary to the Government of Fort St. George, dated 1st May 1812, to the Supreme Government at Calcutta, in which he referred to the errors that unfortunately marked the latter period of his (Pūrnaiya's) "age and his infirmity." There is no indication, however, in the records of the period, what these "errors" due to "infirmity" and "age" were. Sir John Malcolm has stated that "the enemies of Pūrnaiya succeeded in poisoning the mind of the young Prince (Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar III) against that able minister who was

Causes of  
difference.

compelled to resign his power and soon afterwards died." (See his *Political History of India*, 1784-1829, I. 544-7). There may be truth in this as Malcolm wrote as a contemporary and with first hand knowledge. In the discussions that ended in the recognition of His Highness Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar's adoption in 1865, it has been suggested that Purnaiya was "ousted" from power by an "intrigue" conducted by certain people. (See *Opinions of the Press on the Annexation of Mysore*, 1866, quotation from the *Examiner*, dated April 1, 1865). It is possible that as he advanced in years, Purnaiya found it increasingly difficult to accommodate himself to the new circumstances resulting from the attaining of majority by His Highness, which doubtless afforded opportunities to designing people to take advantage of the situation and turn it to their own personal benefit.

An estimate  
of his work  
as Regent and  
Dewan.

No narrative of the events of the first decade of the reign of His Highness Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar III would be considered complete without an estimate of Purnaiya's work and worth. A proper estimate would have reference to the conditions under which he was appointed to the position in which he served; the persons with whom he was associated in his Administration; and the actual benefits that the country as a whole secured from his uncommon talents. From what has been already mentioned, he took over charge of the administration at a particularly difficult moment. The prospects were none too brilliant and a lesser man than he would have hesitated to accept office. But Purnaiya, undeterred by the difficulties before him, agreed to take it over. He impressed the Commission—composed of perhaps the ablest men in the Civil and Military Departments in the Company's service in the South at the time—as one who could be trusted to carry out the great task before him. The Governor-General, perhaps the greatest India has

known, with the possible exception of Warren Hastings, agreed with the proposal that he should hold office. To have won the goodwill of statesmen of this type and to have "given satisfactory proofs of readiness to serve the new Government in the same capacity" as before should have required not merely ability but also no mean self-confidence. That his Administration was based on proper lines, that it was progressive without being radical and that it was relatively less costly than what it might have been in the Company's hands were conceded by the highest authorities of the time. Success came to him because he strived for it. Purnaiya was active, energetic and all-mindful of his duties. To have secured the unqualified approval of men of the type of Marquess Wellesley, General Arthur Wellesley, Sir Barry Close, Sir John Malcolm, Lord Clive, Lord William Bentinck, Sir George Barlow, and the Earl of Minto cannot have been an easy task. As Sir John Malcolm put it, he could not "call to mind, during the period of eight years that he governed Mysore, one instance in which his conduct has been censured by those authorities to whose inspection and control he has been, during the whole of that period, immediately subject." Such exemplary conduct argues adherence on his part to certain rigid principles of policy in the matter not only of his personal attitude towards the Company's representatives but also in the matter of the administration of the State itself. These principles appear to have been thorough loyalty to the cause of His Highness and to the Company's Government, and good Government his sole aim in the administration of the territories entrusted to his care. These being his principles of action, he soon established an absolute identity of interests between His Highness' Government and the Government of the Company, which enured as much to the benefit of His Highness' Government as to that of the Company. This was exemplified

as much by the conduct of His Highness' Government in the Mahratta War as by that of the Company in the suppression of insurrections in the Manjarabad area and in the campaign against Dhoondia Waugh, who if he had not been put down, probably would have proved another Haidar Ali. The internal security of the State being made possible by this policy of "unity of thought," "unity of force" and "unity of action," Pūrnaiya conducted his administration on lines which made early restoration of normal life in the State, a question of mere time. His administration was a cautious one, its primary object being the happiness and contentment of the people. Hence the stress laid on keeping disturbers of the public peace under the strictest control. The policy which put down the Manjarabad rebel and Dhoondia Waugh was the same which kept the Mahrattas out of Mysore in 1803-4 and it was identical with the one that reduced the Pālegars to the position of pensioners without even the pretence of power in their hands. This policy it was that enabled Pūrnaiya to secure the benefits of a peaceful administration to the people who had had the misfortune to experience the evils of continued warfare for nearly a century since the death of Chikka Dēva-Rāja in 1704. The success of the British arms that followed in the wake of the prosperous administration of His Highness' Government in its first decade was made possible by the replenished treasury of Mysore, by the men supplied by it, and by the stores made available by it. The Administration proved a great success and it was that success that made other successes a possibility. Pūrnaiya's greatness consisted in using his opportunities well and to the advantage of the country he administered. He administered in such a way too as to prove beyond doubt the capacity of his countrymen in the political and administrative fields. This is what Col. Wilks, a contemporary of Pūrnaiya and one who worked with him



and through him for a time in Mysore, said of the success achieved by him :—

“ Among the inconveniences of that singular and generally beneficial Government, established by the British nation in India, is the practice of committing the higher officers of the army and the State, and almost all situations of trust and emolument to Europeans ; and thereby excluding the natives of the country from every object of honourable ambition. The settlement of Mysore, was distinguished from all preceding measures of British policy, was quoted with applause in the remotest parts of India, and was acknowledged with unlimited gratitude by the people to be governed, by leaving every office, civil and military, to be filled by the natives themselves, with the single guard of those of powers of interposition in the internal affairs of the Government which were reserved by a special provision of the treaty. It is obvious that any ostensible exercise of such a power by the British political Resident, would have a direct tendency to weaken and subvert the authority of the native Government, and that such an interposition, to be efficient to its true purposes, must be delicate, silent, and unobserved ; the experiment was new, and with relation to its remote consequences of momentous importance ; the eminent talents of the Minister and Resident were supported by the cordial co-operation, in the military command of the Honourable Colonel Wellesley, a name which no epithet can exalt ; and Lord Wellesley had the satisfaction of being enabled to declare at the close of his memorable administration in India, that the actual success of the arrangement of Mysoor had fulfilled his most sanguine expectations.” (Wilks, *History of Mysoor* II. 386-7).

The above is a just appreciation of the great work done by the Marquess Wellesley and General Wellesley for and in Mysore ; not only that but also by Sir Barry Close and his successors as Residents at the Court of His Highness and by Pūrnaiya in his capacity as Dewan. The last of these, it has to be conceded, made his Administration so much of a success that it was possible to “quote” it “with applause to the remotest parts of



India" and to be "acknowledged with unlimited gratitude by the people to be governed" under the system evolved by the Marquess. There was no doubt control over him; and there was the provision of the Treaty about interposition. But he made the latter wholly innocuous by his supremely sagacious judgment and unremitting personal toil. Wilks writes:—

"The practical efficiency of the Government was secured (under Marquess Wellesley's arrangement) by the uncommon talents of Poornea (Pūrnaiya) in the office of Minister to the new Raja, and that efficiency was directed to proper objects, by the control reserved to the English Government in the provisions of the Treaty; and by the happy selection of Lieutenant-Colonel Close to be Political Resident at the new Court, a man whose eminent talents, experience, and conciliatory manners enabled him to guide the new minister, without permitting him to feel the existence of control."

That was really what made the administration of Pūrnaiya the splendid success it proved, so much so that Wilks pointed to the moral of it thus, in words which, despite the century and ten years which have elapsed since then, still adorn a tale:—

"It is not intended to suggest that the exclusive employment of native agency is an example fit for imitation in the more extended scale of our national administration of India; but the general success of this experiment, and practice (where discretionary power has been allowed) of the most efficient public officers in the south of India, have established the wisdom, the safety, and may we add, the justice, of committing to the governed, a larger interest in the prosperity of the Government; of securing fidelity in opening to their hopes a field of moderate and legitimate ambition; and thus temperately regulating that system of exclusion which, in its present state, no humility can otherwise contemplate than as the brand of national humiliation." (Wilks, *History of Mysoor* II. 387).

It was Pūrnaiya's good work, his punctilious discharge of duty and his exact fulfilment of his obligations under

the Treaty that won for him the appreciation and the goodwill of Marquess Wellesley, General Wellesley, Sir Barry Close and others. The opinions of some of these on his Administration have been referred to above. "I deem it," said Marquess Wellesley, "to be an act of justice to acknowledge that the expectation which I formed in selecting Poorneah for the important office of Minister of Mysore have been greatly exceeded by the benefits which have resulted from his excellent administration." General Wellesley in his touching farewell was equally emphatic as to the success of Purnaiya's administration. "I part with you," said he, "with the greatest regret; and I shall ever continue to feel the most lively interest for the honour and prosperity of the Government of the Rajah of Mysore over which you preside. For six years I have been concerned in the affairs of the Mysore Government, and I have contemplated with the greatest satisfaction its increasing prosperity under your administration." And he added:—

"In every situation in which I may be placed, you may depend upon it that I shall not fail to bear testimony of my sense of your merits upon every occasion that may offer, and that I shall suffer no opportunity to pass by which I may think favourable for rendering you service."

Sir John Malcolm was no less clear on the meritorious character of the services rendered by Purnaiya and of the "extraordinary claims" established by him on the Government of the Company and Mysore. Such testimony as this speaks eloquently of Purnaiya's work. It is, however, difficult to reconcile it with the views propounded by certain later writers in regard to it. For instance, it has been suggested that his system of Government was rather "arbitrary" and "absolute." (See Lewin Bowring, *Eastern Experiences*, 186; also see the last edition of this work, Vol. I. 420). "Arbitrary" and "absolute" are

Criticisms of his administrative Policy answered.

terms difficult of application to the constitution of the State as established by the Treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam of 1799. Under the latter, the State as restored had to fulfil obligations of a peculiarly onerous character. Article 2 fixed an annual payment to the Company of seven lakhs of Star Pagodas, payable in twelve monthly instalments, for securing the defence and security of His Highness' Dominions by means of a Subsidiary Force to be maintained by the Company for the purpose. Article 3 of that Treaty fixed on it a liability to contribute for the expenses of future wars undertaken "for the protection and defence of the territories of the contracting parties or either of them," which was wholly indefinite. Articles 4 and 5 confessedly went beyond the standard model of Treaties concluded so far by the Company in as much as they gave power to the Governor-General in Council, in case His Highness' Government failed to defray either the expenses of the permanent military force in time of peace or the extraordinary expenses incurred in time of war, to have full power and right to introduce regulations and ordinances for the internal management and collection of the Revenues of the country, or even, if they should deem it necessary, to assume and bring under their direct management, the whole or part of the territories of His Highness' Government. The independence of His Highness' Government was, under the Treaty, avowedly made dependent on the manner in which it discharged its onerous conditions. The responsibility that rested on Purnaiya was accordingly correspondingly great. If he disliked anything, it was interference into the affairs of the State he had undertaken to administer. To mention but an instance of this extreme touchiness on his part. In 1804, General Arthur Wellesley proposed, without Purnaiya knowing anything of it before the recommendation was made, that a couple of persons in the service of His Highness'

Government should be rewarded by the Company for valuable services rendered by them, while on duty with him. Purnaiya having come to know of the proposal, mildly protested through Captain Wilks, then Acting Resident, and suggested the withdrawal of the proposal. General Wellesley while agreeing that the agents of the Company like himself "ought to be very cautious in our interference with the servants of the Rajah's Government," urged the plea that it was "not inconsistent with the principle not to interfere with the Rajah's servants, to give rewards to those of them who may serve the Company usefully and with fidelity: particularly if care be taken, as it will be in these instances, to bring forward the Government of Mysore as much as possible; and to provide that the rewards given shall go through the hands of the Rajah's Government, and shall be dependent upon the continuance of the faithful services of the receiver, and in a great measure upon the pleasure of the Dewan." General Wellesley urged that he had gone too far in the matter to recede and that if he now asked the Governor-General "not to give these rewards, he would suspect Purneah (Purnaiya) of being insensible of the merits and services of the persons in question, towards the Company or that Purneah was himself jealous of their services." The matter then dropped. The incident, however, shows how "particularly jealous," as General-Wellesley put it, Purnaiya was in matters of this kind. He therefore had to devise a system of administration that would suit the conditions laid down by the Treaty and make the interference of the Governor-General-in-Council almost impossible. His policy may be said to have been based on liberty combined with restraint: liberty to every loyal subject to live his own life without interference but restraint on every evil doer that even the chance of lawlessness breaking out might be avoided. That he succeeded in his attempt is borne

out not merely by the repeated testimony borne by successive Political Residents at His Highness' Court and by the Marquess of Wellesley, Sir George Barlow who succeeded him, and by General Wellesley, Lord Clive, and Lord William Bentinck, but also by the regularity and precision with which he carried out every single obligation laid down in the Treaty to which he was a signatory on behalf of His Highness. The Marquess Wellesley thus wrote at the end of five years from signing the treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam :—

“I have great satisfaction in availing myself on this occasion to record my deliberate declaration, that every object which I have contemplated, in the settlement of the Government of Mysore on the terms of its actual relation to the British power, has been completely accomplished. The affairs of the Government of Mysore have been conducted with a degree of regularity, wisdom, discretion, and justice, unparalleled in any Native State in India. The benefits of this system of administration, combined with the conditions of its connection with the British Government, have been manifested in the general tranquillity and prosperity of the Rajah of Mysore's dominions, in the increase of the population and resources of the country, in the general happiness of the people, and in the ability of the Government of Mysore to discharge with zeal, and fidelity, every obligation of the subsisting Alliance.

“Under the operations of the Treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam in the course of five years, that Country has acquired a degree of prosperity, which could not possibly have been attained under any other system of political connection, and has been enabled in some degree to repay, by the efficacy of its assistance in the hour of emergency, the benefits which it has derived from the protecting influence and power of the British Government.

“I discharge a satisfactory part of my duty in availing myself of this occasion to record the high sense, which I entertain of the merits and services of the Dewan Poorneah. To the extraordinary abilities, eminent public zeal, integrity, judgment, and energy of that distinguished Minister, must be



ascribed, in a considerable degree, the success of the measures, which I originally adopted for the settlement of Mysore, and the happy and prosperous condition of that flourishing Country. The merits and services of the Dewan have been peculiarly conspicuous in the promptitude and wisdom manifested by him in the application of the resources of Mysore to the exigencies of the public service, during the late War with the confederated Mahratta Chieftains : and I deem it to be an act of justice to acknowledge, that the expectations, which I formed in selecting Poorneah for the important office of Minister of Mysore, have been greatly exceeded by the benefits which have resulted from his excellent Administration."

Whether the "benefits" which resulted from such an administration, which wrung such unstinted admiration from the Marquess Wellesley and during the course of which Purnaiya was not even once censured by the authorities under whose inspection and control he had worked, can with justice be termed "absolute" need not, it is presumed, be further dealt with here. But it might be usefully remarked that Purnaiya was too far-seeing to mistake either the difficulty of his position or that of His Highness, whose minority threw a special responsibility for continued caution on his part. He appears to have realized also the business-like manner in which the Governor-General and his representatives would deal with him in matters small and great. In his case, the knowledge that the Governor-General in Council possessed the right to interpose his authority on certain occasions under the Treaty proved sufficient of itself to prevent any need for its exercise. In matters political, prevention was with him better than cure.

Another aspect of Purnaiya's administration which latter-day critics have noticed is directly connected with his financial policy. It has been suggested that "as a financier, the accumulation of surplus revenue presented itself to him as a prime end to be attained." It has

Criticism of  
his Financial  
Policy.



accordingly been questioned "whether he did not to some extent enrich the treasury at the expense the State, by narrowing the resources of the people; for by 1811 he had amassed in the public coffers upwards of two crores of rupees. (See last edition of this work, I. 420-421). As this criticism appears elsewhere as well and is still sometimes heard, it might be useful to point out that a closer examination will show that it is wholly unsubstantial. The position of Pūrnaiya, in view of the commitment of the State under Article Three of the Treaty of Seringapatam, was an extremely difficult one. His responsibilities were a thousand-fold increased by Articles 4 and 5 which provided resumption of restored territories as the only other alternative for inability to meet the Company's demand. Credit was undeveloped, taxes were uncertain and even some of those realized were partly received in kind; trade there was but a great deal of it was still conducted on the basis of primitive barter; and as regards inter-provincial commerce, a Commercial Treaty had been adumbrated by Marquess Wellesley but had yet to be taken up in earnest even at the death of Pūrnaiya. Such were the conditions in which Pūrnaiya found himself and he had to devise a policy of finance which would enable him to meet his monthly recurring demand of the subsidy of seven lakhs of Star Pagodas due to the Company and build up a cash reserve that would enable him to meet any sudden "extraordinary" war expenditure which was definitely stipulated for in the Treaty. The latter was a demand of an indefinite nature and might arise at any time. Wars were then daily expected and Pūrnaiya would have fared ill if he had not taken due note of his position and the position of the State under the Treaty. He has, therefore, a right to demand that his financial policy should be judged by his critics in the light of the political and economic conditions of his day. In the Mysore of his day—we might even

say, in the India of his day, as in contemporary Europe—the efficient maintenance of any army in the field depended in a great degree on the supply of what is so often called the ‘sinews of war.’ Cases are not unknown where expeditions have failed altogether from want of this indispensable auxiliary. If State-hoarding owed its origin to the force of habit, its continuance was due to a felt necessity. Where credit was undeveloped, and taxes were occasional and uncertain expedients, a State that had no treasure was in a dangerous situation, unprepared either for attack or defence. If primitive economic conditions led to State-hoarding, modern economic conditions have helped to its abandonment. The increased productiveness of taxes, and the facility with which credit could be used, have relieved Government, as Bastable has pointed out, from the duty of keeping a stock of bullion for emergencies. The State has ceased to be its own banker and has come to rely on the instrument supplied by the growth of trade. This was certainly not the position in Mysore in Pūrnaiya’s days. It is doubtful even if we could state, without fear of contradiction, that after the lapse of nearly a century and a quarter after he was appointed Dewan of this State, Mysore has reached that stage of economic development which could dispense with reserves of any kind. From the stress laid to-day on the maintenance of “reserves” of different kinds in the State, one might infer that credit facilities still leave much to be desired. While thus the actual economic conditions of his time were such as to necessitate the building up of a reserve of the kind, praise is due to Pūrnaiya, if as a practical financier, he did build up one to meet the stern necessities of his position. There is little doubt that if he had not hit on evolving a policy of the kind he did, he would soon have been reduced to the position of an administrator without the means to conduct even his routine administration, leaving alone his inability to meet

"extraordinary" war expenditure of the kind contemplated by Article Three of the Treaty. Nothing is more telling in this connection than a frank observation of General Wellesley as to the economic position in this State in 1801, *i.e.*, two years after Purnaiya took over charge, "The great want in this country," he wrote in a letter to his brother Henry Wellesley, "is of money. There is plenty of everything to bring it into the country; but as it is entirely cut off from the sea, and has no navigable streams, there is no commerce, and accordingly in many parts of the country, the revenue is paid in kind and the common purchases are made by the barter. As the Company will take nothing but money in payment of the subsidy, I am always afraid that the Government will, at some time or other, be reduced to borrow upon the crops from the Madras sharks, and the first time they do that they take stride towards their downfall, which will soon be followed by others." Regretting the departure of Colonel Close from Mysore to Poona, at the time he was writing this, he added that "Close had a thorough knowledge of this evil and by his care and management, I think that he would have prevented its bad effects." Purnaiya not only avoided, single handed, the detested "Madras sharks" but also the dread calamity of the "downfall" that General Wellesley dreaded. As a matter of fact, writing four years later, in his report to the Governor-General dated the 18th July 1804, General Wellesley referred in glowing terms to the "superior management of the Dewan" (*i.e.*, Purnaiya) and mentions how he had raised the gross revenue to about Rs. 24 lakhs of Kantirai pagodas and added: "The Dewan, at an early period of his administration, determined to provide means to enable the Rājā's Government to comply with any requisition which the British Government might make for assistance in war, under the Third Article of the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore (otherwise called the Treaty of

Seringapatam); and he has saved annually a sum of money amounting to *one lac* of Star Pagodas. He has made this saving the criterion by which he has endeavoured to regulate his disbursements, and he has considered the sum resulting from that saving to constitute the fund for answering any eventual demand, under the Third Article of the Treaty." Therein lies the vindication of Purnaiya's financial policy—a policy for which there was at the time no other possible alternative.

The principle of State hoarding has not so far been, from a purely theoretic standpoint, entirely given up. Germany was until recently, in actual practice, keeping a large hoard for use in the event of war. Before the Great European War, she had built up a huge hoard by means of the resources obtained through the French indemnity. A sum of £6,000,000 was held in bullion and a much larger amount was invested in high class securities, chiefly German Railways and the debts of foreign countries. The "fund for invalids" came to nearly £25,000,000 in 1889. There was, in 1890—fully a quarter of a century before the Great War actually broke out—a reserve of £30,000,000 held by the German Empire in what was practically the form of a hoard; and ready for use in time of War. German Economists (like Roscher, Wagner and Cohn) have defended this proceeding on the ground that it is imperatively necessary for military necessities. The use of the treasure in the past is dwelt on, and it is further urged that on the outbreak of war, the money market is so strained that a large loan is costly, if not unobtainable. In their view, the treasure or war chest is but the complement of the fortresses, equipment, and system of speedy mobilization that constitute the safeguards of German unity (see Bastable, *Public Finance*, 539). The argument against State reserves of this kind is a simple but forcible one. It is

Principle of  
State hoard-  
ing.

quite uncalled for in any country with an efficient system of banking. This certainly was not the case in the Mysore of 1800-1811 and Pūrnaiya's policy, whether from the practical or the theoretical standpoint, was a perfectly sound one and from the point of view of the Treaty of 1799, the only possible one.

Pūrnaiya's  
Policy  
justified.

Apart from the economic argument and the argument derived from a consideration of the necessity created by the Treaty of Seringapatam, it is a question if Pūrnaiya's financial policy did involve any injustice to the people or their material well-being. He may have been a frugal Finance Minister but judging from the amount he expended on public utility concerns, he could not have been the niggard he is sometimes described to have been. During his Dewanship of ten years, he spent not less than Rs. 77 lakhs on public works, nearly 50 of which were devoted to irrigation works. About Rs. 32 lakhs he expended on the repair of old tanks and channels, the majority of which, as we have seen, had fallen into a ruinous condition during the usurpation period. About Rs. 15 lakhs, he spent on the construction and repair of the forts of Bangalore and Channapatna, to secure the people against the possible or rather expected inroads of Mahrattas, and infuse general confidence among them of absolute security against the loss of their property. Among other necessary works carried out by him were:— Over Rs. 5½ lakhs on the Wellesley Bridge; about Rs. 3½ lakhs on Travellers' Bungalows, etc.,; nearly Rs. 2 lakhs on *mutts*, *chattrams* and other religious foundations; Rs. 1½ lakhs on the Webbe monument at French-Rocks; and Rs. 17½ lakhs on the Nallah which is now known after his name. The last work was partially an irrigation and partially a water-supply scheme for the benefit of Mysore City. As already mentioned, it is drawn from the Cauvery, some thirty miles above Seringapatam. It



is upwards of 70 miles in length and terminates at Mysore City. It was carried over the Lakshmantīrtha river by means of an aqueduct. Immense labour was expended on its excavation, cuttings of more than 100 feet deep, through solid rock, having been dug at many points of its course. There has been a disposition of late among certain Engineers to declare this Scheme an impracticable one. But Colonel Colin Mackenzie, who carried out a survey of Mysore and subsequently became Surveyor-General of Madras and later Surveyor-General of India, and has left a special memorandum on it after a professional examination of the scheme as proposed and as it was being carried out, has not adversely criticised it. The following passage is taken from his memorandum dated 22nd March 1807 :—

“From thence (from the anicut across the Lakshmantīrtha) the new *nalla* is now cutting to Mysore in a winding course of  $48\frac{1}{2}$  miles, the whole length when completed to Mysore Fort will be  $71\frac{1}{2}$  miles. Its general breadth from 25 to 30 feet and the greatest depth of water it is expected to drain off at its first outlet (for which the drains from the Cauvery should only be estimated) is reckoned at  $3\frac{1}{2}$  feet, but probably it will seldom amount to that depth. Of this time, some idea may be formed from inspection of the chart annexed (to his Memorandum), though on a minute scale, to which I shall only add that the greatest depth of water carried off by it can only take place at the height of the floods.”

The above remarks would seem to suggest that the scheme cannot have been the impracticable one it is said to have been by latter day Engineering critics. As regards Colonel Mackenzie himself, it should be remarked that he was very chary of offering final opinions on any matter without careful study. “It was the character of Colonel Mackenzie,” said Sir Alexander Johnston, late Chief Justice of Ceylon, before the Select Committee of House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company in 1832, “to be diffident of sending anything



forth to the world whilst there seemed to be any part of the subject susceptible of more complete elucidation." If he thought a scheme practicable, there should certainly be something to be said for it; at least it would demand closer examination before final judgment is pronounced on it. Apart from this aspect of the matter, Mr. J. D. B. Gribble, late of the Madras Civil Service, has expressed a doubt whether so shrewd a man as Pūrnaiya would have spent so much exertion and money on an impossible task. He is rather inclined to believe that when Pūrnaiya left office there was no one with the wish or the determination to carry the work through.

Though in the Manjarabad and other parts, many roads were opened up, the amount expended on roads was, however, not large. Only Rs. 67,000 had been spent by him on this necessary work, and that too after he had been five years in power. On this point, however, the author of the Report of 1870, has pertinently remarked as follows:—

"Pūrnaiya's ignorance of the impetus which roads would give is excusable, seeing that several years after this period, the Secretary to a neighbouring Government gravely impresses upon a too restless Engineer that His Excellency in Council would see no necessity for spending money on the roads he proposed for the reason that as yet there were no carts to take advantage of them."

Altogether during the eleven years that Pūrnaiya held office, he spent on an average more than Rs. 7 lakhs on Public Works, or Rs. 7 lakhs more than the total spent during the twenty-five years of British management from 1831-1856! That, at any rate, shows that he did not lag behind the ideas of even an avowedly progressive administration of a later date. Besides the above works, Pūrnaiya built *chattrams* and *musafir khanas* for the accommodation of Indian travellers and Travellers' Bungalows for Europeans along the principal roads and

planted avenue trees on their sides. He also built the towns of Closepet and Nyamati, the former for securing greater security for the high road from Bangalore to Mysore, which then passed through a wild and jungly tract. The latter was built to encourage trade between the Malnad and Maidan regions, Nyamati being situated between the two. (See *Volume V* of this work under *Closepet* and *Nyamati*). As Mr. Gribble has remarked, "to have done all this shows not only what enlightened views this really great Indian Statesman must have had, but also what a careful and thrifty supervision he must have exercised over every branch, for not only was the whole internal machinery of administration kept in thorough order, but when he left office, there was in the Treasury an accumulation of no less than Pagodas 75 lakhs (or Rs. 262 lakhs), besides jewels, etc., of considerable value."

In the earlier years, nobody spoke of Purnaiya without the aid of adjectives referring to his great qualities of head and heart. If the good service he did to the British cause in promptly submitting himself on the fall of Seringapatam and his pre-eminent experience and ability won for him the Dewanship of the restored kingdom, his wonderful capacity for sustained work and untiring zeal for the good of the country and the Royal House to which he stood in a fiduciary character, gained for him the admiration and the confidence of the remarkable men who were then concerned in the affairs of Southern India. "He is never mentioned," wrote Sir Mark Cubbon, in his letter to the Government of India dated 15th October 1860, "without praise by Lord Wellesley, Sir Barry Close, Sir John Malcolm, Colonel Wilks, Mr. (Josiah) Webbe and Sir Thomas Munro." More than all this, his character and talents have been celebrated by the Duke of Wellington, who on leaving India sent him his full length portrait accompanied by a letter

Contemporary  
British  
testimony  
to Purnaiya's  
greatness.

in which he says that it is given "as a testimony of my sense of benefits, which the public have derived from your administration, of my sincere regard, and of my gratitude for many acts of personal kindness and attention." This picture now hangs on the walls of the British Residency and the letter sealed with the Persian Signet of the Duke's dead friend Josiah Webbe, is preserved among the archives of the family.

Sir Thomas  
Munro's  
opinion.

Sir Thomas Munro, who had personally known Purnaiya and watched his administration as well, has left on record his views about him. He regarded the period of his administration as something to marvel at. Himself no ordinary administrator, Sir Thomas, writing of Purnaiya, remarked that he "was calculated to realize the most sanguine hopes that could be formed." "He had," he adds, "in the time of Haidar Ali found his way by his talents from an obscure situation to one of the first offices in the State, and he maintained himself in it, in opposition to many able rivals throughout the reign of Tippu Sultan. When Seringapatam fell, we found him willing to accept the office of Dewan. He was beyond comparison better qualified than any other person for it, and both his interest and his ambition led him to exert every means to promote the welfare and resources of the Country under his Administration. But we cannot expect again to find a man so qualified." (Sir Thomas Munro's Minute No. 115, dated 8th November 1825). There is hardly any doubt that the success of his administration was due as much to the extraordinarily vigorous mind he brought to bear on his work as to the unstinted support he received from his British colleagues of the day. He evolved a system where he found none and that neutralized the exercise of the "absolute power" he is, by some writers, said to have possessed and even wielded.

In private life, Pūrnaiya was a simple, straightforward and honourable man. Short of stature, he was fair in complexion and stout in build. Numerous portraits of his, which are available, largely confirm this description of him. He was inured to hard life and on occasions could work continuously for hours without a break even for ablutions or food. He was well read in the *Sāstras* and never dined without personally performing the worship of the household Gods. A devout follower of the system of Śrī-Madhvāchārya, he had studied first hand every work of that great teacher and of Vyāsa-tīrta, the great 16th century expounder of Madhva. He was versatile to a degree, being as good at figures as with the sword. He led armies, managed the Commissariat and raised troops with equal skill. His knowledge of practical Engineering was great, while his Revenue Survey of the State is still spoken of by those who know that work as one that could only have been carried out by a genius like himself. He does not appear to have been ever conscious of his greatness or abilities. General Wellesley actually complained of this trait in him to Colonel Wilks. "He is," said the General, "insensible of the strong impressions in his own favour, which his conduct, his character, and his abilities have made upon all the persons who have at present any power in India,"—the reference being to the Governor-General, the Governor of Madras, Sir Barry Close, etc. (letter dated 9th September 1804). In another letter, dated 13th February 1802, he wrote to Sir Barry Close, of Pūrnaiya's business-like despatch of public business in language which deserves to be recalled. "Pūrnaiya's abilities have," he said, "astonished me; he is so different from another man of the same kind whom I before dealt with. I mean Ball Kishen Bhow. He has done everything that I could wish him to do." A remarkable point about him was, he did his duty and never enquired as to what others thought of him or his

work, or even how he stood with those who were above him. "It is impossible," wrote General Wellesley on 27th February 1802, to Josiah Webbe, the Resident, "for a man to be more ignorant of European policies than Purneah is; indeed, he does not appear to me to have had any knowledge of the late orders from Europe, and the proposed changes of men and measures at Madras, which were so likely to affect his own situation. I attribute his salutary ignorance upon these points to his not having any communication with Madras *dubashes*, who know everything." To whatever cause his ignorance was due, intrigue did not lie in his way. Colonel Wilks was equally emphatic in his opinion of Purnaiya. "Every trait in the character of the Dewan," he said in his Report to the Governor-General, dated 5th December 1804, "marks him as an extraordinary man." By thus describing him, he did not mean to represent him, he says, "in the visionary view of a character without a fault," but as one, "very far surpassing the reasonable expectations of experienced men." "And," he added, "if an order of things has been established, competent upon the whole to correct abuses, when discovered, it may seem to your Lordship (Marquess Wellesley) to constitute some approximation to the sober views and practical ends of good Government."

Purnaiya was a thoroughly typical Brahman with all the virtues of his race. Intercourse with him was, from all accounts, most agreeable, his manners being almost delightful. He is said to have understood English without knowing it—either to read or write. He was well read in Sanskrit and Kannada, and Persian, he probably knew as well as any Muhammadan nobleman of his day. His official correspondence was usually in Persian and his letters—some of which have survived—were couched in a style which should have deeply impressed the persons to whom they were addressed. Lord Clive in one of his



many letters adverts to this admirable feature of his correspondence. Commencing a long letter to him on 28th April 1802, he refers in the very first paragraph to the pleasure which he invariably experienced from the perusal of his friendly communications. That this description was not intended to be a mere compliment to Pūrnaiya is evident from Pūrnaiya's letters themselves: they were pointed, brief and businesslike. There was, as might be expected, a poetical flavour about them which made the reader enjoy them. Pūrnaiya's intelligence was evidently of a high order though not without, as it would appear, a trace of cunning. This cunning, however, was of an innocuous nature and did nobody any ill. Added to this, he had a sense of humour, which enabled him easily to avoid the pitfalls that lay before him. Occasionally, he was almost witty in his conversations. Many an anecdote can be narrated to justify this trait in him. On Tipū Sultān proposing to him one day that he should mediate in a matter of importance, he is said to have remarked: Neither you nor I will ever be good diplomatists, I because I never lie and you because you never speak the truth. When the Sultān's mother heard of this, she is said to have fallen into a fit of laughter. Wilks has recorded a story which shows how Pūrnaiya's ready wit saved a Lingāyat from an untimely end. It is an article of faith with the Lingāyats, that if any one of that community loses the *linga* he wears on his body, he ought not to survive that misfortune. A Lingāyat who had by a mischance lost his *linga*, consulted him in the matter and Pūrnaiya gave him a better counsel. It is a part of the ceremonial preceding the sacrifice of the individual that the principal persons of the sect should assemble on the bank of some holy stream, and placing in a basket the holy *lingas* of the whole assembly, purify them in the sacred waters. The destined victim, in conformity to the advice of his



friend, suddenly seized the basket and overturned its contents into the rapid Cauvery. "Now, my friends," said he, "we are on equal terms: let us prepare to die together." The discussion terminated according to expectation. The whole party took an oath of inviolable secrecy, and each privately provided himself with a new *linga*. (*History of Mysore*, II, App. IV. 515.)

Pūrnaiya rendered valuable service to Colonel Wilks in one particular matter which deserves special mention. At Colonel Wilks' request, he got prepared a historical memoir of Mysore for use in connection with the writing of his *History of Mysoor*. The best informed persons in the State who were known to possess family Mss. or historical works were assembled by Pūrnaiya for this purpose, and a memoir was compiled from a composition of these authorities. The whole work was carried out under the direction of Pūrnaiya, who was actively helped by his assistant Butche Rao in this work. Wilks in the preface to his work sets down this memoir as the first of the six different authorities he used in the composition of his *History of Mysoor* and acknowledges the help rendered to him by Pūrnaiya, whom he calls "the present able and distinguished minister of Mysoor."

Second period  
of the reign  
of H. H.  
Krishna-Raja-  
Wodeyar III,  
1811-1831.

Residents,  
Governors-  
General and  
Governors of  
Madras of  
the period.

We now arrive at the second period of the reign of His Highness Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar III (1811-1831).

During the greater part of this period, Hon. A. H. Cole was the British Resident. He was succeeded in 1827 by J. A. Casamaijor, who had filled different positions at Seringapatam and on the Residency staff. The period also covered the last two years of the Governor-Generalship of the Earl of Minto (1807-1813), the full terms of office of the Marquess of Hastings (1813-1823) and the Earl of Amherst (1823-1828) and the first three

years of Lord William Bentinck (1828-1835). In Madras, it covered part of the Governorship of Sir George Barlow (1807-1814) and the tenures of Mr. Hugh Elliot (1814-1820), Sir Thomas Munro (1820-1827), and Mr. S. R. Lushington (1827-1832). Sir Frederick Adam (1827-1832) just began his Governorship when this period of His Highness' reign closed.

The following persons held the office of Dewan during this period:—

Dewans of the period.

Bāgir Bakshi Balaji Rao	...	April 1811 to January 1812.
Savār Bakshi Rama Rao	...	February 1812 to October 1812.
Bābu Rao	...	November 1817 to April 1818.
Siddharaj Urs	...	May 1820 to February 1820.
Bābu Rao	...	March 1820 to August 1821.
Lingarāj Urs	...	November 1821 to November 1822.
Bābu Rao	...	December 1822 to November 1825.
Venkate Urs	...	May 1827 to October 1831.

Not much is, however, known of these Dewans. Savār Bakshi Rama Rao was the brother of Bishtopant, the Bishnapah of the *Wellington Despatches*. He had been appointed Faujdar of Nagar Division on the Restoration of the country in 1799. Subsequently, in 1809, when the mutiny of European officers spread to Mysore, he was appointed to impede the progress of the British forces marching from Chitaldrug to Seringapatam. (See *ante*). He was made Dewan at the instance of Mr. Cole, the Resident. He was an highly honourable person and was eventually granted a special pension of Rs. 800 per mensem, in recognition of his meritorious service by the Madras Government. The pension took effect from 1st January 1812, and was enjoyed by him uninterruptedly during a period of twenty-eight years. He also distinguished himself in the war against Holkar, in 1818, and was then rewarded by Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III with many valuable *khillats* and presents; including an elephant on which he was allowed to ride in a *howdah*—

a rare mark of honour. (*Nirup* dated 11th March 1818). Bābu Rao, who became Dewan in November 1817, was an equally well-known personage of the time. He had served under Haidar and had been present at the battle of Perambāk at the defeat of Col. Baillie. Subsequently he was in Civil employ. In the latter days of Tipū, he was upheld as a rival of Pūrnaiya and was always considered by him, "as the man of all others in his Government next to that distinguished individual most fit to perform the office of Finance Minister." (Col. Briggs' *Minute* dated 14th May 1832). He filled the office of Dewan on three different occasions and finally retired from service in November 1825. He was, as will be seen below, recalled by Col. Briggs, the Senior Commissioner, and reappointed to the same post in 1832. That he was considered by reason of his character and abilities, fit for that post, there can be no question, as in the *Minute* quoted above, Col. Briggs speaks highly of him.

On the sudden resignation of Pūrnaiya, His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar had to meet a rather trying situation and, from all accounts, he appears to have conducted himself with considerable discretion. With the consent of the Hon. Mr. Cole, he forthwith appointed Bārgir Bakshi Bālāji Rao, a man of talent and ripe experience, to take over the office of Dewan. But he held office only for about nine months, when Rama Rao took his place. Under Rama Rao, the administration was conducted on the lines established by Pūrnaiya. The country was divided into the six Faujdaris of Bangalore, Maddagiri, Chitaldrug, Ashtagram, Manjarabad and Nagar. These were, again, subdivided into 125 *gadīs* or Taluks.

System of  
Administra-  
tion.

The Faujdaris were under the Dewan, who managed them with an office consisting of 18 Departments, all personally subordinate to him. These administrative divisions continued to the end of His Highness' reign

under succeeding Dewans. There was, during this period, little change in the system of administration as devised by Purnaiya. A full account of it—under the heads of *Land Revenue*, *Sayur*, *Panch Bāb*, *Civil Justice*, *Criminal Justice*, and *Police*—will be found in *Volume IV*, Chapter I of this work. According to a *Hukkumnāma* dated 26th March 1819, issued by His Highness, it would seem that he took personal interest in every part of the District administration. (See *Annals of Mysore Family*, II. 57—78).

Between 1810 and 1824, His Highness' Government took a prominent part in the operations against Amīr Khān, in the Pindari war of 1812-17; in the final operations against the Pindaris in 1818; in the pursuit of Peishwa Bāji Rao, in 1800; and in the suppression of the insurrection at Kittoor, in 1824. In all these wars, the Mysore Horse distinguished itself, and His Highness was again and again thanked by the Government of India for the valuable services rendered by him. Sir John Malcolm has testified to the successful character of His Highness' administration and the manner in which they contributed to British victories in the field at the time. "It is important to remark," he has said, "that this change (from Purnaiya to His Highness) has in no degree affected the efficiency of the Mysore Horse which served during the campaigns of 1817 and 1818 in the countries of Malwa and Rajputana with as much zeal, fidelity and gallantry as they had before displayed in the Dekhan during the Mahratta wars of 1803." (See his *Political History of India*, 1784-1829, I. 544-7). These wars are briefly referred to below in so far as they relate to the part played by Mysore troops.

Wars of the period.

In the operations against Amīr Khān, an old soldier of fortune who had been at one time an adherent of Jaswanta Rao Hōlkar but subsequently turned

Operations against Amīr Khān 1810.

independent, a contingent of Mysore Horse (1,500 strong) took part in the occupation of Seronje, his capital, under the command of Colonel Barry Close. Amīr Khān fled to Indore, and with it the army broke up.

Operations  
against the  
Pindaris,  
1816.

Similarly, the Mysore Horse distinguished itself in the suppression of the Pindaris, during the period of 1812-17. Early in November 1816, a body of Pindaris, computed at about 2,500 men, under the command of one of their principal leaders named Bukscoo, left Nimawar, in Mālwa. Nimawar is on the Godavari opposite to Scindia's fort at Hindia, and was one of the headquarter camps of the Pindaris. It crossed the Nerbudda, and advanced in a south-easterly direction by Seonee and Ramteak, leaving Nagpore on the right, and Chunda on the left. It then passed Yedalabad and Beder, and penetrated as far as the Krishna, plundering as it went. On reaching the Krishna, it turned up along the left bank for some distance, and then struck north towards the district of Nuldrug, which it entered early in January 1817. At this time, Major Robert McDowall, 2nd battalion 24th regiment, was moving about in the Nizām's districts of Beder, Naudair and Nuldrug, with a small field force consisting of part of his own battalion, some companies of the 2nd battalion 15th regiment under Captain Williams, and a body of *Mysore Silladar Horse* under Annajee Rao. On the 14th January, when marching towards the town of Omergh in Nuldrug, he received information to the effect that the Pindaris were in the neighbourhood of the village of Moorli, about 8 miles towards the south-east. Leaving his camp at Omergh under the protection of 80 men, the Major marched about 9 P.M. with 325 rank and file and 1,000 Silladar Horse, and about 3 A.M. on the 15th he surprised the Pindaris in their encampment, and dispersed them with considerable loss.



They continued their flight until evening, when they made a short halt, after which they resumed their retreat taking the most direct line for the Godavari. Their loss was estimated at about 500 men killed, wounded and taken prisoners; 800 horses, of which half were very good, were captured, and about 200 were killed and wounded. Two of the chiefs, named Cawder and Moomdee, besides several other leaders, were wounded, but they were carried off by their men by being tied on their horses. All their booty was left behind, except what they had about their persons, and a large quantity of arms, principally swords and spears, were abandoned.

The inhabitants rose upon the plunderers during their retreat and captured a number, all of whom were executed by order of the Nizām's Government.

A detachment of Mysore Horse distinguished itself in the Mahratta War of 1817-18. They took an active part in the capture of Dossanah, 35 miles north-west of Dhoolia, by Lieutenant-Colonel Robert Scot. The *pettah* being taken by assault, the garrison surrendered on condition of being allowed to carry away their private property. The fall of Dossanah, which was considered a great strong-hold, created a great impression at the time. Prinsep speaks of its "gallant storm" as having contributed to the expulsion of the adherents of Trimbakji Danglia from the Kandeish.

Mahratta  
War, 1817-18,

A detachment of the Mysore Horse (400 strong) formed part of the 3rd division of the Deccan Army under Brigadier-General Sir John Malcolm. The detachment was commanded by Captain Grant, Madras Cavalry, and took part in the combined movements against the Pindaris beyond the Nerbudda and in the defeat of Hōlkar's Army at Mahidpoor in November 1817. Sir John Malcolm marched on the 18th November in search

Operations  
against the  
Pindaris,  
1817.

Capture of  
Talyne.



of Chetoo, an adherent of Hōlkar, and proceeding by Ashta, he arrived at Mynapoor on the 24th and detached 1,200 Mysore Horse, under Captain Grant, against the fort at Talyne, distant 32 miles. Captain Grant making a forced march reached the place at day-break on the 25th and surrounded it. A reinforcement came up during the day, and the garrison composed of a small body of horse and foot under the command of Wahid Khān, the adopted son of Chetoo, seeing no chance of escape, surrendered at discretion.

Battle of  
Mahidpore,  
21st  
December  
1817.

At Mahidpore, the British artillery had been at first overmatched by the enemy's, the loss on the British side being heavy. The enemy's guns were soon captured, though they were well served and laid, the gunners depressing them as the troops advanced, and pouring in a very heavy fire of grape and chain shot. The left infantry Brigade moved forward about the same time as the others with the object of turning the right of the enemy but before it could reach their line, the brigades of Cavalry (H. M's. 22nd Light Dragoons 100, 3rd Light Cavalry 385, 4th Light Cavalry 282, 8th Light Cavalry 330, detail 6th Light Cavalry 18, Mysore Horse, 3,284) charged in two bodies, completely routed the enemy's horse, and captured most of the guns. A body of infantry in the centre, with some twenty guns, still held the ground, but they soon gave way. The defeat in all parts of the field was then complete. The regular cavalry, when following the flying infantry, suddenly caught sight of Hōlkar's camp in a hollow to their right, upon which they turned down towards it in the hope of a valuable capture, leaving the pursuit to be continued by the Mysore Horse. The camp, however, turned out to be empty and the Cavalry finding themselves to be exposed to the fire of the battery of thirteen guns posted behind a ravine on the same side of the river, but some distance

lower down, withdrew to the shelter of the village, where they awaited the arrival of the 1st and Light Brigades then approaching under Sir Thomas Hislop, the Commander-in-Chief. On their coming up, a party of the Light Infantry was sent to turn the flank of the battery, but the demonstration was sufficient for the enemy who fled across the river leaving their guns and the field in the possession of the victors. The Mysore Horse, shortly after having taken up the pursuit entrusted to them by the regular Cavalry, captured 20 standards, 2 guns, 1 tumbril, 7 elephants, 218 camels and a large quantity of very valuable property, including the jewels of Hölkar's family. The distribution of this booty became the subject of much discussion afterwards and is separately referred to below.

Booty  
captured by  
Mysore  
Horse.

On the morning of the 27th December (1817), a light detachment (4th and 8th cavalry, two squadrons of each, four Horse artillery guns and 2,000 Mysore Horse), under Sir John Malcolm, marched towards Mundissoor and on the 31st, the whole of the cattle and the bazaars belonging to Hölkar's army was captured under the walls of that place by a squadron of Cavalry and the Mysore Horse under Captain Grant which had been sent on in advance. Sir Thomas Hislop, leaving the field hospital at Mahidpoor in charge of the 2nd battalion 6th, a brigade of guns, and 200 Mysore Horse, all under Major Moodie of the 6th, marched on the 28th with the headquarters and met the division from Guzerat under Sir William Grant Keir at Taul on the Chumbul on the 30th.

Capture of  
Hölkar's  
bazaars.

Both columns marched again on the 31st and encamped four miles south of Mundissoor on the 1st and 2nd January 1818, and four days later the treaty of peace was signed at Mundissoor by Sir John Malcolm on the one side as Political Agent to the Governor-General and

Treaty of  
Mundissoor  
signed, 6th  
January 1818

Vittul Pant Tautiah Jogh, the Minister of Hōlkar, on the other. (An independent account of this battle will be found in the *Asiatic Journal* for July 1818. See also Sir John Kaye's *Life of Malcolm*, II.)

Final  
operations  
against the  
Pindaris in  
Malwa,  
January and  
February,  
1818.

Lieutenant-Colonel Heath, commanding at Hindia, having received information on the morning of the 25th January, 1818, to the effect that Chetoo, the Pindari leader, with about 1,500 men, was at Kunnoda, about 25 miles from Hindia, with the supposed intention of crossing the Nerbudda in order to join the Peishwa, marched (with a detachment, part of which was made up of the Mysore Silladar Horse under three Sirdars), and succeeded in surprising their camp that same night. Favoured by the darkness, most of the Pindaris escaped, but they were completely dispersed. Chetoo, with about 500 men, flew northwards, but he never recovered from the effects of this blow, by which he was deprived of the whole of his baggage, besides two elephants, 110 camels and 130 horses. His standards of red silk with a white crescent in the centre, measuring thirteen and a half feet by eleven and a half feet, was taken. He subsequently joined Appa Sahib, and escaped to Assirghar, but being refused admittance into that fortress, and having been deserted by his followers, he fled northwards, and turned into a forest, where he is supposed to have been killed by a tiger (February 1819). His son gave himself up to Sir John Malcolm, who stayed on in Malwa with the 3rd Division (which consisted of the 3rd Light Cavalry and 2,000 Mysore Horse under Lieutenant-Colonel Russell) to co-operate with the Grand Army from Bengal, and to carry out the instructions of the Governor-General regarding the settlement of that province.

In pursuit of  
Peishwa Bāji  
Rao, 1818.

After the memorable action at Sewnee, the pursuit of the Peishwa Bāji Rao was taken up by Brigadier-General

Doveton who had followed him relentlessly, allowing him neither time to rest nor to feed his horses. The Peishwa reached Dhocote, about 7 miles west of Assirghur, with 5,000 horse and 4,000 foot, when it was determined to attempt to capture him. A select detachment (among them one squadron of 7th Cavalry and 1,000 Mysore Horse) was under orders to march whenever the moon should rise, but the enterprize was given up in consequence of a communication to the effect that the Peishwa had entered into a negotiation with Sir John Malcolm respecting the terms of surrender.

The Mysore Horse returned to Mysore about March 1820, when the Madras troops were relieved in Mālwa.

Return of  
Mysore  
Horse, 1820.

As stated above, the booty captured during the war of 1817-18 became the subject of violent contention. A brief account of the same, largely based on Colonel Wilson's resumé of the original correspondence, is all that is needed here of this subject.

Dispute  
regarding  
Booty  
captured by  
Mysore  
Horse at  
Battle of  
Mahidpoor,  
1817.

The Mysore Horse, under Captain James Grant of the 5th Cavalry, after taking up the pursuit left to them by the regular cavalry, speedily overtook the baggage, and captured seven elephants, and two hundred and eighteen camels, together with a quantity of jewels, miscellaneous articles, horses and money; the total value of which was estimated, by the Resident in Mysore, at about twenty-six lakhs of *pagōdas* (Rs. 91,00,000), exclusive of one and-a-half lakhs presented by the captors to H. H. the Mahārāja of Mysore. The Commander-in-Chief of Madras subsequently estimated the value of the whole at about one million pounds sterling.

Part played  
by the  
Mysore  
Horse.

On the 8th December 1818, the Madras Government, at the instance of the Commander-in-Chief, requested

Booty claimed  
by Sir Thomas  
Hislop as  
general prize,  
1818.

the Governor-General to cause the restitution of the booty in order that it might be made part of the general prize fund; and the decision of the Supreme Government in the case of a complaint made by Major Robert MacDowall against the Silladars on the occasion of the surprise of the Pindari camp in the Nizam's country, on the 15th January 1817, was cited as a precedent.

Disallowed  
by the  
Governor-  
General.

The Governor-General, in his reply, dated 2nd January 1819, disallowed the claim on the following grounds, *viz.*:—That the Mysore Horse had, like other irregular troops of a similar description, been allowed the privilege of retaining possession of property captured by themselves in the field, and were in consequence of that privilege, excluded from participation in the general prize fund. That upon the occasion in question the Mysore Horse had been actively engaged in completing the destruction of Hölkar's broken army when they made the capture.

That the case of Major MacDowall did not apply, inasmuch as the Pindari camp had been taken by the native infantry of the detachment, who, without halting to secure it, had pressed forward in pursuit of the enemy, whereas the Silladars, instead of charging the flying Pindaris, as ordered by the Major, remained behind, plundered the camp, and carried away the booty.

Sir Thomas  
Hislop  
remonstrates  
on certain  
grounds.

Sir Thomas Hislop, being dissatisfied with this decision, remonstrated against it in a letter, dated 12th February 1819, on the ground that the Governor-General in Council had no knowledge of the circumstances which had enabled the Mysore Horse to gain exclusive possession of the booty; and he proceeded to explain, that when the line of the enemy had been broken by the infantry, and afterwards put to flight by the cavalry, he, the Commander-in-Chief, had sent an order for all the



troops to form upon the 1st Brigade, then about to advance upon the enemy's camp. That this movement, which had been necessary to complete the defeat in that part of the field, had prevented the cavalry from capturing the booty, which, had they not been ordered off the line of pursuit, must have fallen into their hands. He went on to say that the Mysore Horse had not been engaged in the attack, but only in skirmishing on the line of march, in assisting to guard the baggage, and in the pursuit; for which reasons, he urged that the troops, which had borne the brunt of the fight, ought not to be deprived of their share of the fruits of the victory by others who had done so little.

The assertion that the cavalry, in quitting the line of pursuit, had acted under orders was never satisfactorily established, although it was admitted by Lord Hastings for the sake of the argument. Adverting to the relative positions of Sir Thomas Hislop and the cavalry at the close of the action, it seems scarcely possible that the latter could have received any order until after they had abandoned the pursuit, on coming in sight of Holkar's camp, presumably with the object of plunder, for they were not then aware that all valuable property had already been removed from it. The remarks of Colonel Blacker, himself an Officer of Cavalry, are against the presumption of any such order, and he was of opinion that the Cavalry would have been more usefully employed in the pursuit, than in going to the right of the field where there was already more than sufficient force. (See Blacker's *Mahratta War*, 150 and 155).

Their  
accuracy  
doubtful.

The Governor-General in Council, in a despatch dated 8th April 1819, informed the Madras Government that Sri Thomas Hislop's appeal contained no argument tending to alter his opinion. He pointed out that the

The  
Governor-  
General in  
Council  
adheres to  
his decision,  
1819.



matter at issue was not to be decided with reference to the comparative merits of the troops engaged, but in conformity with a certain recognized principle, which he had already explained, and proceeded to repeat :

“ Our determination founded itself on usage, and clear equity. It has been the uniform custom to exclude the auxiliary cavalry from participation in the distribution of prize money to the regular army. This was done on the plea that from the nature of their services, the irregular cavalry must get much booty which they never could be influenced to bring to general account.

“ They were, therefore, to be satisfied with such gains as they could collect in their desultory operations. Though there was this ostensible reason for the refusal to admit them as sharers, the arrangement was not advantageous for the auxiliary horse, because they were shut out from participation in the more important treasures taken where fortresses surrendered ; or in the donations issued to the regular troops in return for military stores made over to Government. That upon a particular occasion the plunder acquired by the auxiliary horse went to an extraordinary amount, as is surmised to have been the case at Mahidpoor, cannot alter the terms of an established rule.

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“ Lieutenant-General Sir Thomas Hislop informs us that, when the enemy were routed on the ground which they first occupied, they made a show of rallying in a retired position where they had some artillery. The regular troops, as was incumbent, were led to the latter point to complete the enemy's disorder and prevent their attempt at retrieving the day. The Mysore Horse were ordered in a different direction to pursue the baggage which had taken that other route ; the object of the order being, that by the capture of the baggage, including treasure, Holkar should be deprived of the means to make new levies, and prolong the contest. What the Silladar Horse effected was, as we apprehend, the duty distinctly committed to them. Is it pretended to have been held out to them, that if they brought their expected capture to the

common stock, they should participate in the general distribution? No such thing is intimated; and it is obvious that they were supposed to be acting on the known established terms, till the suspicion of their having gotten an enormous prey, excited the question whether their right could not be impugned."

Another reference of a somewhat similar character was made about the same time. Amongst the property captured by the Silladars, there happened to have been a sword and belt believed to have been worn by Hōlkar. These were presented to Sir John Malcolm by the Mahārāja Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar in acknowledgment of the kindness and consideration with which he had treated the auxiliary troops. Sir Thomas Hislop took serious offence at this, and, in a minute dated 18th December 1818, he solemnly protested against the gift, adding that the sword was a suitable trophy to be presented to His Royal Highness the Prince Regent. Nevertheless, the action of His Highness was confirmed by the Governor-General in Council on the same grounds as those on which his decision regarding the prize had been founded, and an appeal preferred by Sir Thomas Hislop to the Court of Directors was unsuccessful. It is understood that the sword has been long preserved in the Malcolm family as a precious heirloom.

Sword and  
Belt of  
Hōlkar.

The services rendered by the Mysore troops in the campaigns of 1817-1818 won the approbation of the Marquess of Hastings (Earl Moira), then Governor-General of India. He sent His Highness Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III a number of letters, in one of which he very warmly thanked His Highness for the help he had extended for "promoting the welfare and happiness of the people living in the British Territory." (Letter dated 19th December 1817). "Your sincerity shines," he added, "to the best advantage when I see that Your

Thanks of the  
Governor-  
General  
(Marquess of  
Hastings).

Highness has not only carried out the Treaty obligations but has also gone so far as to help this Government with Your Troops and ammunition even beyond the limits of expectation." (*Ibid.*) At the end of the War, Earl Moira wrote his final letter, dated the 27th March 1818, in which he complimented and thanked His Highness for the valuable aid he had rendered. "I take this opportunity," he wrote, "to express my pleasure at the distinguished services rendered by the Mysore Troops and on account of the zeal and sincere love shown by Your Highness towards this Government. And I hope that Your Highness has, by this time, become fully aware of the success achieved by your Troops along with the British Forces. I am also informed by the British officers about the valour and tactfulness which your Troops have shown in performing their duty which it gives me great pleasure to bring to Your Highness' notice." (Letter dated 27th March 1818.)

Grant of  
Jaghirs to  
Bakshis  
Rama Rao  
and Bhima  
Rao, 14th  
October 1818.

Bakshi Rama Rao and his nephew Bhima Rao, who commanded the Mysore Horse in these Wars, were on 14th October 1818 rewarded by His Highness the Mahārājah by the grant of Jaghirs yielding annual revenues of Rs. 6,000 and 4,000 respectively.

Insurrection  
at Kittoor,  
1824.

In suppressing the insurrection at Kittoor, about 20 miles from Dharwar, in October 1824, in which Mr. Thackeray, the Collector, lost his life, two contingents of Mysore Horse were requisitioned, both for guarding the frontier at Harihar and also for the reduction of the place. For the latter purpose, 700 of the Mysore Horse joined the British and the Company's troops at Belgaum under the command of Colonel Deacon. The fort was invested and taken, a large quantity of treasure and valuables (subsequently valued at over Rs. 12 Lakhs) falling into the hands of the captors.

In 1830, Seringapatam ceased to be a Military Station on the reduction of the "Seringapatam Local Battalion," the gun Carriage Manufactory being removed in June of the same year, from it to Fort St. George.

Seringapatam ceases to be a Military Station, 1830.

His Highness took a personal interest in the education and well being of the members of the Ursu community, who during the usurpation period, had been despoiled of their riches and reduced to poverty. His Highness brought them together, provided for their accommodation and means of livelihood by settling salaries and pensions on them.

Relief for Members of the Ursu Community.

His Highness paid, in October 1811, a State visit to Bangalore, travelling in the company of the Hon. Mr. Cole, the Resident. His Highness held a *darbar* at the Palace in the Bangalore Fort on the occasion. The visit proved a great success, a large number of European ladies and gentlemen having been thus given an opportunity to offer their respects to him. His Highness took a keen interest in the development of Bangalore and extended hearty support to the scheme of making it the seat of a cantonment. He granted the necessary lands for the purpose from time to time as required by the Supreme Government.

His Highness' visit to Bangalore, October 1811.

In the year 1820-1821, His Highness travelled through the State, visiting in his progress most of the Foujdaris, including Ashtagram, Nagar and Madhugiri.

Tour through the State, 1820-1821.

One Triplicane Ramaswami Mudaliar, who had seen service under Col. Wilks, the Resident, built (or rather re-built) two bridges across the Cauvery at Sivasamudram. He is said to have expended several thousands of pounds on the work, for which he received from the British Government, in 1843, the title of *Janopakar Kām Karta*.

Construction of bridges across the Cauvery at Sivasamudram, 1829.

(the constructor of work useful to the people) as also an estate of five villages, yielding about Rs. 800 annually. His Highness the Mahārāja granted him in 1829, seven villages, yielding annually Rs. 900, in recognition of his meritorious services. These bridges are no more, having been washed away a couple of years back by floods and are under reconstruction now. They were, according to Mr. Bowring, fine specimens of Indian workmanship, being composed of hewn-stone, supported on colossal pillars twenty feet high, firmly fixed in the rocks of the river, while they were so constructed as to resist the force of the current during high floods, which are truly formidable. (See *Eastern Experiences* 47-48; also *Annals of the Mysore Royal Family*, II. 84).

His Highness' Administration ; misapprehensions and differences.

About 1814, some differences arose between the Hon. Mr. Cole, the Resident, and His Highness the Mahārāja, mostly due, as they would now seem, from a misapprehension of the financial position. The large balances left by Pūrnaiya in the Treasury had been, it is said, expended, and that benefactions to temples had increased. There seems no ground for these suggestions. As regards the expenditure, the subsidy had to be paid, under the Treaty, regularly every month and even so adverse a critic as the late Mr. Lewin Bowring has openly acknowledged that His Highness had paid it scrupulously on the due dates. "It does not appear," he says, "that he (His Highness) at any time failed in paying the subsidy due by him to the British Government." (*Eastern Experiences*, 189). During His Highness' reign, he had to maintain an efficient army, which under the Treaty of Seringapatam of 1799, as amended by the Supplementary Treaty in 1807, was obligatory on him. As already stated, these forces had proved immensely useful in the wars in which the British were engaged between 1810 to 1824. (See *ante*). These wars meant also additional



expenditure, apart from maintenance charges. Next, there were at least two years of serious distress—1816-17 and 1823-24. The latter year was really a year of famine. The ordinary expenditure averaged about Rs. 70 to 90 lakhs per annum. The total receipts averaged as follows during the decades mentioned :—

1801	...	Rs. 77 lakhs.
1800-1810	...	Rs. 86½ lakhs.
1810-1820	...	Rs. 86½ lakhs.
1820-1830	...	Rs. 76 lakhs.

As the expenditure went up to Rs. 90 lakhs, some years proved deficit years. Moreover, owing to low prices, the grain collected as the Government share, fetched very low prices. If Pūrnaiya spent large sums on public works, His Highness did not lag behind the standard set up by him in this connection. Between the years 1811-12 and 1830-31, His Highness' Government expended something like 8,50,272 lakhs of Kantirai pagodas, on public works. This means, on an average, about 42,514 Kantirai pagodas. An examination of the annual expenditure incurred during these twenty years shows that on an average not less than 22½ lakhs of Kantirai pagodas was expended on them, though in some years, this expenditure appears to have mounted up to even 68½ lakhs pagodas.

His Highness' well-known generosity and his interest in temples and other religious institutions appears to have created a misunderstanding in certain quarters. This was wholly unfortunate as it affected political relations as well. In 1825, the "misunderstanding" and "irritation," as Sir Thomas Munro, then Governor of Madras, put it in a minute dated 8th November 1825, on the part of the Hon. Mr. Cole, had reached such a stage that Sir Thomas deemed it necessary "by a personal visit, to remove, if possible, the causes of irritation."

Sir Thomas  
Munro's  
visit to  
Mysore,  
September  
1825.



Sir Thomas arrived at Mysore on 16th September 1825 and paid a visit to His Highness. In the Minute above referred to, he sets down what took place at the interview. He held that there was no substance in the suggestion of the Resident that accounts had not been furnished by His Highness' Government. He held that they "had not been furnished from the time of Purniah, and because they were probably not ready." At the same time, he put it to His Highness that by the furnishing of accounts, the Company's Government would be enabled to know "the true state of affairs," which would put an end to "vague reports" and avoid "interference" with the affairs of His Highness' Government. He also assured His Highness that any suggestions made by him were not intended to interfere with his Government. He explained that it was his wish that His Highness "should be under no alarm about the security of the Treaty, but set his mind at rest regarding it, because it was not the intention of the British Government to alter it on any point; that by keeping it unchanged, many advantages accrued to both States." He suggested to His Highness that expenditure should not exceed the receipts; that he should accumulate "a treasure of ten or twelve lakhs of Canteroy pagdoas" and that "when this was accomplished, there would be room for again replacing the diminution which the present state of things might render it necessary to make in some of the departments." At the same time, Sir Thomas took occasion to restore cordial relations between the Hon. Mr. Cole and His Highness which had been somewhat ruffled by the rude behaviour of one of the former's servants. After reviewing the situation, Sir Thomas held that no case had been made out for interference by the Company's Government. He wrote:—

"By the orders of the Supreme Government, our superintending influence is to be exercised with caution, delicacy,

and moderation ; and it is supposed that the reasonable interposition of our advice, combined with the disposition of the Executive Administration to cultivate the good opinion of the Company's Government, will always be sufficient to prevent the occurrence of any flagrant abuse."

In regard to alleged over-expenditure for religious purposes, after a careful examination of the statement prepared by the Hon. Mr. Cole, Sir Thomas held that there was no ground for this allegation. He wrote :—

"As the expenditure by the Rajah under the heads of pagodas, Brahmans, Fakirs, etc., is double what it was in Purniah's account, I wished to have suggested a considerable reduction to the Rajah, but the design was given up because it appeared to the Resident upon further enquiry that Purniah did not show all his disbursements for these heads and that the whole was so little less than the Rajah's expenditure that it was not advisable to make any alteration."

The Hon. Mr. Cole was, in 1827, succeeded by Mr. J. A. Casamaijor as Resident.

Hon. Mr. Cole  
succeeded by  
Mr. J. A.  
Casamaijor,  
1827.

In 1830, symptoms of certain disturbances began to show in the Nagar country. The people of this part of the State were rather of a turbulent type and never paid their dues to Government with any degree of regularity. The outstanding balances of revenue had accumulated to upwards of thirteen lakhs of rupees. Large remissions to the extent of seven-and-a-half lakhs were made in 1828. His Highness disapproved of these remissions and displaced the Faujdar by another from head-quarters. The latter discovered that much fraud had been practised in the remissions, and re-imposed the claims, which naturally excited dissatisfaction in those affected. The previous Faujdar's party, also, fearful of the consequences to themselves if the inquiries which his successor was pursuing should expose the corruption and malversation

Disturbances  
in Nagar,  
1830.

they had practised during so many years, connived at the seditious proceedings of a pretender to the throne of Nagar. This man, whose real name was Sadar Malla, was the son of a common *raiya*t of Kumsi. Before the age of twenty, he had been concerned in several robberies and spent two years in jail. He afterwards entered the service of a Jangama who had been priest of the last Nayak of Bednur and was possessed of his seal rings. These, on the death of the priest, Sadar Malla got hold of, and assuming the name of Būdi Basavappa, wandered about the country secretly giving out that he was a descendant of the Nagar family. About 1812, he was imprisoned for some time in Kanara for robbery, and on release, obtained a passport bearing the seal of the Zillah court, in which was entered his name as he himself gave it, Būdi Basavappa Nagar Khavind. This document was now exhibited as a *sannad* from the East India Company recognizing his claims. These deceptions were effectual, and when the discontent to which we have alluded was at its height, taking advantage of it to promise a full remission of all balances and a reduction of the assessment, he was, about April 1830, formally recognized by several *patels* as the sovereign of Nagar.

In August 1830, a force in the name of Sadar Malla attempted to surprise the fort of Anantapur, but failed. At the same period, the *raiya*ts in various places assembled in *Kuta* or indignation meetings. On the ground of these commotions, the new Faujdar was recalled, and the former Faujdar restored. He made use of troops to disperse the *raiya*ts at Hole Honnur on the 7th December, and several were killed and wounded. But they rallied near Honnali and were joined by larger numbers from all parts, who openly espoused the cause of the pretender. The Faujdar again attacked them with a regiment of horse and broke up the assembly. Sarja Hanumappa Nayak, the Pālegar of Tarikere, now suddenly

left Mysore and joined the insurgents, seizing on Kal-droog and Kamandroog. The Faujdar of Bangalore also reported his Division to be in a general state of discontent. Strong reinforcements of troops were sent to the disturbed districts in the Bangalore, Chitaldrug and Nagar Divisions; and His Highness the Mahārāja set out with a considerable force on the 13th December for Channarayapatna, where it was proclaimed that the grievances of the *raiyats* would be inquired into. Investigations were made by the Dewan for some days; several persons were hanged, others flogged or punished otherwise. Meanwhile there were encounters in various parts between the insurgents and the troops. In January 1831, His Highness' camp was established at Hebbur, and the Dewan was despatched with troops against Kamandrug, while Annappa, an officer of cavalry, was appointed to supersede the Faujdar of Nagar. Annappa maintained an arduous conflict for several weeks with the insurgents, and was forced to take refuge in Anantapur. Here he remained till nearly starved, when addressing his troops, he said, "Rather than die in this way of starvation, let us go and fight and die like soldiers." They responded, and sallying forth on the Shikarpur road, fought their way stoutly for fifteen miles to Masur in the Company's territory, whence they retreated to Harihar. The operations against Kamandrug failed, but Kaldrug was taken in February. British aid was now applied for, and a regiment started from Harihar. At the same time, Lieut. Rochfort, of the Resident's escort, taking command of the Mysore troops, captured Kamandrug on the 3rd of March, the Pālegars escaping during the assault. Hence Lieut. Rochfort marched to Shimoga, and hearing that a large body of insurgents had taken Honnali, he proceeded there and took it by assault on the 12th. He now marched west, and carrying several stockades, temporarily recovered

Nagar (or Bednur) on the 26th, and Chandragutti on the 6th of April. Meanwhile enriched by the plunder of district treasuries and other depredations, the insurgent leaders were joined by bodies of armed men, both horse and foot. Attracted by the hope of plunder, 1,500 Kandachar peons of the Bedar caste also deserted to them.

Owing to the increasing strength of the insurgents, the entire Subsidiary Force was employed. One regiment had to retire from a fortified barrier at Fettepet, but the British forces being concentrated at Shimoga, moved on the 31st of May by a circuitous route to Nagar, which was finally taken on the 12th of June, and a death-blow given to the disturbances. By the next month, the majority of the *raiya*ts had returned to their villages under the protection of letters of *cowl*. But the leaders continued at large with marauding bands, committing outrages and raising disturbances for some months longer. Sarja Hanumappa Nāyak, the Tarikere Pālegar, offered a strenuous resistance, which he continued till 1834, when he was seized and hanged.

Causes of the  
disturbances;  
Lewin  
Bowring's  
opinion.

Mr. Lewin Bowring has remarked that these disturbances in Nagar were due in great measure to the faulty system of renting out large tracts of country to the highest bidder, a practice which led to great oppression and discontent, the renters being generally outsiders, and as rapacious as they were venal. (*Eastern Experiences*, 162). But the system had been long in vogue and was not unknown to other parts of the State or to Southern and Western India generally. It has further to be remarked that similar disturbances occurred at the same time in Kanara, the people of which part are closely allied to those in Nagar. In both cases, writes Mr. Bowring, oppressive taxation was the alleged ground for the discontent which prevailed, a feeling which was



certainly fomented by the Tarikere Pālegar as also by the pretender to the Nagar throne, called Būdi Basavappa. (*Ibid*, 163.) The Supreme Government, however, attributed the disturbances to alleged maladministration by His Highness, and made it the cause for taking the power out of his hands. As Mr. Bowring has remarked, the action of Lord William Bentinck, then Governor-General, has been questioned, for "it does not appear," that His Highness "intentionally oppressed his subjects, or that he even did actually fail to pay the subsidy due to the British Government, while it is certain that the people of that part of Mysore (*i.e.*, Nagar) where disturbances broke out were indifferently loyal and prone to disaffection." (*Ibid*, 162-163.) Mr. Bowring, indeed, has definitely stated his opinion that he does not consider that these disturbances were themselves "a sufficient justification for depriving the Rajah of his sovereign power." (*Ibid*, 190.) And if this alleged ground is taken away, there was none other that could, with justice, have been, in the light of the evidence available, be urged against him, especially in view of conditions prescribed in Articles 4 and 5 of the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799, which alone would have justified interference for taking over a part or whole of the country for purposes of direct management by the Company's Government.

In the last edition of this work (I. 428), Mr. Rice, following what is noted in Para 37 of the Historical summary of the *Mysore Administration Report* for 1872-73, says that the Governor-General ordered the formation of a Committee, consisting of Major-General Hawker, Col. W. Morison, Mr. J. M. Macleod and Lieut.-Col., (afterwards Sir Mark) Cubbon to investigate the "origin, progress and suppression of the recent disturbances in Mysore," that their report showed that the misgovernment of the Mahārāja had produced grave and widely

Resumption  
of Administra-  
tion; a mis-  
statement  
corrected.



spread discontent, that the revenues were rapidly falling and that maladministration was rampant in all departments of the State, and that the Governor-General Lord William Bentinck, therefore, determined upon acting on the fourth and fifth articles of the Subsidiary Treaty. This means that the appointment of the investigating committee was the first step the Governor-General took and that their report having brought to light rampant mal-administration, it was as a consequence of the Report that he determined upon acting on the 4th and 5th articles of the Subsidiary Treaty. The fact is quite otherwise. It was in October 1831, when His Highness the Mahārāja Sri-Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar Bahadur III was celebrating the Dasara in that year, that Lord William Bentinck wrote (*vide* letter quoted in *General Memorandum on Mysore, 1833*) to His Highness asking for the surrender of the Administration and His Highness made immediate surrender. The Report which the Committee appointed as aforesaid submitted to Lord William Bentinck is dated 12th December 1833. Soon afterwards Lord William Bentinck termed the assumption of Mysore as a "distressing subject" (*vide* His Excellency's letter to His Highness dated 8th April 1834). He wrote thus to His Highness from Ootacamand under that date:—

"My esteemed friend,—When I had the pleasure of conversation with you at Mysore, I promised so soon as I could find a short period of leisure to communicate further with you on the distressing subject of the assumption of the Mysore Dominions.

"My sentiments and views in this matter I have confided to the Resident at your court in the fullest and most unreserved manner. That gentleman is charged by me with a proposition to Your Highness of the most vital importance to your interests. For the particulars of that proposition, I beg to refer you to Mr. Casamaijor who leaves this place immediately for the express purpose of conferring with you on the subject.

"I should wish for an early communication of your sentiments and I sincerely trust that your decision may be such as will be most conducive to your own comforts."

In his despatch of the 14th April 1834, addressed to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, Lord William Bentinck remarked as follows:—

"By the adoption of the arrangements which I advocate, certain doubts will be removed which I cannot help entertaining both as to the legality and the justice, according to a strict interpretation, of the course that has been pursued. The Treaty warrants an assumption of the country with a view to secure the payment of the subsidy. The assumption was actually made on account of the Raja's misgovernment. The Subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy. Again, the Treaty authorises us to assume such part, or parts, of the Country as may be necessary to render the funds which we claim efficient and available. The whole has been assumed, although a part would unquestionably have sufficed for the purposes specified in the Treaty; and with regard to the justice of the case, I cannot but think that it would have been more fair towards the Raja had a more distinct and positive warning been given him that the decided measure, since adopted, would be put in force, if misgovernment should be found to prevail."

Accordingly, in his letter to His Highness the Mahārāja dated the 14th May 1834, Lord William Bentinck said:—

"I have made a communication on the subject to the authorities in England and should they sanction the arrangement, it will immediately be carried into effect. In that case, the Foudaries of Manjarabad, Mysore and Ashtagram will be made over to Your Highness on the Conditions specified by Mr. Casamaijor and cited in your letter to me. The remainder of the Territory or so much of it as may suffice to satisfy the claims of the Company will be made over to the British Government. Intimation of the pleasure of the Home authorities on this head will probably be received before the expiration of the present year."

Lord William Bentinck's successor, Lord Metcalfe, in his letter dated the 5th April 1835, in reply to His Highness' reminder, wrote :—

“ My friend, you appear to be disappointed because the expectation held out to you by his Lordship that the resolution relative to the affairs of Mysore would reach this country from England by the close of the past year, has not been fulfilled ; but you will readily admit that the realization of this expectation depended upon circumstances wholly beyond His Lordship's control. I sincerely hope, however, that your mind will not be kept much longer in a state of suspense, and that the decision of the Home authorities may be conformable with your inclination.”

The Governor-General Lord Auckland, in his letter to His Highness, dated 28th March 1836, announced the decision of the authorities in England to say that it was thought that His Highness' interests would be best served by maintaining the then undivided and beneficial Administration of His Highness' Territories until such salutary rules and safeguards were matured and confirmed in practice and would afford just ground for confidence to the subjects of a stable form of good Government.

From the foregoing, it is evident that :—

(1) The Administration was taken over by Lord William Bentinck before he received the Report of the Committee he nominated to enquire into the causes of the disturbances in Mysore and not afterwards ;

(2) That on a perusal of that Committee's report, when it reached him, His Excellency saw the harshness of the measure he had adopted in assuming the Territories of Mysore in entirety ;

(3) That consequently he made immediate proposals to the Home authorities to set things right ; and

(4) That the assumption was quite a temporary measure and intended for the time being.

The matter has been referred to at some length here because it is of primary importance as affecting the circumstances of the reign and reputation of so popular and sagacious a sovereign as His late Highness Sri-Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar III. At any rate, it seems high time to set it forth in its true light, and to give no room for misconstruction or misunderstanding. This is the more necessary as the true facts can easily be put historically so as to serve all interests concerned and yet offend none.

Lord William Bentinck, having determined upon acting on the fourth and fifth articles of the Subsidiary Treaty, addressed a letter to His Highness in which after recounting at some length the objects of the Subsidiary Treaty, he went on to say :—

Notice of  
Resumption.

“I have in consequence felt it to be indispensable, as well with reference to the stipulations of the treaty above quoted, as from a regard to the obligation of the protective character which the British Government holds towards the State of Mysore, to interfere for its preservation, and to save the various interests at stake from further ruin. It has seemed to me that in order to do this effectually, it will be necessary to transfer the entire administration of the country into the hands of British officers ; and I have accordingly determined to nominate two Commissioners for the purpose, who will proceed immediately to Mysore.

“I now therefore give to your Highness this formal and final notice, and I request your Highness to consider this letter in that light ; that is, as the notice required by the treaty to be given to your Highness of the measure determined upon for the assumption and management of the Mysore Territory in the case stipulated. I beg of your Highness, therefore, to issue the requisite orders and proclamations to the officers and authorities of Mysore, within ten days from the date when this letter may be delivered to your Highness, for giving effect to the transfer of the territory, and investing the British Commissioners with full authority in all departments, so as to enable them to proceed to take charge and carry on

affairs as they have been ordered, or may be hereafter instructed."

To His Highness, in accordance with the Treaty, the sum of one lakh of Star Pagodas *per annum* was allotted for his private expenses.

(iv) PERIOD OF MYSORE COMMISSION 1831-1881.

Resumption of  
Administra-  
tion and after.

His Highness, who received this communication at the time of the Dasara (19th October 1831), peaceably surrendered the reins of Government, and continued to reside in his palace at Mysore. The Governor-General vested the Government in the hands of two Commissioners, the senior of whom was appointed by himself, and the junior by the Madras Government. The Senior Commissioner who possessed what was termed a casting-vote, and was therefore enabled to overrule his colleague on every point, was aided in financial matters by the Dewan, which latter post was not abolished until 1834. (The Dewan at the time was one Mr. Venkataramanaia. He retired on 14th May 1832 and was succeeded by Bābu Rao, who remained in office till 19th April 1834. The Commissioners, it would appear, had originally intended to leave in the Dewan's hands almost as much power as he had had under His Highness the Mahārāja, but the Governor-General did not concur in this view of their duties.) Up to June 1832, the Commissioners were under the Government of Madras, but in that month they were made immediately subordinate to the Government of India.

The following is a list of these Commissioners, with their dates of office:—

SENIOR.

Colonel J. Briggs, 4th Oct. 1831  
" W. Morison, 6th Feb. 1833

JUNIOR.

Mr. C. M. Lushington, 4th Oct 1831  
" G. D. Drury, 18th Feb. 1832  
" J. M. Macleod, 16th June 1832  
" Col. Mark Cubbon, 17th Feb. 1834



It was soon found that a Board of two Commissioners, who naturally constantly differed in opinion, was an agency ill-adapted for the organization of a proper system of Government.

Accordingly, in April 1834, one Commissioner, Colonel Morison, was appointed for the whole State. But the office of Resident was still maintained, and thus a dual control continued to exist.

Of the two Commissioners, Lieut.-Col. Briggs, the senior of the two, belonged to the Madras Army, and was the author of a work on the land-tax of India, showing an intimate acquaintance with that complicated subject. Mr. C. M. Lushington, the Junior Member, was a brother of Stephen Rumbold Lushington, the then Governor of Madras. He was at the time the second Puisne Judge of the Sudder Adawlut Court at Madras. Mr. Edmund Smith, of the Madras Civil Service, was appointed as their Assistant. Previous to his appointment, Mr. Smith had been, for some three years, acting as an Assistant to the Chief Secretary to Government and as Dy. Persian Translator to Government. He, however, did not stay for long in that post, for in 1832, he was succeeded by Mr. P. B. Smollet, of the same service. Mr. Lushington took over charge in October 1831, he being joined in December of the same year by Col. Briggs. Immediately Mr. Lushington took charge of his duties, he appointed one Venkataramanaia, who had been sent as Dewan to deliver charge of the State. Next, with a view to retrench expenditure, Mr. Lushington (1) abolished the regiment of 500 Burgir Sepoys who had been organized since the days of Purnaiya, (see Col. Morrison's *Notes on Mysore*, No. 39, Military); (2) resumed all the grants made to religious institutions with a view to examine the legality of their origin; and (3) did away with the Sudder Court. On Col. Briggs' arrival, however, he found he could not agree with Mr. Lushington in what he had done.



He reversed Mr. Lushington's decisions in all these matters.

Was  
Resumption of  
Administra-  
tion justified?

Whether the circumstances justified the Resumption of the administration of the territories by the Supreme Government under Articles 4 and 5 of the Subsidiary Treaty need not detain us long. Lewin Bowring has, as mentioned above, suggested that the disturbances that occurred at about this time, did not justify such a step. Whether alleged "misgovernment" to which also he refers (*Eastern Experiences*, 190-191) was such as to entitle the Supreme Government to act on those Articles has been discussed by many distinguished writers. It is unnecessary to go into details and it ought to suffice if it is stated:--

(1) That the subsequent Rendition of the State to His Highness' son and heir shows that the case for resumption did not rest on a secure basis.

(2) That the greatest authorities, including Mr. John (afterwards Viscount) Morley of Blackburn and many others were for the Rendition shows at least the *prima facie* case against the assumption that the resumption ordered by Lord William Bentinck could be justified.

(3) That even Lord William Bentinck subsequently thought that the step taken by him was not altogether justified.

(4) That the subsequent correspondence shows that His Highness' position was not, as Sovereign, altered and that the administration was still only conducted in his name and on the basis that the Rendition would be inevitable.

"In fact," as Mr. Lewin Bowring writes, "the sovereign rights of the Raja were on all occasions acknowledged, and the treaties with him at all times enforced, even at considerable inconvenience to both Mysore and British territory, as regards judicial procedure" (*Eastern Experiences*, 204.) More than this, in a Minute dated 14th April 1834, the Governor-General (Lord William

Bentinck) raised this question in a direct manner and answered it thus:—

“Has the Company’s Government assumed the management of the Mysore country on its own account or is that country still managed for and on behalf of the Rajah? Is the Subsidiary Treaty of Mysore virtually cancelled or is it still in full force? The answer must undoubtedly be that the management has been assumed for and on behalf of the Rajah and that the Treaty is still in force.”

He held, in the same Minute, that there had been no “final assumption of the Mysore country” and that the assumption made by the Company was something very different from the “final assumption” which would abrogate the Treaty. (See Para 4 of the Minute quoted; also Para 9.)

And (5) that the resumption itself was, from the time it was given effect to, partial and even the Administration was directed to be conducted on Indian lines. The fact that this direction was not, later, strictly adhered to, was due to circumstances unconnected with the alleged cause of the resumption itself.

The Court of Directors themselves, in their Despatch dated 25th September 1835, referring to the measures taken to pacify the country after the disturbances of 1831, acknowledged that they, as much as the Governor-General, only contemplated the continuance of the assumption of the administration of the country till the object of establishing permanent good government in it had been accomplished. (See Despatch dated 25th September 1835, Para 20.) The Government of India so far recognized the sovereignty of Krishna-Raja-Wodeyar III that they refused to alienate any land on rent-free tenure *without his consent* duly obtained. (See Letter from Secretary to Government of India, Pol. Department, to the Commissioner in Mysore, dated 28th November 1836.)

Lord William  
Bentinck's  
visit to  
Mysore,  
March 16,  
1834.

Lord William Bentinck, on receipt of the Report of the Committee appointed by him for enquiring into the origin of the disturbances in the Nagar District, came to Mysore (*via* Nilgiris) with a view to acquaint himself with the exact position there. He arrived at Mysore on March 16, 1834, and stayed for a short time in the Bungalow on the Chamundi Hill in Mysore City. He had interviews with His Highness, as the result of which he eventually made two important proposals to the Court of Directors:—(1) that only half the territory should be administered by the British Commission for securing the subsidy, and (2) that not more than four European officers should be appointed under the Commission for carrying on the administration as the Indian Agency should be retained so that the ultimate reversion of the administration to His Highness may not be attended with difficulties. There is reason to believe that Lord William was convinced that the disturbances had nothing to do with His Highness' rule over his Dominions. As a matter of fact, the Committee's searching investigation attributed them to the want of adequate care in the exercise of his powers by the Resident. The *Bengal Chronicle*, a Calcutta newspaper of the time, styled it "mismanagement on the part of the ex-Resident," (the Hon. Mr. A. H. Cole), who, it said, was guided by "non-interference or anti-subsidiary theories." It seems clear from the Report of the Committee that His Highness did not receive that amount of friendly co-operation and counsel that the Subsidiary Treaty itself (in Article 14) prescribed and which had always been steadily kept in view by successive Residents at His Highness' Court and given effect to by them in a manner which conduced to the benefit of both the contracting parties. It is greatly to be feared that Mr. Cole, good, able and experienced as he was, failed to realise the true character of his duties and was guided less by considerations of prudence

than by the authority and power which he supposed he possessed by virtue of his position. The Bentinck Committee, composed of some of the ablest officers, Civil and Military, of the time found in fact that "the disturbances that had occurred were greatly attributable to the withdrawal of the advice of the British Resident." The Hon. Mr. Cole was virtually declared to have failed in his primary duty. This finding made such a deep impression on Lord William Bentinck that he ever felt a pang over what he had hastily done in the case of His Highness. He went so far as to put on record the expression of his sorrow for what he had done under a grievous misapprehension of facts. He acknowledged also that the "severe" ultimatum he sent to His Highness was the result of "the exaggerated representations of the Madras Government" to which the superintendence of Mysore was then entrusted. Indeed, Lord William Bentinck not only expressed doubts about the legality of his assumption of administration, but also repented of what he had done, and spoke after his return to England, of this act as the only one throughout his whole career the retrospect of which disturbed his conscience! In later times, partizan writers tried to justify the assumption on different grounds, every one of which can, without fear of contradiction to-day, be said to be wholly devoid of reason. It is now acknowledged that the subsidy was never in danger; that the Supreme Government acted hastily; that the excuse of subsidy failing, the plea of mis-government was set up, although such a contingency was not referred to in the Subsidiary Treaty itself, on which the action taken was actually based; then the story of an alleged and promised "bequest" was started; this, again, being denied, the Dalhousian maxim of "lapse" was next thought of; this led in turn to the denial of the Sovereign right of Adoption; which finally ended in the open, but unjust, suggestion of "annexation"

in the alleged interests of the subjects! Thus one error led to another and threatened eventually the very existence of the State, for no valid reason whatsoever. But His Highness proved equal to the occasion and supported as he was by firm British friends and well-wishers, he never ceased to hope and to believe that the Government of his country would some day be restored to his hands. (See below under *Story of the Reversion.*)

Third part of the reign of Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III: The British Commission, 1831-1868.

The position of the Commission and the scope of its duties and responsibilities.

With this we enter on the third part of the reign of Krishna-Rāja-Wodeyar III (1831-1868). One of the first acts done by them, the Commissioners, was to determine their position under the Treaties governing the relations between Mysore and the Company's Government. In a letter, dated 21st February 1832, Colonel Briggs, the Senior Commissioner, intimated to the Chief Secretary to the Government of Madras that under the Subsidiary Treaty of 1799 and the Supplementary Treaty of 1807 explanatory of the third Article of the same, that (1) the only pecuniary demand to which His Highness was subject to was the payment, under Article 2 of the Treaty, of seven lakhs of pagodas in twelve equal monthly instalments and that (2) under Article 5 of the Subsidiary Treaty the Company's Government were bound, so long as they remained in charge of His Highness' territories, to render to His Highness a true and faithful account of the Revenue (and produce) of the Territories so assumed and (3) that the Company's Government were bound to pay to His Highness from the territorial revenue not less than the sum of "one lac of Star Pagodas, together with one-fifth part of the net revenues of the whole territories, the remaining four-fifths being made available under the 5th Article for the expenses of war or preparations for hostilities by either of the contracting powers. But as this latter clause had



been abrogated by the Supplementary Treaty of 1807 and commuted by it for the maintenance of 4,000 horse, the revenues of the State though under the management of the Commission, were "not liable to any other pecuniary demand beyond the annual subsidy of seven lacs of star pagodas." Col. Briggs, at the same time, pointed out that the public debt of His Highness' Government was to be met from the public revenues and not chargeable to what was payable to him for his own personal expenses which were to be considered in the light of a sum chargeable on the Civil List which he was in every case entitled to receive in full, as his private income, it being left to him to regulate his expenses according to his means, his convenience and his pleasure. He also suggested that early steps should be taken to pay off the troops and public establishments and to reduce the establishments, which he said, "though not greater than in the time of Purniah, seems to exceed much what the country will now bear."

Three months later, in May 1832, the Commission introduced various reforms both with a view to reduce expenditure and to give effect to the objects with which the Commission was appointed:—

Reforms  
introduced by  
the British  
Commission,  
May 1832.

(1) The Dewan in charge, one Venkataramanaiya, was called upon to tender his resignation, and to submit an account of all receipts and disbursements, made under his authority. In his place, Bābu Rao, who had been previously Dewan, was recalled and re-appointed. His establishment was divided into two Departments (Dufters) with 43 clerks and 10 munshis.

(2) Morāri Rao, the son-in-law of the late Dewan, who was in charge of Feryad Cutcherry, was removed from that place and Lall Singh was appointed in his place. This person had seen service in the country since the days of Marquess Cornwallis, whose army he had accompanied and had subsequently served in the British establishment both as a soldier and as an Agent in a political capacity.



(3) A Court of Huzur Adālat was established to which Rām Rāz, a man of talent and learning, was appointed Chief Judge. A proclamation was, at the same time, issued notifying the establishment of this Court throughout the State. Rām Rāz, however, did not long serve in this high office. He died in the year 1833 and was succeeded by Seshagiri Rao, a much respected Indian gentleman who had been formerly Dewan of Cochin.

(4) At the same time, circulars were issued to the Amils and Fouzdars detailing their respective duties as officers of justice.

(5) Another proclamation was issued calling the attention of all classes to the continuance of the orders of 1826 in regard to the levy of stamp duties which were retained as a just mode of meeting the cost of administering justice.

(6) Steps were, at the same time, taken to get the Supreme Government to sanction the expenditure involved in maintaining the Huzur Adālat.

(7) The office of Treasurer was ordered to be held by Kuppannah, brother-in-law of Pūrnaiya, on his furnishing security for two lakhs of pagodas.

(8) From the savings of the Dewan's Cutcherry, a Huzur Cutcherry was brought into existence, to work directly under the British Commission.

(9) Steps were also taken to draw up distinctly the relative duties of all the departments in order that memoranda bearing on them may be furnished to their respective heads for their guidance and to the District Officers requiring them to address all letters on subjects connected with the respective Departments.

(10) All accounts were also ordered to be kept by all Departments so as to correspond with the European months in order to facilitate the business of the Commission.

Aims and  
objects of the  
new Reforms.

The aim and object of the Commission in introducing these reforms was to make everyone to look to them for orders and not to the Dewan, who was made primarily responsible for financial matters. Further, through the new Huzur Cutcherry, the Commission sought to obtain that sort of information which could not be acquired in

any other way and for getting a correct insight into the past and present condition of the finances of the country. The Commission, in effect, as desired by the Governor-General, took the place for the time being of the Ruler of the country and made themselves the focus from which all orders emanated, the Dewan being reduced to the position of a mere Departmental head charged with the duty of confining his attention "strictly to questions belonging to the Finance Department, to the formation of annual or other settlements and to the issuing of orders to the officers in immediate subordination to him." Any aid the Dewan required in the discharge of his particular duties, he was to obtain through written memoranda addressed to the Commission, through their Secretary, who issued the requisite orders, if necessary, to the Department concerned to furnish its assistance. The Commission were thus determined not to transfer to any other hands any measure of responsibility that belonged solely to them as a Board. Each Department was accordingly to receive orders from the Board only through its Secretary and to issue them in the name of the Commission, all private communications being "strongly discountenanced." (See Minute of Proceedings of the Board of Commissioners for the Government of Mysore, dated 14th May 1832.)

As regards the Huzur Adālat, it was intended to be the Supreme Court of Justice at the capital. Its formation had been urged by the Governor-General on 27th February 1831 and communicated in a Minute dated 24th April 1831. It was essentially based on the system brought into force by Pūrnaiya, agreeably to the instructions of the Governor-General, in this behalf, though a regular Code based on that evolved—in the light of the best Hindu usage—by Elphinstone, as sole Commissioner for the Satara State, was also introduced for

The Huzūr  
Adālat: its  
origin and  
powers.

facilitating judicial administration on definite lines. Under this system five Courts were recognized:—The Village Court, the Cotwal's Court, the District or Amildar's Court, the Fouzdari or Provincial Court, and the Huzur or Supreme Court. These Courts exercised both Civil and Criminal powers. The defects observed in Purnaiya's system, on the criminal side, were rectified. The systems prescribed by the Madras Code of 1816 and by the Satara rules, were judiciously combined for the purpose of Mysore, and these together with what was found to be best in the practice of the country were utilized for the drawing up of a Code for Mysore for the guidance of these Courts. (*Ibid*).

Other  
Reforms  
contemplated  
by the  
Commission.

At the same time, reductions in the military garrisons throughout the country were contemplated; the reorganization of the Barr (or infantry) Department was also kept in view, a report on this and the Sawar, Anche (Post) and Kandachar departments being called for from Colonel Conway, who was in charge of them. (*Ibid*).

New system  
in force,  
June 1832.

These reforms were given effect to without delay and the new system came into force from about the beginning of June 1832. (For further information, See *Volume IV*, Chapter I, of this work.)

Pacification  
of Nagar.

Immediately Dewan Venkataramanaiya was removed and Bābu Rao took over charge, the Commission first initiated a movement to pacify the country, which had become somewhat unsettled owing to the disturbances in Nagar. The Rt. Hon. Mr. S. R. Lushington, the then Governor of Madras, had arrived at Mysore and had taken up his residence at Yelwal, near Mysore. Though the disturbed area had been divided into 12 military departments and no fewer than 500 cavalry and 1,200 regular infantry, besides irregulars, had been dis-

tributed in the several garrisons, the objective aimed at, *viz.*, the apprehension of those who were disturbing the peace of the country, had not so far been effected. Martial law prevailed in the area, the *killedars* and officers commanding detachments acting on their own information and often making calamitous mistakes as to persons and property. Colonel Briggs mooted with Mr. C. M. Lushington, the Junior Commissioner, and Mr. Casamaïor, the Resident, the subject of an amnesty to the principal chieftains involved in the disturbances. As this was not agreed to by them, he, in consultation with Major-General Hawker and others acquainted with the affairs in the State, suggested to the Rt. Hon. the Governor that a Proclamation should be promulgated in Nagar to end the disturbed state of affairs. This was agreed to and was publicly notified with the announcement that, if after its promulgation, any persons should molest the inhabitants, or plunder the country, they would be apprehended and tried and, on due conviction, be punished with the utmost severity of the law. This practically ended the disturbances, those concerned in them, except a few ringleaders, including the Pālegars of Tarikere, who demanded impossible terms, returned to their homes and renewed their domestic occupations. Col. Briggs' Proclamation, however, was later disowned by the Rt. Hon. the Governor, who issued another Proclamation, "describing the Polegar chiefs as common robbers for the seizure of whom he proposed that rewards should be offered" and "recommended that the inhabitants should be encouraged to employ fire-arms and other weapons to protect themselves from the Polegars." Subsequently, however, Col. Briggs was permitted to proceed in person to Nagar to secure the submission of the Pālegars and to pacify the country. This he was able to do, not without some trouble, by adopting a conciliatory method. First, he suspended Annappa

from office and made it known throughout the country that he was so suspended because he had attacked one of the Pālegars without authority. This had a good effect. Next, by restoring the pensions to which the Pālegars of Tarikere were entitled, he won them over to allegiance. The rest of the people then dispersed to their homes. Thus, without shedding "a drop of blood," peace was restored with the aid almost exclusively of the inhabitants of the disturbed area itself. (See Minute of Senior Commissioner, dated Chitaldrug, August 4, 1832.) At the same time, Būdi Basavappa, who had escaped, made overtures to voluntarily surrender himself if he was recognized as the Pālegar of Nagar. But Col. Briggs, convinced of his being altogether an imposter and "not being a member of the House of Nagar Polegars," refused to hold out any such promise. At the same time, he was still so extremely influential, that he was being helped with men and money by his agents. To counteract his evil influence, "secret measures" were taken to effect his capture.

Resignation  
of Col.  
Briggs.

Meanwhile the serious differences of opinion that had arisen between the senior and junior Commissioners reached the Governor-General. To such an extent, indeed, had this disagreement proceeded that Col. Briggs had expressed his earnest desire to be relieved from the position of Senior Commissioner. He had also suggested that the existing constitution of the Commission should be modified and that the entire authority should be vested in a single Commissioner, disclaiming at the same time all wish "of being himself nominated to such an office." Though Lord William Bentinck did not agree to the suggestion, he directed the transfer of Colonel Briggs as Resident at Nagpur. His Lordship, in accepting his resignation, remarked that "it was no more than an act of justice to that officer to record his sense of the

Appreciation  
of his  
services.



energy, activity and zeal which he has displayed in the discharge of the duties of Senior Commissioner. So far as his Lordship is able to judge, the exertions of Lieut.-Col. Briggs have been judiciously directed and his successful efforts in restoring tranquility to the province of Naggar (Nagar) entitle him to great commendation." (See letter from W. H. Macnaghten, Secretary to the Governor-General, to the Commissioners for the Affairs of Mysore, dated 13th November.1832).

Before we take leave of General Briggs, it has to be remarked that he had a vigorous personality and the bearing of a true soldier. He was remarkably assiduous and brought to his task both freshness and sincerity. By close application to the duties of his office, he was able to discern and unmask the real state of affairs. He found the several mis-statements which had crept into official reports and had helped to give birth to the annoyances to which His Highness had been subjected. He confirmed all the grants and charitable endowments conferred by His Highness, as they had been, in his opinion, made on valid grounds. Col. Briggs entirely agreed in this particular matter—on which had been built up a wholly baseless charge against His Highness' administration—with the finding of Sir Thomas Munro in 1825. (See *ante*.) His Highness remembered his eminent services to the State and his personal goodwill towards him for many years after his departure from the State. Col. Briggs rose to be Major-General and eventually became a Member of the Court of Proprietors of the East India Company, in which capacity, he offered a stout opposition to Lord Dalhousie's policy of annexation. He is now best remembered as the translator of Ferishta's famous Persian history. He was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society and took a prominent part in the restoration of the administration of the State in 1865-7,

An estimate  
of his  
services to  
the State.



forming one of the deputation to the then Secretary of State for India led by Sir Henry Rawlinson. He died in 1875, his *Memories* being published by Major Evans Bell in 1886.

Lient.-Col.  
W. Morison,  
C. B.,  
succeeds him.

Col. Briggs' place was taken by J. M. Macleod, the Junior Commissioner, until the arrival of Lient.-Col. W. Morison, C. B., when he was directed to revert to his previous position of Junior Commissioner. (*Ibid*). In April 1834, Col. Briggs' suggestion of a single Commissioner was adopted and given effect to, Col. Morison being nominated to the post. He continued in that office till about June 1834, when he left for Calcutta. An account of the administration of the country as it was conducted during his time will be found in *Volume IV*, Chapter I, of this work. A few salient points, however, may be noted here. A number of changes were introduced in the Administration in accordance with the instructions of the Governor-General conveyed to the Commissioners in a letter dated 14th April 1834. Agreeably to these instructions, four European Superintendents superseded the four Indian Fouzdars. They were ordered to conduct the revenue, magisterial and certain judicial duties of the country including the custody of the judicial records. They were also to superintend every Department of Civil Government within certain limits. While exceedingly unwilling to introduce unnecessary changes in the system of Government hitherto followed, it was deemed necessary to order certain improvements in the administration of Civil and Criminal justice. The Superintendents were to respect all ancient usages and institutions of the country, especially those of a religious nature. The Amils were to exercise Police but no magisterial powers. Village watchmen were to be continued to report all serious offences to the Amils. The Superintendents were to be vested with the power of superintend-

Reform of  
Administra-  
tion ordered  
by Lord  
William  
Bentinck,  
14th April  
1834.

ence over all matters Civil and Criminal, all matters of difficulty being referred to the Commissioner. Corporal punishment was on no account to be inflicted. Death sentence was to be restricted to murder, plunder on the frontier and to gang robbers. Col. Briggs' system of (administering) civil justice had given powers to Patels in judicial matters. This was ordered to be done away with as "mischievous," as Patels were usually renters of Villagers. Appeals from Amils were to be heard by Principal Sudder Munsiffs, one or two of whom were to be attached to each Superintendent's jurisdiction. Their monetary jurisdictions were also fixed and regular rules drawn up for the conduct of their business.

In regard to revenue administration, the Superintendents in their revenue capacity were to revise the whole of the existing system of settlement and subject to the orders of the Commissioner, they were to see that the Amils protected the rights of each *raiyat*. To achieve this object, they were to control the Amils in their respective jurisdictions, check all collections and disbursements and investigate all complaints preferred against them or their subordinates. The renting system was to be gradually discontinued; opportunity was to be taken to convert payments in kind to a money rent, especially on dry lands; assessments were to be collected in instalments at harvest time and receipts given to *raiya*s; various returns were to be called for to show demand, collections and balances due; repairs to tanks were to be carried out to avoid fall in the revenue; and an investigation into Inām lands was to be carried out as also into arrears of land revenue due. The Superintendents were also to hear complaints once a week. The general policy to be observed in carrying out these reforms was laid down to be not only that the "Native forms should be preserved but that Native Agency should be adhered to as much as practicable." The Commissioner was to

assimilate his position to that of the Board of Revenue at the Presidency in regard to Revenue matters, and was to be aided by the European Superintendents and the Officers of the Dewan's Cutcherry. After the new system came into active operation, the services of the Dewan were to be dispensed with.

Reforms  
approved by  
the Court of  
Directors,  
25th Septem-  
ber 1835

The Court of Directors, in their Despatch dated the 25th September 1835, approved of the Governor-General's decision to appoint a sole Commissioner and four European Assistants as Superintendents to attend to the details of the internal Government. They insisted on the efficient superintendence of the work of the Amils. They also suggested that the Commissioner should be instructed to afford "security to the cultivators against future exaction." They recommended in particular that *Pattas* or leases should be granted to the cultivators at moderate rates, and through such leases to fix the demand upon the *raiya*t for a period of years. This, they remarked, would enable the Supreme Government "to attain the ends for which they assumed the Government of the Mysore country." (Directors' Despatch dated 25th September 1835, para 29.) They also approved of the provisions made by the Governor-General for the due administration of justice through the new tribunals established by him. At the same time, they did not agree that the levy of an institution fee in the case of suits of more than Rs. 10 and on appeals was equitable. "We are aware," they wrote, "that the fee is intended to check litigation, and not to levy a tax for the benefit of the State; but its imposition is contrary to all just principle, and the attempt to check litigation may in reality operate to prevent an injured party from obtaining redress for a wrong. We therefore wish you to reconsider the mode of preventing improper litigation." (*Ibid*, Para 63.)

The instructions of the Governor-General to the Madras Government on the assumption of the administration had been to the effect that "the agency under the Commissioners should be exclusively native; indeed, that the existing native institutions should be carefully maintained." These views were confirmed by the Court of Directors in their letter above quoted (dated 25th September 1835), in which they stated that they were "desirous of adhering, as far as can be done, to the native usage, and not to introduce a system which cannot be worked hereafter by native agency."

Indian  
Administra-  
tion ordered  
to be  
continued.

Lord William Bentinck also settled that the one-fifth of the revenues to which His Highness was entitled under the Subsidiary Treaty, was to be the sum so arrived at "after all the charges of the administration of the country shall have been defrayed." (See his Minute dated 14th April 1834.) It was specifically stated that as the Treaty was not abrogated by the assumption of the administration, the Company's Government was entitled "under all the circumstances to the stipulated Subsidy which being a distinct alienation might fairly be excluded from any calculation of the revenues of Mysore." (Lord William Bentinck's Despatch dated 14th April 1834, para 9.)

His Highness'  
rights to  
one-fifth  
revenue  
settled.

Col. Conway drew up his report on the organization of the Military forces on 22nd April 1833 and forwarded it to Government. Though in reviewing it, Col. Morison expressed certain differences of opinion, he entirely agreed with him in thinking that there had been deterioration in the character of the Silladars, which he set down to the evil example of the Buckshee, who was in charge of them. Col. Morison recommended that the whole of the Silladars (3,500) should be kept up on the existing footing. He agreed that one Buckshee was quite capable, as

Reorganiza-  
tion of the  
Military  
Forces.

at present, of managing it and that even if finances permitted it, no European officer need be appointed for its ordinary management. "In the event of war beyond the frontier," he said, "an European commandant, aided by one staff officer, would be requisite." Any such appointment of an European officer during ordinary times would, he was persuaded, only mean "a divided authority" ending in discontent among the troops. But he recommended that there should be a Military Assistant to the Commissioner, who should be allowed to attend to all details "arising out of communications received from the Buckshee and to inspect all the remount horses brought by the men." He was, however, to have no military authority but only to act as Assistant to the Commissioner in the Military matters. (See for further details Morison's *Notes on Mysore*, Nos. 39 and 40.)

Change in the  
Residency.

In 1834, Casamaijor, was transferred as Resident at Travancore, his place at Mysore being taken in June of that year by Col. J. S. Fraser, who also held the posts of Commissioner and Military Commandant of Coorg. In 1836, he succeeded Casamaijor at Travancore, being in turn succeeded in Mysore by Col. R. D. Stokes. Both these won the esteem and friendship of His Highness the Mahārāja and did much to soften the acerbities of the situation.

Change in the  
Commissioner  
ship : Col.  
Mark Cubbon  
succeeds Col.  
Morison, June  
1834.

Meanwhile in June 1834, Col. Morison was transferred to Calcutta and was succeeded in the post of sole Commissioner by Col. (afterwards Sir Mark) Cubbon. Colonel Cubbon continued in this office for twenty-six years, during which period the administration of the State was conducted on lines which won universal admiration.

The history of the State during his administration is that of a people made happy by an illustrious member of the patriarchal school of Indian Administration, who



conducted it, "in a manner honourable to the British name" on the lines of a benevolent despotism worked through the agency of selected British Officers. During this period, peace and order prevailed; speculation died out and affairs generally were conducted with such prudence and economy that though the land tax was greatly reduced and different kinds of vexatious imposts swept away, the revenue largely exceeded the expenditure. The rise in the revenue, however, was gradual and did not prove irksome to them from whom it was raised. In addition, the abuses in the working of the land revenue, which had crept in since the time of Purnaiya, were removed; the payment of the assessment was made as easy as possible to the *raiyat* by dividing it into five instalments, payable with reference to the periods of harvest; the system of *batayi* or payment of assessment in kind, which exposed the *raiyat* to numberless exactions, was in great measure abolished, and the land assessment in many cases was lowered. The growth in the revenue helped to pay off State debts aggregating Rs. 85 lakhs; credit was restored, and a nest-egg of Rs. 40 lakhs was invested in British Government Securities. At the same time, the country was opened up for traffic by inexpensive but practicable roads and all transit duties were abolished.

Sir Mark Cubbon had invaluable help in his work from a remarkable Indian Assistant in the person of Mr. Venkata Rao, subsequently well-known as Rai-Raaya-Rai Kollam Venkata Rao. He was a Brahmin from Kumbakonum and was the father of Dewan Bahadur Raghunatha Rao, who himself rose to be the Dewan of two States. He succeeded Bābu Rao, who, chosen by General Briggs for the Dewan's post, had died in 1834. The post of Dewan was, thereafter, abolished and his establishment was amalgamated with the Commissioner's office, the Dewan's place being taken by a

Rai Raaya  
Rai Kollam  
Venkata Rao,  
Special  
Assistant to  
Sir Mark  
Cubbon.



functionary called the Huzur Head Sherestedar. Kollam Venkata Rao was appointed to the new post and he was later given the designation of Native Assistant to the Commissioner. In 1838, however, he went to Travancore as Dewan. His place, with the old name of Huzur Head Sherestedar, was taken by one Surappayya. The latter died in 1840, in which year Kollam Venkata Rao rejoined his old post, as Special Assistant to the Commissioner for the Government of Mysore. In this position, he proved of immense service to Sir Mark Cubbon. His knowledge of the work of the Revenue Department was both intimate and real and he besides possessed certain "peculiar and rare qualifications" which attracted the notice of high European officers of the time. He combined in himself, as General J. S. Fraser put it, just those qualifications which were wanted for a successful administration—"every capacity (particularly in the Revenue Department), and conciliation and kindness with a gentlemanly manner and deportment." General Fraser, indeed, was so taken up with him and his abilities, that he requisitioned for his services for Haiderabad, to which place he himself had been accredited as Resident in 1838. He desired to displace Chundoo Lall, the famous Dewan of that place, by Venkata Rao, whom he described in his letters as "a man of great ability," and whose administrative talents, especially in the Revenue and Finance Departments, he referred as being of "a first-rate order." (*See Memoirs and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser*, by Col. Hastings Fraser, I. S. C., 153-154). Sir Mark Cubbon entirely agreed in this estimate of Venkata Rao, and though sorry to part with him, he complied with the request of General Fraser, on the distinct and explicit recommendation of the Government of India that he was to be appointed as Assistant to Rajah Chundoo Lall. General Fraser desired to retire Chundoo Lall and secure the nomination of Venkata

Rao as his successor. But as this idea could not be easily carried out, it was decided to appoint him as his Assistant to bring the Haiderabad financial administration into order. "It was after conversing with him (Venkata Rao)," wrote General Fraser on 14th July 1842 to Lord Ellenborough, then Governor-General of India, "for an hour or two that Lord William Bentinck remarked it was such men who might be placed with advantage in the Supreme Council of India." (*l.c.*, *Memoirs*). Venkata Rao was accordingly given six months' leave of absence to proceed to Haiderabad, ostensibly on a private visit, but really to take up the new post offered to him. (*Ibid*, 75). But as misfortune would have it, he became seriously unwell with dropsy and returning to Bangalore, almost immediately thereafter, died there. In intimating the sad news to Lord Ellenborough, General Fraser expressed how his expectations had been disappointed. "The British Government," he said, "has lost in him one of the ablest Native servants that it has ever been my lot to meet with during my career in India." (*Ibid*, letter dated 13th July 1843). Such was the Special Indian Assistant of Sir Mark Cubbon and some meed of praise is due to him for the great success that attended Sir Mark's administration of Mysore. He is at present remembered by a Chuttram founded by him in Bangalore, which is now situated on the Krishnarajendra Road in the City. The title of *Rai Raaya Rai* was bestowed on him in 1838, just before his departure to Haiderabad in recognition of his valued services. A Madras *Government Gazette* notification issued in this connection from Fort St. George, dated April 19, 1838, ran as follows:—

"The Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, having taken into consideration the eminent zeal, ability and integrity displayed by Venkata Rao, in his capacity of Native Assistant to the Commissioner for the Territories of Mysore, has been

pleased, as a mark of the favour of the British Government to bestow upon him the title of *Rai Raaya Rai*; and the same is hereby notified for general information by the order of the Right Honorable the Governor-in-Council."

Venkata Rao's successors in Mysore in the post of Native Assistant were the following :—

(1) Kola Krishnama Naidu, who had for some time served as head of the English Department in the Palace and subsequently as a Munsiff in the British Commission. He served from 1844 to 1858.

(2) Kola Vijayarangam Naidu, brother of Kola Krishnama Naidu, from 1858-1866; and

(3) Arunachala Mudaliar from 1866 to 1868.

Administra-  
tive changes  
between 1834  
and 1843;  
abolition of  
the Resi-  
dency, 1843.

During the ten years that elapsed between 1834 and 1843, certain administrative changes were introduced. One of these was the abolition of the post of the British Resident in Mysore, which had been created at the time of the Restoration of the State about June 1799. Major (afterwards Major-General) R. D. Stokes, who had proved so successful in his post, continued in that post till 1843, when it was abolished. There is reason to believe that the position of the Resident proved impossible in view of the larger powers wielded in the administration by the Commissioner. In actual working, that close and unre-served intimacy between the Resident and the Commis-sioner that was necessary was not realized. Their individual ideas in regard "to the future destiny of the Mysore country," as it was described, evidently also differed. While the Commissioner might have been guided in regard to these by those derived from the Supreme Government, the Resident being probably unaware of them, could not have had any conception of them to guide him in his own attitude in regard to various matters affecting the personal *status* of His Highness. Thus, His Highness' rights to adjudge all

disputes among his own immediate relations (Rājbindis) which had been conceded to him, in 1834, was questioned in 1839. (See Letter from General J. S. Fraser to Major Stokes, dated 7th March 1839, in Hasting's Fraser's *Memoirs and Correspondence of General J. S. Fraser*). Difficulties of this kind, personal and political, induced the Government of India to decide on the abolition of the post of Resident in 1843. Major Stokes proved accordingly the last of his line during the Pre-emption days. He kept up, after his retirement, an intimate private correspondence with His Highness the Maharaja from his residence in Ireland. In a letter dated in 1836 to Sir Frederick Adam, General J. S. Fraser wrote of him thus :—

“I am very glad to find that the Rajah likes Major Stokes, and that the latter is proving himself, so far as I can judge from his letters, an honest friend and a very judicious adviser to the Rajah.....It strikes me that, under the circumstances in which the Mysore Country is now placed, Major Stokes is as good a Resident there as any one I know, either civil or military, could be; and the same sound sense and judgment will render him perfectly capable of conducting the same duties when he shall have a rather more independent part to play than at present.” (*Loc. Cit.* Hasting's Fraser's *Memoirs*, 27.)

The loss of so good a friend and adviser was, as might be expected, keenly felt by His Highness the Mahārāja. Indeed, the abolition of the post of Resident was not at first welcomed by His Highness, but it brought him into closer relations with Colonel Cubbon, the Commissioner, and from 1847 they continued on the most friendly terms. Before this, however, in 1844, in a letter to Lord Hardinge, the Governor-General, His Highness urged his claim to the restoration of his kingdom, to which the Directors in 1847 returned a negative reply.

Lord  
Dalhousie's  
visit to  
Mysore 1855;  
Reforms  
introduced  
into the  
Administra-  
tion.

With Lord Dalhousie, who became Governor-General in 1848, His Highness the Mahārāja kept up a continuous correspondence. In 1854, he invited him to his capital to be present at the sixtieth anniversary of his birth, which he intended to celebrate with due solemnity. (Letter dated 10th February 1854). Hearing of his arrival on the Nilgiris, in April 1855, he once again invited him to visit his capital. (Letters dated 5th April 1855 and 25th October 1855). On 30th October 1855, Lord Dalhousie arrived at Mysore and stayed there a couple of days. He recorded his opinion that the administration had been highly honourable to the British name and reflected the utmost credit upon the exertions of the valuable body of officers by whom such great results had been accomplished.

Changes due  
to Company's  
renewal of  
Charter in  
1854.

Several changes were soon after introduced, arising out of the renewal of the Company's Charter in 1854. A Judicial Commissioner was appointed and departments were formed for Public Works and Public Instruction.

Whatever might have been Lord Dalhousie's views on or about the restoration of the State to His Highness (see below), he kept up his correspondence with His Highness. On receipt of the news from him of the fall of Sebastapool, His Highness celebrated the victory at his capital by the distribution of sugar to the populace and by the firing of a Royal Salute from the ramparts of his fort. (Letter dated 16th January 1856). There is no doubt he treated Lord Dalhousie as his true friend. (*Ibid*). In acknowledging his letter announcing his retirement in 1856, His Highness characterized his administration as "almost unparalleled in Indian History" and as permanently establishing his fame throughout the world. His Highness also returned thanks for the promise made by him to bring his "approved course of conduct" to the notice of Lord Canning, his successor. (Letter dated 19th May 1856.)



With Lord Canning, His Highness kept up a similar friendly correspondence. The Sepoy Mutiny broke out in 1857 and the safety of Southern India was assured by the exemplary conduct of His Highness, who proved a firm friend of the British. In November 1858, he placed, at short notice, his country house at the disposal of the Commissioner for removing into it the Public Treasury at Mysore. "As I am protected by the British Government," he wrote to Sir Mark Cubbon, "I consider my life and property as bound up in their own welfare and stability. You may, therefore, rest assured that as far as possible, I shall at all times be ready to render any assistance it may be in my power to afford." (Letter dated 14th November 1848). His Highness' ready compliance elicited an immediate acknowledgement. "It will be my duty," Sir Mark Cubbon wrote to His Highness, "to bring to the notice of the Right Honorable the Governor-General of India my sense of obligation to your Highness for your cordial co-operation in providing for the public safety against the ill-disposed and bad characters assembled in the town of Mysore, bent on mischief." (Letter dated 16th November 1858). He also contributed to the success of the British arms by rendering assistance to the passage of His Majesty's troops towards the disturbed Districts. He also caused to be placed at the disposal of the Supreme Government two thousand Silladar Horse "to aid in the suppression of the Rebellion." (Letter dated 15th March 1860).

The following extract from a letter of Sir Mark Cubbon dated 2nd June 1860, well sums up the sterling services rendered by His Highness at this critical hour in the history of the British in India:—

"To no one was the Government more indebted for the preservation of tranquility than to His Highness the Rajah, who displayed the most steadfast loyalty throughout the crisis, discountenancing everything in the shape of disaffection, and

Correspondence with Lord Canning, successor of Lord Dalhousie. Assistance rendered during the Great Mutiny, 1857-8,



taking every opportunity to proclaim his perfect confidence in the stability of English rule. When the small party of Europeans arrived at Mysore, he made manifest his satisfaction by giving them a feast. He offered one of his Palaces for their accommodation, and as a stronghold for the security of the treasure; and even gave up his own personal establishment of elephants, &c., to assist the 74th Highlanders in their forced march from the Neilgherries to Bellary, for the protection of Ceded Districts, a proceeding which, although of no great magnitude in itself, produced great moral effects throughout the Country. In fact, there was nothing in his power which he did not do to manifest his fidelity to the British Government, and to discourage the unfriendly."

On receipt of the above communication, Lord Canning thus warmly acknowledged His Highness' services, in a letter dated 28th June 1860:—

"Your Highness' wise confidence in the power of England and your open manifestation of it, the consideration and kindness which you showed to British subjects, and the ready and useful assistance which you rendered to the Queen's troops, have been mentioned by the Commissioner in terms of the highest praise. I beg your Highness to accept the expression of my warm thanks for these fresh proofs of the spirit by which your Highness is animated in your relations with the Government of India. I shall have much pleasure in making them known to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India."

His Highness' services brought to the notice of Her Majesty the Queen.

His Highness' "loyal conduct and good service" was brought to the notice of Her Majesty the Queen and Her Majesty's "acknowledgments" were caused to be conveyed to His Highness in the Secretary of State's Despatch dated 31st August 1859.

Proclamation of Assumption of sovereignty by Her Majesty the Queen.

On receipt of Lord Canning's letter dated 25th October 1859, announcing Her Majesty the Queen's Proclamation that she had taken upon herself the direct Government of Her Indian Territories, His Highness wrote back to state that the joyful intelligence had been received

by a salute of 21 guns fired from the ramparts of the Mysore Fort and the Proclamation itself was duly proclaimed at Mysore with every demonstration of loyalty and respect before a vast concourse of people, sugar being distributed throughout the City and its suburbs. (Letter dated 24th December 1858). His Highness also wrote a felicitous letter to Lord Stanley, then Secretary of State for India, reminding him of his visit to Mysore some eight years before, and announcing to him how the Proclamation had been joyously received by him at his Capital and requesting him to convey the information to his father, the Earl of Derby. (Letter dated 31st December 1858). This was followed by an equally beautifully worded letter to Her Majesty the Queen herself in which His Highness described the Royal Clemency as "an act which could only emanate from the heart of a British Queen." (Letter dated 31st December 1858.)

On 28th June 1859, His Highness celebrated the Sixtieth anniversary of his accession to the Throne, an event which was marked by joyous rejoicing and thanksgiving. (Letter dated 15th June 1859.)

Celebration of the Sixtieth anniversary of His Highness' accession to the Throne, 28th June, 1859.

About the beginning of 1860, an attempt was made to transfer the superintendence of Mysore affairs from the Governor-General to the Government of Madras, then under Sir Charles Trevelyan, thus reversing what had been done in 1832. This proved so distasteful to Sir Mark Cubbon, that he forthwith tendered his resignation of office as Commissioner and requested to be relieved as soon as it might be found convenient. (Letter dated 5th March 1860). It also gave cause to a spirited protest from His Highness the Mahārāja. First, he objected to the transfer on the ground that it had been made without any reference "to himself as if he had no

Attempted transfer of of Superintendence from Supreme Government to Madras Government, 1860.

longer any interest in the matter or any interests to uphold,"—a kind of procedure which, he said, filled his mind "with apprehension and alarm." Secondly, he remarked, he did not see how his interests or those of his country were to be bettered by the transfer. Perfect tranquillity has, he said, reigned in the country at a time when disaffection on the part of his people would have thrown Southern India into a blaze. "But my conduct," he protested, "and that of my people during that dreadful period, exhibit the complete success of the administration as at present carried out." Thirdly, he expressed a grave fear that such a step as this would adversely affect his future and the future of his country. "Such a measure as this," he said, "if introduced, would possibly interfere with the claims that I and my heirs have for the restoration of the Government of my country as it is evident that the contemplated change is with the view of introducing alteration in the form of Government, which would render it difficult for me or my successor to conduct the administration hereafter with a native agency." Fourthly, he urged that whereas Mysore had prospered under the Supreme Government for many years, when it was last transferred to the control of Madras, the reverse had proved the case. Fifthly and finally, His Highness remarked that "it would require very strong reasons to justify the risk of making the change now proposed." (Letter dated 15th March 1860). This respectful but emphatic protest produced a profound impression on Lord Canning. He wrote back to say that His Highness' sentiments had been received by him with the "truest respect" and that he did "not hesitate to suspend the execution of the orders" which had been issued by the Secretary of State for India in Council for the transfer of the superintendence from the Supreme to the Madras Government. He also added that he would "immediately" make known to Her Majesty's Government

His Highness' feelings in the matter. (Letter dated 30th March 1860). On the same date, Lord Canning sent out a lengthy Despatch to the Secretary of State, in which he urged the recalling of the order issued. He wrote :—

“I feel it to be impossible, in the face of such an appeal coming from so venerable and loyal a prince, and couched in terms so dignified, and so respectful, to persist in the immediate execution of your orders without submitting the case for your reconsideration.”

He remarked that it would be both “ungenerous and impolitic” to set aside His Highness' feelings in the matter. The transfer of superintendence, he added, was not “worth purchasing at the cost of ending and alienating the Sovereign of the Country.” He suggested that the first measure towards Mysore by the direct Government of the Queen should be something very different. “Surely,” he urged, “it is to be desired that it should not be such as to draw from the Rajah an emphatic protest and refusal of consent, in which he will carry with him, reasonably or unreasonably, the sympathy of his fellow Princes.” Needless to state, Lord Canning's letter had the desired effect. He had the pleasure, on 28th June 1860, to announce to His Highness that agreeably to his feelings, Her Majesty's Government had passed orders “directing the transfer should be cancelled.”

Not only was His Highness gratified with this cancellation but Sir Mark Cubbon also withdrew his resignation and continued in service for nearly another year. Early in 1861, however, Sir Mark was attacked with serious illness which compelled him to resign and seek rest in his island home. His resignation, which he made known to His Highness the Mahārāja on 1st March 1861, was a great shock to the latter. The news was received by him with sincere regret. It meant the severance of the

Resignation  
and death of  
Sir Mark  
Cubbon, 1861.

official relationship which for a period of twenty-six years had so cordially subsisted between the two great worthies. "Although I was in some measure," wrote His Highness, "prepared to receive this communication, yet when it came, the sensation it produced in me was inexpressibly distressing and painful—the more so—as it conveyed the intimation that your departure from the Country was to be without a personal interview with me, and without the last interchange of a friendly farewell." Sir Mark, indeed, was too unwell to go to Mysore to take leave of His Highness and had to leave Bangalore (on 16th March 1861) direct to Madras to catch the first vessel sailing to England. His heartfelt desire to reach his native shores was, however, never fulfilled. He died, on the voyage home, at Suez, in April 1861, at an advanced age, having spent the whole of the century in India. He left Mysore full of honours as full of years and his memory is still cherished with affection by the people whose affairs he administered so successfully and so long. His Highness, in a letter breathing the highest sentiments of regard and esteem, thus referred to his administration:—

His Highness' appreciation of his services to the State.

"The zeal and ability you have displayed in your administration of its (the State's) affairs, the great improvements you have introduced without changing the native system of administration, the continued prosperity of the country and happiness of the people have been the theme of admiration and praise in everybody's mouth. In fact, your administration of it has been so perfectly consistent with the wishes of the Sovereign and his people that I have specially noticed it in my letter to His Excellency the Right Honourable Lord Canning, dated 23rd ultimo (this has been printed in the *Parliamentary Blue-Book*, 1866, 1-3), and I will only add that you have earned for yourself a world-wide fame, and have enrolled your name with those of the Duke of Wellington and other great statesmen, who by their generous rule and wise policy have established for themselves a name and reputation in this Country which can never be obliterated."



Sir Mark was the son of a Manx clergyman, and came out to India in 1801, at the age of 16. On arrival, he joined his uncle Major Wilks, at the Mysore Residency, and there gained an early acquaintance with Indian customs and habits. Before long he was appointed to the Commissariat Department at Hunsur, and became the head of it when Colonel Morison was made Resident of Travancore. The latter officer returned to Mysore as Senior Commissioner in 1833, and was next year appointed to the Council of the Governor-General at Calcutta. A complimentary order issued in November 1839, on his departure to England, says, "His Lordship in Council would particularly draw the attention of the young officers of the Madras army to the career of Colonel Morison." He was transferred from the line to the artillery solely on account of his talents, and made Instructor. He afterwards became Surveyor-General and when the Commissariat Department was formed, Commissary-General. His subsequent appointments have been mentioned above. He was the first Madras Officer, since the days of Lord Clive, selected for a seat in the Supreme Council. Colonel Cubbon who was Junior Commissioner, at the time of Col. Morison's departure succeeded him and became the Sole Commissioner in Mysore.

General Sir Mark Cubbon was a statesman of the old school, and, says General Dobbs, was particularly in his element when engaged in disentangling webs of local intrigue. In this he fought the local people with their own weapons, with one noble exception—he abhorred and never resorted to espionage, and often spoke of the failure of Europeans who descended to such tactics. He was intensely conservative, but his strong reluctance to change was corrected by his wide reading of the public journals, which were then few in number. To his deputies, in all matters in which he considered they possessed practical



knowledge, he allowed great liberty in exercising their own judgment, and was generous and kind hearted in support of them. He was passionately fond of horses, and kept up to fifty or more, chiefly Arabs, in his stables as pets. To encourage the production of high-bred animals, he had a number trained for the races, but did not run them, preferring to pay the fines. Though he did not go to Church, he was particular in enforcing observancy of Sunday as a day of rest in all courts and offices, and would not receive Indian visitors on that day. His favourite retreat was Nandidroog, where he spent several months in the year.

We obtain a delightful picture of him in 1858, at the time of Lady Canning's visit. Her companion, the Hon'ble Mrs. Stuart, writes :—

"At seven in the morning (22nd March) drove up, through the lines of the 60th Rifles, to General Cubbon's charming bungalow at Bangalore. We found the whole house prepared for us, the chivalrous old man of 74 having put himself into a tent. He is a very handsome, keen-eyed, intelligent man, and the quantity of anecdote of the deepest interest that he has told us has been more entertaining than I can describe."

Lady Canning, writing from Nandidroog, says :—

"I am visiting a charming old General, Sir Mark Cubbon, 1,500 feet above the table-land of Bangalore, and with a view over about 150 miles of country on all sides. It is cool fresh air and a very pleasant spot, and the old gentleman is very delightful. He has been all this century in India, but seems to know all that has gone on all over the world, and is the most *grand siegneur* old man I almost ever saw." (*The Story of Two Noble Lives*, by A. J. C. Hare.)

His remains were conveyed by Dr. Campbell, the Durbar Surgeon, who had accompanied him on the voyage, to Isle of Man, where he was met by Colonels Macqueen and Haines, old Officers of the Mysore Commission, and the body was laid to rest in the family vault

in a public funeral in which the whole island took part. As the mourners left the tomb, "There lies," said the archdeacon, "the greatest man this island has produced for centuries back." An equestrian statue, by Baron Marochetti, was erected to his memory at Bangalore by public subscription, and stands in front of the Public Offices.

With the approval of Lord Canning, His Highness despatched, on 13th March 1861, a number of presents, through Dr. J. C. Campbell, the Durbar Surgeon, to Her Majesty. These included a number of jewels peculiar to India, various insignias of royalty, animals reared within the precincts of His Highness' Palace and a large portrait of His Grace the Duke of Wellington, painted for His Highness "soon after the siege of Seringapatam whilst His Grace was yet a young man" and which His Highness had "always highly priced." (Letter dated 13th March 1861.) These were duly presented to Her Majesty, who commanded the despatch, through Dr. Campbell, of "a few specimens of the manufactures of Great Britain and other articles" which Her Majesty requested the acceptance of by His Highness "as token of Her friendship and esteem." In sending these and in acknowledging His Highness' assurances of friendship, Sir Charles Wood (afterwards Lord Halifax), then Secretary of State for India, wrote to His Highness thus :—

His Highness' presents to Her Majesty the Queen, 1861.

"From Your Highness these good words are specially gratifying. For more than sixty years you have been the faithful ally of the British Government who felt assured, when trouble recently overtook them, that as Your Highness was the oldest so would you be the staunchest of their friends, if evil and misguided men should seek to sow sedition in Your Highness' Country. By the blessing of God, the Southern Peninsula remained undisturbed, but Your Highness nevertheless was enabled to contribute to the success of the British

arms by the assistance which you rendered to the passage of Her Majesty's Troops towards the disturbed Districts, whilst by your personal bearing in this critical juncture, you encouraged and sustained the loyalty of your subjects and helped to preserve the tranquillity of the Country."

This letter, so well couched and so well conceived, was received with due solemnity and read in open Durbar by His Highness, who was deeply touched by this expression of "the feeling of regard and setem with which the Queen of England and of India" saw fit "to regard her distant and humble ally." (Letter dated 20th April 1862).

Mr. C. B. Saunders,  
Offg. Commissioner;  
arrival of  
Mr. L. B. Bowring,  
Commissioner,  
1862-1870.

Sir Mark Cubbon handed over charge to Mr. C. B. Saunders, the Judicial Commissioner, who conducted the administration till the arrival in February 1862 of the new Commissioner, Mr. L. B. Bowring, and the latter, with the interval of a year's leave in 1866-67, during which Mr. Saunders again officiated, held office until 1870. During this period of seven years, many radical changes were effected. A quarter of a century of progress had resulted in an increase of population and wealth. With the growth of intelligence and business, a system of administration which had answered well during the period and had evoked the gratitude of all, became more and more inadequate. For though the territory had been opened out with roads and the finances put in order, yet, in other matters, such as law and justice, police and jail management, survey and settlement of land, education, public works, irrigation, medical aid, sanitation, forest conservancy and the like, Mysore though blessed with a large surplus, was far below the standard of a British Province. Such was the situation, when Mr. Bowring took over charge of the office of Chief Commissioner. He was a distinguished member of the Bengal Civil Service and had been Assistant Resident at Lahore in 1847 and subsequently in the Punjab Commission.

He had been, during 1858-1862, Private Secretary to Lord Canning, a position in which he had won laurels. Both by experience and by training, he was eminently the man for the times. He found an overflowing treasury and he considered the stage had been reached at when a thorough change in the administration was necessary. Convinced that the patriarchal system was no longer suited, he determined upon introducing a system of administration more in consonance with the spirit of the times. Himself an old Punjab Officer, he resolved upon remodelling the local administration on the basis of the system prevailing in that province. The reorganization, however, was carried out by him with care and judgment, and the administration approximated more or less to that obtaining in British territory, and in the absence of competent Indian agency, free use was made of the agency of British Officers. The Punjab too was not blindly followed; in matters of survey and settlement of land, the Bombay system was found more suitable, and in dealing with *inām* or tax-free tenures, the principles followed were those in force in Madras. In a word, the new administration, as introduced by Mr. Bowring, has been well described as the scientific result of the administrative experience of the three provinces of Madras, Bombay and the Punjab.

It was in these circumstances that the non-regulation system gave place to the regulation system in the State in 1862. The result was eminently beneficial. The State was now formed into three Divisions, sub-divided into eight Districts, each division being placed under a Superintendent with enlarged powers and each District in charge of a Deputy Superintendent, aided by Assistant Superintendents. The department of finance underwent at the same time a sweeping reform, and in place of the large discretion previously allowed to officers of

Non-regulation system displaced by Regulation system.

all grades in regard to the disbursement of moneys, the Indian Budget system of audit and accounts was introduced. Surplus revenue was no longer hoarded, but spent liberally on Public Works. In 1863 was commenced a much needed revenue survey and settlement, for the purposes of obtaining an accurate land measurement, of regulating the customary land-tax, and of preserving all proprietary and other rights connected with the soil. In conjunction with this, the period of assessment was fixed for thirty years, thus securing to the cultivator the full advantages of a lease for that period without burdening him with any condition beyond that of discharging the assessment for the single year to which his engagements extended. Soon after, it was found necessary to form an *inām* Commission, to inquire into the validity of titles to lands held by individuals or religious institutions as real or pretended endowments. The conservation of the numerous irrigation channels and of the valuable forests of the country received attention; and as judicial work grew heavier, judicial assistants were appointed, one for each District, for the disposal of civil suits. Education was greatly extended, miles and miles of admirable roads were constructed, rivers bridged, public offices erected, municipalities established, sanitation and conservancy looked after to an extent previously unknown. Jail administration was thoroughly reformed and the Bangalore Central Jail became a model institution. In short, there was scarcely a branch of the administration but came under the scrutiny and reforming hand of the untiring and energetic head of the Government. The effect was magical. Prosperity increased. Capital was attracted and coffee planting began on a large scale and mines came to be developed.



justice of his claim, with the advance of years, the fear became all but universal that the Supreme Government was not unwilling to see the assumption of administration converted into annexation. At first, Lord William Bentinck, who assumed the administration, seems to have suggested a partial annexation, which did not meet with approval. His proposal, made in the beginning of 1834, was to restore the Districts of Mysore, Ashtagram and Manjarabad in full sovereignty to His Highness the Mahārāja and to annex the remainder of the country as an equivalent for the subsidy. A new treaty was also to be concluded to give effect to this proposal. (Letter of Sir Frederick Adam to Col. J. S. Fraser dated 17th April 1834, see l. c. *Memoirs*.) The Court of Directors, however, did not approve of this idea. They were wholly against any proposal that aimed at the dismemberment of the State. In after times, as mentioned above, Lord William Bentinck deeply regretted the hastiness with which he had acted with regard to Mysore, and is known to have more than once said that it was the only act of his Indian administration that he looked back upon with regret. He put it on record that what he had done had been carried out under a grievous misconception of facts, and that he had been misled into action by the "exaggerated representations of the Madras Government" of the time. In his Despatch to the Court of Directors, he could not help expressing "certain doubts both as to the legality and the justice, according to the strict interpretation, of the course that had been pursued." He gave as a reason for these doubts that the Treaty warrants an assumption of the Country with a view to secure the payment of the subsidy, "whereas the subsidy does not appear to have been in any immediate jeopardy." Then, again, the Treaty only authorised the assumption of part or parts of the Country, whereas the whole was assumed. The reply of the Court arrived in 1835 when Sir (after-



wards Lord) Charles Metcalfe was Officiating as Governor-General and was made known in 1836 to His Highness by Lord Auckland, who, in that year, succeeded to the Governor-Generalship. Lord Metcalfe himself is said to have spoken of the assumption as "a harsh and unprovoked measure," and it is evident from the wording of his letters to His Highness that he favoured his claim to a restoration of his rights. Like Bentinck, he was for restoring to His Highness the administration, care being taken that the administration was properly conducted. The Court of Directors were, however, against any sudden cancelment of the existing order. That they were for eventual restoration there can be no doubt whatever. In their Despatch of 1835, they not only affirmed that "Native usage should be respected but also expressed their desire" not to introduce a system which "cannot be worked hereafter by Native agency *when the Country shall be restored to the Rajah.*" Lord Hardinge, when Governor-General (1844-48), wrote a despatch in which he conveyed his doubts as to the Company's right to keep the Country when there was no longer any cause for anxiety about the subsidy. Lord Auckland, in communicating the view of the Directors, was accordingly reasonable in the choice of his language, though particularly careful not to commit himself to any precise date for the restoration of the administration to His Highness. The administration, he wrote, was to remain on the existing footing until the arrangements for the good Government of His Highness' Territories should "have been so firmly established as to be secure from future disturbance." His Highness had no reason to expect a more friendly disposal of his claim at the hands of Lord Dalhousie as his declared policy was against the perpetuation of Indian States generally. Lord Dalhousie is, in fact, known to have favoured annexation as advocated by the smaller politicians and this was, as it was said at the

time, to be expected from one who had, in the course of his eight years' administration, annexed ten kingdoms or principalities. In a minute he wrote on the subject, he said that "as His Highness was sixty years of age at the time and had no male heirs and had never declared his intention to adopt one, the Kingdom would lapse to the original donor." He also observed that the treaties by which the Kingdom was bestowed on His Highness were silent "as to heirs and successors. No mention is made of them, the Treaty is exclusively a personal one." How baseless this suggestion was in the light of the treaties of Mysore and Seringapatam of 1799, will be found adverted to below. From Earl Canning, His Highness was justified, for many reasons, in looking for a statesmanlike treatment of his claims. But Lord Canning had, in the case of Mysore, developed almost an obsession. He had firmly come to believe that Mysore should become British Territory—an exception to his declared policy towards Indian States generally. With this fixed idea implanted in his mind, he had not even extended to His Highness the right of adoption, which, under his famous Despatch, reckoned as second only to the Queen's Proclamation, was accorded to all the other Princes and Chiefs of India ranking above a Jaghirdar. The reason assigned was that His Highness was not personally governing his Territories at the time of the Proclamation of that Despatch! Yet, at the same time, there had been repeated declarations from successive Governors-General that the assumption of the administration was, under the Treaty, illegal. The transference of superintendence from the Supreme to the Madras Government, ordered in 1860, was, as we have seen, suspected by His Highness as a step in the annexation proposal which was in the air at the time. Lord Canning had himself given currency, when requesting the Secretary of State for India, to re-consider this decision, to

a strange story which, as was subsequently made known in the voluminous Press writings and political pamphleteering of the time, was wholly an invention. It had been circulated that His Highness was an old gentleman, past sixty and of a family known to be short-lived. He had, it had been added, no son, and had adopted no heir. "It has been supposed," wrote Lord Canning, "that he will bequeath his kingdom to the British Government. I say "supposed" because there is no formal or official evidence of his purpose; but I know for certain that such was his intention, because early in 1858, and whilst Upper India was still in full rebellion, the Rajah seized an opportunity of conveying to myself, through an entirely private channel, not only the strongest protestation of his loyalty, gratitude and devotion to the Government, but a distinct and earnest declaration, more than once repeated, of his wish that everything that he possessed should at his death pass into its hands." This is what he says he had heard from a "channel" which he describes as "private" but he soon discovered from His Highness himself (*vide* his letter dated 15th March 1860 protesting against the transfer of superintendence to Madras) that the whole story was a fiction and that His Highness entertained no such sentiments as those ascribed by him. (*Vide* Lord Canning's letter dated 30th March 1860 to the Secretary of State for India.) "I beg of you," Lord Canning said, "to compare this declaration with the passage in his letter now enclosed, in which the Rajah expresses grave fears that the measure announced from England (transfer of superintendence) will interfere with the claims which he and his heirs have for the restoration of the Government of his country." Despite this clear and unequivocal statement, Lord Canning still preferred to believe the story of the "supposed" bequest and hoped for its realization. Though he thought that it was "very little desirable

that more Provinces should be added to those which are already under the absolute rule of the Queen in India," he appears to have made an exception in regard to Mysore. He said that the case of Mysore "lying in the midst of the Madras Presidency, and already bound to us in a way which is not convenient or satisfactory, is quite exceptional." So he desired that the "bequest" "should not be defeated." Yet, it was the same statesman who penned the following words of prophetic wisdom in the self-same year, 1860:—

"Should the day come, when India shall be threatened by an external enemy, or when the interests of England elsewhere may require that her Eastern Empire shall incur more than ordinary risk, one of our best mainstays will be found in those Native States. But to make them so, we must treat their chiefs and influential families with consideration and generosity, teaching them that, in spite of all suspicions to the contrary, their independence is safe, and we are not waiting for plausible opportunities to convert their country into British Territory, and convincing them that they have nothing to gain by helping to displace us in favour of any new rulers from within or without."

These words and the sound policy underlying them have been fully justified, though Lord Canning forgot both, when he suggested in hardly veiled language the absorption of Mysore, despite a solemn Treaty then but three score years old and to the enactment of which there were still living witnesses. But at the time we are writing of, these real sentiments of Lord Canning in regard to Mysore were not known, either to His Highness the Mahārājah or his British advisers. His Highness had seen the control of India pass on 1st November 1858 from the Company to the Crown and a new atmosphere had been created by this change. His Highness too had by his supremely statesmanlike conduct at an hour of crisis won the goodwill of British administrators in

His Highness'  
*Kharitas* on  
the subject.

Mysore and statesmen in England. The resignation of Sir Mark Cubbon, after quarter of a century of successful administration, was daily being expected. The country was in a perfect state of tranquillity and the revenues stood at Rs. 93 Lakhs, the highest that had so far been reached. The purpose of assumption of the administration had thus been achieved and nothing remained but to hand it back to its rightful Sovereign. Encouraged accordingly by these circumstances and by the friendly terms in which Lord Canning had in the previous year acknowledged his steadfastness during the Mutiny and supported his objection to the transference of the superintendence to Madras, as well as by his proclaimed goodwill towards Indian Princes, His Highness thought the opportunity favourable for definitely formulating his claim to the restoration of his country. He accordingly addressed a *Kharita* to Lord Canning on the subject on 23rd February 1861, in which after briefly reviewing the circumstances of Mysore since the Restoration in 1799, he desired the retransfer of the administration of the country to himself, the avowed object for which the administration had been temporarily made over to the agency of the British having long since been accomplished. Lord Canning, in his reply dated 11th March 1862, the day before he left for England, took exception to the claim put forward, and rejected it, stating that the treaty with His Highness was a personal one, that what the British gave to him might be taken duly from him and "whilst the British Government had been careful to satisfy the right which it originally conceded to your Highness..... it is equally alive to its obligations to the people of Mysore and to the responsibility for their prosperity and welfare of which it cannot divest itself." This reply (parts of which will be found summarised in Aitchison's *Treaties*) expressive of deep disappointment, with traces of anger and something of discourtesy as



well, contained sentiments, so utterly averse to his avowed policy, that it was given out at the time (in one of the leading organs of British public opinion) that Lord Canning was not its actual author, "for it seems to have been despatched in haste, and was, indeed, the last important act of his public Indian life, in all other respects so eminently meritorious." It reached His Highness the Mahārājah a few days before the exquisitely written letter of Sir Charles Wood, Secretary of State for India, acknowledging, on behalf of Her Majesty the Queen, His Highness' loyal services during the trying days of the Mutiny. Both the letters had been read in Durbar by the command of His Highness and the striking differences between the two, both in their language and in the impressions they created on those who heard them when read, were thus delineated by His Highness in his reply to Sir Charles Wood, dated 20th April 1862, owning receipt of his letter and the presents sent to him by Her Majesty :—

"The letter and the presents were delivered by Dr. Campbell (the Durbar Surgeon) in the presence of Mr. Saunders (the officiating Commissioner) and the leading officers engaged in the administration of my kingdom and, as Her Majesty's Gracious and Queenly words fell upon their ears, I could read in their faces that they fully sympathised with the delight I must feel in being so honoured, and that one and all hoped that I should now be consoled for very different words from another pen which had been read upon the same spot only a few days before.

"And I did feel that consolation.

"I feel that although Lord Canning's facts could be (and would be) easily explained, and his arguments refuted, the best answer to the letter of the Viceroy was the letter of that Viceroy's Sovereign."

True to his word, His Highness addressed Lord Elgin, the successor of Lord Canning, his *Kharita* dated 20th

Untenable  
views of Lord  
Canning



April 1862, in which he fully met and answered every argument that had been advanced by Lord Canning. The matter then went up to the Home Government, whose decision, dated 17th July 1863, however, proved adverse. While matters were at this juncture and His Highness was deliberating on the next step to be taken, the death was announced, on 21st November 1863, of Lord Elgin. This event was a matter of sincere grief to His Highness and led to some further delay in his arriving at a decision. Major-General Sir William Denison, the Governor of Madras, became *Officiating* Governor-General. He had visited Mysore in the preceding June, but had even then acquired a reputation for the unfavourable view he took of Indians generally. The Home Government, using him as their mouth-piece, affected to be puzzled as to the possibility of ever restoring to His Highness his former power, because no provision was to be found in the Treaty for such a contingency! And yet the Treaty clearly enough indicates that only a temporary occupation was ever contemplated, for it provides that *so long as any part or parts* of the Mysore Kingdom shall remain under the control of the Company's Government, the Governor-General shall render to His Highness a true and faithful account of the revenue collected in his Territories. His Highness, however, was not deterred by these somewhat damping circumstances from once again urging his rightful claim to restoration of the administration. After considerable deliberation, His Highness addressed, on 25th January 1865, a fresh *Kharita* to Sir (afterwards Lord) John Lawrence, the successor of Lord Elgin in the Governor-Generalship, in which he set out in some detail the grounds of his claim to re-assume the administration of his Dominions. He also followed it up by another *Kharita* dated 1st February 1865, in which he intimated that he was reluctantly compelled to carry his appeal to Her Majesty the Queen

through the medium of Dr. Campbell, who had once before gone on a mission on his behalf to England. Lord Lawrence transmitted copies of these communications to the Secretary of State for India. In informing His Highness of this, Lord Lawrence expressed the view that he could not countenance the case as formulated by His Highness. This induced His Highness to address his *Kharita* dated the 4th July 1866 to substantiate his position. Meanwhile, His Highness desired in due conformity with Hindu custom and religion, to adopt a son as his heir and successor, to inherit his country and hold it as its Sovereign. He had made known his intention in this connection in February 1864, but the Supreme Government, while recognising his right to adopt so far as his private property was concerned, informed His Highness on 29th March 1864 that no authority to adopt a suceedor to the State had ever been given to him, and that no such power could now be conceded. This decision was upheld by the Home Government, despite Her Majesty's Proclamation of November 1st, 1858, which contained the express clauses "we desire no extension of our present territorial possessions," "we shall respect the rights, dignity, and honour of native princes as our own" etc., and despite also the fact that the famous circular letter dated 14th October 1860 regarding "adoption as affecting the succession to the Native States and Principalities of India" had been addressed to the Commissioner in Mysore as well and been acknowledged by him (*vide* letter dated 15th October 1860), though not extended to His Highness in person. Notwithstanding this decision, His Highness adopted, on the 18th June 1865, Srī-Chāmarajēndra-Wodeyar Bahadur, a child of  $2\frac{1}{2}$  years of age, and a member of the Bettadakote family (he was the third son of Chikka-Krishna Arasu, a descendant, by adoption, of Katti Gōpāla Rāj Arasu, father of Lakshmi-Ammanni, the

wife of Krishna-Raja II, who signed the Subsidiary Treaty of Seringapatam in 1799) as successor to all his rights and privileges, including the Sovereignty of Mysore. His Highness furnished due intimation of the fact to the Commissioner of Mysore, His Excellency the Viceroy and Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India. The Mysore Question, as it was then called, thus assumed a double aspect—the restoration of the administration and the recognition of the adoption.

Soon the question became widely known in India and a visible change came over the minds of Indian Princes, whose fears had been so assiduously set at rest, by the Queen's Proclamation and the Adoption Despatch. The Mysore Case, as it was called, became a test question. Everything turned, in their opinion, on how His Majesty's Government were going to settle it. That would show to them if disparity existed between the words and deeds of British Statesmen and Indian Administrators. Two of the greater Princes, Holkar and Scindia, had written to England, although their own rights of adoption—and this is well worth noting as indicative of the prevailing distrust felt by the generality of the Princes at the time—were assured to them so far back as the Governor-Generalship of Lord Ellenborough. Visvanāth Nārāyan Mandalik, well-known at the time as a scholar and a publicist, took up the cause of His Highness and in a closely reasoned pamphlet, entitled *Adoption vs. Annexation*, reviewed the theory and practice of adoption according to Hindu Law and criticised the doctrine of lapse, showing how it was untenable and had no foundation in the customs of the country. He wrote:—

V. N. Mandalik on the Doctrine of Lapse.

“A glorious opportunity now awaits the British Parliament to show practically that it will right the wronged. I allude to the case of Maharajah of Mysore, which I see is to be brought before the British Nation. The Maharaja's cause, or in other words that of British faith, is warmly and judiciously

advocated by five members of the Indian Council. But natives of India are grieved to see a person like Mr. Mangles employing arguments as puerile as they are unjust. Whoever heard a Treaty such as that of Mysore called a deed of gift? Still more strange is it to read that the words "shall be binding upon the contracting parties as long as the Sun and Moon shall endure," do not imply perpetuity to Indian minds. The Indian mind is shocked at such sophistry in high quarters. As to policy, I say for the safety both of India and England—for, our welfare is intimately connected with that of Great Britain—that political honesty and fair dealings is the best policy. I would request members of Parliament to fling away mere ephemeral political expediency (to use Mr. Mangles' own expression), and look well deeply into the past and the future. Weigh the words of Sir G. Clerk, Sir F. Currie, Mr. Eastwick, and the other dissenting members. You are now looking at the events of 1805 from the stand-point of 1866. Take note that your conduct will be watched by the people of India. Do justice even if the Heavens fall. The good of the people, which the annexationists talk of to excuse their injustice to the Princes of India, is a mere stock pretence, and this is well shown by Sir F. Currie and others. Has the good of the People been considered when ephemeral political expediency pointed the other way and have not People been handed over bodily to alien Rulers when it suited the interests of the British Government?

"The Maharajah of Mysore is a Sovereign under a specific Treaty. If he breaks it, let him by all means be punished *in accordance with that Treaty*. But for the British Nation to permit mere land-hunger to turn itself from the scrupulous observance of Treaties, is like a descent from the spiritual to the material—a lapse from monotheism into idolatry, which must in time corrupt the Governors and the Governed, to the certain ruin both of India and England."

Lord Lawrence had evidently made up his mind on "annexation" and had even won over so high-minded, able and amiable a Statesman as Sir Charles Wood, then Secretary of State for India, to his views. Lord Lawrence had proved a true disciple of Lord Dalhousie

Sir Charles  
Wood's  
despatch.

in his application of the doctrine of lapse and to that view he had converted Sir Charles Wood as well. In his Despatch dated 17th July 1863, Sir Charles propounded the extraordinary theory that the Treaty of Seringapatam of 1799 "contains no condition under which the administration of the Maharaja's possessions, if once assumed by the British Government, was to be restored to His Highness." This argument received special attention at the hands of Mr. (later Viscount) John Morley in a critical article he wrote in the *Fortnightly Review* of the time, which will be found noticed below in the proper place. Not only that; it was differed from, along with certain other reasons put forward by him, by six of Sir Charles' own colleagues on the India Council, among whom were Sir Henry Montgomery, Sir George Clerk, Sir Frederick Currie, Sir John Willoughby, and Captain W. J. Eastwick. Even in the Cabinet, the Despatch had had only a qualified approval, because there had been an influential minority against it in it. Immediately whispers of these differences in the Cabinet and the India Council became known, public opinion in England was greatly stirred. Meanwhile, Lord Palmerston, who had been Prime Minister since 1859, died on October 18, 1865, and Earl Russell became Premier on the following day. In 1866, the Derby Ministry came into existence, with Lord Cranborne (afterwards famous as Marquis of Salisbury) as Secretary of State for India, displacing Sir Charles Wood in that office. Almost immediately thereafter, a deputation was (in 1866) organized against the idea of "annexation." Headed by Sir Henry Rawlinson, who had seen considerable service in India and Persia and had been a Director of the East India Company and subsequently, in 1858-59, a Member of the original Council of India, waited on Lord Cranborne and urged on him a reconsideration of the whole case relating to Mysore, more particularly as



modified by the adoption. Later in the same year, a petition signed by several old Indian Officers and others well-known in the public life of England—including Sir Henry Rawlinson, Mr. (afterwards Sir M. E.) Grant-Duff, Colonel Sykes, (Chairman of the Court of Directors in 1856), Major Evans Bell, and Mr. John Dickinson (Chairman of the Indian Reform Society in London, in succession to John Bright) and many others—was presented to the House of Commons by Mr. John Stuart Mill, praying that "Your Honourable House will take such steps as may seem in your wisdom most efficacious for ensuring, with the least possible delay, the re-establishment of a Native Government in the tributary State of Mysore, with every possible security for British interests and for the prosperity and happiness of the people of the country."

Though the Government of India declined to recognize the adoption or to accord to the adopted son the honours and privileges due to the heir to the State of Mysore, His Highness stood adamant in his determination to urge his claim once again. As mentioned above, he transmitted, on the 4th July 1866, a fresh *Kharita* to substantiate his position both as regards himself and his adopted son and heir. Meanwhile His Highness made known to certain of his British well-wishers—Lord Harris, who had been Governor of Madras from 1854 to March 1859; His Grace the Duke of Wellington, son of the first Duke; the Rt. Hon. Lord Stanley M. P., who had been Secretary of State for India, and others—the differences that had arisen between himself and the Supreme Government in India relating to the true interpretation of the Treaties entered into by him and the Company and sought their goodwill and support in his appeal to Her Majesty the Queen. (Letter dated 1st February 1865.) The British Press took up the matter

His Highness  
renewed  
attempt to  
secure  
recognition  
of his rights.



and put forward the just claims of His Highness in a manner at once fair and convincing. There was outspoken but responsible criticism from some of the ablest-edited British journals of the time. Almost every aspect of the case was urged threadbare and hardly any ground was left for loose thinking in a matter which was considered vital in the interests of British good faith and political policy in India.

Comments  
in the British  
Press: the  
views of the  
*Examiner*.

Thus, the *Examiner* in its issue of April, 1, 1865, after setting out a brief reference to the history of Mysore since the Treaty of Seringapatam of 1799 and to the unhappy diplomacy of the Madras Government in connection with the sequestration of the Mysore Administration in 1831, attacked pointedly the unjust suggestion of Lord Dalhousie that the Treaty of 1799 was an exclusively personal one with His Highness the Mahārājah.

"No heirs are certainly named, for an obvious reason. It would be contrary to Hindoo law to do so, since the Hindoo sovereign names his own heir, having, moreover, the legal right of adopting one, while, even in his failing to do so, the power rests with his eldest surviving widow. But the Treaty contained the words still stronger than those of heirs. It was called "a Treaty of perpetual friendship and alliance," made to last "as long as the Sun and Moon shall endure." And so, Lord Dalhousie's limits to the endurance of the Sun and Moon were confined to the lifetime of a single Prince of short-lived generation! His Lordship's hopes have been signally defeated. The man of sixty-two whose shortness of life was reckoned upon, still lives at seventy-one, and openly and publicly affirms his determination to exercise his lawful right of naming his own heir."

After remarking that Lord Canning was wronging himself when he was attempting to act contrary to his own avowed views in regard to Indian States, it turned to the question whether it was really true that the

Satyāśraya (Irivi-Bedanga): later Chālukya king, 997-1009 A.D., 768-71.

author of *Alankāra Sudhā*—work throwing light on the reign of Ma II, the Vijaya-

—the British—er by—till—II.

Daughter referred to—

Sculpture: material of: (1) wood, (2) stone, (3) precious gems, and (4) metals, 133.

Sculpture: the effect of religion on sculpture, 136-9.

Sculpture: the four classes of; their origin and periods, 134-6.

Sculpture in India: a symbolic representation of an idea; what it really means to India, 130.

Sculpture work in Mysore: began in 3rd century; little of Buddhist work has survived, 136; reached a high degree of excellence in Mysore in 2nd century A.D., 140.

*Second or Sāluva dynasty (of Vijayanagar)*: 1486-1499 A.D., 1666-1756; Sāluva Narasimha I, 1666-1718; early history of the Sāluvas, 1667-1677; of Sāluva Mangu, 1667-1675; his descendants, 1676-1677; birth and history of Sāluva Narasimha, 1678-84; extent of his kingdom, 1684-86; military tour and coronation, 1686-1688; encouragement of trade in horses, 1688; a literary patron, 1688-1690; a donor of gifts; his titles, 1690-91; domestic life, 1692; personal appearance, his generals and ministers, 1693; course of his revolution, 1695-96; agents of, 1696-98; part played by him, 1700-1705; occupation of Mudkal and Raichur, 1707-8; Bijāpur invasion, 1708-10; an estimate of his rule, 1710-12; a picture of his policy, 1712-14; political maxims of Pina Virabhadra 1714-1717;

death of Narasimha, 1498, 1717-18; revolution of Narasana-Nāyaka and date of its occurrence, 1730-40; his administration, 1740-41; attempt on Goa, 1742-43; description of the City by Varthema, 1743; discontent among the peasantry, 1744-45; inroads of Nanja-Rāja Udaiyar, the Ummattur chief, 1745-46; ministers and generals, 1746-48; as a donor of gifts, 1748-49; personal appearance and domestic life, 1749-51; his death, 1751-54; later Sāluvas, 1754-56.

—daseer; action at; between Tipū's forces and the English, 2639.

Seringapatam: seige of, 1792 A.D., 2599; treaty of, 2608; treaty criticised, 2609; a second seige by general Harris in 1799, 2643-53; its plunder for a day after its fall, 2700.

Seshadri Iyer, Sir K : Dewan, 3007-10. Sēvunas: Mohamadan attacks on 1410-14.

Shāmaiya: leader of the Loyalists' insurrection, 2665.

Shāhji, father of Sivaji; Bijāpur province formed under him, 2428.

Shawe, Lieutenant-Colonel: one of the commanders of the English army in 1799, 2645.

Shekh Ayaz: first governor of Chitaldrug, then of Bednur country; abandoned his charge and fled to Bombay, 2547.

Shimoga: battle at, between the Mahrattas and Tipū's forces, 2599.

Sholinghur: battle of, 2533.

Silver coins: of Tipū Sultan, 108-110; of Krishna-Rāja Wodeyar, 110-112; of the Mughals, 112; of the East India Company, 112-115.

Silver coins: Tipū's names of; *Khizri*, *Ahmadi*, *Haidari*, *ābidi*, *bāqiri*, *kāzimi*, 108-110.

Singhana-Dēva: Kalachuryan king, 1183 A.D., 897-898.

*Sivagananbōdham*: a literary work translated by one Meykundadēvar, grandson of Sadaipappallāl, at Tiruvennainallur in 1250 A.D., 1237.

- Sivamāra I: Ganga king; described as "Sishtapriya" or "beloved of the God" in Keregodī-Rangapura plates, 633-4; Ereganga, his unnamed son died before ascending the throne, 632.
- Sivamāra II: Ganga king; vicissitudes undergone by him; his innumerable wars; his imprisonment, his poetic talents, 639-646.
- Sivappa-Nāyaka: chief of Keladi; a feudatory of Śrī-Ranga VI, 2401.
- Siva temple: at Paparayanhalli; its fine stone umbrella described, 16.
- Social life: in the 9th cent., 58.
- during the reign of Rājārāja 977; during Chōla period, 1276; during the Sangama period, 1649; during Krishna-Dēva-Rāya's reign, 1899; position and status of women, 1900-1; 1906-7; festivals and amusements, 1904-6.
- Solakōn: agent of Kōpperunjinga at Chidambaram, 1225.
- Sōmēsvara: the *guru* of Kulōttunga III and son of Śrīkantha Sāmbhu; bore the name of Īśvarasiva; he is mentioned in connection with the consecration ceremony of Siva and Pārvati in the Tribhuvanavīrēsvara temple; was also the author of *Siddhāntaratnākara*, 1195.
- Sōmēsvara I: Chālukyan king, 1042-1068 A.D.; his continuous warfare against Chōlas; his suzerainty over Sōntara kings; his personal qualities; his wives, 778-91.
- Sōmēsvara II: Chālukyan king, 1068-76 A.D.; his victory over Chōlas, his personal qualities, his ministers, as an upholder of Saiva faith; his dethronement: his death, 791-800.
- Sōmēsvara III: Chālukyan king, 1127-36 A.D.; had a peaceful reign; his literary traits, 839-42.
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